Harris v. Kent, County of et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHAMARRI HARRIS,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-0794
KENT COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as a result
of a back injury he alleges he incurred during an attack by a fellow inmate in the
Kent County Jail. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff claims that the defendants
violated his constitutional rights through their deliberate indifference to his medical
needs; he claims Kent County also violated his constitutional rights by failing to
properly train and supervise its personnel regarding inmate medical needs; and he
brings a state law claim against all defendants for gross negligence.
The defendants, other than Deputy John Doe,1 have moved to dismiss the
amended complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure
1 Plaintiff has failed to serve Defendant John Doe, and the deadline for service has
passed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). Accordingly, on May 26, 2026, the Court issued an
order requiring Plaintiff to show cause by June 5, 2026, why his claims against John Doe
should not be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (ECF
No. 61).
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to state a claim. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends
that the constitutional claims (Counts I and II) be dismissed with prejudice for failing
to state a claim, and that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the gross
negligence claim (Count III), dismissing it without prejudice.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on July 16, 2025, against Kent County, the
Kent County Sheriff, and a number of named and unnamed county deputies and
employees. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff claimed that four individual defendants engaged
in excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I);
that four of the defendants engaged in racial discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause (Count II); that, through policies, practices, and customs, Kent
County and the Sheriff were deliberately indifferent to the excessive force,
discrimination, and cruel and unusual punishment visited upon Plaintiff (Count III);
that all defendants were deliberately indifferent to the denial of medical care for
Plaintiff (Count IV); and that all defendants were grossly negligent (Count 5). (Id.).
On September 19, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to state a cognizable claim. (ECF
No. 13, 14). Twenty days later, Plaintiff responded by amending his complaint.
(ECF No. 15). The amended complaint names the following defendants: Kent
County, Deputy John Doe, Sergeant King, Dr. Koren (first name unknown), Dr.
Michael Thomas, Nurse Jake (last name unknown), Nurse Practitioner Amy (last
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name unknown), and Nurse Practitioner Katie (last name unknown). (Id. at
PageID.121-22). The amended complaint claims that all the defendants, including
Kent County, were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs (Count I); that
Kent County was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs through its
failure to properly train and supervise its jail staff (Count II); and that all defendants
were grossly negligent in denying Plaintiff medical care (Count III).
On October 22, 2025, Defendants Kaelie Lewis, Jacob Jenkins, Koren Gebben,
Amy Rice, and Michael Tomaszczyk filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
amended complaint. 2 (ECF No. 17). They argue that the complaint fails to
sufficiently allege that any reasonable jail official would have known that Plaintiff
was suffering from a serious medical need, or that any official would have known that
non-intervention would create an unjustifiable risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health. (Id.
at PageID.150-54). They also argue that the gross negligence claim should be
dismissed due to the fact that Michigan does not recognize it as independent cause of
action. (Id. at PageID.155).
The next day, Kent County moved to dismiss the amended complaint against
it under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that the complaint fails to state
a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs; it fails to state a claim for liability
2 These are the actual names for the defendants identified in the amended complaint as
“Dr. Koren,” “Nurse Jake,” “Nurse Practitioner Katie,” “Nurse Practitioner Amy,” and
“Dr. Michael Thomas.” (See ECF No. 17, PageID.148). For the purposes of this Report
and Recommendation, the undersigned will use the forms of identification used in the
amended complaint.
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against the county; that it improperly names two deputies in their official capacity;
and that plaintiff has failed to state a gross negligence claim. (ECF No. 18, 19).3
Sergeant King was served with the amended complaint and summons on
November 3, 2025 (ECF No. 22), and she filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on
November 19, 2025 (ECF No. 25). The arguments in her motion essentially mirror
those in Kent County’s motion.
Plaintiff has responded to defendants’ motions. (ECF No. 23, 34). Defendants
have replied. (ECF No. 29, 30, 36). The undersigned has determined that oral
argument is unnecessary.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following, “upon
information and belief.” He was incarcerated in the Kent County Jail to serve a
sentence for a controlled substance conviction. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 16, ECF
No. 15, PageID.122). He was placed into a cell with another inmate, Jolan Martell
Strickland-Shaw, who suffers from “known mental health problems, including
schizophrenia, which caused Shaw to have mental health outbursts, some of which
were known to be violent.” (Id. at ¶ 17). Shaw was prescribed drugs to control his
schizophrenia, but the jail staff failed to administer them. (Id.).
3 The undersigned judicial officer need not address the other arguments raised in this
motion, as the other infirmities in the complaint constitute ample bases to recommend
dismissal. The undersigned will not address the county’s argument regarding the
dismissal of the official capacity claim against Deputy John Doe, as counsel for the
county have not made an appearance on his behalf.
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On July 17, 2024, “Plaintiff was suddenly and viciously attacked by Shaw,
when Shaw was caused to ‘go off the deep end’ during one of his violent episodes,
whereby he was previously deprived of his prescribed mental health medications by
jail staff, so as to control his behavior and violent outburst.” (Id. at ¶ 18). “Plaintiff
was pushed into a desk by Shaw and injured his back.” (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff
pressed the emergency call button, but it took approximately five minutes before a
lone deputy (Deputy John Doe) responded. (Id., PageID.122-23). “Plaintiff was
backed against the wall with a chair between him and the violent inmate, Shaw.”
(Id. at ¶ 21, PageID.123). The deputy delayed in taking action, “thereby
compounding the injury to [Plaintiff’s] back.” (Id.).
Later that same day, Plaintiff was “supposedly treated” by Dr. Koren (first
name unknown), “who stated to Plaintiff that he would soon undergo a urine sample
and [be] given X-rays to ascertain Plaintiff’s back injuries.” (Id. at ¶ 22). But the
urine tests and X-rays “were not provided until five months later.” (Id.). “In the
interim, Plaintiff needlessly suffered in pain and was not provided with any pain
medications during this time as a result.” (Id.).
Plaintiff was examined by a “Nurse Jake (last name unknown)” and
“Practitioner Amy (last name unknown)” on August 6, 2024, for his back injuries (id.
at ¶ 23), twenty days after the July 17 altercation with Shaw. Neither provided
Plaintiff medical treatment, Nurse Jake “telling Plaintiff that he was ‘irritating him’
and would be listed as a refusal.” (Id.). During “a follow-up medical visit” on
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August 17, 2024, “Practitioner Katie (last name unknown)” denied Plaintiff care
without providing him a reason. (Id. at ¶ 25, PageID.124).
Plaintiff submitted three medical requests and one grievance to Sergeant King.
(Id. at ¶ 26). Plaintiff received no response. (Id.).
On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff met with “Practitioner Amy” for his back injury
and pain. (Id. at ¶ 27). She denied him medical care, and marked Plaintiff as a
refusal of treatment “after Plaintiff simply asked or inquired . . . about his back injury
and how it would be treated.” (Id.). Later that day, she told Plaintiff “that
‘VitalCore’ does not want staff to provide real medical care to inmates or detainees—
only to mask conditions until inmates are released.” (Id.).4
On February 5, 2025, Plaintiff met with Dr. Michael Thomas regarding his
back pain. Dr. Thomas told Plaintiff “to just ‘keep taking ibuprofen until you’re
out.’ ” (Id. at ¶ 28). The doctor provided “no real medical intervention or
treatment.” (Id.).
ANALYSIS
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests a complaint’s legal sufficiency. A
claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless
the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic
4 Vitalcore Correctional Healthcare provides medical services for inmates of the Kent
County Jail. (See https://www.kentcountymi.gov/972/Inmate-Support-Services (last
viewed May 25, 2026)).
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has held, to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78
(2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. If
the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s
liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.’ ” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice . . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
I. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Cognizable Deliberate Indifference Claim
To state a claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when
construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law.”
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Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006). A prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment if the official is “deliberately indifferent” to the serious
medical needs of a prisoner. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). A
deliberate indifference claim involves both an objective and a subjective component.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the
deprivation must be “ ‘sufficiently serious’.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991)). The subjective component requires a showing of “a sufficiently culpable
state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir.
2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834)). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for
the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. at 837.
That a medical provider was “negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition” is insufficient to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 105. “Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained that “an
inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” Id. Accordingly, differences in judgment between an inmate and medical
providers as to the propriety of a diagnosis or treatment is insufficient to form the basis
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of a deliberate indifference claim. Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017);
Briggs v. Westcomb, 801 Fed. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020); Mitchell v. Hininger, 553
Fed. App’x 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2014). Neither a misdiagnosis nor inadequate treatment
is a sufficient basis for an Eighth Amendment claim, even if it results in considerable
suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a
complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner
received inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th
Cir. 1976). If an inmate has received some medical attention and the dispute concerns
the adequacy of the treatment, courts are reluctant “to second guess medical judgments
and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.
In the instant case, Plaintiff claims that he suffered some unspecified back injury
that caused him pain. He offers no details regarding the nature of the back injury or
the extent to which the injury was obvious to any of the defendants; nor does he claim
that the injury significantly affected any of his activities. Moreover, Plaintiff
acknowledges that he received at least some level of medical attention. He was seen by
a physician (“Dr. Koren”) the same day he was injured. The doctor prescribed a urine
test and X-rays. Plaintiff complains that he waited five months for these tests to be
performed, but he fails to provide any of the results of these tests; nor does he offer
anything to suggest that the delay caused him substantial physical harm. Plaintiff
notes that he was later advised by another jail doctor (Dr. Michael Thomas) that he
should continue taking ibuprofen for his pain.
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Treating Plaintiff’s allegations as true, and giving them the benefit of all
reasonable inferences, they are insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim for
deliberate indifference. The allegations fail to establish either the objective or
subjective component of such a claim. At most, Plaintiff’s complaint sounds in
negligence or medical malpractice.
In his response to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that the seriousness of
his condition was “obvious” (ECF No. 34, PageID.290), and that “it is axiomatic or
obvious that a person pushed into a metal desk, and their back hitting it is going to
sustain[] a ‘serious injury’ to their back.” (ECF No. 23, PageID.200). To the contrary,
there is nothing axiomatic or obvious here, particularly given the conclusory nature of
Plaintiff’s allegations. A back injury can take many forms from slight bruising, to
broken bones, to damage to the spinal cord. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to give so much
as a hint as to the extent of the alleged injury. More to the point, Plaintiff fails to
include allegations sufficient to establish that any of the defendants were aware of the
need for medical attention beyond what he received. Failure to immediately treat an
inmate’s self-diagnosis does not necessarily amount to a constitutional violation. See
Trozzi v. Lake County, 29 F.4th 745, 758-59 (6th Cir. 2022).
Plaintiff’s repeated pleas for discovery (ECF No. 23, PageID.191, 199, 200, 201)
are unavailing. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-
technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ikbal, 556 U.S. at
678-79.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference should be dismissed as to
all defendants.
II. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Cognizable Monell Claim
Having found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding deliberate indifference fail to
state a claim for a constitutional violation, his Count II claim that Kent County failed to
properly train and supervise its jail staff regarding inmate medical care must fail as
well.5 Moreover, the amended complaint fails to allege a cognizable Monell claim.
Kent County cannot be held liable for the actions of its employees or agents based
on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691-94 (1978).6 Instead, liability under Section 1983 must be predicated on the county’s
“own violations,” consisting of a policy or custom made by lawmakers or by those “whose
edicts and acts may fairly aid to represent official policy.” Id. at 694. The policy or
custom must be shown “to have ‘caused’ one of its employees to violate the Plaintiff’s
5 As to the failure to properly train and supervise (Count II), Plaintiff asserts that the
county violated his rights under “the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Id. at ¶ 41,
PageID.127). But Plaintiff was an inmate, not a detainee, at the time of the alleged
injury. (See Amended Complaint, ¶ 16, ECF No. 15, PageID.122 (acknowledging that
Plaintiff was serving a “sentence[] to county time”)). As such, Plaintiff’s claims must be
brought under the Eighth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth. See, e.g. Hodges v.
Abram, 138 F.4th 980, 987-88 (6th Cir. 2025).
6 Plaintiff purports to sue Sergeant King in her official capacity as well as her individual
capacity. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 9, ECF No. 15, PageID.121). Official capacity claims
must be brought against the county itself. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55 (official
capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent”). Accordingly, the official capacity claim against
Sergeant King is subsumed into the Monell claim against Kent County.
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constitutional rights.” D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2014).
“These stringent standards are ‘necessary to avoid de facto respondeat superior liability
explicitly prohibited by Monell.” Graham ex rel. Est. of Graham v. Washtenaw County,
358 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2004).
Even assuming one of the jail staff violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the
allegations in the amended complaint fall well short of establishing a link between any
policy or custom and any such violation. In his response to Kent County’s motion to
dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he basis for Monell liability is the municipality’s failure
to train its employees.” (ECF No. 23, PageID.206). But Plaintiff fails to provide any
specification as to what training was constitutionally required, much less how the lack
of that training caused Plaintiff harm. Instead, he attempts to buttress his failure to
train claim with a purely conclusory assertion that the need for different or additional
training, as well as its causal effect on his medical treatment, or lack thereof, were
“obvious.” (Id. at PageID206-07). As with Plaintiff’s assertion regarding the
seriousness of his back injury, there is nothing obvious about Plaintiff’s failure to train
claim.
As such, Count II fails to state a cognizable claim. Accordingly, it should be
dismissed.
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III. The Court Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
Count III of the amended complaint raises a state law claim for gross negligence.
(ECF No. 15, PageID.130-31). The undersigned recommends that the Court decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and to dismiss it without prejudice.
The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction was originally established by the
Supreme Court as a matter of federal common law under the term “pendent jurisdiction.”
See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). It is now largely codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Under that statute, “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over such a claim if:
(1) 	the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) 	the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) 	the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) 	in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1-4).
District courts retain broad discretion in deciding whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, discretion which “is bounded by
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constitutional and prudential limits on the use of federal judicial power.” See Musson
Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996). “As a rule
of thumb . . . [w]hen all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of
considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims.” Id. (citing
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)).
In determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after the dismissal
of the federal claims, the Court must take into consideration the basis for the dismissal
of the federal claims. “Not all ‘pretrial dismissals’ affect supplemental claims in the
same manner.” Musson, 89 F.3d at 1255. Dismissals following summary judgment do
not affect the Court’s ability to resolve supplemental claims. Id.
Appellate courts closely scrutinize, however, the retention of supplemental
jurisdiction following the dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6). See id. Dismissals
under Rule 12(b)(6) trigger a “strong presumption in favor of dismissing supplemental
claims.” Id. (citing Taylor v. First America Bank-Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th Cir.
1992) (dictum); Vild v. Visconsi, 956 F.2d 560, 570 (6th Cir. 1992) (dictum); Aschinger v.
Columbus Showcase Co., 934 F.2d 1402, 1412 (6th Cir. 1991) (dictum); Gaff v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp., 814 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court’s
decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)). One of the
reasons for the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal presumption is that it comes early in the case,
before the court has expended time or resources on the state claims. See Musson, 89
F.3d at 1255. That presumption may be overcome by “unusual circumstances,” Gaff,
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814 F.2d at 318; for example, “some prejudice arising from relegating the case for trial
in the state court.” Nolan v. Meyer, 520 F.2d 1276, 1280 (2d Cir. 1975).
The undersigned judicial officer can discern no prejudice to Plaintiff in requiring
him to litigate his gross negligence claim in state court. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Counts I and
II of the amended complaint (ECF No. 15) be dismissed with prejudice, and that
Count III be dismissed without prejudice. The only remaining claims would be those
against unserved Defendant John Doe.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: May 25, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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