Henke et al v. East Lansing Public Schools et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTI HENKE and
RICH HENKE ex rel. P.H.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
EAST LANDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS and
INGHAM INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-680
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Christi and Rich Henke sued their child P.H.’s former school districts under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for allegedly failing to provide him with a free public
education appropriate to his special needs. The Ingham Intermediate School District (IISD) now
moves that it be dismissed from the action on the grounds that the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the claims against it and that the claims are not adequately pleaded. (ECF No. 13.)
Because neither basis for dismissal is sound, the Court will deny the motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
According to the due-process complaint the Henkes filed against the school districts before
bringing the instant suit, the Henkes’ son P.H. began to experience educational challenges in
preschool. (Am. Due Process Compl. [ADPC] ¶ 4, ECF No. 1-1.) As a kindergartener, P.H. was
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder; his disruptive and aggressive behavior resulted in his
being secluded from other students and even physically restrained. 	(Id. ¶¶ 16–21.) 	P.H. began
attending Marble Elementary School, operated by East Lansing Public Schools, during the 2023–
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2024 academic year. 	(Id. ¶¶ 24–25.) 	P.H.’s individualized education plan (IEP) included
additional support and instruction in the form of speech, language, and occupational therapy (id.
¶ 31), as well as the aid of a paraprofessional (id. ¶ 46). These services were provided primarily
by Marble Elementary employees, but P.H.’s occupational therapist, Stacey Turke, worked for
IISD (id. ¶ 51). The Henkes alleged that P.H.’s IEP was not fully implemented (id. ¶ 92) and was
not updated when his behavioral problems worsened (id. ¶¶ 111–113). 	After concluding that
Marble Elementary was unable to meet P.H.’s special needs (id. ¶¶ 115–116), the Henkes pulled
P.H. out of school (id. ¶ 123).
In July 2024, the Henkes filed a complaint against East Lansing Public Schools with the
Michigan Department of Education. (Id. ¶ 125.) The department found that ELPS fell short of its
obligations under IDEA and issued a corrective-action plan (id. ¶ 126). 	That December, the
Henkes 	sought 	additional 	relief 	in 	the 	form 	of 	compensatory 	education, 	therapy, 	and
reimbursement for the Henkes’ out-of-pocket expenses through a due-process hearing conducted
by Michigan’s central-panel system. (MOAHR MTD Order, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.71.) Relying
on prior administrative decisions dismissing independent school districts not “responsible for
providing direct services” from due-process hearings (id., PageID.75), the administrative-law
judge assigned to the Henkes’ case dismissed IISD from the proceeding on January 30, 2025 (id.,
PageID.77). On March 24, the ALJ issued a decision and order finding that East Lansing Public
Schools did not deny P.H. a free appropriate public education as alleged by the Henkes. (MOAHR
Decision, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.143–45.) The Henkes filed a complaint challenging both IISD’s
dismissal from the hearing and the hearing’s substantive outcome with this Court on June 20. (ECF
No. 1.) IISD timely moved to dismiss on September 22, and its motion is now ripe for review.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be directed either to the
face of a complaint or to facts beyond it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); W6 Rest. Grp. v. Loeffler, 140
F.4th 344, 349 (6th Cir. 2025). A court entertaining a facial attack on jurisdiction must “take[] the
allegations of the complaint as true.” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014).
Because a court that lacks jurisdiction “cannot proceed at all in any cause,” Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514
(1868)), a court reviewing a motion to dismiss on grounds of both jurisdiction and factual
sufficiency “must consider the 12(b)(1) motion first.” Houchens v. Beshear, 850 F. App’x 340,
342 (6th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to ‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The Court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” 	Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 	Just as with facial
jurisdictional challenges under Rule 12(b)(1), a court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must
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“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Parrino v. Price, 869 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2017).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
IISD’s jurisdictional attack invokes 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B), which provides that “the
party bringing the action” challenging the decision rendered in an IDEA due-process hearing must
file suit within ninety days “of the decision of the hearing officer.” (Mot. to Dismiss 7, ECF No.
13-1.) Because 141 days elapsed from the date of the order dismissing IISD from the due-process
hearing to the date the Henkes filed suit in this Court, the school district contends that the Court
lacks jurisdiction over the Henkes’ claims against it. 	(Id.) 	The premise underpinning IISD’s
argument is that subsection (i)(2)(B)’s time bar is jurisdictional in nature. IISD’s argument fails
because subsection (i)(2)(B) is most plausibly construed not as a jurisdictional limitation but as an
ordinary claim-processing rule.
For over twenty years, the Supreme Court has encouraged lower federal courts to refrain
from the “less than meticulous” labeling of time prescriptions and other preconditions to suit as
limits on the courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004);
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.
154, 161 (2010) (“In light of the important distinctions between jurisdictional prescriptions and
claim-processing rules, we have encouraged federal courts and litigants to facilitate clarity by
using the term ‘jurisdictional’ only when it is apposite.” (cleaned up)); Fort Bend County v. Davis,
587 U.S. 541, 549 (2019) (“The Court has characterized as nonjurisdictional an array of mandatory
claim-processing rules and other preconditions to relief.”).
What sets jurisdictional rules apart is that they determine the very authority of a court to
adjudicate a dispute. 	“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter
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‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible
and without exception.’” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94–95 (alteration in original) (quoting Mansfield,
Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 	Labeling a statutory
condition on the invocation of a claim as jurisdictional can therefore have “harsh consequences,”
not least of which is foreclosing waiver of the condition if equity so demands. United States v.
Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 409 (2015). Consequently, the Court has prescribed that rules “not
involving the timebound transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another”
be interpreted as limits on jurisdiction only if they “clearly state[]” so. Hamer v. Neighborhood
Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 25 n.9 (2017) (quoting Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141
(2012)). “[M]ost statutory time bars” do not satisfy this clear-statement requirement. Id. (cleaned
up).
Interpreting section 1415(i)(2)(B) using the “traditional tools of statutory construction”
makes mincemeat of the suggestion that Congress intended to “imbue[]” the provision “with
jurisdictional consequences.” Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 158 (2023) (quoting Kwai
Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410). 	The word “jurisdiction” appears nowhere in subsection (i)(2)(B).
The provision simply directs a party “aggrieved by the findings and decision” in a due process
hearing, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), to “bring[] the action” raising those grievances no later than
ninety days “from the date of the decision of the hearing officer,” id. § 1415(i)(2)(B). 	This
“mundane” language “says only what every time bar, by definition, must: that after a certain time
a claim is barred.” 	Wilkins, 598 U.S. at 159 (cleaned up). 	That subsection (i)(2)(B) bears the
heading “Limitation,” the sort of label one would expect to encounter affixed to a normal time bar,
reinforces the provision’s ordinary meaning. See Garner & Scalia, Reading Law 221–24 (2012)
(discussing title-and-headings canon). Confirmation that subsection (i)(2)(B) is nonjurisdictional
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is supplied by the fact that a neighboring provision, titled “Jurisdiction of district courts,” see 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3), explicitly confers subject-matter jurisdiction without “condition[ing] the
jurisdictional grant on the limitations period” or “otherwise link[ing] those separate provisions,”
Wilkins, 598 U.S. at 159 (cleaned up).
The text and immediate context of subsection (i)(2)(B) make it more than plausible that it
imposes a “run-of-the-mill filing deadline.” Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 601 U.S. 480, 484 (2024)
(cleaned up). 	It follows that subsection (i)(2)(B) does not clearly impose a jurisdictional
restriction. See Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 596 U.S. 199, 205 (2022) (“Where multiple plausible
interpretations exist . . . it is difficult to make the case that the jurisdictional reading is clear.”).
Consequently, subsection (i)(2)(B)’s time bar is an ordinary claim-processing rule, and its
transgression does not oust a court of jurisdiction over an IDEA action.
IISD’s efforts to resist this conclusion are unavailing. The sole precedent to which IISD
refers is not on point because it construed an earlier version of IDEA lacking subsection (i)(2)(B).
See Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss ex rel. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 396 (6th
Cir. 1998). Boss explicitly noted that it was applying a state statute of limitations because IDEA as
it then stood “provide[d] no statute of limitations for actions brought under it.” Id.; see 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2) (1997) (amended 2004). Although Boss’s reasoning implies that any dismissal of an
IDEA claim on limitations grounds is jurisdictional, that reasoning cannot override interpretive
principles developed after Boss was decided. See Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 246
(2016) (“Statutes of limitations and other filing deadlines ordinarily are not jurisdictional.”
(cleaned up)); Oquendo v. Comm’r, 148 F.4th 820, 830 (6th Cir. 2025) (“[G]iven our past cases’
extraneous or passing references to jurisdiction . . . , we do not accord those holdings controlling
weight and proceed to consider . . . jurisdiction[] . . . consistent with the modern approach taken
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by the Supreme Court.”). 	The balance of the case law construing current subsection (i)(2)(B)
agrees that it is not jurisdictional. See Wall Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. C.M., 534 F. Supp. 2d 487, 492
(D.N.J. 2008); Lab’y Charter Sch. v. A.L.L., No. CV 24-5039, 2025 WL 1667361, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
June 12, 2025) (collecting cases). IISD’s attempt to revive Boss fails.
IISD’s backup argument, that subsection (i)(2)(B) is jurisdictional because expressed in a
statute, is equally spurious. As the earlier discussion of “statutory time bars” made evident, the
clear-statement rule for jurisdictional limitations applies to all positive enactments, statutes and
court-promulgated rules alike. IISD’s contention is based on a misreading of Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205 (2007), in which the Court reaffirmed longstanding practice interpreting the
“deadline for filing an appeal from a district court’s decision in a civil case” as jurisdictional.
Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 601 U.S. 480, 488 (2024); see Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209 n.2. But as the
Court made abundantly clear in Harrow, “Bowles governs statutory deadlines to appeal ‘from one
Article III court to another.’” 	Id. at 489 (quoting Hamer, 583 U.S. at 25 n.9). 	Time limits on
“appeals not from another court but from an agency” fall “outside the Bowles exception” and are
subject to the clear-statement rule, even if the time bar is contained in a statute. 	Id.; see In re
Tennial, 978 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A] civil appellate deadline is jurisdictional when
the rule creates a specific appeal deadline that is set forth in a statute.” (cleaned up)).
Nor can IISD’s argument be salvaged by characterizing an IDEA suit challenging the
outcome of a due-process hearing as an “appeal.” (Mot. to Dismiss 9.) There can be no appeal
from a state administrative proceeding to a federal court because the two belong to different
governmental systems. 	See Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“Federal courts have no general appellate authority over state courts or state agencies.”).
Notwithstanding the loose use of the “appeal” label in some IDEA decisions, no authority known
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to this Court has adopted that characterization. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
216 F.3d 380, 386–87 (4th Cir. 2000); Jonathan H. v. Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 527,
529 (3d Cir. 2009). 	Comparing subsection (i)(2)(B), which permits an aggrieved party to
“bring . . . an action,” to 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which delimits when an “appeal” may “bring any
judgment . . . before a court of appeals for review,” proves that a suit challenging the decision in a
due-process hearing is an original action, not an appeal. Text, precedent, and doctrine foreclose
IISD’s jurisdictional challenge. The Court will therefore deny IISD’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion.
B. 	Failure to State a Claim
IISD presents two grounds for granting its motion under Rule 12(b)(6). 	Neither is
convincing. 	First, IISD contends that the Henkes’ challenge to IISD’s dismissal from the due-
process hearing was untimely regardless of whether subsection (i)(2)(B) is jurisdictional in nature.
(Reply 2–3, ECF No. 19.) According to IISD, because the ALJ’s dismissal order was a “decision
of the hearing officer,” the Henkes were obliged to challenge that order within ninety days of its entry.
IISD’s interpretation of subsection (i)(2)(B) is at odds with statutory text and settled
doctrine. 	Whether 	framed 	in 	terms 	of 	finality 	or 	exhaustion, 	see 	Hickman 	& 	Pierce,
Administrative Law Treatise § 17.17, VitalLaw (database updated Nov. 2025), the allocation of
authority between administrative agencies and courts has long been understood to require courts
to avoid “premature interruption of the administrative process.” McKart v. United States, 395 U.S.
185, 193 (1969). 	In the IDEA context, the decision of a due-process hearing that is subject to
judicial review concerns “whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” 	20
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). It is that decision, and not interlocutory orders issued on the way to that
decision, that the IDEA mandates “shall be final.” Id. § 1415(i)(1)(A). Only “the issuance of a
final decision” exhausts an IDEA claim. L.D. v. Sumner Cnty. Schs., 299 F. Supp. 3d 901, 906
(M.D. Tenn. 2018) (cleaned up). The dismissal of IISD as a party to the hearing was not the final
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decision whose review the Henkes are entitled to seek from this Court. Accordingly, the Henkes
were not required to challenge IISD’s dismissal before the due-process hearing culminated in a
decision on the substance of their claims. The Henkes’ challenge to the dismissal of IISD is timely.
Second, IISD argues that it should be dismissed because it is not a proper party to this suit.
IISD’s rationale goes like this: An IDEA complaint can be presented against any entity responsible
for 	the 	“identification, 	evaluation, . . . educational 	placement,” 	or 	provisioning 	of 	a 	free
appropriate public education to a student with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). But state
law did not make IISD responsible for any of these duties as a general matter (Reply 8–9), and the
Henkes do not allege that IISD took on those duties in lieu of East Lansing Public Schools. (Id. at
12–13.) 	It follows (according to IISD) that IISD cannot be sued under IDEA for not providing
P.H. with a free appropriate public education.
IISD’s argument falters at the second step. The Henkes’ amended due-process complaint,
incorporated by reference in the complaint filed in this action, expressly refers to IISD employee
Stacey Turke’s providing occupational therapy to P.H. (ADPC ¶ 51.) Because IISD was in some
respect responsible for providing P.H. with a free appropriate public education, IISD’s alleged
shortcomings in providing that education are reviewable by this Court. The Court need not reach
the question whether intermediate school districts, solely by virtue of their supervisory functions,
are proper parties to actions challenging the treatment of a single student. See Rule 16 Hr’g Tr. at
18–19, L.G. v. Kelloggsville Pub. Schs., No. 1:23-cv-833 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2025), ECF No. 47
(denying intermediate school district’s motion to dismiss because plaintiff adequately alleged
predetermination). The Henkes’ allegation that an IISD employee directly participated in P.H.’s
education suffices to compel IISD to defend against the Henkes’ suit.
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The final basis IISD provides in justification of its dismissal is a Michigan Department of
Education memorandum interpreting IDEA to require the participation only of the public agency
responsible for providing a free appropriate public education in due-process hearings. 	(ECF
No. 20-1, PageID.702.) A state executive officer’s interpretation of a statute that places significant
regulatory responsibility on the states is certainly entitled to respectful consideration. See Bd. of
Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982). But even if the
Michigan Department of Education’s construction of IDEA’s due-process-hearing provisions is
sound, it does not follow that those provisions also limit the proper parties to an IDEA action in
federal court. The Sixth Circuit has suggested its agreement with the view that “either or both” a
state educational agency and a local educational agency “may be held liable for the failure to
provide a free appropriate public education.” Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gilmour Acad., 273 F.3d 671,
679 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana, 142 F.3d 776, 784 (5th
Cir. 1998)). If both a state and a local educational agency can be proper defendants in the same
IDEA lawsuit, then the same may hold true for educational service agencies like IISD. (See Mot. to
Dismiss 3.) This uncertainty, which the Michigan Department of Education memorandum does
not dispel, counsels against dismissal of IISD at this early stage of the litigation. Accordingly, the
Court will deny IISD’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
IISD fails to show that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Henkes’ claim against it or that
the Henkes fail to state a claim. The Court will therefore deny both grounds for IISD’s Rule 12
motion. An order consistent with this Opinion shall issue.
Dated: December 17, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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