Ash v. Commissioner of Social Security

1:25-cv-00381Miwd17.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHERYL ASH,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-381
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant,
__________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review
of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) which denied her claim
for disability insurance benefits (DIB).
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on February 8, 2022, alleging a disability onset
date of March 1, 2018. PageID.28. Plaintiff completed the 12th grade and had past relevant work
as a car wash attendant and cashier. PageID.36, 216. Plaintiff identified her disabling conditions
as major depressive disorder (MDD), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), panic disorder,
osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis [B hands, back and B feet], and “unknown special sense &
speech [B eyes]”. PageID.215. An administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed plaintiff’s claim de
novo and entered a written decision denying benefits on January 31, 2024. PageID.28-39. This
decision, which was later approved by the Appeals Council, has become the final decision of the
Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
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“The federal courts review the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial
evidence and give fresh review to its legal interpretations.” 	Taskila v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 819 F.3d 902, 903 (6th Cir. 2016). This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision
is typically focused on determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990).
“[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97,
103 (2019). “Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means —
and means only — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A determination of substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record
taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 925 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).
The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. 	This Court does not
review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, or weigh the evidence. Brainard v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that the record
also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the
Commissioner’s decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in the record.
Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). “If the
[Commissioner’s] decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if the
reviewing court would decide the matter differently, and even if substantial evidence also supports
the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286
(6th Cir. 1994).
A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to
benefits. 	A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial
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gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1505; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923
(6th Cir. 1990). 	In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step
analysis:
The Social Security Act requires the [Commissioner] to follow a “five-step
sequential process” for claims of disability. First, plaintiff must demonstrate that
she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time she seeks
disability benefits. 	Second, plaintiff must show that she suffers from a “severe
impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability. A “severe impairment” is
one which “significantly limits . . . 	physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” Third, if plaintiff is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a
severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the
impairment meets a listed impairment, plaintiff is presumed to be disabled
regardless of age, education or work experience. 	Fourth, if the plaintiff's
impairment does not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, plaintiff is not
disabled. For the fifth and final step, even if the plaintiff’s impairment does prevent
her from doing her past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy
that plaintiff can perform, plaintiff is not disabled.
Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations
caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant
work through step four. 	Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.
2003). However, at step five of the inquiry, “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a
significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile.” Id. If it is determined that a claimant
is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis
v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).
II. 	ALJ’s DECISION
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Plaintiff’s claim failed at the fifth step of the evaluation. At the first step, the ALJ
found that plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on June 30,
2023. PageID.30. The ALJ also found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
from the alleged onset date of March 1, 2018, through her date last insured of June 30, 2021. Id.
At the second step, the ALJ found that through the date last insured, plaintiff
had severe impairments of: arthralgias; valgus deformity, and chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD). Id. 	In reaching this determination, the ALJ found that
The claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments of depression,
anxiety, panic disorder, and alcohol use disorder, considered singly and in
combination, did not cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability
to perform basic mental work activities and were therefore nonsevere.
PageID.31.
The ALJ explained that,
The claimant reported a history of mental impairments. She received
medication management to address her symptoms. The claimant’s mental status
exams where largely unremarkable during the relevant period. Exams noted she
often presented as cooperative, had a normal mood and affect, exhibited normal
behavior, had good insight and judgment, and had intact memory and concentration
(1F/9, 20, 31, 35; 3F/11; 5F/108, 141, 167). In June of 2018, the claimant reported
doing well and that her symptoms were well controlled on medications (3F/11).
During an exam in September of 2020, the claimant reported continuing mental
impairment symptoms. On exam, the claimant had a normal mood and affect, was
cooperative, exhibited normal speech and thoughts, and had intact attention,
concentration, cognition, and memory (1F/38; 5F/179). In June of 2021, the
claimant reported her mental impairment symptoms were well controlled by
medications (5F/138). She also reported achieving sobriety after attending rehab
(5F/138). As the claimant’s mental status exams were unremarkable, she received
minimal treatment, and reported her symptoms were well controlled by medication,
I find her mental impairments non-severe.
PageID.31.
The ALJ explained his methodology for determining the existence of a “severe”
impairment at Step Two, stating that
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In making this finding, I have considered the broad funtional [sic] areas of
mental functioning set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental
disorders and in the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1). These four broad functional areas are known as the “paragraph B” criteria.
Id. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff had a “mild limitation” in each of the four functional areas:
understanding, remembering or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating,
persisting or maintaining pace; and, adapting or managing oneself. 	PageID.31-32. 	After
considering the “Paragraph B” criteria, the ALJ concluded that:
Because the claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments caused
no more than “mild” limitation in any of the functional areas and the evidence does
not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s
ability to do basic work activities, they were nonsevere (20 CFR 404.1520a(d)(1)).
PageID.32 (emphasis in original). The ALJ also explained that:
The limitations identified in the “paragraph B” criteria are not a residual
functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental
impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. The mental
residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential
evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment. The following residual
functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation I have found in the
“paragraph B” mental function analysis.
PageID.32.
At the third step, the ALJ addressed plaintiff’s physical impairments and found that
through the date last insured, plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1. Id.1 The ALJ decided at the fourth step that:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the date
last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform medium
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except the claimant can frequently stoop,
1 In reaching this determination, the ALJ’s decision did not address whether plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments
met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment. However, plaintiff’s statement of errors did not include an
alleged error related to the Listings. Accordingly, any alleged error in the ALJ’s review of the Listings is waived. See
Notice (ECF No. 7, PageID.908) (“Failure to identify an issue in the Statement of Errors constitutes a waiver of that
issue.”).
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kneel, crouch, and crawl, occasionally climb ramps and stairs, can never climb
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, can frequently handle and finger bilaterally, must
avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat, humidity or to concentrated
pulmonary irritants such as fumes, dusts, odors, or gases.
PageID.32-33. 	The ALJ also found that through the date last insured, plaintiff was unable to
perform any past relevant work. PageID.36.
At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, plaintiff
could perform a significant number of medium, unskilled jobs. 	PageID.37-38. 	Based on the
testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform the requirements
of occupations in the national economy such as “Laborer, stores” (20,000 jobs) and assembler
(88,000 jobs). 	PageID.37. 	Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not under a
disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from March 1, 2018 (the alleged onset
date) through January 31, 2024 (the date last insured). PageID.38.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raised one error on appeal:
The 	ALJ 	failed 	to 	adequately 	evaluate 	Ash’s 	depression,
anxiety, and panic disorder and failed to account for her
resulting mental limitations in the RFC [residual functional
capacity].
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ provided a limited analysis of her mental limitations
at Step Two (i.e., depression, anxiety, and panic disorder), found these impairments to be non-
severe, and relied on this limited analysis to support an RFC with no mental limitations. 	See
Plaintiff’s Brief (ECF No. 13, PageID.926).
RFC is a medical assessment of what an individual can do in a work setting in spite
of functional limitations and environmental restrictions imposed by all of her medically
determinable impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. It is defined as “the maximum degree to
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which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental
requirements of jobs.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(c). In determining the RFC,
the ALJ considers impairments that are both “severe” and “not severe” (see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545)
“based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record” (20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(e)).
As discussed, the ALJ found that plaintiff had severe impairments of arthralgias,
valgus deformity, and COPD. Upon determining that a claimant has one severe impairment, the
ALJ must continue with the remaining steps in the disability evaluation. See Maziarz v. Secretary
of Health & Human Services, 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987). Once the ALJ determines that a
claimant suffers from at least one severe impairment, the ALJ “will consider the limiting effects
of all [the claimant’s] impairment(s), even those that are not severe, in determining [the claimant's]
residual functional capacity”. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). 	See Hedges v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 725 Fed. Appx. 394, 395 (6th Cir. 2018). 	“The fact that some of [the claimant’s]
impairments were not deemed to be severe at step two is therefore legally irrelevant.” Anthony v.
Astrue, 266 Fed. Appx. 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008).
Here, the record reflects that the ALJ evaluated both the severe and non-severe
impairments while determining plaintiff’s RFC. 	At Step Four, the ALJ observed that plaintiff
“reported a history of mental impairments.” PageID.33. Specifically,
She reported the impairments result in difficulty concentrating, remembering
details, understanding instructions, and dealing with stress and pressure. She
reported she can only focus for five minutes and often gets easily confused when
trying to follow instructions.
PageID.33. 	The ALJ explained that plaintiff’s claim is limited to the time period between her
alleged disability onset date (March 1, 2018) through her date last insured (June 30, 2021). During
this time period,
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The objective medical evidence was not fully consistent with the claimant’s
reported symptoms and limitations. While the evidence supported some limitations,
it was not fully consistent with disabling limitations. To be sure, the evidence from
after the date last insured showed the claimant developed new impairments.
However, the evidence from the relevant period showed generally unremarkable
exam findings and minimal treatment.
PageID.34-35.
In this regard, the ALJ found the opinions of the state agency psychological
consultants were not persuasive:
I considered the prior administrative findings of state agency psychological
consultants Alvin Smith, Ph.D., and Natalie Rea-Michalak, Psy.D., who found the
claimant had severe mental impairments, but there was insufficient evidence to
determine her functional capacity (1A; 4A). I do not find their findings persuasive.
Their findings were not well supported, as it is inconsistent to say there is sufficient
evidence to find the claimant’s mental impairments were severe but not enough to
determine her functioning. Their finding the claimant’s mental impairments were
severe was not consistent with the claimant’s minimal treatment and unremarkable
mental status exams (1F/9, 20, 31, 35; 3F/11; 5F/108, 141, 167).
PageID.35-36.2
In addition, the ALJ found that:
I considered the opinions of the claimant’s therapist and Dr. Charlotte
Johnson, who opined the claimant has marked limitations to her ability to
concentration, but otherwise had mild limitations (11F). I do not find their findings
persuasive. Their opinions were not well supported, as their examinations do not
contain objective findings consistent with marked limitations. Their opinion were
internally inconsistent, as they stated the claimant had mild memory and social
limitations, but later said they were marked. Their opinions were not consistent with
the claimant’s minimal treatment and unremarkable mental status exams (1F/9, 20,
31, 35; 3F/11; 5F/108, 141, 167). Furthermore, the opinion was given years after
the date last insured and it is not clear whether they focused solely on the claimant’s
functioning during the relevant period.
2 The Court notes that while Dr. Smith stated that plaintiff had a severe impairment of “Depressive, Bipolar and
Related Disorders”, the doctor stated that “[a] medically determinable impairment is present that does not precisely
satisfy the diagnostic criteria” of the “A” criteria of the listings, there was “insufficient evidence” of the “B” criteria
of the listings, and there was “insufficient evidence” of the “C” criteria of the listings. PageID.85-86. The doctor also
stated that “the available evidence is insufficient to fully address impairments”. PageID.86. On reconsideration, Dr.
Rea-Michalak made similar findings. PageID.94-95.
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PageID.36.3
The ALJ also found that “[a]side from the medical evidence, the claimant’s reported
activities and abilities were not fully consistent with disabling limitations.” 	PageID.35. 	For
example,
The claimant reported being able to perform a wide range of daily activities. She
reported caring for her grandson several hours a day (5E). She reported being able
to tend to her personal care and hygiene, care for pets, do laundry, wash dishes,
dust, sweep, drive, shop in stores, socialize with others, and denied difficulty
following instructions, remembering, and getting along with others (5E). Some of
the physical and mental abilities and social interactions required in order to perform
these activities are the same as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining
employment. I find the claimant’s ability to participate in such activities diminishes
the persuasiveness of the claimant’s allegations of functional limitations.
PageID.35.
Here, the ALJ explained why plaintiff’s non-severe, mild mental limitations did not
result in functional limitations. Based on this record, the ALJ’s RFC determination, which did not
include any mental limitations, is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim
of error should be denied.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons discussed, I respectfully recommend that the Commissioner’s
decision be AFFIRMED.
Dated: June 17, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge
3 The Court notes that the “Treating Source Statement – Psychological Conditions” (Exh. 11F, PageID.872-876) is
dated August 23, 2023 (PageID.876). In this regard, the therapist and Dr. Johnson did not begin treating plaintiff until
July 11, 2022, more than one year after the relevant time period (PageID.872).
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ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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