Lewis #781780 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DARIUS LEWIS,
Case No. 1:24-cv-1068
Plaintiff,
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se civil rights action brought by plaintiff Darius Lewis, a prisoner in
the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). The incidents in this lawsuit
occurred at the MDOC’s Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF). 	Two defendants remain in this
lawsuit, MDOC Special Activities Coordinator (SAC) Adrian Dirschell and DRF Chaplain Lonnie
Blount. This matter is now before the Court on plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) (ECF No. 26) and defendants Dirschell and Blount’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 35).
I. 	Plaintiff’s complaint
The Court summarized plaintiff’s complaint as follows:
Plaintiff is “a devout Muslim in the Nation of Islam.” (Id., PageID.5.) He
claims that, as a Muslim, he must follow strict dietary laws, including not
consuming soy or items that have been cross contaminated with soy. (Id.) Because
“90% of the vegan menu is soy,” Plaintiff requested an alternative diet that
represents his “sincerely held beliefs in the Nation of Islam.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Blount and Dirschell are responsible for
evaluating 	and 	approving 	requests 	for 	religious 	and 	alternative 	diets. 	(Id.,
PageID.4.) On February 1, 2024, Defendant Blount interviewed Plaintiff to
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 1
of 17

2
determine whether a Halal religious diet or alternative diet was necessary to
accommodate Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs. (See Grievance, id.,
PageID.17.) During this interview, Defendant Blount recommended that Plaintiff’s
request be approved. (See Grievance Resp., id., PageID.18.) However, Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Blount incorrectly wrote down Plaintiff’s responses to
Defendant Blount’s questions and refused to add Plaintiff’s additional commentary,
which resulted in Defendant Dirschell denying Plaintiff’s request for an alternative
diet. (See Compl., id., PageID.5; see also Grievance, id., PageID.29.) 	Plaintiff
claims that in April of 2024 Defendant Blount also denied Plaintiff the opportunity
to appeal the denial that was given to Nation of Islam members. (Compl., Id.,
PageID.5.) Finally, on May 15, 2024, Defendant Blount denied Plaintiff the
opportunity to submit additional “expert[] documentation” regarding Plaintiff’s
requested diet and, instead, “constructed his own fact finding solutions . . . ,”
leading to the continued denial of Plaintiff’s requested diet. (Id., PageID.7.) . . . .
Plaintiff states that he intends to bring three “claims for relief”: a First
Amendment claim for violation of Plaintiff’s right to free exercise of religion, a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, and a RLUIPA claim. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.8.)
Opinion (ECF No. 11, PageID.12-14).1 For his relief, plaintiff seeks $4,500,000.00 in damages
and requests that the Court “Issue Injunctive Relief enjoining Defendants . . . from denying Nation
of Islam members diet [sic] that comport with their sincerely held beliefs.” Compl. at PageID.9.
The Court construed plaintiff’s lawsuit as involving constitutional claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-1(a). PageID.14. The Court dismissed all claims except for plaintiff’s First Amendment
free exercise claims against defendants Dirschell and Blount individually, the First Amendment
free exercise claim against defendant Dirschell in his official capacity for injunctive relief, and the
RLUIPA claim against defendant Dirschell in his official capacity. Opinion at PageID.23.
The Court identified the First Amendment free exercise claims as follows:
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Blount and Dirschell, in denying Plaintiff’s
request for an alternative religious diet, violated Plaintiff’s rights under the First
Amendment. The First Amendment provides “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .
1 While plaintiff alleged that he requested an “alternative diet”, that is not correct. This lawsuit involves plaintiff’s
request to be placed on the vegan/Halal menu. See discussion, infra.
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 2
of 17

3
.” U.S. Const. amend I. The right to freely exercise one’s religion falls within the
fundamental concept of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. 	Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Accordingly, state legislatures and those
acting on behalf of a state are “as incompetent as Congress” to interfere with the
right. Id.
While “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation 	of 	many 	privileges 	and 	rights,” 	inmates 	clearly 	retain 	the 	First
Amendment protection to freely exercise their religion. See O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted). To establish that this right has been
violated, Plaintiff must establish (1) that the belief or practice he seeks to protect is
religious within his own “scheme of things,” (2) that his belief is sincerely held,
and (3) that Defendant’s behavior infringes upon this practice or belief. Kent v.
Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Flagner v. Wilkinson,
241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); Bakr v. Johnson, No. 95-2348, 1997 WL
428903, at *2 (6th Cir. July 30, 1997) (noting that “sincerely held religious beliefs
require accommodation by prison officials”).
PageID.19-20. Taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court allowed plaintiff to proceed with
his First Amendment claims against defendants Chaplain Blount and SAC Dirschell. 	Id. at
PageID.20.
The Court identified plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim as follows:
Plaintiff also brings claims against Defendants under RLIUPA. RLUIPA,
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to [a prison] . .
. unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
Id.; see also Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 559-60 (6th Cir. 2014).
RLUIPA creates a burden-shifting framework for assessing prisoner claims.
A prisoner bears the initial burden to show (1) his desired religious exercise is
motivated by a “sincerely held religious belief” and (2) the government is
substantially burdening that religious exercise. Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 927
F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Ackerman v. Washington, 16 F.4th 170, 179
(6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “If the prisoner successfully shows the state
substantially burdens a sincere religious belief, the burden shifts to the government
to justify the burden on the religious adherent under the ‘daunting compelling
interest and least-restrictive means test,’ with a slight twist.” Ackerman, 16 F.4th at
179 (quoting Cavin, 927 F.3d at 458). Courts must give “due deference to the
experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary
regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline,
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 3
of 17

4
consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005). . . .
RLUIPA also does not permit damages claims against prison officials in
their official capacities. As discussed above, a suit against an individual in his
official capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the governmental entity. . . .
That leaves only a RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Dirschell
in his official capacity.
PageID.20-22. 	Taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court found that plaintiff alleged
sufficient facts to state a RLUIPA claim against SAC Dirschell. PageID.22.
In summary, the Court stated that,
Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claims against Defendants Dirschell and
Blount individually, First Amendment free exercise claim against Defendant
Dirschell in his official capacity for injunctive relief, and Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim
against Defendant Dirschell in his official capacity for injunctive relief remain in
the case.
PageID.23.
II. 	Motion for summary judgment
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 4
of 17

5
In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff did not a responsive brief as required by W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(c) which
requires that “any party opposing a dispositive motion shall, within twenty-eight (28) days after
service of the motion, file a responsive brief and any supporting materials”. 	The record reflects
that plaintiff filed a 3-page, unsigned “Verified Declaration” which the Clerk’s Office designated
as a “response” (ECF No. 37). This document appears to restate plaintiff’s claims. Defendants
filed a reply (ECF No. 39) pointing out that plaintiff only filed an unsigned declaration. Finally,
the record reflects that plaintiff included a “verification” at the end of his complaint, presumably
so that it could serve as supporting material for a response to a motion for summary judgment. See
Compl. at PageID.1-10; Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993) (a verified
complaint has the same force and effect as an affidavit for purposes of responding to a motion for
summary judgment).
Based on this record, plaintiff has not filed a response brief which addresses the
arguments set forth in defendants’ brief. In this regard, it is not the function of this Court to review
plaintiff’s submissions and then create legal arguments to respond to defendants’ motion. “The
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 5
of 17

6
Court’s role is adjudicatory; it is not an advocate.” 	Burley v. Miller, 241 F. Supp. 3d 828, 840
(E.D. Mich. 2017). “The fact that there has been no response to a summary judgment motion does
not, of course, mean that the motion is to be granted automatically.” Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d
483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996). 	The trial court is required to “intelligently and carefully review the
legitimacy of such unresponded-to motion” and cannot “blithely accept the conclusions argued in
the motion.” 	Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 1992).
However, when a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, “[n]othing in either the Rules or
case law supports an argument that the trial court must conduct its own probing investigation of
the record” to demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 405.
III. 	Plaintiff’s constitutional claim
A. 	Legal standard
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a civil cause of
action for individuals who are deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or federal laws by those acting under color of state law.” 	Smith v. City of Salem,
Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). 	To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
(2) that the defendant deprived him of this federal right under color of law. Jones v. Duncan, 840
F.2d 359, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As discussed, plaintiff’s claim arises from the First Amendment’s free exercise
clause. 	Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claim is barred by qualified immunity. Under this
defense, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 6
of 17

7
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity
“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Carroll v.
Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 17 (2014).
The qualified-immunity inquiry involves two questions: whether the defendant
violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). “These questions may be answered in any order; if either one
is answered in the negative, then qualified immunity protects the official from civil damages.”
Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 457 (6th Cir. 2016). “On summary judgment, the court must
analyze these questions after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting
the injury and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Id. “When, as here, a
defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494 (6th
Cir. 2009).
B. 	Plaintiff’s claims and the MDOC’s religious diet procedure
Plaintiff claims that SAC Dirschell and Chaplain Blount violated his First
Amendment rights by denying his request for a religious diet. 	As an initial matter, portions of
plaintiff’s complaint, motions and other papers filed in this lawsuit confuse and conflate the claims
at issue in this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s claim is that SAC Dirschell improperly denied his request to be
placed on the MDOC’s vegetarian menu, which is variously referred to as vegan, Halal,
vegan/Halal, and Kosher. Ultimately, plaintiff wants to be placed on an “alternative diet” because
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 7
of 17

8
the MDOC’s vegan/Halal menu does not meet his alleged religious beliefs. Plaintiff’s references
to requesting or being denied an “alternative diet” are misplaced, because neither his interview
with Chaplain Blount nor his request denied by SAC Dirschell involved an “alternative diet”.
The MDOC offers two meal options, a regular meal and one of which is a non-meat
entrée. See MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 ¶ NN. 2 The MDOC offers a vegan menu to meet
the religious diet to meet the dietary needs of prisoners at some facilities. Id. at ¶ OO.
A prisoner may eat from a Vegan menu only with approval of the CFA
Special Activities Coordinator. Approval shall be granted only if it is necessary to
the practice of the prisoner’s designated religion, including the prisoner’s sincerely
held religious beliefs.
Id. at ¶ PP. 	Here, plaintiff requested the “test for Halal diet”, i.e., he requested to eat from the
vegan menu. See Religious Meal Packet (ECF No. 36-3, PageID.151). See Robinson v. Jackson,
615 Fed. Appx. 310, 313 (6th Cir. 2015) (The Sixth Circuit has “explicitly held that vegetarian
meals are, in fact, Halal.”).
At the time plaintiff made the request at issue in this lawsuit, “[he] was not on any
religious meal program” and SAC Dirschell “received documentation requesting access to the
vegan menu.” Dirschell Decl. (ECF No. 36-5, PageID.175). Dirschell explained the procedure by
which a prisoner on the vegan menu can request to be placed on an “alternative diet”:
13. Once the requestor is on the vegan menu, if they believe the menu does not
meet their dietary needs, they can request an alternative diet.
14. There was a time when the MDOC allowed people to bypass the vegan menu
and directly request an alternative menu, but that process has been changed and
now the requestor must first be on the vegan diet and then show how the diet does
not comport to their religious dietary needs.
2 Policy Directive 05.03.150 addresses “Religious beliefs and practices of prisoners”. Paragraph NN states:
The regular diet menu shall be posted a minimum of one week in advance in all facilities
at which meals are provided to prisoners to permit observance of any religious dietary restrictions.
Prisoners shall be permitted to abstain from any foods that violate their religious tenets. Non-meat
entrees shall be available as set forth in PD 04.07.100 “Offender Meals and Food Quality Assurance.
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 8
of 17

9
15. According to policy, I do not approve or deny requests for an alternative menu.
Those requests are handled by the CFA Deputy Director.
16. As mentioned, the records I received for Lewis [plaintiff] were for the universal
vegan menu and I considered the request.
Id. Here, plaintiff “updated his religious designation to Nation of Islam in 2016”, which according
to SAC Dirschell “has some of the strictest dietary requirements.” 	Id. See Plaintiff’s Religious
Designation (ECF No. 36-1). Based on the MDOC procedure outlined above, plaintiff would need
to be on the MDOC’s vegan/Halal menu before he could request to be placed on a “stricter”
alternative diet to meet the alleged dietary requirements of the Nation of Islam.
C. 	Discussion
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted because plaintiff has
not shown that defendants violation a constitutional right. To prevail on his § 1983 claim, plaintiff
must show that defendants deprived him of his First Amendment right to practice his religion.
With respect to food, “prison administrators must provide an adequate diet without violating the
inmate’s religious dietary restrictions.” 	Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	“[T]his is essentially a constitutional right not to eat the
offending food item.” Alexander v. Carrick, 31 Fed. Appx. 176, 179 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, “[i]f
the prisoner’s diet . . . is sufficient to sustain the prisoner in good health, no constitutional right
has been violated.” Colvin, 605 F.3d at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
During his deposition, plaintiff testified that the MDOC’s vegan/Halal menu is
insufficient because the Nation of Islam has a more restrictive diet that:
Our dietary restrictions, we are to refrain from soy or any soy byproducts. We are
to stay far, far away and never to eat the prohibited flesh of swine. We are to not
eat corn, potatoes, peas, all type of peas, certain type of navy -- certain type of beans
we are prohibited to eat. We are only taught to eat one bean and that’s the Navy
bean, the small one. 	We’re taught to stay away from starchy and sugary food.
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page 9
of 17

10
There's a – what else?ꞏ Macaroni, spaghetti, all these different things that causes
diabetes 	and 	cancer 	and 	all 	these 	things 	and 	causing 	people 	to 	become
homosexuals. And a lot of the things that people -- that we are fed in the MDOC
is producing a lot of diseases and homosexuality and behavior around this place.
Lewis Dep. (ECF No. 36-6, PageID.185).
Although plaintiff requested to be on the vegan menu, plaintiff testified that he does
not want a vegan diet and that he is currently on the regular menu where “I just pick around the
food and do my best.” PageID.187. As discussed, while this lawsuit involves plaintiff’s request
for a vegan/Halal diet, plaintiff ultimately wants an alternative meal plan, with replacements for
corn, potatoes, soy, powdered milk, concentrated fruit juices, pasta, canned fruit, margarine,
peanut butter and “all beans except the navy bean.” PageID.187-188. Plaintiff testified that the
vegan menu “is mandatory to comply with cultural Halal religious tenants [sic], but not in the faith
and belief of Muslims or the most Honorable Muhammad because we’re taught not to eat soy.”
PageID.187.
Defendants seek summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff is not sincere with
his religious beliefs, i.e., strict adherence to the Nation of Islam diet. 	Defendants can consider
evidence of a prisoner’s sincerity in addressing requests for religious accommodations.
[P]rison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner’s religiosity,
asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic. Although
RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is “central” to a
prisoner's religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), the Act does not preclude
inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiosity. Cf. Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 457, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (“ ‘[T]he “truth” of
a belief is not open to question’; rather, the question is whether the objector’s beliefs
are ‘truly held.’” (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185, 85 S.Ct. 850,
13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965))).
Cutter, 544 U.S. 709, 725, n. 13.
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page
10 of 17

11
1. 	SAC Dirschell
Defendant SAC Dirschell’s duties include reviewing, approving and denying
requests for access to the religious vegan menu. Dirschell Decl. (ECF No. 36-5, PageID.174). In
his declaration, Dirschell stated “the vegan menu is not available at every prison” and that “[e]very
prisoner seeking access to the vegan menu, regardless of their religious designation, must submit
a written request in accordance with MDOC PD 05.03.150.” Id.
Since providing vegan meals is expensive, they are not available to anyone
who claims to want or need a vegan meal. If there is evidence the requestor does
not abide by his own professed need for a vegan meal, the request is denied. The
decision is not made based on a minor lapse, but on a totality of the record that
evidences how sincere the requestor is about the religious dietary need.
Id. (emphasis added).
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s beliefs regarding the Nation of Islam dietary
restrictions are not sincere because he violates those restrictions by purchasing prohibited food
items at the prison store on a regular basis. SAC Dirschell considered these food purchases in
denying plaintiff’s request for an alternative menu:
22. Since I do not work at any facility, the only way available to consider a
requestor’s sincerity is through paperwork and review of the institutional file. I
reviewed Lewis’ commissary purchases and contrary to his statements, Lewis was
purchasing most of the food items he claimed he could not eat.
23. He had purchased white rice, refried beans (which are not navy beans),
macaroni, peanut butter, many kinds of chips (white potatoes), popcorn, sausage
salami, hot & spicy summer sausage, cinnamon rolls, chocolate chip cookies,
ramen, candies, and many other unhealthy foods that the Nation of Islam rejects.
These were not accidental purchases where someone who was trying to live by a
professed belief purchased something that had a prohibited ingredient that perhaps
was unknown, such as the fruit chews Lewis bought. These were not occasional
purchases that could be overlooked, they are his purchases on a regular basis.
24. All things considered, I did not find Lewis’ need for the vegan menu to be
sincere at the time, and I denied his request for access to the vegan menu.
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page
11 of 17

12
Id. at PageID.176. 	See Inmate Order and Refund (listing items which plaintiff purchased from
9/27/2023 through 2/21/2024, which included multiple purchases of macaroni and cheese, multiple
purchases of creamy and crunchy peanut butter, cajun chicken ramen, roast beef ramen, refried
beans and a wide variety of snack foods such as Doritos, microwave popcorn, salted peanuts, rich
hot cocoa, and cinnamon rolls) (ECF No. 36-3, PageID.152-159).
As discussed, plaintiff’s lawsuit is based on his request for the “halal diet test”, his
interview with Chaplain Blount for a vegan/halal diet, and SAC Dirschell’s denial of that request.
However, SAC Dirschell further stated that,
If Lewis was trying to request the alternative menu, that too would have
been denied, for the same reasons. Although I am not the decision maker for
alternative diet requests, there is no justifiable reason to create a special diet for
someone who does not comply with the restrictions of the diet which is already
available.
Dirschell Decl. at PageID.177.
Based on this record, SAC Dirschell did not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights as alleged in this lawsuit. Accordingly, SAC Dirschell should be granted summary judgment
on this claim.
2. 	Chaplain Blount
Plaintiff alleged that Chaplain Blount incorrectly wrote down plaintiff’s responses
to Blount’s questions, refused to add plaintiff’s additional commentary, and refused to file an
appeal with expert information, all of which resulted in SAC Dirschell denying plaintiff’s request.
Based on the record, Chaplain Blount’s statements placed in the Religious Meal Interview form
were consistent with plaintiff’s version of his religious practices and diet. 	See Religious Meal
Packet (ECF No. 36-3) 3 ; Lewis Dep. (PageID.186-188). 	Chaplain Blount recommended that
3 As discussed, plaintiff’s kite refers to this as the “test for Halal diet” (ECF No. 36-3, PageID.151).
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page
12 of 17

13
plaintiff’s request be approved “unless he is buying non-Kosher food”. 	Chaplain Blount’s
reference to “Kosher food” is a reference to the vegan diet. 	See Blount Decl. (ECF No. 36-7,
PageID.201) (“[t]he ‘Halal’ diet within the MDOC, it [sic] the vegan menu, which is a universal
vegan diet intended to comply with as many different religious beliefs as possible” and that
“[a]ccording to policy the diet meets both Kosher and Halal needs”).
Blount stated that he has no control over approval for religious diets, that the SAC
has authority to “consider approve, or deny requests for the vegan menu,” that he gathers
information from individuals about their religious beliefs, and that he passes this information to
the SAC. 	Id. 	Here, Blount interviewed plaintiff to make a recommendation to the SAC and
recommended that plaintiff’s request for the vegan menu be approved but qualified that that
recommendation “based on any additional investigation conducted by the Special Activities
Coordinator to ensure his purchases did not violate the requested diet.” Id.
With respect to the appeal of the decision, Blount said that he would process an
appeal for plaintiff. However, plaintiff wanted to include a large stack of “Last Call” newspapers
with the appeal, and that Blount told him on multiple occasions that the appeal could not include
a stack of newspapers. 	Id. at PageID.201-203.4 Blount told plaintiff to make notes from the
newspaper issues connected to each appeal request and he would process the appeals, but plaintiff
insisted that he must include the stack of newspapers. Id. However, plaintiff did not submit the
appeal forms. Id. at PageID.203.5
4 It appears the Chaplain Blount is referring to the “Final Call” rather than the “Last Call.” In his verified complaint,
plaintiff referred to the documents as from “Final Call Newspapers”. Compl. at PageID.7. See Muhammad-Ali v.
Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The Final Call, the Nation of Islam’s official newspaper, has a
weekly circulation of roughly 70,000 readers.”). At his deposition, plaintiff described the “evidence” as 20, 25 or 30
newspapers. Lewis Dep. at PageID.189.
5 As discussed, plaintiff did not file a response brief to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court notes
that while plaintiff’s verified complaint states that Chaplain Blount’s “fact finding solutions directing me to take notes
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page
13 of 17

14
Based on this record plaintiff has not shown that Chaplain Blount violated his First
Amendment rights with respect to the interview, recommendation or appeal. Accordingly,
Chaplain Blount should be granted summary judgment on this claim.
IV. 	RLUIPA
Plaintiff claims that SAC Dirschell violated RLUIPA when he denied plaintiff’s
request for a vegan/Halal diet. See Comp. at PageID.5-6.
RLUIPA prohibits a State from imposing “a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution” unless the
government shows that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest”
and “is the least restrictive means” of doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). That
makes the statute a three-act play. In Act One, the inmate must demonstrate that he
seeks to exercise religion out of a “sincerely held religious belief.” See Holt v.
Hobbs, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015). In Act Two,
he must show that the government substantially burdened that religious exercise.
Id. In Act Three, the government must meet the daunting compelling-interest and
least-restrictive-means test. Id. at 863.
Cavin, 927 F.3d at 458. RLUIPA was not intended to eliminate all burdens on religious exercise.
Rather, 	RLUIPA 	“alleviates 	exceptional 	government-created 	burdens 	on 	private 	religious
exercise.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (emphasis added).
RLUIPA does not define the term “substantial burden.” See Living Water Church
of God v. Charter Township of Meridian, 258 Fed. Appx, 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2007). 	However,
Courts have developed a working definition.
[T]he Supreme Court generally has found that a government’s action constituted a
substantial burden on an individual’s free exercise of religion [1] when that action
forced an individual to choose between “following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits” or [2] when the action in question placed “substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs[.]”
. . . clearly is contrary to what the (CSJ-997) form instructs”, plaintiff does not provide any details on how the
Chaplain’s advice was contrary to the form.
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page
14 of 17

15
Id. at PageID.734. On the other hand, the Supreme Court “has found no substantial burden when,
although the action encumbered the practice of religion, it did not pressure the individual to violate
his or her religious beliefs.” Id.
Here, plaintiff appears to claim that the government placed a substantial burden on
his free exercise of religion when SAC Dirschell denied his request for a vegan/Halal menu and
that this decision put substantial pressure on plaintiff to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs (i.e., eating food which violated his religious beliefs). 	Plaintiff’s claim fails. 	Plaintiff
cannot show that the government action violated his sincerely held religious belief regarding a
religious diet. 	As discussed, plaintiff regularly purchased food from the prison store which
violated his alleged beliefs. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish that SAC Dirschell’s decision
substantially burdened his religious exercise.
Furthermore, plaintiff has not established that the MDOC had a “policy” which
violated RLUIPA. 	“To establish a cognizable claim under RLUIPA, the inmate must first
demonstrate that a prison policy substantially burdens a religious practice.” Board v. Weston, No.
2:19-cv-151, 2019 WL 3955678 at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2019). 	A prisoner fails to state a
claim for relief against an agency when he does not identify a policy that violates RLUIPA. See
Ali v. Adamson, 132 F.4th 924, 935 (6th Cir. 2025). Thus, a prisoner does not present a cognizable
RLUIPA claim when his theory of harm is that an MDOC employee refused to approve a request
for a religious diet. Id. 	As the court explained, in such a situation,
[T]he Department of Corrections did not refuse that request. [The MDOC
employee] did. 	Because [the prisoner] does not challenge the Department’s
policies themselves, he fails to show that it imposed a “substantial burden” on his
religious exercise.
Id. 	Similarly, in the present case, plaintiff is not challenging the MDOC’s policy directive
regarding religious diets; rather, he is challenging SAC Dirschell’s “improper denial” of his
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page
15 of 17

16
request made under the policy directive. 	For all of these reasons, defendants should be granted
summary judgment on plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim.
V. 	Injunction and Motion for TRO
A. 	Injunction
Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to enjoin defendants “from denying Nation of Islam
members diet [sic] that comports with their sincerely held beliefs.” Compl. at PageID.9. 	As an
initial matter, plaintiff’s request for this MDOC-wide prospective relief is overly broad. Title 18
U.S.C. § 3626 “Appropriate remedies with respect to prison conditions” states that,
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall
extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a
particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective
relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system caused by the relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). 	Here, plaintiff’s request that the Court enter a preliminary injunction
granting prospective relief to all “Nation of Islam members” in the MDOC extends far beyond the
action necessary to address plaintiff’s complaint in this lawsuit. 	Furthermore, for the reasons
discussed, plaintiff has not demonstrated a violation of the First Amendment or RLUIPA. There
is no basis for plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief. Accordingly, defendants should be granted
summary judgment on this claim.
B. 	TRO
Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO (ECF No. 26) does not ask the Court for any particular
relief. 	In his supporting brief, plaintiff does not seek to maintain the status quo during the
pendency of this lawsuit. 	Rather, plaintiff seeks the ultimate injunctive relief requested in the
complaint, i.e., that the Court issue an order “enjoining defendants from providing plaintiff foods
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page
16 of 17

17
that violate his sincerely held religious beliefs as articulated in How to Eat to Live Book 1 & 2 by
the Honorable Elijah Muhammad who is the Messenger of Allah (God)”. 	See Plaintiff’s Brief
(ECF No. 27, PageID.72-73). 	For the reasons discussed, plaintiff has not demonstrated a violation
of the First Amendment or RLUIPA. Plaintiff has no basis for this Court to enter an injunction
against defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a TRO (ECF No. 26) should be denied.
VI. 	Recommendation
For these reasons, I respectfully recommend that plaintiff’s motion for a TRO (ECF
No. 26) be DENIED, that defendants Dirschell and Blount’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 35) be GRANTED, and that this case be terminated.
Dated: February 9, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case 1:24-cv-01068-JMB-RSK ECF No. 41, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/09/26 Page
17 of 17