McDaniel v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHELLE L. MCDANIEL,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00615
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the
Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative
record and provides that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it shall be conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing
United States Magistrate Judges to submit proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for disposition of Social Security appeals, the undersigned
recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
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Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Livingston v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 776 Fed. Appx. 897, 898 (6th Cir., June 19, 2019).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial-evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 53 years of age on her date last insured. (ECF No. 5-2, 40, 50).
She successfully completed high school and worked previously as a certified nurse
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assistant. Plaintiff applied for DIB benefits on May 26, 2022, alleging that she had
been disabled since February 27, 2021, due to degenerative disk disease of the lower
spine, total knee replacements of each knee, ACL replacement in left knee, ulcerative
colitis, obesity, aortic aneurysm, arthritis in left shoulder, neuropathy in bilateral
feet, and Graves disease. (ECF No. 5-7, PageID.288).
Plaintiff’s application was denied and denied again upon reconsideration, after
which time she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
(ECF No. 5-3, PageID.108, 133; ECF No. 5-4, PageID.169-70). Following an
administrative hearing, ALJ Manh Nguyen, in an opinion dated June 10, 2024,
determined that Plaintiff did not qualify for disability benefits. (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.37-52). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s determination,
rendering it the Commissioner’s final decision in the matter. (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.21-26). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 5-5, PageID.222-
23).
Plaintiff’s insured status expired on December 31, 2024. (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.40); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1). Accordingly, to be eligible for Disability
Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish
that she became disabled prior to the expiration of her insured status. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423; Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1990).
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ANALYSIS
I. Disability Framework
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
provide that if a claimant suffers from both non-exertional and exertional
impairments, both are considered in determining her residual functional capacity.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that she is entitled to disability
benefits and that she satisfies her burden by demonstrating that her impairments
are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering
her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful
employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A). While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of
the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step
four of the procedure—the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is
determined. O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th
Cir., Jan. 7, 2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine with spondylosis, cervicalgia, type II diabetes mellitus, ascending aortic
aneurysm, status post-left shoulder rotator cuff tear, bilateral carpal tunnel release,
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hernia, trochanteric bursitis of the left hip, osteoarthritis of the left knee status post-
knee replacement, polyarthralgia, headaches, insomnia/sleep apnea, obesity, major
depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder, severe impairments that
whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy
the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed
in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.40-41).
With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff, through her date last insured, retained the ability to perform light work
subject to the following limitations: the claimant (1) can occasionally climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds and kneel and crawl; (2) can frequently climb ramps and stairs,
stoop, crouch, balance, reach, handle, and finger; (3) cannot perform any commercial
driving or operation of moving machinery or work at a production rate pace such as
assembly line work; (4) can never work around hazards such as unprotected heights
or uncovered/unguarded moving machinery; (5) can understand, remember, and
carry out simple instructions and tolerate occasional changes in a routine work
setting. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.44-45).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work at
which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by
substantial evidence that there exists in the national economy a significant number
of specific jobs that Plaintiff can perform notwithstanding her limitations. O’Neal,
799 Fed. Appx. at 316. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.50). In satisfying this burden, the
ALJ may rely on a vocational expert’s testimony. Id.
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In this case, a vocational expert testified that there existed approximately
168,900 jobs in the national economy which an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could
perform. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.51). This represents a significant number of jobs.
See, e.g., Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and
others have deemed ‘significant’”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
was not entitled to benefits.
II. 	Analysis
As part of her disability application, Plaintiff submitted a form filled out by
Andria Carter, PA-C, who opined that Plaintiff experienced greater functional
limitations than the ALJ recognized. (ECF No. 6-21, PageID.2913-16). The ALJ,
however, found that PA Carter’s observations were “not persuasive.” (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.49-50). Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ failed
to properly evaluate PA Carter’s opinion. (ECF No. 12, PageID.3094). The
undersigned disagrees.
Because Plaintiff filed her application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ
evaluated the opinions in question pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. This
regulation provides that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s),” even an opinion from a treating source. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ is required to articulate his determination
of the persuasiveness of a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors
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listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(b)(1).
These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with
the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(1)-(5). The ALJ must explain his
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but absent circumstances
not present here, the ALJ is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2), (3). The regulations define “supportability”
and “consistency” as follows:
(1) 	Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
(2) 	Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
PA Carter provided a medical source statement regarding Plaintiff’s physical
capacity from January 11, 2024. (ECF No. 6-21, PageID.2913-16). The statement
is in checkbox and short fill-in-the-blank format. PA Carter reported the following.
Plaintiff can occasionally lift and carry up to twenty pounds occasionally and less
than ten pounds frequently; could sit less than two hours total in an eight-hour
workday; could stand or walk for about four hours during an eight-hour workday;
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required the ability to walk around every ten to fifteen minutes for five minutes each
time throughout an eight-hour workday; needed to shift positions at will; could sit
for twenty to thirty minutes at a time; could stand for ten to fifteen minutes at a
time; would be off task 25% of the workday; required unscheduled breaks every ten
to fifteen minutes; must elevate her legs 45 to 90 degrees as needed due to swelling;
could occasionally twist, stoop, climb stairs; and could never crouch or climb ladders.
(ECF No. 6-21, PageID.2913-16). PA Carter also noted that, “per pt[,] [her] back
issues became unbearable 2 years ago.” (ECF No. 6-21, PageID.2913).
As stated above, the ALJ found PA Carter’s opinion “not persuasive.” (ECF
No. 5-2, PageID.50). In his analysis, the ALJ noted that PA Carter’s “per patient”
statement “suggests [PA Carter’s] findings are based, at least in part, on the
claimant’s subjective reports.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.49). The ALJ continued,
“Regardless, the medical evidence is not consistent with the degree of limitations
included in this opinion.” (Id.). The ALJ pointed to the following medical evidence
in support of his evaluation.
In 2021 and early 2022, Plaintiff walked with a normal gait and displayed
normal coordination and range of motion of the hips, knees, and shoulders. (ECF
No. 5-17, PageID.702, 745; ECF No. 5-18, PageID.995). Following her total left
knee replacement, Plaintiff was doing “exceptionally well.” (ECF No. 5-25,
PageID.1242). She ultimately underwent revision surgery on the left knee to repair
inner kneecap tissue but showed improvement. (ECF No. 5-30, PageID.1636; ECF
No. 5-33, PageID.1681, 1688; ECF No. 6-3, PageID.1909). Despite reports of
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ongoing back pain, Plaintiff’s gait was only “mildly” antalgic, strength in all muscle
groups was normal, and straight leg raising was negative. (ECF No. 6-8,
PageID.2119). In late 2023, Plaintiff reported 90% relief following a left
trochanteric bursa injection. (ECF No. 6-30, PageID.3063). Examination
indicated 4/4 strength of the lower extremities. (ECF No. 6-8, PageID.2113). In
addition, she ambulated without difficulty. (ECF No. 6-8, PageID.2115). In
January 2024, Plaintiff walked with a non-limping gait. (ECF No. 6-16,
PageID.2604). Upon examination in 2024, her gait was only “mildly” antalgic.
(ECF No. 6-30, PageID.3056). Finally, the ALJ noted, “The evidence does not show
the claimant had ongoing swelling or edema to warrant a finding that she needs to
elevate her legs.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.50).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate PA Carter’s
opinion, but the Court finds no reversible error in this regard.
First, as to supportability, the ALJ noted that PA Carter’s remark that some
information was “per” Plaintiff on the form “suggests” that PA Carter’s findings are
“at least in part” based on Plaintiff’s self-reports. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.49).
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s statement “insinuate[d] that the opinion was solely
based on [Plaintiff’s] subjective reports.” (ECF No. 12, PageID.3096). Plaintiff’s
argument mischaracterizes the ALJ’s evaluation. Most notably, the ALJ stated
that PA Carter’s remark “suggest[ed]” that her findings are “at least in part” based
on Plaintiff’s self-reports, not solely based on her self-reports, as Plaintiff argues.
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.49). Plaintiff’s own statements are considered a nonmedical
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source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(e). The form called for PA Carter to estimate the
earliest date that Plaintiff’s limitations applied, not Plaintiff. (ECF No. 6-21,
PageID.2913). Therefore, the ALJ appropriately discounted PA Carter’s opinion.1
Second, as to consistency, the ALJ stated that “the medical evidence is not
consistent with the degree of limitations included in this opinion.” (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.49). In July 2022, Plaintiff underwent a left knee replacement (ECF No. 5-
23, PageID.1211), and despite undergoing a medial retinaculum repair in November
2022 (ECF No. 5-30, PageID.1636), and having boggy swelling in the knee in
January 2023 (ECF No. 5-33, PageID.1688), by February 2023, she was doing well
overall and was advised to follow up in one year (ECF No. 6-3, PageID.1909).
In December 2023, a straight leg test was negative with referred pain, and
Plaintiff’s lower extremity strength was equal bilaterally at 4/4. (ECF No. 6-8,
PageID.2113). At the same appointment, Plaintiff received a left trochanteric bursa
injection, after which she reported “90% relief.” (ECF No. 6-8, PageID.2114-15).
Later that month, Plaintiff reported lower back pain, but upon examination, her gait
was “mildly antalgic,” and the straight leg test was negative bilaterally. (ECF No.
6-8, PageID.2119). In January 2024, Plaintiff’s gait was “not limping.” (ECF
No. 6-16, PageID2604). In March 2024, Plaintiff received a lumbar epidural steroid
1 While the ALJ did not directly articulate “supportability” in the opinion of the
undersigned, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical
opinion. See Hardy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:20-cv-4097, 2021 WL
4059310 at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2021) (“The ALJ’s decision substantially complied
with the requirements of § 404.1520c, and her failure to specifically use the terms
“supportability” and “consistency” in her analysis, even if error, was harmless.”)
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injection, after which she “ambulate[d] without difficulty” and had “100% relief.”
(ECF No.6-30, PageID.3058).
The record is consistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that “[t]he evidence does
not show the claimant had ongoing swelling or edema to warrant a finding that she
needs to elevate her legs.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.50; see ECF No. 6-29, PageID.3048
(provider noted in January 2023 that “swelling in front of the knee is smaller than
it has been” and that “she will likely gradually have the swelling diminished over
the period of several months”); ECF No. 6-20, PageID.2824 (provider noted no lower
leg edema in March 2023); ECF No. 6-28, PageID.3033 (Plaintiff denied lower
extremity swelling in July 2023); ECF No. 6-7, PageID.2087 (Plaintiff did not report
any leg swelling in October 2023); ECF No. 6-30,PageID.3062 (provider noted no
edema in legs in December 2023)). Although there may be some evidence that is
consistent with PA Carter’s opinion, substantial evidence of Plaintiff’s examinations
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that PA Carter’s opined physical limitations are not
consistent with the record.
Plaintiff then recites a litany of evidence in support of his conclusion that PA
Carter’s opinion was supported by and consistent with the record (ECF No. 12,
PageID.3095-97), arguing that the ALJ did “not provide a logical bridge for the
rejection of all of PA Carter’s opined limitations” (ECF No. 12, PageID.3095) and
that that the ALJ cherry-picked evidence (ECF No. 12, PageID.3097). But the
Court’s role is not to re-weigh the evidence. The ALJ was not required to directly
address every piece of evidence to show his consideration of it. Kornecky v. Commr
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of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). Additionally, the law is clear
that, if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, “it must
be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even
if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). In other words, the
question is not whether substantial evidence could support PA Carter’s opined
limitations but whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluated
limitations. Shepard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 705 F. App’x 435, 442 (6th Cir. 2017).
And even if substantial evidence could support the limitations that Plaintiff alleges
are necessary, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determinations.
Finally, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument otherwise (ECF No. 12,
PageID.3099), the ALJ cannot be faulted for not giving more consideration to
Plaintiff’s January 22, 2024 lumbar MRI because there are no medical records or
provider opinions explaining what the MRI means in terms of Plaintiff’s functional
limitations (ECF No. 30, PageID.3066-67).2 See Flowers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
14-CV12449, 2015 WL 4274961, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2015) (“[T]he MRI and
the CT scan reports provide no insight into what additional limitations Plaintiff may
suffer from based on the diagnoses therein.”). The ALJ is not a doctor and is unable
to assess functional limitations based merely upon MRI findings; however, these
MRI findings do not constitute raw medical data that the ALJ is prohibited from
2 PA Carter’s statement was dated January 11, 2024, before the MRI occurred.
(ECF No. 6-21, PageID.2916).
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interpreting either. See Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 726 (6th
Cir. 2013). The major findings were transcribed by a reviewing medical
professional, such that the ALJ’s use of those records does not constitute his
interpreting the raw medical data. (ECF No. 30, PageID.3066-67). See id. at 727.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: June 18, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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