Geisler v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
JOHN G., 	Case No. 1:24-cv-558
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Chief U.S. District Judge
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
On June 6, 2025, this Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”) and remanded this case under sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings. ECF No. 12. 	Counsel did not request EAJA
fees in this case because Plaintiff’s net worth exceeds the statutory limit. 	ECF No.
14, PageID.560.
On November 9, 2025, the Commissioner awarded Plaintiff Social Security
disability benefits dating back to September 21, 2022. 	ECF No.14-2, PageID.578.
The Commissioner calculated that Plaintiff’s past due benefits totaled $114,306. Id.,
PageID.577-80. The Commissioner withheld $28,576.50 in past due benefits –
twenty-five percent of the total – to pay Plaintiff’s representative. 	Id., PageID.580.
On December 13, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for attorney’s fees under 42
U.S.C. § 406(b). 	ECF No.14. 	Plaintiff’s counsel requests “an amount between
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$15,210.00 to $22,750.00, or up to no more than the full 25% of the Plaintiff’s back
due benefits owed of $28,576.50.” Id., PageID.554.
The Commissioner has responded to the motion requesting Section 406(b) fees
and takes no position on Counsel’s request. ECF No. 15.
II. Analysis
The Social Security Act provides that “whenever a court renders a judgment
favorable to a claimant...who was represented before the court by an attorney, the
court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to
which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
“The statute deals with administrative and judicial review stages discretely: § 406(a)
governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; 406(b) controls fees for
representation in court.” 	Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002); see
Culbertson v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 517, 520 (2019). “[E]ach tribunal may award fees
only for the work done before it.” Horenstein v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
35 F.3d 261, 262 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Attorney’s fees under section 406(b) can only be awarded out of the plaintiff’s
award of past-due benefits. “A prevailing claimant’s fees are payable only out of the
benefits recovered; in amount, such fees may not exceed 25 percent of past-due
benefits.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 792. 	Section 406(b) “does not authorize the
prevailing party to recover fees from the losing party. 	Section 406(b) is of another
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genre: 	It authorizes fees payable from the successful party’s recovery.” 	Gisbrecht,
535 U.S. at 802.
The Supreme Court has held that section 406(b) calls for court review of such
contingency fee arrangements. In
Gisbrecht, the Court explained as follows:
[Section] 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an
independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in
particular cases. Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements
are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25
percent of past-due benefits. 	Within the 25 percent boundary . . . the
attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is
reasonable for the services rendered.
535 U.S. at 807.
Counsel and Plaintiff executed a retainer agreement in which Plaintiff agreed
to pay counsel up to twenty-five percent (25%) of past-due benefits awarded. 	ECF
No. 14-3, PageID.584. Although there exists a presumption of reasonableness to a 25
percent contingency-fee arrangement, counsel is not automatically entitled to 25
percent of his client’s past-due benefits. 	Lasley v. Commissioner of Social Security,
771 F.3d 308, 309 (6th Cir. 2014). Instead, the Court has an independent obligation
to assess the reasonableness of a request for attorney fees to ensure counsel does not
enjoy a “windfall.” 	Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. 	The Court may order a downward
adjustment when the “the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time
counsel spent on the case.” Id. at 808. The Sixth Circuit has stated:
[A] windfall can never occur when, in a case where a contingent fee
contract exists, the hypothetical hourly rate determined by dividing the
number of hours worked for the claimant into the amount of the fee
permitted under the contract is less than twice the standard rate for
such work in the relevant market.
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Hayes v. Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff’s Counsel asserts that he spent 16.25 billable hours on Plaintiff’s case.
ECF No. 14, PageID.570. 	Plaintiff’s Counsel states that $15,210.00 to $22,750.00
range derives from a base hourly rate between $936.00 to $1,400 – double the average
75th to 95th percentile billing rates for administrative attorneys. Id., PageID.572.
While the requested award equates to a significant hourly rate, counsel should
not be punished for obtaining exemplary results in an efficient manner. See, e.g.,
Kazanjian v. Astrue, No. 09 civ. 3678(BMC), 2011 WL 2847439 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July
15, 2011) (where counsel requested more than $48,000 in Section 406(b) fees for less
than 20 hours work, the court observed that counsel “should not, however, be
penalized for being efficient, which is exactly what I would be doing if I cut his
requested fee”). The Court must also take into consideration the general risk
associated with contingent fee cases. See, e.g., Ballatore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
11-15335, 2015 WL 5830836 at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2015) (one consideration in the
windfall analysis is whether counsel obtained a large award with minimal risk).
It is important to note, first, that counsel for the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration does not oppose this request. ECF No. 15. Second, Counsel
for Claimant appears to have complied with the requirements of Western District of
Michigan’s Local Civil Rule 54.2, concerning Attorney’s fees in certain Social Security
Cases. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 54.2. Third, the Counsel for Claimant filed an affidavit
by Claimant in which the Claimant supported counsel’s request. ECF No. 14-4.
Considering all the relevant circumstances, the Court finds counsel’s request
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to be reasonable. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, $15, 210.00 is a reasonable fee
for Plaintiff’s Counsel representation in this matter. A fee of $15,210.00 falls within
Counsel’s 	requested 	range 	but 	accounts 	for 	the 	Court’s 	obligation 	to 	assess
reasonableness in attorney fees.
III. 	Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Court GRANT Counsel’s request for
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and award $15,210.00.
In this case, Counsel did not receive prior EAJA fees. As such, there is not an
applicable EAJA refund.
Dated: 	May 19, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES:
Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served on opposing parties
and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of any further
right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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