Abdi v. Becker et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
ABDINAJIB ABDI, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-01049
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Maarten Vermaat
U.S. Magistrate Judge
v.
CHRISTOPHER BECKER, et al.,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Pro se Plaintiff Abdinajib Abdi, a Kent County inmate, filed this complaint
alleging that the criminal charges pending against him are false. (ECF No. 1.) Abdi,
who 	is 	a 	currently 	a 	pretrial 	detainee 	awaiting 	a 	criminal 	trial, 	requests
“compensatory, consequential, nominal, and punitive damages” from Defendants.
(Id., PageID.7.)
Abdi 	sues 	a 	total 	of 	seven 	people. 	The 	Defendants 	are 	Kent 	County
Prosecuting Attorney Becker and 61st District Court Judge Dotson, and the following
Grand 	Rapids 	Police 	Department 	employees: 	Officer/Detectives 	Zabriskie 	and
Johnson, Officers Hebden and Maring, and Sergeant Hefner. 	Abdi alleges a
conspiracy to bring false charges against him. 	Abdi alleges that he was initially
arrested during a murder investigation, but the murder charges were dismissed.
Nevertheless, he says that Prosecutor Becker and the Defendants targeted him and
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his co-defendant1 in an unlawful investigation. 	Abdi says that Prosecutor Becker
committed prosecutorial misconduct by falsifying evidence and charging him with
crimes without probable cause. (Id., PageID.5.) Abdi says that he is currently being
charged with discharging a firearm in a building, felony firearm possession, and
carrying a concealed weapon. 	(Id.) 	He further alleges that District Judge Dotson
stepped into the prosecutorial role and added a charge of unlawful use of a vehicle
before binding him over to the Circuit Court. 	(Id.) 	Abdu says that he has been
detained since September of 2023. (Id., PageID.6.)
Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status on September 5, 2025. 	(ECF
No. 4.)
II. Standard of Law
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any action brought in
forma pauperis if the action is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
1 	Plantiff’s co-defendant filed a similar lawsuit against Prosecutor Becker, the
City of Grand Rapids, and Officers Johnson, Zambriskie, and Hefner. 	The Court
dismissed the case without prejudice. 	(See Abidiyow v. Becker, W.D. Mich. Case No.
1:24-cv-1349, ECF Nos. 9 and 11 (R. & R., and Order Approving and Adopting R. &
R.).) 	Abidiyow filed a notice of appeal (W.D. Mich. Case No. 1:24-cv-1349, ECF No.
15), but then voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal (W.D. Mich. Case No. 1:24-cv-
1349, ECF No. 17 (Order of the USCA)). Plaintiff filed a motion in this case (ECF No.
6), with Abidiyow’s consent, to join Abidiyow’s claims to those in this case. A separate
order will address that motion.
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id. The court
must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In addition, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 33 (1992).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff is essentially asking the Court to interfere with his state criminal
proceeding. 	“Since the beginning of this country’s history Congress has, subject to
few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from
interference by federal courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Generally,
federal courts should abstain from deciding a matter that would interfere with
pending state proceedings involving important state matters unless extraordinary
circumstances are present. Id. at 44−55. This principle is based on notions of equity
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and comity, “and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.” Id. at 44. A federal court may raise abstention sua
sponte. O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2008).
Younger generally permits a federal court to abstain from considering a
plaintiff's 	claims 	where: 	(1) 	the 	state 	proceedings 	are 	ongoing; 	(2) 	the 	state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford
an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm.
v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). 	Criminal defendants “need be
accorded only an opportunity to fairly pursue their constitutional claims in the
ongoing 	state 	proceedings 	. 	. 	. 	and 	their 	failure 	to 	avail 	themselves 	of 	such
opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate.” Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973)).
Exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine have been recognized in the
following circumstances: (1) where “the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to
harass or is conducted in bad faith,” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611
(1975); (2) where “[a] challenged statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions,” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 424 (1979) (quoting
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611); and (3) where there is “an extraordinarily pressing need
for immediate federal equitable relief,” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975).
These exceptions have been interpreted narrowly. 	Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d
199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986).
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The three factors supporting Younger abstention are present in this case.
First, 	Plaintiff’s 	case 	is 	pending 	in 	state 	court. 	Second, 	Plaintiff’s 	criminal
proceedings 	involve 	important 	state 	interests. 	See 	Younger, 	401 	U.S. 	at 	43
(recognizing that when the state proceeding is criminal in nature, the policy against
federal interference is “particularly” strong); see also Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8
(6th Cir. 1980) (stating that “Younger established a near-absolute restraint rule when
there are pending state criminal proceedings”). 	Third, the state court proceedings
provide an adequate opportunity for Plaintiff to raise his claims.
Plaintiff’s civil claims are premature. 	Plaintiff’s damage claims are not
cognizable until his criminal proceeding is resolved in his favor. 	Dismissal without
prejudice is appropriate where the complaint seeks both equitable and legal relief and
the Court abstains under the Younger. 	See Schwab v. Wyoming Police Dep’t., 2020
WL 3603283, at *7-8 (W.D. Mich. July 2, 2020) (noting that dismissal without
prejudice is an option when both equitable and legal relief is sought but deciding to
stay pending final resolution of the criminal prosecution). 	Where a Plaintiff seeks
only damages, as in this case, the Court “must stay the case instead of exercising
discretion to dismiss the case.” 	Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs., 707 F.3d 699,
702 (6th Cir. 2013). “This is because the United States Supreme Court has held that
‘[u]nder our precedents, federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases
based on abstention principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or
otherwise discretionary.” Id., (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
731 (1996)).
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Accordingly, the Court will stay and administratively close this case and allow
Plaintiff to request to reopen his civil lawsuit if the pending state criminal charges
are resolved in his favor.
Dated: 	November 17, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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