Goben v. Kent, County of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
AULTON DANIEL GOBEN, III, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00017
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Robert J. Jonker
U.S. District Judge
v.
COUNTY OF KENT, et al.,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. 	(ECF No. 61.)
Plaintiff – Kent County Jail inmate Aulton Daniel Goben – filed an unverified
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the remaining Defendants – Kent
County Deputies Shavalier, Dominguez-Morales, and John Doe (now identified as Joe
Proulx 1 ) – violated his First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment2 , and state law
rights. 	Goben alleges that Deputy Shavalier failed to protect him from an inmate
1 	Plaintiff filed his complaint on Jan. 6, 2026. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	On April 28, 2025,
he filed a motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 20), which the Court subsequently
denied (ECF No. 31). Recently, Plaintiff filed a motion asking to amend his complaint
simply by adding a party – Deputy Proulx. 	(ECF No. 72.) 	In a separate order, the
undersigned will be granting this motion and ordering the U.S. Marshal Service mail
a request for waiver of service to Proulx.
2 	In the screening opinion, the Court was unsure whether the Fourteenth
Amendment, applicable to pretrial detainees, or the Eighth Amendment, applicable
to those convicted of a crime, applied to Plaintiff. 	Defendant represents that
Plaintiff was detained because he committed an offense while he was on parole.
Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment applies because Plaintiff was not a pretrial
detainee at the time of the alleged violations.
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assault, and that Deputies Dominguez-Morales and Proulx failed to provide him with
medical care after the altercation.
Defendants Shavalier and Dominguez-Morales filed a motion for summary
judgment. 	For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that the
Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismiss them from this
lawsuit.
II. 	Factual Allegations
On March 21, 2025, this Court entered an opinion dismissing all claims except
for claims arising out of an altercation on December 23, 2024. 	The Court previously
summarized the facts as follows:
On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Inmates John
Does #1–3 “battered/assaulted” him “inside of [his] cell,” and he alleges
that these inmates “breached their []KCCF[] Handbook duty.” (Id.,
PageID.6, 7.) Plaintiff claims that “before the incident took place,
Shaverlier stated, ‘Do you want to go to war,’ through [Plaintiff’s] cell’s
intercom.” (Id., PageID.6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “Shaverlier,
Sutton, or Dunham did not protect [him] from the battery/assault or
contact a nurse for medical attention.” (Id., PageID.6–7.) Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendants Dominguez and Unknown Party #1 “breached
their duty to get [Plaintiff] medical attention,” explaining that “both
deputies had spoken to the deputies responsible beforehand, and they
all s[aw] that [Plaintiff] was visibly bleeding on the floor, carpet, and
door of [the] housing unit.” (Id., PageID.7.) Plaintiff claims that two days
prior to the December 23, 2024, incident, he overheard Defendant
Inmate John Doe #2 say that “Shaverlier asked him to perform the
mentioned battery/assault,” but Plaintiff “did not know at the time that
[he] was the target being discussed.” (Id.) Plaintiff also overheard
Defendant Inmate John Doe #2 say that “he ‘did not want to perform the
task’ and Shaverlier had threatened to [sic] something to his ‘people(s)’
if he did not perform the task.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he believes “the
imminent danger that [he] is in is retaliation for a[n] incident with Kent
Deputies on a previous detention.” 	(Id.)
(ECF No. 11, PageID.33-34.)
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III. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
IV. 	Failure to Protect
Goben alleges that on December 21, 2024, two days before the altercation, he
overheard “inmate John Doe #2 inform the inmate that was in D1B next door to me
in cell #4 that Shavalier asked him to perform the mentioned battery/assault, but I
did not know at the time that I was the target begin discussed.” 	(ECF No. 1,
PageID.7) (cleaned up). 	Goben says that he heard John Doe #2 state “he did not
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want to perform the task” but Deputy Shavalier had threatened his “people.” 	(Id.)
On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff asserts that Deputy Shavalier commented over the
intercom, “Do you want to go to war.” 	(Id., PageID.6.) 	Goben alleges that he was
“battered/assaulted” by inmates John Doe #2 and John Doe #3. 	(Id.)
A Kent County Sheriff’s Office Incident Report summarizes what happened:
(ECF No. 62-1, PageID.224.)
Video of the incident confirms the summary of facts in the incident report.3
Inmates Young and Dixon were charged with assault of another inmate, and
both admitted their guilt in the incident. 	(Id., PageID.225.)
3 	Defendants 	have 	submitted 	three 	surveillance 	videos 	that 	depict 	the
altercation and events that occurred after the altercation. 	The videos do not have
sound.
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(Id., PageID.227.)
Under the Eighth Amendment, a prison official has a duty to protect an inmate
from violence caused by other prisoners. 	Wilson v. Sieter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991);
Nelson v. Overberg, 999 F.2d 162, 165 (6th Cir. 1993); Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d
1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990); Roland v. Johnson, 856 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1988); McGhee
v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1988). 	“A prison official’s ‘deliberate
indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth
Amendment.” 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (citations omitted).
Recognizing that a prison official has an obligation to protect an inmate from assault
by another inmate, the Supreme Court defined deliberate indifference as requiring a
showing that the prison official consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious
harm to plaintiff. 	Id. at 839. 	The court stated:
We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth 	Amendment 	for 	denying 	an 	inmate 	humane 	conditions 	of
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confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . 	But an official’s
failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but
did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as infliction of punishment.
Id. at 837. 	Thus, to support a claim that a prison official failed to protect a prisoner,
two conditions must be satisfied: the inmate must show (1) that a substantial risk of
harm was present, and (2) that the defendants, having knowledge of that risk,
possessed a culpable state of mind. 	Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 914 (6th Cir. 2021)
(“An official is deliberately indifferent if he or she ‘knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.’”)
To support an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must establish “something
more than a lack of ordinary due care, inadvertence, or error; the conduct must
instead be ‘obdurate’ or ‘wanton’--exhibiting recklessness or callous neglect.” 	Id. at
165. 	See also Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992); Walker v. Norris,
917 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 1988).
An error of judgment does not subject a prison official to liability. 	Jeffers v. Heavrin,
10 F.3d 380, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (errors of judgment are shielded by qualified
immunity).
As noted above, the court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. 	A
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review of the video shows that the altercation between inmates Goben, Dixon, and
Young took place in a matter of seconds. 	Importantly, Dixon attests that he was not
asked to assault or fight with Goben:
(ECF No. 62-3, PageID.231.)
And Young says that he was present during the altercation but was not asked
to assault or fight with Goben:
(ECF No. 62-4, PageID.234.)
The only evidence that supports Goben’s claim that Deputy Shavalier solicited
inmates Dixon and Young comes from Goben. 	Goben asserts that he overheard John
Doe #2 tell the inmate in the cell next to Goben that Deputy Shavalier wanted him to
commit an assault. 	(ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) 	Goben acknowledged in his complaint
that he did not know whom John Doe #2 was allegedly told to assault. 	Goben also
presented a declaration of an alleged statement from Deputy Iacaboni:
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(ECF No. 76, PageID.299.) 	Neither of these pieces of evidence creates a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to whether Deputy Shavalier solicited inmates
Dixon and Young to assault Plaintiff.
Moreover, there exists no evidence that inmates Dixon or Young were going to
harm inmate Goben or that they had made any threats toward Goben prior to the
incident. 	Goben did not make a request for protection, nor did he indicate to any
other deputy that he feared that he would be harmed or attacked by another inmate.
(ECF No. 62-6, PageID.241-242 (affidavit of Lieutenant Knott who investigated the
incident on behalf of the Kent County Correctional Facility).) 	Lieutenant Knott
attests that:
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(Id., PageID.242.) 	In the opinion of the undersigned, there exists no genuine issue
of material fact with respect to Goben’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim
against Defendant Deputy Shavalier. 	Thus, Shavalier is entitled to summary
judgment.
V. 	Failure to Provide Medical Care
Goben says he was denied medical care by Deputy Dominguez-Morales. 	The
evidence is clear that Goben was provided with medical care. 	Immediately after the
incident, Goben was evaluated by medical personnel, and he was taken to the hospital
for further evaluation:
(ECF No. 62-1, PageID.224-225.)
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An Eighth Amendment claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has
an objective and a subjective component. 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). 	To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical
need at issue is sufficiently serious. 	Id. 	In other words, the inmate must show that
he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. 	Id.
The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the
seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.”
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); Phillips v. Roane
Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2008). 	Where a prisoner challenges their
treatment as inadequate, a prisoner must show more than a serious medical need.
Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021). 	To establish the objective
component in a situation where a prisoner asserts that the care received was
inadequate, a prisoner must prove grossly inadequate care which generally requires
the introduction of medical evidence typically in the form of expert testimony. 	Id.
The subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim requires an inmate
to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying
medical care. 	Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). 	Deliberate
indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by
something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 	“[T]he official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 	Id. at 837. 	To prove a
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defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence .
. . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from
the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” 	Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842)).
The subjective component was summarized in Rhinehart. 	There, the court of
appeals stated the following:
[T]he plaintiff must show that each defendant acted with a mental state
“equivalent to criminal recklessness.” 	This showing requires proof that
each 	defendant 	“subjectively 	perceived 	facts 	from 	which 	to 	infer
substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference,
and that he then disregarded that risk” by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.
A plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove subjective
recklessness: A jury is entitled to “conclude that a prison official knew
of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” And
if a risk is well-documented and circumstances suggest that the official
has been exposed to information so that he must have known of the risk,
the 	evidence 	is 	sufficient 	for 	a 	jury 	to 	find 	that 	the 	official 	had
knowledge.
But the plaintiff also must present enough evidence from which a jury
could conclude that each defendant “so recklessly ignored the risk that
he was deliberately indifferent to it.”
Id. 738–39 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Goben has presented no evidence showing that he was denied medical care.
The evidence clearly shows otherwise. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, no genuine
issue of material fact exists with respect to Goben’s Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference 	claim 	against 	Defendant 	Deputy 	Dominguez-Morales. 	Thus,
Dominguez-Morales is entitled to summary judgment.
VI. 	Qualified Immunity
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Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the
complaint against them based upon qualified immunity. 	“Under the doctrine of
qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing 	discretionary 	functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises
the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’”
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 	The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of
Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must
“determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id.
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the
right at issue was “‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a
reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 	A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if
either step of the analysis is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted,
810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
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In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (per curiam), which means it is dictated by “controlling authority”
or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al–Kidd,
supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It is not enough that
the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U.S., at
666, 	132 	S.Ct. 	2088. 	Otherwise, 	the 	rule 	is 	not 	one 	that 	“every
reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
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the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2018).
In the opinion of the undersigned, for the reasons set forth above, no genuine
issue of material fact exists entitling Defendants to summary judgment. As such,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability.
VII. 	State Law Claims
To 	the 	extent 	that 	Goben 	raises 	state 	laws 	claims 	against 	Defendants
Shavalier and Dominguez-Morales it is recommended that the Court decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. 	In determining
whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, “[a] district court
should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of
litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.”
Landefeld 	v. 	Marion 	Gen. 	Hosp., 	Inc., 	994 	F.2d 	1178, 	1182 	(6th 	Cir. 	1993).
Ordinarily, when a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim
solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed
prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. 	Id. 	Dismissal,
however, remains “purely discretionary.” 	Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556
U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise,
LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).
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If the Court adopts the undersigned’s recommendation, it will dismiss all of
Goben’s federal law claims against Defendants Shavalier and Dominguez-Morales.
The balance of the relevant considerations would therefore weigh against the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction. 	As such, the undersigned respectfully recommends
that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Goben’s state law
claims against Shavalier and Dominguez-Morales.
VIII. 	Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants Shavalier and
Dominguez-Morales’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss them from this
case.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	December 8, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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