Williams #324866 v. Unknown Part(y)(ies) #1 et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KEITH J. WILLIAMS #324866,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-1072
UNKNOWN PART(Y)(IES) #1, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before me on Defendants Coty Foster, Janet Traore, and Karen Kowalski’s
Motion for Summary Judgment based on the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion. (ECF No. 38.)
The motion is fully briefed and ready for decision. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I
recommend that the motion be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth
below. 1
I. Background
Plaintiff, a prisoner currently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 on June 3, 2025, against several MDOC employees based on events that occurred primarily
at the Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) in 2024. After conducting a Rule 21 analysis and an
initial review of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A and 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c), the Court allowed the following claims to proceed: (1) First Amendment
1 Defendant Makey Ow was previously dismissed from this action without prejudice based on
Plaintiff’s failure to provide required service information. (ECF No. 48.)
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interference-with-mail claims against Defendants Foster, Ms. Traore, and Kowalski; (2) First
Amendment retaliation claim against Ms. Traore regarding her actions on November 1, 2024; and
(3) First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Kowalski concerning the 90-day JPay
restriction. (ECF No. 17 at PageID.49–50.)
The Court previously summarized Plaintiff’s allegations pertinent to the remaining
Defendants as follows:
[O]n August 9, 2024, his publisher sent him a “proof copy” of a book that he had
written titled, “Cancer.” (Id.) Plaintiff confirmed that the book was received at LCF,
but Plaintiff did not receive the book. (Id.)
On September 9, 2024, Plaintiff sent a kite to the LCF mailroom threatening to take
legal action related to the missing book. (Id., PageID.7.) The following day,
Plaintiff received a response from Defendants Foster and Ow indicating that the
book had been rejected because it was in violation of MDOC policy. (Id.) On
September 11, 2024, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Kowalski, contesting the
rejection. (Id.)
On September 30, 2024, Defendant Kowalski called Plaintiff into her office and
accused him of filing an untimely request for hearing to contest the book’s
rejection. (Id.) She then held a hearing concerning the rejection and upheld the
rejection. (Id.)
On October 3, 2024, Plaintiff sent Defendant Ms. Traore several kites appealing the
book’s rejection, claiming that the book had previously been permitted by an
African American staff member, and that books written by African Americans
concerning their American experience were being “methodically . . . banned” by
the MDOC.” (Id., PageID.8.) Defendant Ms. Traore did not respond. (Id.)
On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff sent another kite to Defendant Ms. Traore, requesting
her involvement with resolving the book rejection. (Id.) And, on October 24, 2024,
Plaintiff sent a disbursement to Defendant Kowalski’s office to have the book
mailed to his brother. (Id.)
On October 24, 2024, Defendant Traore responded to Plaintiff’s kites with an
excerpt of MDOC policy that states in part, “If the warden concurs with the hearing
officer’s decision [to reject a book], the [w]arden or designee shall promptly submit
copies of [the rejection], the publication’s cover, and a representative sampling
of the specific sections of the publication found to violate . . . policy.” (Id.)
(emphasis added by Plaintiff).
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On October 31, 2024, Plaintiff sent a JPay email to his publisher concerning the
book’s rejection and stating that Defendant Ms. Traore was “a coward” and “a
typical Black a** White supremacist,” and that he planned to write about her in
future books. (Id., PageID.8–9.) The following day, Defendant Ms. Traore
chastised Plaintiff for his message “before several White correctional officers with
tasers.” (Id., PageID.9.) Also on November 1, 2024, Defendant Ms. Traore issued
Plaintiff a misconduct report concerning his JPay message and a notice of hearing
(NOI) recommending a 90-day JPay restriction. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed two grievances against Defendant Ms. Traore. (Id., PageID.10.)
Defendants Rohrig and Brawley rejected the grievances as vague and placed
Plaintiff on a modified grievance restriction. (Id.) Non-party Sergeant Shameleh
found Plaintiff guilty of the November 1, 2024, misconduct charge of insolence and
Plaintiff received nine days’ loss of privileges. (Id.)
On November 8, 2024, Defendant Kowalski held a hearing on the NOI, imposing
the 90-day JPay restriction. (Id.) That day, Plaintiff sent “a myriad of written
request(s)” 	to 	Defendants 	Morrison, 	Rohrig, 	Brawley, 	and 	Kowalski 	for
misconduct and grievance appeal forms. (Id.)
(Id. at PageID.24–26.)
Defendants Foster, Ms. Traore, and Kowalski now move for summary judgment on the
basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against them.
II. Motion Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return
judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
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While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the opponent cannot
sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially higher
hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the
burden, “his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could
find other than for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir.
1986). The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof “must show that
the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so
powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting
Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, summary
judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion “is inappropriate when the evidence
is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner must exhaust all available administrative
remedies before filing a lawsuit with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Prisoners are no longer required to demonstrate
exhaustion in their complaints. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is “an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” which the defendant
bears the burden of establishing. Id. With respect to what constitutes proper exhaustion, the
Supreme Court has stated that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion,”
defined as “compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). In Bock, the Court reiterated:
Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by
the PLRA to “properly exhaust.” The level of detail necessary in a grievance to
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comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim
to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the
boundaries of proper exhaustion.
Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 sets forth the applicable grievance procedure for
prisoners in MDOC custody. Prior to submitting a grievance, a prisoner is required to “attempt to
resolve the issue with the staff member involved within two business days after becoming aware
of a grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond their control or if the issue is
believed to fall within the jurisdiction of Internal Affairs.” Mich. Dep’t of Corr. Policy Directive
03.02.130 ¶ W (effective 09/25/2023).2 If this attempt is unsuccessful (or is inapplicable), the
prisoner may submit a Step I grievance. Id. The Step I grievance must be submitted within five
business days after attempting to resolve the matter with staff. Id. The issues asserted in a grievance
“should be stated briefly but concisely,” and the “[d]ates, times, places, and names of all those
involved in the issue being grieved are to be included.” Id. at ¶ Y.
If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely response,
he may appeal to Step II within ten business days of the response, or if no response was received,
within ten business days after the response was due. Id. at ¶ JJ. If the prisoner is dissatisfied with
the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal the matter to
Step III. Id. at ¶ NN. The Step III grievance must be submitted within ten business days after
receiving the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days
after the date the Step II response was due. Id.
2 Defendants note that Plaintiff’s claims fall under both the September 25, 2023, and October 21,
2024 versions of Policy Directive 03.02.130 and attach both versions to their supporting brief.
(ECF Nos. 39-2 and 39-3.) Because no material differences exist between the two versions for
purposes of the present motion, I cite only the earlier version’s provisions.
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Under the applicable versions of the MDOC’s grievance policy in effect at the time of the
events in question, grievances challenging “decisions” made in Class I, II, or III misconduct
hearings must be pursued through the appeal process set forth in Policy Directive 03.03.105. Mich.
Dep’t of Corr. Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶¶ P.9 and 11. If the prisoner claims that retaliation was
the basis for the misconduct ticket, he must exhaust his claim through the grievance process. Id.
¶¶ P.9 and 11.
In support of their motion, Defendants submit a Step III Grievance Report for Plaintiff
dated November 12, 2025, which shows the grievances arising out of LCF that Plaintiff filed at
Step I near the time of the events in question and pursued through Step III. (ECF No. 39-4.)
Defendants assert that the following grievances pertain to Plaintiff’s claims in this action: (1) LCF-
24-12-0918-28i (0918 Grievance); (2) LCF-24-11-0850-28b (0850 Grievance); and (3) LCF-24-
11-0851-28b (0851 Grievance). (Id. at PageID.200–01.) As an initial matter, the 0918 Grievance
cannot exhaust any of the claims that remain in this case because it concerns CO Traore’s (not Ms.
Traore’s) conduct on November 28, 2024, of entering Plaintiff’s cube, snatching the pillow from
under his head, and warning Plaintiff that he would make Plaintiff pay for filing grievances against
CO Traore’s sister (Ms. Traore). (Id. at PageID.210.) The Court dismissed this claim in its
November 3, 2025 Opinion. (ECF No. 39 at PageID.17.) Because the -918 Grievance does not
complain of any remaining Defendant’s conduct that is the subject of the remaining claims, it
cannot exhaust those claims. See Vandiver v. Martin, 48 F. App’x 517, 519 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The
issues [a plaintiff] may raise, and the defendants he may name, in his lawsuit are limited to the
specific issues raised, and the specific individuals mentioned, in his grievance.”).
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A. 	The Claims
1. 	Mail Interference
The Court construed Plaintiff’s first remaining claim as an interference-with-mail claim
under the First Amendment against Defendants Foster, Ms. Traore, and Kowalski. The alleged
interference is rejecting Plaintiff’s book. (Id. at PageID.35–36.) Neither the 0850 nor the 0851
Grievance names Defendants Foster or Kowalski. And while both grievances mention Ms. Traore,
they have nothing to do with the mail interference claim. Instead, both grievances concern Ms.
Traore’s actions on November 1, 2024, in response to Plaintiff’s JPay communication to his book
publisher. (ECF No. 39-4 at PageID.213, 216.)
In his response, Williams argues in conclusory fashion that he should be excused from
exhausting his claims because the grievance process is not available as set forth in Ross v. Blake,
578 U.S. 632 (2016). He asserts that the MDOC’s grievance procedure is a “racket/scam” because
prison officials manipulate the process to render it effectively unavailable by throwing up
roadblocks such as rejections and other procedural impediments to argue that the prisoner failed
to properly exhaust his claim as required under the Supreme Court’s precedents. (ECF No. 42 at
PageID.233–34.) But this argument does not demonstrate that the grievance process was
unavailable. Rather, prison officials are entitled to insist that prisoners comply with the rules and
applicable provisions of an administrative process. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–93 (an untimely
grievance is not properly exhausted); Scott v. Ambani, 577 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting
that “a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise
procedurally defective administrative grievance”).
Plaintiff also asserts that two other grievances are relevant to his claims, LCF-25-01-0002-
27a (0002 Grievance) and LCF-25-01-0013-15f (0015 Grievance). (Id. at PageID.236–39, 241.)
However, neither grievance concerns the claims at issue. In the 0002 Grievance, Plaintiff
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complained about not receiving a Class II misconduct appeal form for the Insolence misconduct
he received. (ECF No. 43-1 at PageID.276.) In the 0015 Grievance, Plaintiff complained that his
rejected book had not been sent to his brother. (Id. at PageID.272–73.) Although these grievances
are tangentially related to two of Plaintiff’s remaining claims, neither grievance addressed the
rejection of the book itself or the allegedly retaliatory misconduct that Ms. Traore issued to
Plaintiff on November 1, 2024.
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants’ motion with regard to the
interference-with-mail claim.
2. 	Retaliation Claim against Ms. Traore
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Ms. Traore is based on her actions on November 1,
2024, of writing Plaintiff a misconduct report concerning his JPay message and a NOI
recommending a 90-day JPay restriction. Plaintiff wrote the 0850 and 0851 Grievances against
Ms. Traore concerning these actions. Both of these grievances were rejected as vague at Step I.
(ECF No. 39-4 at PageID.213, 216.) Plaintiff appealed the rejections without success through Steps
II and III. (Id. at PageID.211–12, 214–15.) Because neither grievance mentioned the misconduct
that Ms. Traore wrote, they cannot exhaust Plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on the misconduct.3
Vandiver, 48 F. App’x at 519.
Plaintiff argues that the grievances were improperly rejected because Ms. Traore violated
the grievance policy by answering/writing the responses to grievances that were against her. (ECF
No. 42 at PageID.234–35.) Defendants respond that Ms. Traore did not violate policy in
3 To the extent Plaintiff believes that he was required to exhaust the misconduct-based retaliation
claim through appeal of the misconduct hearing decision, he is mistaken. As noted above, under
the applicable versions of Policy Directive 03.02.130 a prisoner claiming that the issuance of the
misconduct ticket itself was a retaliatory act must exhaust his claim through the grievance process.
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determining that the grievances should be rejected as vague because she did not “participate in any
capacity in the grievance investigation, review, or response . . . .” Mich. Dep’t of Corr. Policy
Directive 03.02.130 ¶ BB. Rather, they argue that Ms. Traore was acting as the Grievance
Coordinator in accordance with paragraph EE. (ECF No. 43 at PageID.264.) I find no need to
resolve this issue.
In general, courts should be reluctant to interject themselves into the MDOC’s grievance
process, but they are not obligated to simply disregard errors or mistakes in the enforcement or
application of the grievance policy. See, e.g., Burnett v. Walsh, No. 18-11063, 2020 WL 3716555
at *3-4 (E.D. Mich., June 15, 2020), adopted by 2020 WL 3639564 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 2020)
(recommending that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on failure to exhaust grounds
be denied after finding that the MDOC “improperly rejected” prisoner’s grievance); Ashley v.
Boayue, No. 19-10484, 2020 WL 5985203 at *5-6 (E.D. Mich., Feb. 18, 2020), adopted by 2020
WL 4282198 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2020) (recommending that motion for summary judgment on
failure to exhaust grounds be denied in part after finding that the MDOC “improperly rejected”
prisoner’s grievance). While I find the vagueness conclusion sound as to the 0850 Grievance, the
0851 Grievance sufficiently notified prison officials that Plaintiff was alleging that Ms. Traore
retaliated against him by issuing a NOI in response to Plaintiff’s JPay communication with his
book publisher. A prisoner complaining of retaliation need not use the word “retaliation” in his
grievance so long as he suggests some retaliatory motive sufficient to place prison officials on
notice that the prisoner is complaining of retaliation. See Doe v. Anderson, No. 15-13852, 2017
WL 4684614, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2017); Jackson v. Huss, No. 1:14-CV-426, 2015 WL
5691026, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2015). Here, the 0851 Grievance contained sufficient content
to alert prison officials that Plaintiff was complaining that Ms. Traore issued the NOI to retaliate
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for Plaintiff’s communication with his book publisher. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court
deny Defendants’ motion as to the retaliation claim against Ms. Traore based the NOI.
3. 	Retaliation Claim Against Defendant Kowalski
Plaintiff’s final claim is that Defendant Kowalski retaliated against him by imposing a 90-
day JPay restriction. According to Plaintiff’s allegations, Kowalski held a hearing on the NOI and
imposed the 90-day restriction on November 8, 2024. None of the grievances discussed above
exhausts a retaliation claim against Defendant Kowalski for her actions in imposing the JPay
restriction on November 8, 2024. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court grant the motion as to
the retaliation claim against Defendant Kowalski.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 38) as follows: (1) grant the motion as to
Plaintiff’s interference-with-mail claims against Defendants Foster, Ms. Traore, and Kowalski, his
misconduct-related retaliation claim against Ms. Traore, and his retaliation claim against
Defendant Kowalski and dismiss these claims without prejudice; and (2) deny the motion as to the
NOI-related retaliation claim against Ms. Traore.
Dated: April 27, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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