Kissinger v. Commissioner of Social Security

1:25-cv-00171Miwd05.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
PAUL K., 	Case No. 	1:25-cv-00171
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	addresses 	Plaintiff’s 	appeal 	of
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Brian Burgtorf’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request
for 	Disability 	Insurance 	Benefits 	(DIB). 	This 	appeal 	is 	brought 	pursuant 	to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The 	record 	shows 	that 	Plaintiff 	suffers 	from 	multiple 	severe 	medically
determinable impairments (MDI), including effects from a partial amputation of his
left foot that occurred during childhood, a right knee replacement, left knee arthritis,
and multiple left shoulder surgeries. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.32, 55–56.) 	Plaintiff
asserts that ALJ Burgtorf’s formulation of his Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)
was not supported by substantial evidence. 1 	Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical opinion of his treating orthopedic
1 	RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations,” and is
measured using “all the relevant evidence in [the] case record.” 	20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1).
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specialist, 	William 	Comai, 	D.O., 	as 	required 	under 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520(c),
particularly with respect to his left knee. 	(ECF No. 9, PageID.864.) 	Plaintiff
primarily focuses on the ALJ’s treatment of an RFC questionnaire completed by Dr.
Comai on August 9, 2024, (see id., PageID.865 (originally Exh. 18F)), and treatment
notes from a follow up physical evaluation on October 1, 2024 (see id., PageID.869
(originally Exh. 16F)).
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Comai’s opinion was only partially persuasive in
assessing RFC. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.41.) 	The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ
appropriately evaluated Dr. Comai’s opinion and that the RFC assessment is
supported by substantial evidence. 	(ECF No. 10, PageID.878.)
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that the Court
affirm the ALJ’s decision.
I. 	Procedural History
A. 	Key Dates
The ALJ’s decision notes that Plaintiff applied for DIB on May 11, 2023,
alleging an onset date of April 15, 2023. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.29.) 	Plaintiff’s claim
was initially denied by the Social Security Administration on March 11, 202[4] 2 .
(Id.) 	The claim was then denied on reconsideration on June 3, 2024. 	(Id.)
On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. 	(Id.) 	ALJ
Burgtorf conducted a telephone hearing on Plaintiff’s claim on October 10, 2024.
2 	The ALJ decision says the denial was on March 11, 2023, but it is clear from
the record that the denial occurred in 2024, and any resulting error is harmless.
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The ALJ heard testimony from both Plaintiff and Melanie Frye, an impartial
vocational expert. 	(Id.)
The ALJ issued his decision on October 24, 2024, finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 	(Id.) 	On December 16,
2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision,
making that decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 	(Id., PageID.15).
Plaintiff timely filed this lawsuit on February 14, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1.)
B. 	Summary of ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ’s decision accurately outlined the five-step sequential process for
determining whether an individual is disabled. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.30–31.)
Before stating his findings at each step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff meets the
insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2028.
(Id., PageID.31.)
At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since his reported onset date of April 15, 2023. 	(Id., PageID.32.)
At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following MDI:3
[S]tatus-post left great toe and 1st metatarsal amputation; status-post
right knee replacement; status-post left shoulder rotator cuff repair;
carpal tunnel syndrome; osteoarthritis of the left knee; degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine; obesity; headaches; tendinopathy of the left
biceps tendon; a partial-tear of the left common extensor tendon; and
psoriatic arthritis. (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
3 	The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s history of hypertension, which he found was
not an MDI, but which he considered when formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. (ECF No. 5-
2, PageID.32.)
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(Id.)
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 	(Id.) 	The ALJ
specifically commented on the impairments in the following Listings:4
 	1.15 (degenerative disc disease) (id., PageID.33);
 	1.16 (degenerative disc disease) (id.);
 	1.17 (right knee replacement) (id., PageID.34);
 	1.18 (left knee osteoarthritis and left rotator cuff repair) (id.);
 	1.20 (left foot amputation) (id.);
 	1.21 (left rotator cuff repair, tendinopathy of the left biceps tendon, and
partial tear of the left common extensor tendon) (id.); and
 	11.14 (carpal tunnel syndrome) (id., PageID.34–35).
Before going on to Step Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the
following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant
has the residual functional capacity to perform light work[5] as defined
4 	While obesity is not a listed impairment, the ALJ noted that he considered the
functional limitations caused by Plaintiff’s obesity—alone and in combination with
his other MDI—at each step of the sequential evaluation process. 	(ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.35.) 	The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s headaches—for which there is no
specific listing—failed to meet the requirements of any listings in section 11.00
(neurological disorders). 	(Id.)
5 	Light work is defined as “work [that] involves lifting no more than 20 pounds
at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even
though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires
a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with
some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
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in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except can stand and/or walk for four hours out
of eight; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can frequently
climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; can
never overhead reach with the left upper extremity; can frequently
handle with the right hand; can never work around vibration, nor
hazards, such as unprotected heights or unguarded moving machinery;
can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, and make
simple work-related decisions.
(Id.)
The ALJ devoted seven pages to discussing Plaintiff’s RFC, including:
 	a summary of the regulations regarding how he addressed Plaintiff’s
symptoms (id., PageID.35–36);
 	a summary of Plaintiff’s statements (id., PageID.36);
 	a summary of medical evidence related to Plaintiff’s treatment by Dr.
Comai (id., PageID.36–38); primary care provider Jeremiah Schnoor,
M.D. (id., PageID.37); and rheumatologist Hirenkumar Patel, M.D.
(id., PageID.38–39);
 	a summary of the opinions by internal medicine consultative examiner
Tama Abel, M.D., (id., PageID.37), and state agency medical consultants
Larry Jackson, M.D., and Catherine Mazei, D.O. (id., PageID.40);
 	a summary of the opinion by Dr. Comai, opining that Plaintiff “would be
incapable of performing even low stress jobs” and that his “left knee
arthritis would affect his ability to stand and/or walk for any length of
performing a full or wide range of light work, [claimant] must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities.” 	20 CFR § 404.1567(b).
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time,” (id., PageID.40–41). As set forth above, the ALJ found Dr. Comai’s
opinion partially persuasive, which Plaintiff argues was in error; and
 	an explanation of how the ALJ arrived at his decision that Plaintiff has
an RFC to perform light work (id.).
At Step Four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past
relevant work as a factory machine operator. 	(Id., PageID.41–42.)
At Step Five, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience
and RFC, and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social
Security Act because there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that he could perform. 	(Id., PageID.42–43.)
II. 	Standard of Review
Review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to two issues: (1) “whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards,” and (2) “whether the findings of the ALJ are
supported by substantial evidence.” 	Winslow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 566 F. App’x
418, 420 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405
(6th Cir. 2009)); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	The Court may not conduct a de novo review of
the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. 	Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 	It is the Commissioner who is charged
with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and the
Commissioner’s findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial
evidence. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.
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See Cohen v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir.
1992). 	It is “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” 	Jones v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 945 F.2d 1365,
1369 (6th Cir. 1991). 	In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court
must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and whatever evidence in the
record fairly detracts from its weight. 	Richardson v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
The substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within
which the decision maker may properly rule either way, without judicial interference.
Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 	This standard
affords the administrative decisionmaker considerable latitude and acknowledges
that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because
the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. 	Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d
342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993).
III. 	Analysis
The ALJ provided the following summary and assessment of Dr. Comai’s
medical opinion:
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(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.40–41.)
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) failed to meaningfully address how Dr.
Comai’s opinion was inconsistent with the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Abel,
(ECF No. 9, PageID.867), and (2) mischaracterized and selectively cited from Dr.
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Comai’s clinical findings (id., PageID.868). 	The Commissioner argues that the ALJ
acted well within his “zone of choice” as factfinder in determining Dr. Comai’s opinion
was inconsistent with and not supported by the overall record. 	(ECF No. 10,
PageID.879–81.)
Because Plaintiff filed his application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluated
the medical opinions pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c). 	(See ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.41.) 	Under that regulation, the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific
evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative 	medical 	finding(s),” 	even 	an 	opinion 	from 	a 	treating 	source.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). 	Instead, an ALJ will articulate his or her determination of
the persuasiveness of a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors listed
in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” 	20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b)(1). 	Those 	factors 	include: 	(1) 	supportability; 	(2) 	consistency; 	(3)
relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to
support or contradict the opinion. 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5). 	In general, the
ALJ must explain his or her consideration of the supportability and consistency
factors, but the ALJ is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.l520c(b)(2)–(3).
The regulation defines “supportability” and “consistency” as follows:
(1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting 	explanations 	presented 	by 	a 	medical 	source 	are 	to
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), 	the 	more 	persuasive 	the 	medical 	opinions 	or 	prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
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(2) Consistency. 	The 	more 	consistent 	a 	medical 	opinion(s) 	or 	prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c)(1)–(2).
Here, while ALJ Burgtorf’s direct treatment of supportability and consistency
was brief, his reasoning for finding Dr. Comai’s opinion only partially persuasive is
sufficiently supported by his earlier discussion of Plaintiff’s medical records during
the RFC analysis. 	See e.g., Forrest v. Commr. of Soc. Sec., 591 Fed. Appx. 359, 366
(6th Cir. 2014) (“here the ALJ made sufficient factual findings elsewhere in his
decision to support his conclusion at step three”); Crum v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 660 F.
App’x 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2016) (it is sufficient for an ALJ’s reasons for determining
the consistency of a medical opinion to be found elsewhere in the decision); Dunlavy
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3333, 2024 WL 4558606, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2024)
(finding that the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinion was supported where the
inconsistencies in the record were discussed in the same section of her decision);
Lillian A. v. O’Malley, No. 4:23-CV-4-CRS-HBB, 2024 WL 987571, at *2 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 7, 2024) (“Indeed, an ALJ’s reasons for rejecting or adopting a medical opinion
may be gleaned from elsewhere in the written decision: ‘meaningful judicial review
exists – even if the ALJ provided only a cursory or sparse analysis – if the ALJ made
sufficient factual findings elsewhere in the decision that supports her conclusion.’”)
(citing Booker R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-cv-170, 2023 WL 4247312, at *4–5
(S.D. Ohio June 29, 2023).
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The undersigned finds that the ALJ’s decision meets the requirements of 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and is supported by substantial evidence.
A. 	Supportability Factor
First, the ALJ sufficiently addressed the supportability factor, explaining there
were 	not 	“sufficient 	narrative 	statements 	or 	clinical 	examination 	finding
abnormalities to provide a corroborative basis” for all of Dr. Comai’s findings.
(ECF No. 	5-2, 	PageID.40.) 	Specifically, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	Dr. 	Comai’s
recommendations unpersuasive with respect to Plaintiff’s
 	ability to stand and/or walk;
 	need to change positions at will;
 	need to take breaks and/or elevate his legs during the day;
 	inability to perform even low-stress work; and
 	expected level of absenteeism from work.
(Id.)
These findings came from the physical RFC report completed by Dr. Comai on
August 9, 2024 (ECF No. 5-15, PageID.845–49 (originally Exh. 18F)), which the ALJ
cited in his summary of Dr. Comai’s opinion immediately preceding the ALJ’s
evaluation of the opinion’s persuasiveness (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.40–41).
The August 2024 report consists of several selection boxes and some short
answer questions and explanation prompts. 	(ECF No. 5-15, PageID.845–49.) 	The
disputed findings are taken largely from selection box questions, including the
following:
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(ECF No. 5-15, PageID.846–47 (originally Exh. 18F).)
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not give credit to Dr. Comai’s later findings
in October 2024—including a treatment note indicating “the exam findings and x-ray
findings [6] are significant enough that this would affect his ability to stand or walk for
any length of time or any distance”—or his earlier treatment records indicating
abnormalities in Plaintiff’s knee. 	(ECF No. 9, PageID.868–69 (citing ECF No. 5-15,
PageID.813–14 (originally Exh. 16F)).)
But the ALJ explicitly acknowledges Dr. Comai’s October 2024 findings
6 	While Plaintiff emphasizes the x-ray results referenced by Dr. Comai, (ECF
No. 9, PageID.868), no imaging of the left knee from October 2024 was provided in
the record. Results from an MRI of Plaintiff’s left elbow from the same appointment
were provide in original Exhibit 17F (ECF No. 5-15, PageID.820), which the ALJ cites
to in his summary of Plaintiff’s medical treatment (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.38).
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regarding Plaintiff’s left knee—even citing to the same page of original Exhibit 16F
as Plaintiff does in his appeal. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.41.) 	The ALJ also discussed
the October 2024 appointment in detail earlier in his discussion of Plaintiff’s medical
history in the RFC assessment:
(Id., PageID.38.)
Regarding Dr. Comai’s earlier evaluations, the ALJ referenced Dr. Comai’s
treatment record liberally throughout his discussion of Plaintiff’s medical history in
the RFC assessment, including several citations to specific pages addressing Dr.
Comai’s exam findings on Plaintiff’s left knee. 	(See e.g., ECF No. 5-2, PageID.37
(citing August 2023 findings in Exh. 2F/9 and January 2024 findings in Exh. 5F/12);
id., PageID.37–38 (citing March 2024 findings in Exh. 7F/23–24); id., PageID.38,
(citing May 2024 findings in Exh. 11F/8-9 and June 2024 findings in Exh. 12F/44).)
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s failure to discuss particular findings from
Dr. Comai’s treatment undercuts the ALJ’s final assessment is without merit. 	While
an ALJ is required to consider all the evidence in the record, they are not required to
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discuss each item of evidence in their opinion. 	Jenkins v. Colvin, No. 5:15-CV-1165,
2016 WL 825909, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 5:15 CV 1165, 2016 WL 815625 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2016); see Thacker v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 99 F. App’x 661, 665 (6th Cir.2004) (“An ALJ need not discuss
every piece of evidence in the record for his decision to stand.”)
Plaintiff correctly notes that a substantiality of evidence evaluation does not
permit a selective reading of the record. Hardy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F. Supp.
3d 900, 909 (E.D. Mich. 2021); see Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d
680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the
record taken as a whole.... [It] must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight”). 	But here, the ALJ’s opinion demonstrates that he did not
ignore the full scope of Dr. Comai’s examination findings; instead, he found that some
of Dr. Comai’s conclusions were not supported by the overall record.
Plaintiff’s argument merely highlights that there may be substantial evidence
to support an alternative conclusion. 	That is not enough to disturb the ALJ’s
findings. 	Weighing conflicting evidence is the role of the ALJ, not of the Court.
Sallaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3825, 2024 WL 2955645, at *7 (6th Cir. June 12,
2024). 	As long as substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court must defer to it, “even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would
have supported an opposite conclusion.” 	Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there
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exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion”) (citations
omitted).
B. 	Consistency Factor
The ALJ also sufficiently addressed the consistency factor, finding that Dr.
Comai’s recommended limitations are “inconsistent with the normal examination
findings noted by the internal medicine consultative examiner (Exhibit 4F), and the
opinions of the state agency medical consultants. (Exhibits 2A; 3A).” 	(ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.41.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s report requires further development on how Dr.
Comai’s opinion was inconsistent with the “normal examination findings” of Dr. Abel
in January 2024. 	(ECF No. 9, PageID.866–67 (citing ECF No. 5-2, PageID.41).)
Specifically, Plaintiff points out that not all of Dr. Abel’s findings were “normal.”
(Id., PageID.866.) 	But in the next sentence, Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ
acknowledged several abnormal findings earlier in his decision. 	(Id. (citing ECF No.
5-2, PageID.37).)
Indeed, in summarizing Dr. Abel’s examination findings, the ALJ references a
number of adverse observations regarding Plaintiff’s left leg, including an inability to
walk on left heel, difficulty balancing on left leg, decreased sensation in left foot, and
reduced range of motion with lumbar flexion and left ankle dorsiflexion. 	(ECF No. 9,
PageID.866.) 	But these observations were set against several normal examination
findings. 	For example, regarding Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal examination, Dr. Abel
reported:
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Grip and pincher strength was intact, graded at 5/5. Dexterity appeared
unimpaired as he was able to pick up a dime, button clothing, and tie a
shoelace. 	He 	demonstrated 	no 	difficulty 	getting 	on 	and 	off 	the
examination table, no difficulty walking on his toes or right heel, was
unable to walk on his left heel, no difficulty squatting and arising, no
difficulty balancing on the right, and moderate difficulty balancing on
the left.
(ECF No. 5-10, PageID.502) (emphasis added).
Moreover, while Dr. Abel concluded that Plaintiff experienced pain in several
joints causing him to avoid certain positions and activities, (id., PageID.505), he also
found that Plaintiff was “independent with his activities of daily living” at the time
of the examination (id., PageID.501).
The ALJ also found Dr. Comai’s opinion was inconsistent with the more recent
opinions offered by both of the state agency medical consultants. 	(ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.40–41.) 	Both Drs. Jackson and Mazei assessed that Plaintiff would be
capable of performing a range of light work largely consistent with the adopted RFC
assessment. 	(Id.; ECF No. 5-3, PageID.74–76, 83–85.)
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(ECF 	No. 	5-3. 	PageID.74–76 	(originally 	Exh. 	2A, 	March 	2024 	Disability
Determination Explanation completed by Dr. Jackson).) 7
7 	Dr. 	Mazei 	reached 	the 	same 	conclusions 	in 	her 	May 	2024 	Disability
Determination Explanation. 	(ECF No. 5-3, PageID.78–86 (originally Exh. 3A).)
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In fact, where the ALJ departed from the recommendations of Drs. Jackson
and Mazei, it was to impose additional limitations accounting for Plaintiff’s testimony
at the hearing and worsening condition. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.40.) 	The ALJ
reduced Plaintiff’s abilities to stand and/or walk from 6 hours to 4 hours, and included
additional limitations to account both for Plaintiff’s shoulder re-injury as well as his
headaches, pain, side effects to medications, and allegations of dyslexia. 	(Id.)
In the opinion of the undersigned, ALJ Burgtorf addressed the factors of
supportability 	and 	consistency 	and 	met 	the 	articulation 	requirements 	of 	the
regulation. 	In sum, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff’s argument is essentially that the ALJ should have weighed and evaluated
the evidence differently. 	But that is not ground for relief. 	Brown v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1259726, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1251232 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 25,
2024), and report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1258380
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2024).
IV. 	Recommendation
In the opinion of the undersigned, ALJ Burgtorf’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
the ALJ’s decision be affirmed.
Dated: 	December 5, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14)
days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cv-00171-PLM-MV ECF No. 12, PageID .< pageID> of 20
Filed 12/05/25
Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
PAUL K.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00171 Hon. Paul L. Maloney U.S. District Judge
V. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This Report and Recommendation addresses Plaintiff's appeal of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Brian Burgtorf's decision denying Plaintiff's request for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). This appeal is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The record shows that Plaintiff suffers from multiple severe medically determinable impairments (MDI), including effects from a partial amputation of his left foot that occurred during childhood, a right knee replacement, left knee arthritis, and multiple left shoulder surgeries. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.32, 55-56.) Plaintiff asserts that ALJ Burgtorf's formulation of his Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) was not supported by substantial evidence.1 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical opinion of his treating orthopedic
1 RFC is "the most [the claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations," and is measured using "all the relevant evidence in [the] case record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
1
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

2
specialist, 	William 	Comai, 	D.O., 	as 	required 	under 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520(c),
particularly with respect to his left knee. 	(ECF No. 9, PageID.864.) 	Plaintiff
primarily focuses on the ALJ’s treatment of an RFC questionnaire completed by Dr.
Comai on August 9, 2024, (see id., PageID.865 (originally Exh. 18F)), and treatment
notes from a follow up physical evaluation on October 1, 2024 (see id., PageID.869
(originally Exh. 16F)).
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Comai’s opinion was only partially persuasive in
assessing RFC. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.41.) 	The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ
appropriately evaluated Dr. Comai’s opinion and that the RFC assessment is
supported by substantial evidence. 	(ECF No. 10, PageID.878.)
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that the Court
affirm the ALJ’s decision.
I. 	Procedural History
A. 	Key Dates
The ALJ’s decision notes that Plaintiff applied for DIB on May 11, 2023,
alleging an onset date of April 15, 2023. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.29.) 	Plaintiff’s claim
was initially denied by the Social Security Administration on March 11, 202[4] 2 .
(Id.) 	The claim was then denied on reconsideration on June 3, 2024. 	(Id.)
On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. 	(Id.) 	ALJ
Burgtorf conducted a telephone hearing on Plaintiff’s claim on October 10, 2024.
2 	The ALJ decision says the denial was on March 11, 2023, but it is clear from
the record that the denial occurred in 2024, and any resulting error is harmless.
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The ALJ heard testimony from both Plaintiff and Melanie Frye, an impartial
vocational expert. 	(Id.)
The ALJ issued his decision on October 24, 2024, finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 	(Id.) 	On December 16,
2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision,
making that decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 	(Id., PageID.15).
Plaintiff timely filed this lawsuit on February 14, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1.)
B. 	Summary of ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ’s decision accurately outlined the five-step sequential process for
determining whether an individual is disabled. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.30–31.)
Before stating his findings at each step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff meets the
insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2028.
(Id., PageID.31.)
At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since his reported onset date of April 15, 2023. 	(Id., PageID.32.)
At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following MDI:3
[S]tatus-post left great toe and 1st metatarsal amputation; status-post
right knee replacement; status-post left shoulder rotator cuff repair;
carpal tunnel syndrome; osteoarthritis of the left knee; degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine; obesity; headaches; tendinopathy of the left
biceps tendon; a partial-tear of the left common extensor tendon; and
psoriatic arthritis. (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
3 	The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s history of hypertension, which he found was
not an MDI, but which he considered when formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. (ECF No. 5-
2, PageID.32.)
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(Id.)
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 	(Id.) 	The ALJ
specifically commented on the impairments in the following Listings:4
 	1.15 (degenerative disc disease) (id., PageID.33);
 	1.16 (degenerative disc disease) (id.);
 	1.17 (right knee replacement) (id., PageID.34);
 	1.18 (left knee osteoarthritis and left rotator cuff repair) (id.);
 	1.20 (left foot amputation) (id.);
 	1.21 (left rotator cuff repair, tendinopathy of the left biceps tendon, and
partial tear of the left common extensor tendon) (id.); and
 	11.14 (carpal tunnel syndrome) (id., PageID.34–35).
Before going on to Step Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the
following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant
has the residual functional capacity to perform light work[5] as defined
4 	While obesity is not a listed impairment, the ALJ noted that he considered the
functional limitations caused by Plaintiff’s obesity—alone and in combination with
his other MDI—at each step of the sequential evaluation process. 	(ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.35.) 	The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s headaches—for which there is no
specific listing—failed to meet the requirements of any listings in section 11.00
(neurological disorders). 	(Id.)
5 	Light work is defined as “work [that] involves lifting no more than 20 pounds
at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even
though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires
a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with
some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
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in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except can stand and/or walk for four hours out
of eight; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can frequently
climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; can
never overhead reach with the left upper extremity; can frequently
handle with the right hand; can never work around vibration, nor
hazards, such as unprotected heights or unguarded moving machinery;
can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, and make
simple work-related decisions.
(Id.)
The ALJ devoted seven pages to discussing Plaintiff’s RFC, including:
 	a summary of the regulations regarding how he addressed Plaintiff’s
symptoms (id., PageID.35–36);
 	a summary of Plaintiff’s statements (id., PageID.36);
 	a summary of medical evidence related to Plaintiff’s treatment by Dr.
Comai (id., PageID.36–38); primary care provider Jeremiah Schnoor,
M.D. (id., PageID.37); and rheumatologist Hirenkumar Patel, M.D.
(id., PageID.38–39);
 	a summary of the opinions by internal medicine consultative examiner
Tama Abel, M.D., (id., PageID.37), and state agency medical consultants
Larry Jackson, M.D., and Catherine Mazei, D.O. (id., PageID.40);
 	a summary of the opinion by Dr. Comai, opining that Plaintiff “would be
incapable of performing even low stress jobs” and that his “left knee
arthritis would affect his ability to stand and/or walk for any length of
performing a full or wide range of light work, [claimant] must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities.” 	20 CFR § 404.1567(b).
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time,” (id., PageID.40–41). As set forth above, the ALJ found Dr. Comai’s
opinion partially persuasive, which Plaintiff argues was in error; and
 	an explanation of how the ALJ arrived at his decision that Plaintiff has
an RFC to perform light work (id.).
At Step Four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past
relevant work as a factory machine operator. 	(Id., PageID.41–42.)
At Step Five, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience
and RFC, and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social
Security Act because there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that he could perform. 	(Id., PageID.42–43.)
II. 	Standard of Review
Review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to two issues: (1) “whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards,” and (2) “whether the findings of the ALJ are
supported by substantial evidence.” 	Winslow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 566 F. App’x
418, 420 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405
(6th Cir. 2009)); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	The Court may not conduct a de novo review of
the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. 	Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 	It is the Commissioner who is charged
with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and the
Commissioner’s findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial
evidence. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.
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See Cohen v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir.
1992). 	It is “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” 	Jones v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 945 F.2d 1365,
1369 (6th Cir. 1991). 	In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court
must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and whatever evidence in the
record fairly detracts from its weight. 	Richardson v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
The substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within
which the decision maker may properly rule either way, without judicial interference.
Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 	This standard
affords the administrative decisionmaker considerable latitude and acknowledges
that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because
the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. 	Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d
342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993).
III. 	Analysis
The ALJ provided the following summary and assessment of Dr. Comai’s
medical opinion:
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(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.40–41.)
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) failed to meaningfully address how Dr.
Comai’s opinion was inconsistent with the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Abel,
(ECF No. 9, PageID.867), and (2) mischaracterized and selectively cited from Dr.
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Comai’s clinical findings (id., PageID.868). 	The Commissioner argues that the ALJ
acted well within his “zone of choice” as factfinder in determining Dr. Comai’s opinion
was inconsistent with and not supported by the overall record. 	(ECF No. 10,
PageID.879–81.)
Because Plaintiff filed his application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluated
the medical opinions pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c). 	(See ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.41.) 	Under that regulation, the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific
evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative 	medical 	finding(s),” 	even 	an 	opinion 	from 	a 	treating 	source.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). 	Instead, an ALJ will articulate his or her determination of
the persuasiveness of a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors listed
in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” 	20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b)(1). 	Those 	factors 	include: 	(1) 	supportability; 	(2) 	consistency; 	(3)
relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to
support or contradict the opinion. 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5). 	In general, the
ALJ must explain his or her consideration of the supportability and consistency
factors, but the ALJ is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.l520c(b)(2)–(3).
The regulation defines “supportability” and “consistency” as follows:
(1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting 	explanations 	presented 	by 	a 	medical 	source 	are 	to
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), 	the 	more 	persuasive 	the 	medical 	opinions 	or 	prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
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(2) Consistency. 	The 	more 	consistent 	a 	medical 	opinion(s) 	or 	prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c)(1)–(2).
Here, while ALJ Burgtorf’s direct treatment of supportability and consistency
was brief, his reasoning for finding Dr. Comai’s opinion only partially persuasive is
sufficiently supported by his earlier discussion of Plaintiff’s medical records during
the RFC analysis. 	See e.g., Forrest v. Commr. of Soc. Sec., 591 Fed. Appx. 359, 366
(6th Cir. 2014) (“here the ALJ made sufficient factual findings elsewhere in his
decision to support his conclusion at step three”); Crum v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 660 F.
App’x 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2016) (it is sufficient for an ALJ’s reasons for determining
the consistency of a medical opinion to be found elsewhere in the decision); Dunlavy
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3333, 2024 WL 4558606, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2024)
(finding that the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinion was supported where the
inconsistencies in the record were discussed in the same section of her decision);
Lillian A. v. O’Malley, No. 4:23-CV-4-CRS-HBB, 2024 WL 987571, at *2 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 7, 2024) (“Indeed, an ALJ’s reasons for rejecting or adopting a medical opinion
may be gleaned from elsewhere in the written decision: ‘meaningful judicial review
exists – even if the ALJ provided only a cursory or sparse analysis – if the ALJ made
sufficient factual findings elsewhere in the decision that supports her conclusion.’”)
(citing Booker R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-cv-170, 2023 WL 4247312, at *4–5
(S.D. Ohio June 29, 2023).
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The undersigned finds that the ALJ’s decision meets the requirements of 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and is supported by substantial evidence.
A. 	Supportability Factor
First, the ALJ sufficiently addressed the supportability factor, explaining there
were 	not 	“sufficient 	narrative 	statements 	or 	clinical 	examination 	finding
abnormalities to provide a corroborative basis” for all of Dr. Comai’s findings.
(ECF No. 	5-2, 	PageID.40.) 	Specifically, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	Dr. 	Comai’s
recommendations unpersuasive with respect to Plaintiff’s
 	ability to stand and/or walk;
 	need to change positions at will;
 	need to take breaks and/or elevate his legs during the day;
 	inability to perform even low-stress work; and
 	expected level of absenteeism from work.
(Id.)
These findings came from the physical RFC report completed by Dr. Comai on
August 9, 2024 (ECF No. 5-15, PageID.845–49 (originally Exh. 18F)), which the ALJ
cited in his summary of Dr. Comai’s opinion immediately preceding the ALJ’s
evaluation of the opinion’s persuasiveness (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.40–41).
The August 2024 report consists of several selection boxes and some short
answer questions and explanation prompts. 	(ECF No. 5-15, PageID.845–49.) 	The
disputed findings are taken largely from selection box questions, including the
following:
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Case 1:25-cv-00171-PLM-MV
ECF No. 12, PageID .< pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 12 of 20
12. How often during a typical workday is your parent's experience of pain or other symptoms severe enough to interfere with attention and concentration needed to perform.even simple work tasks?
Novor Rarely Occasionally
Frequently
Constantly
For this and other questions on this form, "rarely" means 1 % 10 5% of an 8-hour working day; "occasionally" means 696 to 330% of an 8-hour working day; "frequently" means 349% to 66% of an 8-hour working day.
13. To what degree can your patient tolerate work stress?
VIncapable of even "low stress" jobs
_Moderate skross is okay
Capable of high stress work
unable to do much
Please explain the reesona for you conclusion: W/o pain
14. As a result of your patient's impairments, catimate your patient's functional limitations If your patient were placed in a competitive work situation.
d How many clty blocks can your patient welk without rest or severe prin? 1/2
45 Does your patient need a job that permits shifting positions at will from sitting, standing or walking? VÝes _No
Will your patient sometimes need to take unsobieduled breaks during an 8-hour working day?
No
h. With prolonged sitting, should your patient's log(s) be elevated?
VYes . __ No
12

13
(ECF No. 5-15, PageID.846–47 (originally Exh. 18F).)
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not give credit to Dr. Comai’s later findings
in October 2024—including a treatment note indicating “the exam findings and x-ray
findings [6] are significant enough that this would affect his ability to stand or walk for
any length of time or any distance”—or his earlier treatment records indicating
abnormalities in Plaintiff’s knee. 	(ECF No. 9, PageID.868–69 (citing ECF No. 5-15,
PageID.813–14 (originally Exh. 16F)).)
But the ALJ explicitly acknowledges Dr. Comai’s October 2024 findings
6 	While Plaintiff emphasizes the x-ray results referenced by Dr. Comai, (ECF
No. 9, PageID.868), no imaging of the left knee from October 2024 was provided in
the record. Results from an MRI of Plaintiff’s left elbow from the same appointment
were provide in original Exhibit 17F (ECF No. 5-15, PageID.820), which the ALJ cites
to in his summary of Plaintiff’s medical treatment (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.38).
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regarding Plaintiff’s left knee—even citing to the same page of original Exhibit 16F
as Plaintiff does in his appeal. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.41.) 	The ALJ also discussed
the October 2024 appointment in detail earlier in his discussion of Plaintiff’s medical
history in the RFC assessment:
(Id., PageID.38.)
Regarding Dr. Comai’s earlier evaluations, the ALJ referenced Dr. Comai’s
treatment record liberally throughout his discussion of Plaintiff’s medical history in
the RFC assessment, including several citations to specific pages addressing Dr.
Comai’s exam findings on Plaintiff’s left knee. 	(See e.g., ECF No. 5-2, PageID.37
(citing August 2023 findings in Exh. 2F/9 and January 2024 findings in Exh. 5F/12);
id., PageID.37–38 (citing March 2024 findings in Exh. 7F/23–24); id., PageID.38,
(citing May 2024 findings in Exh. 11F/8-9 and June 2024 findings in Exh. 12F/44).)
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s failure to discuss particular findings from
Dr. Comai’s treatment undercuts the ALJ’s final assessment is without merit. 	While
an ALJ is required to consider all the evidence in the record, they are not required to
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discuss each item of evidence in their opinion. 	Jenkins v. Colvin, No. 5:15-CV-1165,
2016 WL 825909, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 5:15 CV 1165, 2016 WL 815625 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2016); see Thacker v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 99 F. App’x 661, 665 (6th Cir.2004) (“An ALJ need not discuss
every piece of evidence in the record for his decision to stand.”)
Plaintiff correctly notes that a substantiality of evidence evaluation does not
permit a selective reading of the record. Hardy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F. Supp.
3d 900, 909 (E.D. Mich. 2021); see Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d
680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the
record taken as a whole.... [It] must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight”). 	But here, the ALJ’s opinion demonstrates that he did not
ignore the full scope of Dr. Comai’s examination findings; instead, he found that some
of Dr. Comai’s conclusions were not supported by the overall record.
Plaintiff’s argument merely highlights that there may be substantial evidence
to support an alternative conclusion. 	That is not enough to disturb the ALJ’s
findings. 	Weighing conflicting evidence is the role of the ALJ, not of the Court.
Sallaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3825, 2024 WL 2955645, at *7 (6th Cir. June 12,
2024). 	As long as substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court must defer to it, “even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would
have supported an opposite conclusion.” 	Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there
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exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion”) (citations
omitted).
B. 	Consistency Factor
The ALJ also sufficiently addressed the consistency factor, finding that Dr.
Comai’s recommended limitations are “inconsistent with the normal examination
findings noted by the internal medicine consultative examiner (Exhibit 4F), and the
opinions of the state agency medical consultants. (Exhibits 2A; 3A).” 	(ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.41.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s report requires further development on how Dr.
Comai’s opinion was inconsistent with the “normal examination findings” of Dr. Abel
in January 2024. 	(ECF No. 9, PageID.866–67 (citing ECF No. 5-2, PageID.41).)
Specifically, Plaintiff points out that not all of Dr. Abel’s findings were “normal.”
(Id., PageID.866.) 	But in the next sentence, Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ
acknowledged several abnormal findings earlier in his decision. 	(Id. (citing ECF No.
5-2, PageID.37).)
Indeed, in summarizing Dr. Abel’s examination findings, the ALJ references a
number of adverse observations regarding Plaintiff’s left leg, including an inability to
walk on left heel, difficulty balancing on left leg, decreased sensation in left foot, and
reduced range of motion with lumbar flexion and left ankle dorsiflexion. 	(ECF No. 9,
PageID.866.) 	But these observations were set against several normal examination
findings. 	For example, regarding Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal examination, Dr. Abel
reported:
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Grip and pincher strength was intact, graded at 5/5. Dexterity appeared
unimpaired as he was able to pick up a dime, button clothing, and tie a
shoelace. 	He 	demonstrated 	no 	difficulty 	getting 	on 	and 	off 	the
examination table, no difficulty walking on his toes or right heel, was
unable to walk on his left heel, no difficulty squatting and arising, no
difficulty balancing on the right, and moderate difficulty balancing on
the left.
(ECF No. 5-10, PageID.502) (emphasis added).
Moreover, while Dr. Abel concluded that Plaintiff experienced pain in several
joints causing him to avoid certain positions and activities, (id., PageID.505), he also
found that Plaintiff was “independent with his activities of daily living” at the time
of the examination (id., PageID.501).
The ALJ also found Dr. Comai’s opinion was inconsistent with the more recent
opinions offered by both of the state agency medical consultants. 	(ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.40–41.) 	Both Drs. Jackson and Mazei assessed that Plaintiff would be
capable of performing a range of light work largely consistent with the adopted RFC
assessment. 	(Id.; ECF No. 5-3, PageID.74–76, 83–85.)
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(ECF 	No. 	5-3. 	PageID.74–76 	(originally 	Exh. 	2A, 	March 	2024 	Disability
Determination Explanation completed by Dr. Jackson).) 7
7 	Dr. 	Mazei 	reached 	the 	same 	conclusions 	in 	her 	May 	2024 	Disability
Determination Explanation. 	(ECF No. 5-3, PageID.78–86 (originally Exh. 3A).)
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In fact, where the ALJ departed from the recommendations of Drs. Jackson
and Mazei, it was to impose additional limitations accounting for Plaintiff’s testimony
at the hearing and worsening condition. 	(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.40.) 	The ALJ
reduced Plaintiff’s abilities to stand and/or walk from 6 hours to 4 hours, and included
additional limitations to account both for Plaintiff’s shoulder re-injury as well as his
headaches, pain, side effects to medications, and allegations of dyslexia. 	(Id.)
In the opinion of the undersigned, ALJ Burgtorf addressed the factors of
supportability 	and 	consistency 	and 	met 	the 	articulation 	requirements 	of 	the
regulation. 	In sum, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff’s argument is essentially that the ALJ should have weighed and evaluated
the evidence differently. 	But that is not ground for relief. 	Brown v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1259726, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1251232 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 25,
2024), and report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-122, 2024 WL 1258380
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2024).
IV. 	Recommendation
In the opinion of the undersigned, ALJ Burgtorf’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
the ALJ’s decision be affirmed.
Dated: 	December 5, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00171-PLM-MV ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 19
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20
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14)
days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Case 1:25-cv-00171-PLM-MV ECF No. 12, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 20
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