Gonzalez #967783 v. Mukarurinda

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AARON GONZALEZ #967783,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEONCIE MUKARURINDA,
Defendant.
________________________________/
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
Case No. 1:24-cv-00645
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 58). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends
that Defendant’s motion be granted in part and denied in part and that this action be
terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Saginaw Correctional Facility (MSP) in Freeland,
Saginaw County, Michigan, but the events underlying this lawsuit allegedly occurred
at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff
sues Leoncie Mukarurinda, an ICF nurse practitioner, in her individual capacity.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.2).
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following. (ECF No. 1). In February
2023, Plaintiff was transferred to ICF “for [a] medical procedure regarding a torn
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ACL and torn meniscus in [Plaintiff’s] right knee.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3). At ICF
Plaintiff was seen by Defendant. (Id.). Plaintiff requested a knee brace and a higher
dosage of pain medication. (Id.). Defendant denied Plaintiff’s request for a knee brace
but modified his medication. (Id.). “[S]ome months” later, Plaintiff again requested
a higher dosage of pain medication, which Defendant denied. (Id.). Plaintiff sent
multiple kites to Defendant “as the months passed” but was referred to nurses who
“could not do anything for [Plaintiff].” (Id.). Plaintiff underwent surgery in
“May/June 2024,” and “due to lack of proper medical attention by NP Mukarurinda[,]
[Plaintiff’s] meniscus was removed[,] and there was nothing that could be done to
[Plaintiff’s] ACL in [his] right knee due to build up of scar tissue.” (Id.). Plaintiff
“will no longer have full operational motion of [his] right knee and will eventually
have to get [a] knee replacement.” (Id.). Defendant “failed to give [Plaintiff] proper
medical treatment and accommodate [his] medical needs” by “refusing to schedule
[Plaintiff] for [a] medical review regarding [his] injury.” (Id.). Defendant “failed at
her duties as a qualified health professional” in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment rights. (Id.). Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4).
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds and on
the merits of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. (ECF No. 58). Plaintiff did not
respond to the motion. The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D.
Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on
“whether its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman,
993 F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating
that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints,
398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the
non-moving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible
evidence, which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440
F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in
support of the non-moving party’s position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v.
Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-
moving party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present
“significant probative evidence,” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving
party cannot merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope
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that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group
Holdings Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels,
396 F.3d at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence
presents a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the
jury, or whether the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail
as a matter of law.” Harden, 993 F.3d at 474.
While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the
opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof
faces a “substantially higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir.
2002). Where the moving party has the burden, “his showing must be sufficient for
the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving
party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly,
summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof “is inappropriate
when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier
of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
Regarding Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment,
“[e]ven when faced with an unopposed motion for summary judgment, the district
court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment without first considering
supporting evidence and determining whether the movant has met its burden.” Byrne
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v. CSX Transp., Inc., 541 F. App’x 672, 675 (2013); see also Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v.
United Plastics, Inc., 418 F. App’x 374, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Carver v.
Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1991)) (“[A] district court cannot grant
summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has not
responded. The court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant’s motion for
summary judgment to ensure that he has discharged that burden.”). That said, when
a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, “[n]othing in either the Rules or case
law supports an argument that the trial court must conduct its own probing
investigation of the record.” Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 405
(6th Cir. 1992). “The court may rely on the moving party’s unrebutted recitation of
the evidence in reaching a conclusion that facts are uncontroverted and that there is
no genuine issue of material fact.” Jones v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 238 F.3d 421 (6th
Cir. 2000) (table).
ANALYSIS
I. Exhaustion
The question of whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his Eighth Amendment
claims against Defendant is a threshold issue that must be resolved before the Court
can rule on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claims. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007). (“There is
no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted
claims cannot be brought into court.”); see also Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 13-
14356, 2016 WL 465496, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2016) (“Exhaustion is a threshold
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issue of judicial administration that this court ‘must address to determine whether
litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time.’ ”) (quoting Dillon
v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 2010)).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner asserting an action regarding
prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust his administrative
remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). This obligation only
extends, however, to such administrative remedies as are available. Ross v. Blake,
578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (a prisoner “must exhaust available remedies but need not
exhaust unavailable ones”).
Prisoners are no longer required to demonstrate exhaustion in their
complaints. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is “an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” which the
defendant bears the burden of establishing. Ibid.
With respect to what constitutes proper exhaustion, the Supreme Court has
stated that the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” defined
as “compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). In Bock, the Court reiterated that
Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is
all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’ The
level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the
grievance procedures will vary from system to system and
claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not
the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.
Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
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MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 articulates the applicable grievance
procedures for prisoners in MDOC custody. Prior to submitting a grievance, a
prisoner must attempt to resolve the issue with staff, unless prevented by
circumstances beyond his control, or the issue falls within the jurisdiction of Internal
Affairs. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ W (Sept. 25, 2023). The prisoner must
attempt to resolve the matter within two days of becoming aware that there exists a
grievable issue. (Id.).
If this attempt is unsuccessful (or such is inapplicable), the prisoner may
submit a Step I grievance, but such must be submitted within five business days after
attempting to resolve the matter with staff. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ CC
(Sept. 25, 2023). The issues asserted in a grievance “should be stated briefly but
concisely” and the “[d]ates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue
being grieved are to be included.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ Y (Sept. 25,
2023).
If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a
timely response, he may appeal to Step II within ten business days of the response,
or if no response was received, within ten business days after the response was due.
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ JJ (Sept. 25, 2023). If the prisoner is dissatisfied
with the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal
the matter to Step III. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶ NN (Sept. 25, 2023).
In her motion for summary judgment, Defendant provides evidence that
Plaintiff pursued one grievance through Step III about the alleged events that also
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names her: Grievance ICF-23-10-1105-28A.1
Grievance ICF-23-10-1105-28A does not establish that Plaintiff has properly
exhausted his claims against Defendant. On October 26, 2023, Plaintiff submitted
Grievance ICF-23-10-1105-28A, alleging that Defendant “refused to give [Plaintiff]
any kind of medical care,” including a knee brace and pain medication. (ECF No. 58-
3, PageID.417). The Step I grievance was rejected because it was “a duplicate of
another grievance that ha[d] already been processed,” Grievance ICF-23-06-0560-
28B. (ECF No. 58-3, PageID.417-18). Plaintiff appealed to Step II, in which the
rejection was upheld. (ECF No. 58-3, PageID.415-16). Plaintiff also appealed to
Step III, but the rejection was again upheld. (ECF No. 58-3, PageID.414-15).
Defendant Buchanan argues that Grievance ICF-23-10-1105-28A was properly
rejected. (ECF No. 58, PageID.234). The Court disagrees. A grievance may be
rejected if “[i]t raises issues that are duplicative of those raised in another grievance
filed by the grievant.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶¶ P(2) (Sept. 25, 2023).
But, “to carry [her] summary-judgment burden, Defendant[ ] must compare the
issues grieved in the first grievance to those grieved in the . . . allegedly-duplicate
grievances and show that every reasonable jury would think the rejections were
1 To exhaust a claim, inter alia, the grievance must identify an individual and the
issues therein must match the allegations in the complaint. See Rosencrantz v.
Schmalbach, No. 1:24-CV-886, 2025 WL 4082253, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2025)
(“It is well understood that if a prisoner identifies by name a specific individual in a
Step I grievance, that grievance can serve to exhaust claims only as to the individual
named in the Step I grievance.”); see also Smith v. Washington, No. 24-12652, 2025
WL 2947014, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“To exhaust a claim under the PLRA,
an incarcerated person’s grievance claim must match the issue(s) found in the
individual’s § 1983 complaint.”).
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proper.” Johannes v. Washington, No. 14-11691, 2016 WL 1253266, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 31, 2016). Defendant has not provided the Court with a copy of the second
grievance, merely noting that Plaintiff seemingly did not pursue the original
grievance, Grievance ICF-23-06-0560-28B, through Step III. (ECF No. 58,
PageID.233). Accordingly, Defendant fails to demonstrate that Grievance ICF-23-10-
1105-28A was duplicative and fails to establish that Plaintiff has not exhausted his
claim against her. The Court should deny summary judgment on exhaustion
grounds.
II. Merits
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of
the states to punish those convicted of crimes. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving
standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The
Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged
must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir.
1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant
experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual
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punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
“Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.’ ” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must
show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the
defendant official acted with “ ‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.”
Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims).
The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective
components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35-37.
A. Objective Component
To satisfy the objective prong, “the plaintiff must allege that the medical need
at issue is ‘sufficiently serious.’ ” McDuff v. Coleman, No. 4:23-CV-11739, 2026 WL
680985, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2026) (citation omitted). To establish a sufficiently
serious medical need, a plaintiff can assert a theory of: (1) inadequate treatment; or
(2) the failure to treat an obviously serious medical condition. The Sixth Circuit
distinguished between “cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of
medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate
medical treatment.” Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011).
Here, Plaintiff alleges inadequate on-going treatment, so he must show care
“so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be
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intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 737 (6th Cir.
2018). Plaintiff must present enough evidence for a factfinder “to evaluate the
adequacy of the treatment,” and “the severity of the harm caused by the allegedly
inadequate treatment.” Id. This often requires expert medical testimony showing
the medical necessity of Plaintiff's desired treatment and the inadequacy of the
received treatments. Id. “The plaintiff must also ‘place verifying medical evidence
in the record to establish the detrimental effect’ of the inadequate treatment.” Id.
Defendant argues that she provided Plaintiff at least some treatment for his
knee, so he must present expert medical testimony to establish the detrimental effect
of the allegedly inadequate treatment or the detrimental effect of the delay, and he
has failed to do so. (ECF No. 58, PageID.227-30). The Court agrees with Defendant
that Plaintiff must provide verifying medical evidence that his medical need was not
addressed in a reasonable time frame, and medical evidence of the detrimental effect
of the delay. Because Plaintiff fails to provide verifying medical evidence that a delay
in treatment caused scar tissue buildup, hindering the “operational motion” of
Plaintiff’s knee, he cannot satisfy the objective component of her case.
B. Subjective Component
Although Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the objective component is fatal to his
claim, the Court addresses the subjective component of the analysis for completeness.
Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Where a
prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of
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the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical
judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Westlake
v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). “A disagreement over the course of
treatment is insufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Clark v.
Gardner, 895 F.2d 1412 (6th Cir. 1990).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that she was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. (ECF No. 58, PageID.230). In support
of her motion, Defendant provides evidence through her affidavit and Plaintiff’s
medical records that she increased and renewed Plaintiff’s pain medication and that
Plaintiff never complained about his knee sleeve to her nor requested a different one.
(ECF No. 58-1, PageID.275, 308, 314-15, ECF No. 58-2, PageID.401-02). Plaintiff has
not provided evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, Defendant demonstrates that
Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact, and, regarding the
merits of Plaintiff’s claims, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be
granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned judicial officer recommends
that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 58) be granted in part and
denied in part and that this action be terminated. Defendant’s motion should be
granted on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and denied on exhaustion grounds. For the
same reasons the undersigned makes these recommendations, the undersigned finds
that an appeal of such would be frivolous and not in good faith. Coppedge v. United
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States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the
Clerk of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
DATED: April 8, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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