Artis v. Leonard et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KENNETH ARTIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHONY LEONARD, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:24-cv-1250
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Kenneth Artis’s Fourth Amendment
claims against them. (MTD, ECF No. 17.) Artis’s complaint alleges that Defendants arrested him
without a warrant or probable cause. 	Defendants contend dismissal is warranted because Artis
fails to state a claim against them and because they are entitled to qualified immunity. However,
Defendants note that Artis is facing criminal prosecution for the same offense underlying the
allegedly unlawful arrest at issue in this suit. 	(Br. in Supp. of MTD 11, ECF No. 18.) 	An
independent review of the state-court record indicates that a trial date has not been set. See Register
of Actions, Kent County 17th Circuit Court, https://www.kentcountymi.gov/1036/Search-Court-
Records (last updated Nov. 18, 2025) [https://perma.cc/PBH2-VXLU].
Neither party has addressed whether the Court should reach the sufficiency of Artis’s
complaint while a criminal prosecution related to the claims raised in the complaint is pending.
That does not bar the Court from raising the issue on its own initiative, since prudential doctrines
like abstention are not subject to the whims of litigants. See O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638,
642–43 (6th Cir. 2008).
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The basis for abstention in this case is found in Wallace v. Kato, which held that a false-
arrest claim under section 1983 accrues the moment “legal process was initiated against” the
federal claimant. 	549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007). 	Rejecting the position that false-arrest claims are
subject to the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which bars challenges to the validity
of a criminal conviction under section 1983, the Court reasoned that Heck has no bearing on a
claim that would “impugn an anticipated future conviction.” Wallace, 594 U.S. at 393. Delayed
accrual of those types of claims would compel plaintiff and court alike “to speculate about whether
a prosecution will be brought, whether it will result in conviction, and whether the pending civil
action will impugn that verdict.” Id. The Court met the concern that the civil and criminal actions
could conflict by pointing to the “common practice” of staying “the civil action until the criminal
case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Id. at 393–94.
Federal courts in this circuit have relied on the language quoted from Wallace to abstain
from adjudicating false-arrest claims before the prosecution on the underlying offense has
terminated or the threat of prosecution has abated. See, e.g., Spencer v. Boysen, No. 1:13-cv-105,
2013 WL 3805734, at *6 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 2013); Sharp v. Bowling Green Police Dep’t, No.
1:23-cv-174, 2024 WL 5056638, at *8–9 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2024) (collecting cases); see also
Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 641 (6th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that
“timely filing” of claims under section 1983 may “prompt abstention during the pendency of
related state court proceedings”). Wallace relies on a dictum from Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.8, for
the principle that abstention is warranted when a federal civil action overlaps with a pending state
criminal proceeding. 	Heck in turn cites Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), in support of this proposition. 	But few courts evaluate whether
Wallace’s “common practice” passes the demanding test for Colorado River abstention set out in
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Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983), which
permits abstention only when concurrent state and federal actions are “substantially similar,”
Romine v. Compuserve Corp., 160 F.3d 337, 340–41 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nakash v. Marciano,
882 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989)); see Fletcher v. City of Sugar Creek, No. 4:20-cv-30, 2022
WL 1913075, at *3 (W.D. Mo. June 2, 2022) (refusing to abstain from excessive-force case
because “underlying criminal proceedings” would not “fully dispose of any claims in the instant
civil lawsuit” (cleaned up)).
Other courts have regarded abstention from adjudication of false-arrest damages claims as
an application of the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), according to which federal
district courts may not entertain suits seeking to enjoin pending state enforcement proceedings.
See, e.g., Watson v. Perez, 168 F. Supp. 3d 365, 373–74 (D. Mass. 2016) (invoking Younger as
basis for Wallace-type stay); Lynch v. Nolan, 598 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903–4 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (same);
see also Geiger v. Conroy, No. CV 22-2458, 2023 WL 2577233, at *17 n.39 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20,
2023) (noting that Heck cited Colorado River and not Younger to justify abstention pending trial);
Derrick v. Beale, No. 2:21-cv-10717, 2021 WL 5795323, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2021)
(suggesting applicability of both Wallace and Younger). 	This position has its attractions: most
courts of appeals have extended Younger to damages claims, see Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d
965, 978 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), and the Sixth Circuit has affirmed the staying of damages
claims on Younger grounds more than once, see Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 371–72 (6th
Cir. 2017) (citing Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 1998)); but cf. Carras
v. Williams, 807 F.2d 1286, 1291–92 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[A] federal court should not abstain from a
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case seeking monetary relief when the suit arises from a state judicial proceeding to which the state
is not a party . . . .”).1
Many more courts—including the Supreme Court—have avoided the effort to tie Wallace
to one of the formal abstention doctrines and instead regarded the practice it prescribes as a kind
of “ad hoc abstention.” 	McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 120 (2019); see, e.g., Blakely v.
Andrade, 360 F. Supp. 3d 453, 474–75 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (abstaining based on Heck and Wallace
alone); El v. Black, No. 23-cv-10317, 2025 WL 1707817 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (granting
Wallace-type stay based on courts’ “inherent power”); see also Towne v. Donnelly, 44 F.4th 666,
674 (7th Cir. 2022) (extending Wallace to First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claims without
specifying basis for “prudent use of stays and abstention”). Mindful of the admonition that “the
various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases,”
NOPSI v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (cleaned up), this Court need not
solve the puzzle of Wallace-style abstention in order to apply it in this case. 	The Court will
therefore stay this lawsuit until Artis’s prosecution is at an end.
IT IS ORDERED that Kenneth Artis’s repetitive motion to reinstate claims (ECF No. 23;
see ECF No. 15) dismissed in this Court’s screening order (ECF No. 10) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Artis’s claims against Officers Leonard, Raycraft, and
Schut are STAYED pending resolution of Artis’s prosecution in People v. Artis, No. 24-10913-
FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 1, 2024).
1 The Court made clear in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co. that the “power to abstain” derives from the “historic
discretion exercised by federal courts ‘sitting in equity.” 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) (quoting La. Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959)). Younger itself relied on the maxim “restraining courts of equity from
interfering with criminal prosecutions” in addition to the “even more vital consideration” the Court denominated “Our
Federalism” to justify abstaining. 401 U.S. at 43–44; cf. Samuels v. Mackel, 401 U.S. at (extending Younger to the
equally discretionary remedy of declaratory relief). To the extent that Younger is premised on equitable principles,
then, it is doubtful that its rule can be applied to remedies that do not implicate a court’s discretion—especially if
those claims present only the possibility of federal interference with state interests.
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IS IT FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall inform the Court in writing when
Artis’s prosecution has concluded.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the court shall ADMINISTRATIVELY
CLOSE this action until the stay is lifted.
Dated: December 9, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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