Holt v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KELLI NICHOLE HOLT,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
Case No. 1:25-cv-585
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a
closed period of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that,
if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. The
Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff seeks
review of the Commissioner’s decision.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States Magistrate Judges to
submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition of social security appeals,
I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner’s decision and of the
record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 1
of 21

2
limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether
there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting the decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de
novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See
Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Fact finding is the Commissioner’s province,
and those findings are conclusive provided substantial evidence supports them. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v.
Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In
applying this standard, a court must consider the evidence as a whole, while accounting for any
evidence that fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). The substantial evidence standard contemplates a zone within
which the decision maker can properly rule either way without judicial interference. See Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords the administrative decision maker
considerable latitude and precludes reversal simply because the evidence would have supported a
contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
The instant appeal has a lengthy procedural history. Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and
SSI on July 20, 2015, alleging that she became disabled as of September 1, 2011, due to back
injury and pain, lumbar spine stenosis, and asthma. (PageID.184, 448–55.) Plaintiff was 26 years
old on her alleged onset date and 30 years old when she filed her applications. (PageID.184.) She
had earned a high school diploma and had worked as a fast food and retail cashier, factory line
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 2
of 21

3
worker, zoo gate keeper, and medical assistant. (PageID.507.) Plaintiff’s applications were denied
initially and on reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).
On October 4, 2017, ALJ B. Lloyd Blair issued an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s
claims. (PageID.204–12.) On August 1, 2018, the Appeals Council granted review and remanded
the case to ALJ Blair for further consideration and a new decision. (PageID.217–21.) On January
17, 2019, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to July 20, 2014. (PageID.477.) On February
21, 2019, ALJ Blair denied Plaintiffs’ claims a second time. (PageID.226–38.) On March 23, 2020,
the Appeals Council granted review and remanded to a different ALJ for further consideration and
a new decision. (PageID.245–50.)
On September 9, 2020, ALJ Donna J. Grit issued an unfavorable decision denying
Plaintiff’s claims for a closed period of disability through April 16, 2018. (PageID.38–52.) The
Appeals Council denied review on November 17, 2020. (PageID.24–26.) Plaintiff thereafter
sought review of the September 9, 2020 decision in this Court. Holt v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.,
No. 1:21-cv-34 (W.D. Mich.). On April 12, 2022, the Court granted the Commissioner’s
unopposed motion to remand the matter for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of
Section 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Id., ECF Nos. 26 and 27.
On September 7, 2023, ALJ Nicholas Ohanesian held a telephone hearing and received
testimony from Plaintiff, medical expert Dr. Steven Golub, and impartial vocational expert (VE)
Susan Rowe. (PageID.2082–2114.) On September 27, 2023, ALJ Ohanesian issued a written
decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled from her amended alleged onset date of July 20,
2014 through the date of decision. (PageID.2040–59.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
exceptions to the final decision on March 28, 2025. (PageID.1998–2000.) ALJ Ohanesian’s ruling
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 3
of 21

4
thus became the Commissioner’s final decision. See Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432,
434 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff timely initiated this civil action for judicial review on May 21, 2025.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a
dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that, if a claimant suffers from a
nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining
residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff’s shoulders, and
she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable
to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience,
perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national
1 1. 	An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found
to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b));
2. 	An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c));
3. 	If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the
duration requirement and which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of
Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled” will be made without consideration
of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d));
4. 	If an individual is capable of performing her past relevant work, a finding of “not disabled”
must be made (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e));
5. 	If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other
factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity
must be considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),
416.920(f)).
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 4
of 21

5
economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of
proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functional capacity (RFC)
is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant
bears the burden of proof).
After determining that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through June
30, 2015, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful activity beginning April
2018, through the date of the decision. However, the ALJ also found that during the period at issue,
there had been a continuous 12-month period or periods during which Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity. (PageID.2043.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from
severe impairments of obesity; degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; asthma;
right carpal tunnel syndrome; left shoulder degenerative changes; depression; and anxiety.
(PageID.20436.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled any impairment identified in the Listing of
Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.2044–47.) The ALJ
then found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except:
[S]he is limited to standing and walking for a total of 4 hours in an 8-hour workday.
The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, never climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds, occasionally balance, stoop, kneel and crouch, and never crawl. She
can frequently reach, handle, finger, feel, and occasionally push and pull with the
bilateral upper extremities. The claimant can have no exposure to temperature
extremes, excessive vibration, hazardous moving machinery, or unprotected
heights. She can have occasional exposure to pulmonary irritants. The claimant is
limited to receiving, comprehending, and executing simple and routine tasks and
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 5
of 21

6
adapt to changes in workplace routines. She can have occasional contact with others
and can have occasional changes in work duties.
(PageID.2047.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work.
(PageID.2057.) At step five, the ALJ found that based on testimony from the VE, Plaintiff was
able to perform a number of jobs, including inspector, electrical assembler, and electronics worker,
approximately 60,000 of which existed in the national economy. (PageID.2057–58.) This
represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 F.3d 902,
905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this
court and others have deemed ‘significant’”). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
disabled.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises two issues in her appeal: (1) the ALJ failed properly to evaluate Plaintiff’s
subjective symptoms; and (2) the ALJ failed to follow the treating physician rule. (ECF No. 15 at
PageID.2956, 2965.)
I. 	Subjective Symptoms
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons to discount her
subjective complaints. (ECF No. 15 at PageID.2965.) An ALJ evaluates a claimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms of an alleged disability
in accordance with SSR 16-3p. “While SSR 16-3p eliminated the use of the term ‘credibility,’ the
regulatory analysis remains the same.” Karmol v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-cv-977, 2019 WL
1349485, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2019). An ALJ should consider the factors set forth in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3) but “is not required to discuss every factor or conduct
a factor-by-factor analysis.” Pratt v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-cv-1084, 2014 WL 1577525,
at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2014) (collecting cases). SSR 16-3p explains that an ALJ’s decision
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 6
of 21

7
must “contain specific reasons for the weight given to an individual’s symptoms, be consistent
with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so that the individual and any
subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” 2017
WL 5180304, at *10. The same rules of review apply to an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s
symptoms under SSR 16-3p that applied to a credibility assessment under SSR 96-7p. That is, the
ALJ’s determination must be afforded deference so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Lipanye v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 802 F. App’x 165, 171 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that “[i]t is for the administrative law
judge, not the reviewing court, to judge the consistency of a claimant’s statements”).
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ improperly relied on her “routine and minimal”
activities of daily living to discredit her claimed disabling symptoms. (Id. at PageID.2966.) The
ALJ explained his consideration of these activities as follows:
The evidence raises other questions about the claimant’s consistency of subjective
allegations. For instance, the claimant has described other daily activities that are
not limited to the extent one would expect given her allegations of disabling
symptoms. These activities include working full time at substantial gainful activity,
caring for her children, preparing meals, caring for her personal hygiene, driving,
using public transportation, shopping for groceries and necessities, managing
personal 	finances, 	playing 	her 	saxophone, 	reading, 	playing 	video 	games,
socializing with friends, talking on the phone, attending church on a weekly basis,
and managing scheduled activities for her children (Exhibit 3E; 16F/99). While the
scope and extent of these regular activities may change from day to day, the
claimant’s ability to participate in such activities tends to suggest that she is far
more capable than she alleges and undermines the reliability of her allegations of
disabling functional limitations.
(PageID.2053.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to account for her limitations in
completing her daily activities, such as requiring assistance from family members for household
chores and grocery shopping and needing to keep her wheelchair nearby so she could sit down
when performing tasks such as washing dishes. (ECF No. 15 at PageID.2960–61.) However, the
ALJ could properly discount this testimony. The ALJ cited Plaintiff’s October 2015 function report
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 7
of 21

8
describing her daily activities and a progress note from an August 2017 pain psychology
evaluation. (PageID.519–526, 1330–31.) During the 2017 evaluation, Plaintiff reported that she
was independent in performing her daily activities and must maintain the household chores with
“no assistance.” Plaintiff said that she “pace[d] her activity” but did not mention her wheelchair.
(PageID.1331; see also PageID.2105 (testifying that once she got home from the rehabilitation
hospital she “pretty much [had to] do everything on [her] own” because “there was nobody to
really help me”).) Nor did the ALJ err in considering Plaintiff’s daily activities, including caring
for her children, as ALJs are specifically permitted to consider such activities in evaluating a
claimant’s subjective symptoms. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4, 6-7 (as part of the
subjective symptom evaluation, ALJ may consider objective medical evidence, medical opinions,
daily activities, type of treatment and its effectiveness); see also See Powell v. Colvin, No. 5:12-
CV-157, 2014 WL 689721, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2014) (the claimant’s “ability to care for
three grandchildren does tend to show that, if properly motivated, she is capable of engaging in
significant work-like activities”); Swartz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:07-CV-771, 2008 WL
2952021, at *5 (W.D. Mich. July 29, 2008) (finding it “entirely appropriate for the ALJ to take
plaintiff’s daily activities into account in making his credibility determination,” including those
centered around caring for his children). Moreover, the ALJ’s decision shows that he considered
Plaintiff’s daily activities as only one of many factors. See Temples v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 515 F.
App’x 460, 462 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ALJ did not give undue consideration to Temple’s ability
to perform day-to-day activities. Rather, the ALJ properly considered this ability as one factor in
determining whether Temples’ testimony was credible.”).
The ALJ also considered imaging and other objective studies, finding that they did not
support that Plaintiff was limited to the extent she alleged. See Perrault v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 8
of 21

9
No. 1:14-cv-942, 2015 WL 5592931, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2015) (“In evaluating a
claimant’s credibility with respect to the intensity and persistence of symptoms, the ALJ considers
the objective medical evidence.”). The ALJ noted that September 2015 and January 2017 MRIs of
the lumbar spine showed minimal degenerative changes and no spinal stenosis. (PageID.2048
(citing PageID.675–66, 1014, 1113).) A 2016 EMG and nerve conduction study were within
normal limits, although the study was noted as abnormal with evidence of chronic right L4-5 and
left L5-S1 polyradiculopathy without ongoing denervation. (PageID.2048 (citing PageID.1026).)
Similarly, a 2017 EMG and nerve conduction study were within normal limits. (PageID.1860.) An
April 2018 CT of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine taken in connection with an emergency room visit for
radiating low back pain revealed some positive findings without indication of high-grade central
canal or neuroforaminal stenosis or cauda equina. (PageID.2049 (citing PageID.1292).) A
September 2021 MRI of the lumbar spine taken about a month before Plaintiff underwent a right
L4-5 discectomy and right L5-S1 hemilaminectomy showed right L4-5 disc herniation, facet
hypertrophy, and lateral recess stenosis right L5-S1. (PageID.2049 (citing PageID.2599).) The
ALJ concluded that the minimal degenerative changes shown by these studies within the alleged
closed period did not support disabling limitations. (PageID.2049, 2056.)
The ALJ also discussed the examination findings of record, noting (correctly) that most
examinations showed normal or near normal lower extremity strength. The ALJ also observed that
while treatment notes reflected Plaintiff using an assistive device, many examinations indicated
that her gait was normal and that she moved her extremities strongly. (PageID.2048 (citing
PageID.1014, 1017, 1035.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ mischaracterized or “cherry picked”
the record to find Plaintiff not disabled because “the record documents more observations of gait
abnormality than the ALJ acknowledged in [his] decision[.]” (ECF No. 15 at PageID.2961.) As
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page 9
of 21

10
support, Plaintiff cites a number of records, many of which are from Plaintiff’s 2016 course of
physical therapy, documenting use of a walker, gait abnormality, and limping. (See e.g.,
PageID.704, 884, 930, 981, 1006, 1817.) But the ALJ was not required to address every piece of
evidence in the record, so long as he considered the evidence as a whole. See Boseley v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 397 F. App’x 195, 199 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Neither the ALJ nor the Council is
required to discuss each piece of data in its opinion, so long as they consider the evidence as a
whole and reach a reasoned conclusion.”); Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496,
508 (6th Cir. 2006) (observing that “an ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly
addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party”) (quoting Loral
Defense Sys. - Akron v. N.L.R.B., 200 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 1999)). The ALJ’s decision shows
that this is what he did. The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s frequent use of assistive devices but
also noted that the record reflected many instances when her gait was observed as normal.
(PageID.2047–48.) For example, on several visits, some during the same period of time in 2016
when Plaintiff was receiving physical therapy, physicians reported that, with the exception of heel-
to-toe walking, Plaintiff exhibited a normal gait. (PageID.1017 (steady gait but unsteady tandem
gait), 1024 (normal gait but difficulty with tandem gait), 1035 (intact gait), 1040 (intact gait).)
Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged that, “at times, [Plaintiff’s] gait was abnormal.” (PageID.2049)
The ALJ cited a January 2017 examination finding that Plaintiff had a myelopathic gait, but noted
that several months later, in May 2017, Plaintiff’s gait was only “slightly antalgic” and she
ambulated without an assistive device. (PageID.2048 (citing PageID.119, 1314).) Similarly, a
couple months later at the end of her 2017 physical therapy treatment, Plaintiff reported that she
had walked to physical therapy due to a lack of transportation and reported that walking was a
“little better.” (PageID.1836.) In short, contrary to Plaintiff’s view, the ALJ did nothing more than
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
10 of 21

11
weigh the evidence in the record. See White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir.
2009) (rejecting an allegation of “cherry picking” because “the same process can be described
more neutrally as weighing the evidence”). Remand is not warranted simply because there is
evidence in the record that might have supported a different outcome.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by relying on evidence outside of her requested
closed period to discredit her claim. A claimant may qualify for a closed period of disability
benefits where the ALJ finds “that at some point in the past, the claimant was disabled and that, at
some later point in the past, she improved to the point of no longer being disabled.” Campbell v.
Colvin, No. CIV.A. 5:13-408, 2014 WL 5364800, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2014); see also Long
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 93–2321, 1994 WL 718540, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 1994)
(“In order to find a closed period of disability, the Secretary must find that at some point in the
past, the claimant was disabled and that, at some later point in the past, he improved to the point
of no longer being disabled”). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should not have used her April 2018
return to work and lack of further treatment after January 2022 to discredit her claim of disability.
As Plaintiff notes, courts have held that, in some circumstances, an ALJ may err by using a
claimant’s post-closed-period return to work or activities to evaluate her claim for benefits during
the closed period. See, e.g., Pilotti v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:16-CV-85, 2017 WL 443142, at
*5 n.6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL 1026004 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2017); Trenda
v. Astrue, No. 3:08-cv-92, 2009 WL 3063008, at *7–8 (D.N.D. Sept. 21, 2009).
However, courts have found no error when the claimant’s return to work was unrelated to
medical improvement. For example, in Patton v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 10-13314,
2011 WL 4576977 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2011), adopted by 2011 WL 4577250 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
30, 2011), the court found the ALJ did not err by considering the plaintiff’s return to work to
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
11 of 21

12
discount her subjective complaints for the closed period at issue because the evidence showed that
the plaintiff resumed working not due to medical improvement, but because “her short term
disability ended . . . and her failure to resume work after that date would have resulted in
termination.” Id. at *6. See also Adcox v. Colvin, No. 3:15-CV-125, 2016 WL 4991597, at *13
(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 4991567 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2016) (holding
that the ALJ did not err in considering the plaintiff’s return to work because the “closed period
ended not because his impairments had improved, but because he was simply able to find a job he
could perform despite his impairments”). When asked by the ALJ at the August 26, 2020 hearing
what had changed that allowed her to return to work part time, and then full-time, Plaintiff testified
that she was not receiving financial help from her ex-husband to take care of their children and
was “[j]ust trying to find a job that [she] could do,” and “got a job to try to save money” and help
with expenses. (PageID.90–91.) Thus, Plaintiff’s decision to seek work in April 2018 was
unrelated to medical improvement. While Plaintiff testified—in response to her counsel’s question
about what had changed from a physical standpoint that allowed her to return to work—that she
ended up seeing a chiropractor “who did things a bit different than most chiropractors do”
(PageID.93), Plaintiff’s chiropractic records (PageID.1903–89, 2412–64) show that she did not
begin receiving chiropractic services until February 2019, many months after she first returned to
work. Thus, I find no error in the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s work activity outside of the
closed period.
More importantly, the ALJ made clear that he found Plaintiff’s limitations during and after
the closed period essentially unchanged. (PageID.2049, 2056–57.) In other words, the ALJ found
no medical improvement following an initial period of disability to establish a closed period.
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
12 of 21

13
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in considering all of the evidence in the record through the date
of decision.
Therefore, this claim of error lacks merit.
II. 	Opinion Evidence
Because Plaintiff filed her applications prior to March 27, 2017, the so-called treating
physician rule applies. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). The treating physician doctrine
recognizes that medical professionals who have a long history of caring for a claimant and her
maladies generally possess significant insight into her medical condition. See Barker v. Shalala,
40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). An ALJ must, therefore, give controlling weight to the opinion
of a treating source if: (1) the opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques,” and (2) the opinion “is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in the case record.” Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375–76
(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). That deference is appropriate, however, only
where the opinion “is based upon sufficient medical data.” Miller v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., No. 91-1325, 1991 WL 229979, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1991) (citation omitted). The ALJ
may reject the opinion of a treating physician where it is unsupported by the medical record, merely
states a conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial medical evidence. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at
528; Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286–87 (6th Cir. 1994).
If an ALJ accords less than controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ must
give “good reasons” for doing so. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Those reasons must be “supported
by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and
the reasons for that weight.” Id. This requirement “ensures that the ALJ applies the treating
physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.” Id. (citation
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
13 of 21

14
omitted). Simply stating that the physician's opinions “are not well-supported by any objective
findings and are inconsistent with other credible evidence” is, without more, too “ambiguous” to
permit meaningful review of the ALJ’s assessment. Id. at 376-77.
If the ALJ affords less than controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ
must still determine the weight it should be afforded. Id. at 376. In doing so, the ALJ must consider
the following factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of the examination,
(2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability of the opinion, (4) consistency
of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the treating source, and (6) other
relevant factors. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). While the ALJ is not required to explicitly
discuss each of these factors, the record must nevertheless reflect that the ALJ considered those
factors relevant to her assessment. See, e.g., Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir.
2007); Undheim v. Barnhart, 214 F. App’x 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ discussed the weight given to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians as
follows:
In November 2015 disability parking placard application, Qaisar Cheema, M.D.,
opined the claimant has and [sic] inability to walk more than 200 feet without
having to stop and rest due to “weakness in both legs, low back pain” and noted
using and requiring wheelchair (Exhibit 10F/40, 41). In September 2017, Firas
Zouabi, M.D., completed the same form, offered the same opinion with the note
“due to lumbar disc disease” (Exhibit 15F/5). Dr. Cheema further opined in
November 2015 the claimant cannot work at any job and needs help with home
tasks 10F/41). These opinions are assigned little weight as they are not supported
by the medical evidence as a whole including their very own physical examinations
of the claimant. Dr. Zouabi’s physical examinations do not evaluate the claimant’s
back or musculoskeletal and lung examinations are routinely normal. The claimant,
while utilizing an assistive device, often is noted to have a normal gait, she is able
to care for herself and her children, drive a car, and manage her household.
. . . .
In February 2016, Dr. Zouabi offers a statement that the claimant is unable to work
due to her “medical conditions” and notes the use of a walker and the inability to
walk independently, needing more physical therapy and experiencing weakness
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
14 of 21

15
(Exhibit 10F/32). I again note that while Dr. Zouabi is a treating physician, but I do
not give controlling weight. Rather, this opinion provides no vocational limitations
but rather a conclusory statement of her inability to work which is an issue reserved
to the Commissioner. I again note there is no support in Dr. Zouabi’s own progress
notes or physical examinations for use of a walker. Rather, the record supports
largely normal lower extremity examinations with the exception of tandem
walking. Her gait is noted as normal, but more notably, Dr. Zouabi repeatedly fails
to do any back of musculoskeletal examinations. However, the progress notes do
indicate the claimant requesting a note regarding treatment when she presents with
back and [sic] complaints. The statement “weakness from time to time” is vague
and not well supported by the medical evidence. Again, Dr. Zouabi offers an
opinion that the claimant is unable to work, and this is a conclusion reserved to the
Commissioner.
In February 2016, Dr. Cheema completed an opinion for the Department of Human
Services indicating the claimant has limitations related to her lumbar disc disease
and low back pain. Dr. Cheema opined the claimant can frequently lift and carry 10
pounds and occasionally lift and carry 25 pounds, stand and/or walk less than two
hours and sit less than six hours in an eight-hour workday (Exhibit 10F/29). While
this opinion is generally consistent with light exertional work, it does not provide
limitations related to all the claimant’s impairments. I do note this was a check box
form and did not provide boxes relating to postural limitations or environmental
nor does it refer to objective evidence supporting the limitations including the very
limited stand and/or walking less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday. Thus, while
Dr. Cheema is a treating provider, this opinion is not assigned controlling weight
and is assigned little weight as the record as a whole supports additional work
related limitations.
In March 2016, Dr. Zouabi opined the claimant can lift and carry less than 10
pounds occasionally, but marked no boxes regarding standing/walking and sitting
with the notation the claimant is able to sit/stand/walk with a walker. Dr. Zouabi
added the claimant cannot use either foot or leg to operate foot/leg controls, but
indicated the claimant can grasp, reach, and perform fine manipulating with her
bilateral hands and arms, but cannot push or pull with either (Exhibit 10F/24-26).
The record routinely indicates the claimant has normal lower extremity strength
and thus her not being able to operate with leg or foot controls is inconsistent with
the record. Moreover, the use of a walker does not preclude her ability to sit nor
does the record or refer to her being unable to sit when she presents to Dr. Zouabi.
Rather, while she has used a cane at times, her gait has been largely normal with
some difficulty tandem walking. In support of these limitations, Dr. Zouabi notes
“MRI of lumbar spine” but does [not] offer a date or findings to support the assessed
limitations. While the claimant does have impairments that support work related
limitations, the record, including Dr. Zouabi’s own findings of and lack of back and
musculoskeletal 	examinations 	do 	not 	support 	his 	opinion 	in 	March 	2016.
Accordingly, I assign Dr. Zouabi’s March 2016 opinion little weight.
. . . .
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
15 of 21

16
In March 2017, Dr. Cheema again signed the claimant’s application for a disability
parking placard (Exhibit 12F). In this statement, Dr. Cheema opined the claimant
cannot walk more than 200 feet without having to stop due to her lumbar disc
disease. Dr. Cheema notes this is a temporary restriction of six months. I do not
assign this application weight as it is non durational and does not provide function
by function work restrictions.
In September 2017, Dr. Zouabi provided an additional statement that the claimant
is unable to work due to her medical conditions. Dr. Zouabi added the claimant was
still using her walker, is unable to walk independently, requires more physical
therapy and experiences weakness from “time to time.” Dr. Zouabi added the
claimant has low back pain, left shoulder pain, and bilateral leg weakness (Exhibit
15F/4). This opinion is inconsistent with the medical evidence as a whole including
Dr. Zouabi’s own examinations which routinely fail to evaluate the claimant’s back
or musculoskeletal. Dr. Zouabi notes weakness, which is not consistent with the
progress notes often indicating full lower extremity strength and while it is notes
she has “pain” it does not support work related function by function limitations.
Moreover, following this opinion, the claimant participated in minimal physical
therapy being discharged in February 2018, returning for 3 sessions relating to her
left shoulder, but ultimately being discharged in September 2018 without additional
treatment (Exhibit 19F/37, 45, 47). In addition, this opinion again offers an opinion
that the claimant cannot work which is an issue reserved for the Commissioner.
Accordingly, I assign Dr. Zouabi’s September 2017 opinion little weight.
In October 2017, Dr. Zouabi completed another statement for the Department of
Human Services indicating the claimant uses a walker, can occasionally lift and
carry less than ten pounds, and stand and/or walk for less than two hours in an eight-
hour workday. Dr. Zouabi added the claimant will need help with daily activities
and cannot work at any job (Exhibit 15F/2). This opinion is assigned little weight.
The opinion where the claimant cannot work at her usual occupation or any job is
an issue left to the Commissioner and is not consistent with the medical evidence
as a whole nor does it address all the claimant’s impairments and work related
limitations. Dr. Zouabi does not offer objective evidence in support of the assigned
limitations nor why an opinion on sitting was not offered. Again, Dr. Zouabi’s
opinion is assigned little weight as it is inconsistent with his own findings and the
record as a whole.
(PageID.2053–56.)
The ALJ properly declined to give the doctors’ various opinions, many of which provided
extreme functional limitations, controlling weight because they were unsupported by clinical
examination findings or other objective testing and were inconsistent with the record as a whole,
including largely normal lower extremity strength and range of motion findings. Moreover,
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
16 of 21

17
because most of these opinions were based on Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms rather than
medical evidence, the ALJ properly declined to give them controlling weight. See Young v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Kepke v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 636 F. App’x 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[A] a doctor cannot simply report what his patient
says and re-package it as an opinion.”).
The ALJ also provided good reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for the weight he
gave to the opinions. First, the issue of whether the claimant is disabled within the meaning of the
Act is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1); see Warner v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004). A treating physician’s opinion that a
patient is disabled or cannot work carries no special significance. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1),
(3), 416.927(d)(1), (3). Second, some of the opinions were vague, see Foreman v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 2:19-cv-454, 2019 WL 5287913, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2019), adopted by 2020 WL
1316431 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2020), and most provided no functional limitations. Third, the ALJ
found at least one opinion inconsistent with Plaintiff’s daily activities and ability to care for her
children. See Kidd v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 283 F. App'x 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ
additionally found that Dr. West’s conclusion was inconsistent with Kidd’s daily activities and
credibility as a whole.”). Finally, almost every opinion lacked support from the doctors’ own
treatment records or other medical evidence in the record. See McFaddin v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-
CV-685, 2018 WL 1413182, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2018) (“Here, the ALJ found that Dr.
Cox’s opinion was not supported by the medical evidence, including Dr. Cox’s own treatment
notes, both of which constitute ‘good reasons.’”).
Plaintiff contends that “it is erroneous for the ALJ to summarily reject Drs. Cheema and
Zouabi’s opinions solely because their medical records were not formulated in such a way as to
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
17 of 21

18
generate evidence for the disability determination.” (ECF No. 15 at PageID.2958.) But this is not
what the ALJ did. Because the doctors failed to cite objective medical evidence to support their
opinions, the ALJ sensibly looked to the doctors’ own treatment notes—as ALJs typically do—for
supporting examination findings. Although the notes contained some findings when Plaintiff had
specifically complained about back pain, they consistently lacked back or musculoskeletal findings
that would be expected in connection with such complaints. In contrast to Sampson v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 694 F. App’x 727 (11th Cir. 2017), which Plaintiff cites for the
proposition that medical records are generated to “promote communication and recordkeeping,”
“not to provide evidence for disability determinations,” id. at 735 (quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d
625, 634 (9th Cir. 2007), the ALJ did not reject the doctors’ opinions because their treatment notes
did not contain the functional limitations set forth in their opinions. Thus, Sampson’s statement
that “[t]he mere fact that a doctor’s judgments about a claimant’s work-related limitations are not
expressly reflected in treatment notes does not necessarily mean that the judgments are inconsistent
with the treatment notes,” id. at 735–36, is inapplicable here.
Plaintiff next contends Dr. Zouabi’s March 2016 opinion, which the ALJ discounted in part
because the doctor’s citation to an “MRI of lumbar spine” did not specify which MRI and findings,
supported the assessed limitations. Although not raised as a separate claim of error, Plaintiff asserts
that the ALJ failed in his duty to develop the record by not contacting Dr. Zouabi for clarification
about the cited MRI and to cure the deficiencies he found in the forms the doctors completed. This
argument lacks merit, as the Sixth Circuit has observed that “while the ALJ must ensure that every
claimant receives ‘a full and fair hearing,’ the ultimate burden of proving entitlement to benefits
lies with the claimant.” Moats v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 42 F.4th 558, 563 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 856 (6th Cir. 1986)) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
18 of 21

19
404.1512(a)). Because Plaintiff was represented at all times by experienced disability counsel who
had many years to assess the sufficiency of the record, the ALJ did not have a “heightened” duty
to develop the record. Id. at 563–64.
Plaintiff also contends that one of the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Zouabi’s September
2017 opinion—Plaintiff participated in minimal physical therapy being discharged in February
2018, returning for three sessions relating to her left shoulder, but ultimately being discharged in
September 2018 (PageID.2055)—is contrary to the record because Plaintiff also participated in
courses of physical therapy in 2016 and 2017 (ECF No. 15 at PageID.2962). This argument
mischaracterizes the ALJ’s statement, which he prefaced with, “following this opinion[.]” Because
both courses of physical therapy preceded his statement, this reason is fully supported by the
record. Moreover, the ALJ’s narrative discussion of the evidence shows that he specifically
acknowledged the 2016 course of physical therapy. (PageID.2048.)
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving the greatest weight to the opinions of
the non-examining sources, State agency medical consultant Sonia Ramirez-Jacobs, M.D., and
medical expert Dr. Steven Golub, who testified at the hearing. It is well established that “an ALJ
may provide greater weight to a state agency physician’s opinion when the physician’s finding and
rationale are supported by evidence in the record.” Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x
267, 274 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). The ALJ assigned limited weight to Dr.
Ramirez-Jacobs’s opined limitations of lifting and carrying 20 pounds frequently and 10 pounds
occasionally with standing/walking limited to four hours and sitting for about six hours as
consistent with updated imaging and physical examinations accounting for Plaintiff’s lumbar and
cervical spine degenerative disc disease. (PageID.2053.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in
weighing this opinion because Dr. Ramirez-Jacobs lacked the bulk of the medical records and
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
19 of 21

20
reviewed records only through September 2015. But this fact did not escape the ALJ, as he
specifically noted that Dr. Ramirez-Jacobs “was not privy to updated objective imaging [or]
progress notes[.]” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate error. See Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
811 F.3d 825, 834 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that “[w]here the non-examining source did not review
a complete case record, we require some indication that the ALJ at least considered these facts
before giving greater weight to an opinion from the non-examining source.” (quoting Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As for Dr. Golub, whose testimony was limited to the closed period, the ALJ found his
opinions supported by his specific references to the record during his testimony. (PageID.2056,
2092–99.) Dr. Golub found morbid obesity to be the only severe impairment, but opined that,
among other things, Plaintiff would be limited to lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally and
10 pounds frequently and limited to walking four hours and sitting six hours in an eight-hour
workday. (PageID.2056.) The ALJ assigned the opinion some weight because, while it was largely
consistent with the evidence, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal and other impairments
severe. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s finding, which incorporates Dr. Golub’s opined
limitations but includes more severe impairments, is “nonsensical” because it fails to account for
the additional severe impairments. (ECF No. 15 at PageID.2964.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s
contention, the ALJ’s finding makes perfect sense: he and Dr. Golub reached the same place but
took different paths to get there. One found that morbid obesity caused Plaintiff’s limitations while
the other attributed them to different severe impairments. Plaintiff shows no error.
In sum, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with
applicable law.
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
20 of 21

21
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
Dated: April 27, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within that time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case 1:25-cv-00585-PLM-SJB ECF No. 21, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
21 of 21