Silva Orellana v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
LUIS SILVA ORELLANA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1333
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on October 31, 2025, by filing a counseled combined petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for emergency injunctive
relief. (Petition, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake
County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to accept jurisdiction over this action; to declare that Respondents’ actions to
detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and
Nationality Act; to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering
Petitioner’s immediate release or ordering Respondents to promptly schedule a bond hearing for
Petitioner’s removal proceedings; and, to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (Id.,
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PageID.17–18.) 1 For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala. (Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 4;
Wachowski Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.53.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2024
“without inspection and has remained in the United States ever since.” (Petition, ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.) On May 24, 2024, after Petitioner’s entry into the United States, United States Border
Patrol (USBP) encountered Petitioner “in the Rio Grande Valley, Texas Border Patrol Sector,” and
USBP “determined [that Petitioner] had entered the United States at an unknown date, time, and
place without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration officials.” (Wachowski
Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.53.) At that time, Petitioner “claimed fear of persecution or torture
if [he] returned to Guatemala.” (Id. ¶ 5, PageID.53–54.) “USBP referred [Petitioner] for a credible
fear interview with an asylum officer with the United States Citizen and Immigration Services
(USCIS),” and Petitioner “was released from [Department of Homeland Security] custody on or
about May 26, 2024, and was instructed to report to ICE’s Chicago Field Office . . . for his
scheduled credible fear interview.” (Id. ¶ 6, PageID.54.)
1 In his petition, Petitioner sought either an initial temporary restraining order compelling
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to ensure Petitioner’s due process rights, or alternatively,
Petitioner asked the Court to order Respondents to show cause, within three days, why the petition
should not be granted. (Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) In an Order entered on November 3, 2025,
the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas
corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.)
Respondents filed their response on November 6, 2025 (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply
later that same day (ECF No. 5).
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On June 10, 2024, Petitioner reported as directed, and “an asylum officer interviewed
[Petitioner] on his claimed fear of returning to Guatemala.” (Id. ¶ 7.) On June 17, 2024, an asylum
officer with USCIS “determined [Petitioner] had a credible fear and issued him a Form I-862,
Notice to Appear (NTA).” (Id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner was charged with inadmissibility pursuant to
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner “is an
immigrant who is present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, or who
arrived 	at 	a 	time 	or 	place 	not 	designated 	by 	the 	Attorney 	General” 	and 	pursuant 	to
“[§] 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA for being an immigrant who, at the time of application for
admission, is not in possession of valid immigration and travel documents.” (Id.) “The NTA was
filed with the Chicago Immigration Court, thereby commencing removal proceedings.” (Id.,
PageID.54–55.)
On May 16, 2025, Petitioner “filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for
Withholding of Removal, with the Chicago Immigration Court, and a master calendar hearing on
the non-detained docket was scheduled for November 14, 2025.” (Id. ¶ 9, PageID.55.) On October
22, 2025, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations arrested Petitioner “during a local operation
conducted in or around the general area of Chicago, Illinois.” (Id. ¶ 10.)
Respondents contend that Petitioner is presently detained without bond under § 235 of the
INA on the basis that he “is an applicant for admission who is seeking admission, and he is not
clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Respondents report that Petitioner “is
in removal proceedings on the detained docket before the Detroit Immigration Court and is
awaiting a master calendar hearing.” (Id. ¶ 12.)
Prior to Petitioner’s present detention, he resided in Illinois “with his wife and child, with
another child on the way.” (Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
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II. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus
relief because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the immigration court and,
therefore, has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.26.)
Respondents argue that Petitioner should request a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any
unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
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402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024)
(discussing that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not
defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
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exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). If Petitioner
were to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge, that request would likely be denied
given the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado. Moreover, it is simply unlikely that any
administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to change its position,
and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Accordingly, for
the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. First, as noted above,
Petitioner would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. There is no evidence
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in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait until such a hearing, if any, were
scheduled. Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure
Hurtado. Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision to the
BIA. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” See
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is
possible that a determination from the BIA as to whether Petitioner is entitled to bond would come
before any final decision regarding removal. Nevertheless, it is “unmistakable that . . . depriving
[Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And
any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
III. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(See Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.17.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner is “subject
to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and ineligible for a bond redetermination hearing before an
[immigration judge].” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.43.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that
. . . in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
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beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney
General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States.” Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates
that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings.
The difference is that § 1225 provides for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release
of the noncitizen on conditional parole or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that
§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the
United States and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)). But, “the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). “[T]he words of a statute
must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts
v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also “use
every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enter. v.
Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
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admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
An “applicant for admission” is defined as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not
been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” See id. § 1225(a)(1). The INA further
defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id. § 1101(a)(13). “Section 1226(a)
is less specific,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 9, 2025), and states that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
“[T]he statutory text does not provide a definitive answer as to what it means to be present
without admittance where, as here, the individual has already entered and spent [time] living in
the United States.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5. And, even if the terms of § 1225 seem
unambiguous when viewed in isolation, “courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.”
Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted); see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015)
(“Whether a statutory term is unambiguous, however, does not turn solely on dictionary definitions
of its component words. Rather, ‘[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined
[not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’” (alterations in original)
(citations omitted)).
Section 1225 is titled: “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
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word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewm[e]n,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving
“at a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5. In contrast, § 1226 is titled,
“Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress separated removal of
arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for ‘Apprehension and
detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted § 1225 for a specific,
limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v. United States, 143 S.
Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
discussed that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated that, in contrast, “[s]ection 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining
. . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288. Thus, in
Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially arriving to
the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country who
are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
The broader language of the statute, as recently amended, further supports the Court’s
conclusion. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe
a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If the Court accepted
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Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely
superfluous. See Corey, 556 U.S. at 314 (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to
all its provisions.”).
Here, Petitioner has been present in the United States since 2024. (Petition, ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.) Thus, Petitioner is a noncitizen who is already present in the United States, meaning
that “[s]ection 1226 generally governs.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. Petitioner is not a noncitizen
just arriving to the United States, meaning he is not part of the “process of decision [that] generally
begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether
an alien seeking to [initially] enter the country is admissible.” Id. at 287 (discussing the
applicability of § 1225).
Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested. 2
2 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions
filed by immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL
3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL
3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025
WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232,
2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez
v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). Moreover, this
Court is far from the first federal District Court to reach this conclusion. Petitioner cites dozens of
cases that reach the same conclusion. (See Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.12–15; Reply, ECF No. 5,
PageID.62–64.)
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B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID.15–16.) Petitioner contends that “Respondents have not
demonstrated that Petitioner needs to be detained.” (Id., PageID.16 (citation omitted).) Petitioner
also contends that he “should have the opportunity to have a bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge,” and that “[b]y issuing its decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the BIA has taken nearly
all bond authority away from Immigration Judges.” (Id.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s
arguments by stating that Petitioner has received due process because:
Petitioner received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may
attend hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, has the
right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for
a short time.
(Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.49.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See, e.g.,
Resp. ECF No. 4, PageID.49.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own
supporting evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing
has been scheduled. Respondents claim further “that statutory provisions denying bond during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.48
(citation omitted).)
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If this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), then the Government’s due process argument might carry more weight. However,
as set forth above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is
governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section
1226(a) clearly sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to
that provision. The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or
release the alien on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions
prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). This
discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an 	individualized 	custody
determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has discussed that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration
detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If
this court has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the
claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme
Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge. . . .”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following
three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
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(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here,
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he has a wife and child, and another child on the way,
and that Petitioner “is the primary financial support for the family.” (Petition, ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.) There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of
incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack
of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F.
Supp. 3d at 1187.
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. An individualized bond
hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an “erroneous deprivation”
of his rights. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
Under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed,
have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, given the record available
to the Court, Respondents have not established a significant interest in potentially “detaining
someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator, following a hearing and assessment of the
evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.” See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not
established that an individualized hearing would pose “administrative or financial costs” in this
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case—“[t]o the contrary,” Respondents’ position “requires the government to continue funding
and overseeing [Petitioner’s] detention[.]” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify
compliance with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
/s/ Jane M. Beckering	November 17, 2025
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