Gray #643506 v. Michigan Department of Correction et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
MICHAEL TODD GRAY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-746
Honorable Sally J. Berens
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action
under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 3.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining
a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a
defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a
court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S.
344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is
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fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a
party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or
other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and
defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the
summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate
in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by
requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a
circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district
court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir.
2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it
without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the
plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying
these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against
Defendant MDOC. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims for damages against Defendants Jordan Csernyik and John Does ##1–9. Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claims for the use of excessive force against Defendants Jordan Csernyik and
John Does ##1–9 remain in the case.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which
Plaintiff complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) which is
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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also in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the MDOC and ten correctional officers:
Jordan Csernyik and nine unknown correctional officers whom Plaintiff identifies with the
pseudonym John Doe. Plaintiff sues each individual Defendant in that person’s individual and
official capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2–5.)
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 26, 2025, between 2:15 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., while he was
on the floor inside housing unit 3, in the hallway and the vestibule, the ten officers used excessive
force by punching him multiple times in the face and head and then “tazing” him excessively when
he was handcuffed in the restraint chair. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6–7.) Plaintiff reports that he suffered
injuries; he is seeking $5,000,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.)
II. 	Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
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relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because section 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under section 1983
is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
271 (1994).
III. 	Claims against the MDOC
Section 1983 expressly requires that a named defendant be a “person.” See Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, neither the State of Michigan nor the MDOC is a
“person” within the meaning of section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989) (holding a state is not a “person”); Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F. App’x 922, 923
(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Will and holding that the MDOC is not a “person.”); see also Lapides v.
Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will and noting
that “we have held that a State is not a ‘person’ against whom a § 1983 claim for money damages
might be asserted”). Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim against the MDOC upon which the relief he seeks might be granted.
IV. 	Official Capacity Claims for Damages against the Remaining Defendants
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants in their official as well as individual capacities.
A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the
governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
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71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments
are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has
waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has
not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court.
Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting
through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under section 1983 for money damages.
See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison v.
Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. As noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who
may be sued under section 1983 for money damages. Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek monetary
damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“We hold that neither
a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.”). Therefore,
the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for money damages against the individual
Defendants.
V. 	Individual Capacity Claims for Damages against the Remaining Defendants
The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that, although not physically
barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 346 (1981); (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and
wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” Id.
However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson,
800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On
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occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be
subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759
F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects
an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421
F. App'x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011).
There is an objective component and a subjective component to Eighth Amendment claims.
Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693,
702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison
officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’ ”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The objective
component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of
decency.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
Plaintiff’s allegations, though scant, support an inference that the force applied by the
remaining Defendants may reflect an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Therefore, the
Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants in their individual
capacities at this time.
Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the
review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendant MDOC will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
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The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for
damages against Defendants Jordan Csernyik and John Does ## 1–9.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	March 25, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
United States Magistrate Judge
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