Franklin v. Bonfiglio et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ASHLEY EILENE FRANKLIN,
Case No. 1:25-cv-425
Plaintiff,
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v.
DAVID C. BONFIGLIO, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER TO TRANSFER VENUE
I. 	Background
Pro se plaintiff Ashley Eilene Franklin resides in Dowagiac, Michigan. She filed
a verified complaint against defendants alleging 17 causes of action under federal and state law.
See Order (ECF No. 11, PageID.176). Plaintiff named 16 defendants in Indiana, including a judge,
a state court referee and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”). See Compl. (ECF No. 1). “Underlying all
of the claims, Plaintiff contends a court in Indiana, acting without jurisdiction, without notice to
her, and without an evidentiary hearing, terminated her parental rights.” Order at PageID.176.
This federal lawsuit arose from a February 14, 2023 custody hearing in Elkhart
County, Indiana, involving plaintiff’s minor child.1 See Compl. at PageID.9-10. Plaintiff alleged
in pertinent part that:
At the time of the February 14, 2023 hearing in Elkhart County, Plaintiff had sole
physical custody of her son, who lived with mother and his 3 siblings. The father -
Brent Fifer Jr. - filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity using Indiana Code
§ 16-37-2-2.1, a statute that applies only to children born in Indiana, based on an
Indiana paternity affidavit. But Plaintiff's child was born in Michigan. The parties
1 Plaintiff’s child is not a party to this lawsuit.
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signed a Michigan Acknowledgment of Parentage (AOP) at the hospital - legally
establishing paternity and granting Plaintiff initial custody. Rather than filing a
complaint for custody or parenting time, Mr. Fifer used the Indiana paternity statute
to bypass due process entirely. Indiana never registered the Michigan AOP, never
conducted a UCCJEA hearing, and never issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law regarding jurisdiction. No emergency existed. No transfer was ordered by
Michigan. Nevertheless, Indiana courts treated the Michigan AOP as if it were an
Indiana one and issued paternity, custody, and child support orders without legal
authority.
At no point in this entire case, was a proper custody complaint or parenting
time petition filed. Prior to the February 14, 2023 hearing, Mother filed a Motion
to Continue, which was denied. At the February 14, 2023 hearing, Mother was
given primary physical custody and joint legal custody. Judge Bonfiglio ordered
hair follicle drug tests for both parents and a Guardian Ad Litem to represent the
best interest of the minor child. The next hearing was May, 2, 2023, Mother filed a
Motion to Relocate back to her domicile state of Michigan. This was denied without
a hearing, Mother was threatened with losing custody of minor child if she moved
back to Michigan.
The GAL filed a report with recommendations on July, 5, 2023. Father then
filed a Motion to Implement GAL’s Recommendations. A hearing was scheduled
for July 20, 2023, for Father’s motion. At the July 20, 2023 hearing, Indiana courts
awarded sole legal and primary physical custody to the father-without change in
circumstances, without evidence, and without evaluating the best interests of the
child.
The hearing on July 20, 2023, lasted approximately 18 minutes. It was not
an evidentiary hearing. No witnesses were called. No exhibits were admitted. The
judge made his decision solely based on a Motion to Implement the GAL’s
Recommendation-a report filed by Guardian ad Litem Mary Raatz, who had never
met the mother, never met the child, or Father. She conducted no investigation and
does not meet the legal qualifications of a GAL under Indiana law. Plaintiff had
submitted 	proof 	of 	compliance 	with 	court 	orders, 	including, 	a 	scheduled
appointment with court-approved psychologist Dr. Warren Sibilla, and a negative
hair follicle drug test, a full psychological evaluation completed by her licensed
provider.
Plaintiff tried to inform the court that she had complied with the court
orders, however none of it was considered. In less than 20 minutes, a Mother lost
her 1-year-old baby, without any finding of unfitness, without cross-examination,
without the right to be heard and without Indiana having jurisdiction. After custody
was transferred, Plaintiff was denied all contact for more than 70 days, even though
a court order granted supervised visitation through CAPS or an agreed third party.
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CAPS staff refused to schedule visits, later admitting they had been told by the
judge and clerk’s office not to do so. The father refused to allow any third-party
visitation. No justification was ever provided. No court order ever suspended
parenting time. Plaintiff is now limited to just six hours of visitation per month, on
weekdays only, supervised at CAPS, at her own expense. She must drive over an
hour each way, missing work and pulling children out of school. She is not allowed
to whisper to her child. Her other children- [the child’s] siblings- are prohibited
from attending. Close to 100 CAPS visitation reports have been filed, each one
describing bonding, affection, and emotional connection. Not a single one has
documented a concern. Yet, no additional time has ever been granted. All requests
for holidays, extended visits, family travel or reunification have been denied.
When Plaintiff attempted to follow the court’s psychological evaluation
order, she requested a more affordable provider or use of her existing therapist. The
judge refused, requiring her to pay $2,500 to see a specific psychologist. When she
complied, the psychologist recused himself after learning she was seeking legal
advice-as he had advised. The judge responded by ordering an even more expensive
evaluation, with another specific psychologist charging $4,000, again ignoring
Plaintiff's completed report, insurance limitations, and financial hardship. The court
made it clear that Mother would not be reunited with her son until she completed
an evaluation by ONLY the doctor that the Judge chose.
The court even held her in contempt for allegedly failing to complete a drug
test that was ordered while she was not present, and mailed to her after the deadline
had already expired.
And now, Plaintiff has warrants for her arrest for nonpayment of child
support - on a child she is not allowed to see, whose custody was taken without
legal cause, and for whom she never received support when she had custody. She
cannot enter Indiana to visit her [child] without being arrested.
Id. at PageID.9-12.
Plaintiff alleged that she “has exhausted every legal remedy available under Indiana
law.” Id. at PageID.12. Having spent months contesting custody in the Elkhart Superior Court,
plaintiff now seeks relief from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan
which includes: a declaration “that the custody and support orders issued by the Indiana court are
void due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and constitutional defects”; an injunction to “[e]njoin
Defendants from enforcing any custody, support, contempt, or criminal orders arising from or
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connected to the jurisdictionally void Indiana proceedings”; “Order the immediate reinstatement
of Plaintiff's parental rights as required by the Michigan AOP [affidavit of parentage]”; award
compensatory damages of $25,000,000.00; and, award special damages of at least $300,000.00 for
medical treatment, supervised visitation costs, travel expenses, lost wages, and therapy for plaintiff
and her children. Id. at PageID.68-69.
This Court denied plaintiff’s two motions for temporary restraining orders (TROs).
See Orders (ECF Nos. 11 and 79). In the first motion, plaintiff asked the Court to enjoin defendants
from enforcing any custody order issued by the Indiana courts, to order defendants to return her
child to her pending further proceedings, and, to stay all actions, hearings and proceedings in the
Indiana courts involving her and her child. See Order (ECF No. 11, PageID.176). In addressing
plaintiff’s claims, this Court stated in part,
Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that she has a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits. Federal courts generally lack authority to issue divorce,
alimony and child custody decrees. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703
(1992). When a plaintiff seeks relief that modifies or enjoins a divorce, alimony, or
child custody decree, this domestic-relations exception generally precludes federal
court action. See Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 795-96 (6th Cir.
2015). If the domestic-relations exception to federal authority does not apply, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts from functioning as appellate
courts from state court judgments. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that the doctrine applies to “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments”). The Indiana court granted
the father of the child physical and sole legal custody in July 2023 (ECF No. 10-6
PageID.131). The Sixth Circuit has applied Rooker-Feldman to child custody
disputes where the federal plaintiff seeks relief that functions as a review of the
state court judgment. See Hancock v. Miller, 852 F. App’x 914, 921-22.
PageID.178. 	In plaintiff’s second motion for a TRO, she asked this Court to enjoin defendants
from “incarcerating or otherwise penalizing her pursuant to a defective Rule to Show Cause
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proceeding currently set in Elkhart Superior Court 6, Title IV-D docket, on October 10, 2025”.
See Order (ECF No. 79) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants responded to the complaint by filing motions to transfer venue (see ECF
Nos. 38 and 44) as well as motions to dismiss the complaint (see ECF Nos. 19. 23, 24, 38, 44, and
52). For her part, plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint (see ECF No. 67).
Five defendants seek to transfer venue of this case to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana. 	Four of these defendants identify themselves as the
“Elkhart County defendants”: Christopher Anderson (Clerk of the Circuit Court of Elkhart County,
Indiana); Lisa Brown (Director of the Elkhart County Prosecutor’s Office Pretrial Diversion
Program); Hannah Musgrave (a court reporter with Elkhart Superior Court 6 in Elkhart County);
and Mary Raatz (a court-appointed GAL in proceedings before the Elkhart County Courts during
the relevant period). See Elkhart Defendants’ Brief (ECF No. 39, PageID.355-357). The Elkhart
County defendants have filed a combined “motion to transfer venue or to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim” (ECF
No. 38). 	The fifth defendant, Thomas Stipp, represented defendant Brent Fifer, Jr. during the
proceedings in Indiana. 	See Compl. at PageID.16. 	Defendant Stipp filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (3), and (6), with an alternative motion to transfer the case.
See Motion (ECF No. 44, PageID.407-408). 	This matter is now before the Court on these two
motions to transfer venue to the Northern District of Indiana (ECF Nos. 38 and 44).2
2 This case has been referred to the undersigned to handle all matters under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(a) and 636(b)(1)(A) and
for submission of recommendations on dispositive motions under § 636(b)(1)(B). See Order (ECF No. 6). The motions
to transfer venue are non-dispositive matters referred to the undersigned for decision. See Marshall v. George, No.
1:20-cv-722, 2020 WL 6318593 at *1, fn 1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2020) (“The transfer of venue is a non-dispositive
matter.”), citing Carstens v. Michigan Department of Treasury, No. 1:09-cv-664, 2009 WL 2581504 (W.D. Mich.
Aug. 18, 2009) and Horacek v. Heyns, No. CIV.A. 14-13545, 2015 WL 799540 at *3, fn 1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2015)
(“motions to change venue are non-dispositive because they do not address the merits of the parties’ claims and should
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II. 	Discussion
“A district court’s determination that a plaintiff has filed his action in an improper
venue is a question of law.” Miles v. WTMX Radio, 15 Fed. Appx. 213, 215 (6th Cir. 2001). “Once
an objection to venue has been raised, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is
proper.” Domino’s Pizza PMC v. Caribbean Rhino, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1006 (E.D. Mich.
2006). The general venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that:
A civil action may be brought in—
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought
as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect
to such action.
In their motion, the Elkhart County defendants contend that venue is proper under
28 U.S.C. § 1391 because all of their alleged conduct occurred in Elkhart County, Indiana, and
that plaintiff’s residence in Michigan does not render this district a proper venue for the lawsuit.
These defendants also ask this Court to transfer the case to the South Bend Division of the Northern
District of Indiana. 	See Elkhart County Defendants’ Brief at PageID.371-372. 	Similarly,
defendant Stipp contends that the Western District of Michigan is not a proper venue because none
of the defendants reside in this district and none of the events took place in this district (i.e.,
proceed by order rather than report and recommendation.”). This order does not address defendants’ motions to
dismiss.
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“Plaintiff herself alleges that no defendants reside in Michigan and that the events at issue took
place in Elkhart Superior Court in Indiana”), and, that proper venue lies in the Northern District of
Indiana. 	See Defendant Stipp’s Brief (ECF No. 45, PageID.417-418). 	For her part, plaintiff
contends that venue is proper in the Western District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(2) because she suffered harm while residing in Michigan and her child was born in
Michigan. See Plaintiff’s Response to defendant Stipp (ECF No. 54, PageID.474-475); Response
to Elkhart County Defendants (ECF No. 55, PageID.481-482). Plaintiff does not address venue
under either §§ 1391(b)(1) or 1391(b)(3). Id.
As an initial matter, the Western District of Michigan does not qualify as a proper
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 	None of the defendants reside in Michigan. 	Plaintiff
identified all defendants as residents of Indiana (Compl. at PageID.1), with 15 of the 16 defendants
residing and served with a summons in either Elkhart County or St. Joseph County, Indiana, both
of which are located within the geographic boundary of the South Bend Division of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 94(a)(2). Based on this
record, the Northern District of Indiana qualifies as a proper venue under § 1391(b)(1).
3 The executed summonses list an address in Elkhart, Indiana for the following defendants: Heather Schuetz; James
N. Fox; Rebecca Shelter-East; David C. Bonfiglio; Hannah Musgraves; Christopher Anderson; Eric Blackman; Joel
Williams; Brent Fifer, Jr.; Mary Raatz; and, Lashell Brown. Defendants Lisa Brown and Sumaita Hassan’s listed
addresses are in Goshen, Indiana, which is located in Elkhart County. Defendants Warren Sibilla and Thomas Stipp’s
addresses are in South Bend, Indiana, which is located in St. Joseph County. See Executed summonses (ECF Nos. 12
and 14). With respect to defendant Brandie Yoder, identified as “CAPS Supervisor” for defendants Heather Schuetz
and Lachelle Brown (see Compl. at PageID.26), Yoder’s attorney stated, “[a] summons has not been returned executed
to the Court according to the ECF Docket for Defendant Brandie Yoder. However, Defendant Yoder is acquiescing
to the jurisdiction of this Court in the filing of this motion, and a waiver of service will be forthcoming.” Defendant
Yoder’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24, PageID.265, fn.1). According to Yoder’s attorney, “Child and Parent
Services (‘CAPS’) is an Indiana-based not-for-profit entity that, amongst a number of other services, coordinates
supervised visits between parents and children through the state courts.” Defendant Yoder’s Brief (ECF No. 25,
PageID.268). Yoder’s attorney reiterated that plaintiff is “the only party located within the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan.” Id. at PageID.270.
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Next, plaintiff contends that venue is proper in the Western District of Michigan
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) “because the effects of Defendants’ conduct were felt in Michigan.”
Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 55, PageID.481). For example, plaintiff contends: that she is a
resident of Michigan; that the child was born in Michigan; that Michigan was “exercising exclusive
continuing jurisdiction” over the child; and that “[t]he unlawful warrants Defendants procured
against Plaintiff” prevent her from entering Indiana to participate in the proceedings and bar her
from exercising her limited supervised visitation. See Compl. at PageID.7, PageID.9-10; Response
at PageID.481-482.
Plaintiff’s contention is without merit. This lawsuit arises from defendants’ actions
taken during a child custody matter being litigated in Elkhart County, Indiana. Plaintiff’s claim is
that defendants, all citizens of Indiana, committed wrongful acts in that Indiana custody case. In
addition, the record reflects that plaintiff was living in Elkhart, Indiana while the custody matter
was pending in the Indiana court. As discussed, supra, plaintiff alleged that she did not seek to
“relocate” to Michigan until months after the February 14, 2023 custody hearing:
The next hearing was May, 2, 2023, Mother filed a Motion to Relocate back
to her domicile state of Michigan. This was denied without a hearing, Mother was
threatened with losing custody of minor child if she moved back to Michigan.
Compl. at PageID.10. In this regard, the state court order addressing plaintiff’s relocation listed
her address as 22414 County Road 10 in Elkhart, Indiana, and stated in part, “[i]f Mother, in fact,
chooses to relocate to Portage, MI, then Father will be ordered/granted the temporary legal and
physical custody of the minor child subject to Mother’s parenting time.” (Order) (May 2, 2023)
(ECF No. 10-5).
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The fact that plaintiff suffered from negative consequences after returning to
Michigan does not transform defendants’ alleged wrongful acts into “events or omissions” which
occurred in Michigan for purposes of § 1391(b)(2). See, e.g., Tobien v. Nationwide General
Insurance Company, 133 F.4th 613, 622 (6th Cir. 2025) (“To the extent [the plaintiff] argues that
he was situated in Kentucky when he suffered the negative consequences of the insurance
company’s actions, that fails to establish venue. [W]ithout more, an allegation that the plaintiff
suffer[ed] . . . economic harm within a district is not sufficient for purposes of establishing venue
in that district under § 1391(b)(2).”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also, Domino’s Pizza
PMC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 998 at 1006 (observing that “[t]he requirement of ‘substantiality’ is to
prevent the unfairness of a defendant being ‘hauled into a remote district having no real
relationship to the dispute.’ ”) (quoting Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d
291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff also contends that venue is proper in Michigan under § 1391(b)(2) because
her child was born in Michigan and that the Indiana defendants “directed their unlawful conduct
at Michigan” by asserting jurisdiction over a Michigan child. Response at PageID.481. Plaintiff’s
contention is without merit. As discussed, supra, the allegations in the complaint set forth a lengthy
custody dispute in the state court in Elkhart County, Indiana. Defendants alleged wrongful acts
performed during that Indiana custody proceeding are the “events and omissions” at issue in this
lawsuit. For these reasons, the Court finds that the events alleged in plaintiff’s lawsuit have no
connection to the Western District of Michigan and that this Court is not a proper venue for that
lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2). 	However, the Court finds that the Northern District of
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Indiana has multiple connections to the events alleged in this lawsuit and is a proper venue for
plaintiff’s claims under § 1391(b)(2).
Finally, the fallback provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) does not apply here.
While venue is not proper in the Western District of Michigan, venue is proper in the Northern
District of Indiana under both § 1391(b)(1) and § 1391(b)(2). “Section 1391(b)(3) applies only if
there is no other district in which venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).” 	See Haywood v.
Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 21-10507, 2021 WL 5494165 at *2 (E.D. Mich. March
18, 2021).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a
case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” For all of the
reasons as set forth above, the Court finds that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this case to
the Northern District of Indiana. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motions to transfer venue filed by defendants
Christopher Anderson, Lisa Brown, Hannah Musgrave, and Mary Raatz (ECF No. 38) and
defendant Thomas Stipp (ECF No. 44) are GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is transferred to the South Bend
Division of the Northern District of Indiana.
Dated: November 6, 2025 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
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