Houghtaling #302129 v. Siwanowicz

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT HOUGHTALING, #302129,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-263
JUSTIN SIWANOWICZ,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 49). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
Defendant’s motion be granted and this action terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Newberry Correctional Facility. Plaintiff initiated this action against
Corrections Officer Justin Siwanowicz concerning events that occurred while
incarcerated at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility. In his amended complaint
(ECF No. 47) Plaintiff alleges the following.
In May 2021, Plaintiff, believing his life was in danger, requested “protection”
from MDOC staff. Prison officials investigated the matter, after which Plaintiff was
transferred to the “Protection Unit for his safety.” While confined in protective
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custody, Plaintiff “had frequent contact” with Defendant. The pair “did not get along
well” and on one occasion, Defendant “said words to the effect that she wished Plaintiff
was not in protective custody so he would get what was coming to him.”
On August 12, 2021, Defendant arrived at Plaintiff’s cell “to remove bedding.”
After entering Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant “walked away from [Plaintiff’s] cell, leaving
the door wide open and unattended.” Plaintiff “pleaded with Defendant to close his
cell door, warning that he was in protective custody and could be harmed by general
population prisoners.” Defendant refused, stating, “I’m not going to keep opening and
closing your fucking cell door.” Plaintiff again “begged” Defendant to close the door.
Defendant, however, declined and exited down the hallway.
Moments later, prisoner Dangelo Weaver, a general population inmate, “entered
Plaintiff’s cell armed with a homemade knife and violently stabbed Plaintiff” causing
“severe stab wounds to his head, neck, shoulders, arms, and hand.” As a result,
Plaintiff suffers long-term physical, psychological, emotional, and mental trauma.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to protect him in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights and, moreover, exhibited gross negligence in violation of Michigan
law. Defendant Siwanowicz now moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff has
responded to this motion. The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See
W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on “whether
its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman, 993 F.3d 465,
474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating
that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398
F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the non-
moving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible evidence,
which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350,
357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the non-
moving party’s position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730,
734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-moving
party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present “significant
probative evidence” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack v. Damon
Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving party cannot
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merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may
disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings Corp., Inc.,
379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d
at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence presents a
sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury, or whether
the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of law.”
Harden, 993 F.3d at 474.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Failure to Protect
Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim implicates the Eighth Amendment, which
requires Plaintiff to establish that Defendant Siwanowicz was deliberately indifferent to
“a substantial risk” that Plaintiff might suffer “serious harm.” Greene v. Bowles, 361
F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)).
The deliberate indifference standard incorporates both an objective and subjective
component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The objective prong requires Plaintiff to
establish that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id. As for the subjective prong, Plaintiff must prove that Defendant was
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“subjectively aware of the risk,” but failed “to take reasonable measures to abate it.’”
Greene, 361 F.3d at 294 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 847).
To prevail on the specific claim that Defendant failed to protect him from an
assault by another inmate, Plaintiff must establish: (1) Defendant had reason to believe
Plaintiff would be assaulted by another inmate and (2) she had both the opportunity and
means to prevent the assault. See, e.g., Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir.
2013).
Furthermore, that Defendant may have acted negligently is insufficient to
establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (to
prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
acted with a “state of mind more blameworthy than negligence”); Tolbert v. Parker, 2022
WL 532811 at *3 (E.D. Tenn., Feb. 22, 2022) (“[m]ere negligence or dereliction of duty
cannot be the basis of a failure-to-protect claim”) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 328 (1986)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish the objective or subjective
elements of the analysis. The Court only partly agrees.
A. 	Objective Prong
Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff presented no evidence enabling prison
officials to identify who might be targeting him, he cannot satisfy the objective prong.
Defendant’s argument, however, ignores one significant fact – prison officials did, in fact,
place Plaintiff in protective custody following his request for protection.
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It is undisputed that, on July 16, 2001, Plaintiff requested protection because
“someone has put a hit out on him. . .and if he stays in GP [General Population], he will
end up being killed.” (ECF No. 50-2, PageID.417). Following an investigation, prison
officials determined that Plaintiff’s “protection[] needs cannot be met [at this facility],”
thus Plaintiff was placed in protective custody pending a transfer to a different facility.
(Id.).
While it is true that prison officials concluded that “the threat against [Plaintiff’s]
life can not be confirmed,” it was likewise determined that “a threat against his life could
be a real possibility.” (Id.). This latter conclusion was confirmed by the decision to
place Plaintiff in protective custody pending his transfer to a facility that could meet his
protection needs. That prison officials were unable to determine the precise identity of
the prisoner[s] who might pose a threat to Plaintiff does not carry the significance that
Defendant asserts. See, e.g., Westley v. Harris, 2024 WL 4111143 at *3 (6th Cir., Sept.
4, 2024) (citing Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2004)) (the objective
component is satisfied where prison officials perceived “a substantial risk to a particular
inmate, even if the officials were unaware of who would commit the assault”).
In sum, interpreting the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a
reasonable juror could conclude that prison officials transferred Plaintiff to protective
custody because they believed that there existed a substantial risk that he would be
assaulted by another inmate. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Defendant
has not satisfied her burden to obtain summary judgment on this ground.
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B. 	Subjective Prong
With respect to the subjective prong, however, the undersigned reaches a different
conclusion. The evidence before the Court reveals the following.
Inspector J. Goostrey was the person who investigated Plaintiff’s request for
protection. (ECF No. 50-2, PageID.417). Goostrey testified that the specific
allegations concerning Plaintiff’s request for protection were not shared with Corrections
Officers, including Defendant. (ECF No. 53-1, PageID.666-67). As Goostrey testified,
the Brooks facility was not a “protective custody institution” and, therefore, did not have
cells dedicated to protective custody. (ECF No. 53-1, PageID.667). Instead, prisoners
requiring protection were placed in cells ordinarily designated CPH, “confinement
pending hearing.” When a prisoner was placed in a CPH cell, the only information
provided to Corrections Officers was simply whether the prisoner was there for
disciplinary or protective reasons. No further information was provided to Corrections
Officers. (ECF No. 53-1, PageID.667). Defendant Siwanowicz likewise testified that
she had no knowledge why Plaintiff was placed in protective custody or the nature of any
alleged or potential threat prompting such. (ECF No. 50-8, PageID.501-02, 514-15).
As it turned out, the reason Plaintiff was attacked by Dangelo Weaver was
completely unrelated to Plaintiff’s request for protection. Weaver testified that the day
prior to attacking Plaintiff, he was having a conversation with another inmate when
Plaintiff just interrupted and began “disrespecting” Weaver. (ECF No. 50-6,
PageID.469-72). Prior to this incident, Weaver had never interacted with Plaintiff and
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had no issues with Plaintiff. (ECF No. 50-6, PageID.470-71). The following morning
when Weaver saw Plaintiff’s cell door open, Weaver simply “took advantage of. . .going
in there and fighting him.” (ECF No. 50-6, PageID.469-72).
Plaintiff confirmed that, prior to Weaver’s assault, he never had any disagreement
with Weaver and likewise had no reason to fear him. (ECF No. 50-7, PageID.482).
Defendant testified that she had no knowledge of any issues or trouble between Plaintiff
and Weaver. (ECF No. 50-8, PageID.517). Defendant testified that she never heard
Weaver threaten Plaintiff or any other inmate. (ECF No. 50-8, PageID.518-19).
Defendant further testified that Plaintiff never reported to her that Weaver had made
threats to him. (ECF No. 50-8, PageID.519). That Plaintiff was not experiencing
issues or difficulties with other prisoners was confirmed by two other Corrections
Officers. (ECF No. 50-9, PageID.553-54; ECF No. 50-10, PageID.563-64).
In sum, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant failed to reasonably respond to
any risk to Plaintiff of which she was subjectively aware. As Defendant observes,
Weaver’s assault on Plaintiff appears, unfortunately, to simply be “the kind of random
assault that occurs with some frequency in a prison.” Griggs v. Brown, 1986 WL 16199
at *2 (6th Cir., Mar. 3, 1986); Moore v. Guastella, 2024 WL 5506982 at *7 (E.D. Mich.,
Sept. 19, 2024) (failure by prison officials to prevent “random assaults” does not violate
the Eighth Amendment). While it is an open question whether Defendant acted
negligently, such is insufficient to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff’s
arguments in opposition to the present motion are not persuasive.
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First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant was aware that Plaintiff was in protective
custody. As discussed above, however, the assault on Plaintiff was completely
unrelated to his request for protection. Plaintiff was not attacked because of anything
related to his request for protection. Rather, Plaintiff was attacked because of an
incident with Weaver the day preceding the assault.
Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant was aware of the “specific threats against”
Plaintiff and “bore personal animus toward him.” There is no evidence that Plaintiff
was subjected to any specific threats or that Defendant had subjective knowledge of such.
As for Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant exhibited personal animus toward him, such
is unpersuasive. Plaintiff relies on two statements from other prisoners. James
Adkins asserts that he heard Defendant tell Plaintiff that she wished he was not in
protective custody so he would “get fucked up.” (ECF No. 52-8, PageID.632). Zane
Plants asserts that he heard Defendant tell Plaintiff that she was “going to get him
fucked up before he leaves the unit for trying to ruin her coworkers[’] careers.” (ECF
No. 52-9, PageID.635). While the Court does not condone such comments, they do not
establish that Defendant possessed any subjective knowledge that Plaintiff faced any
threat to his safety from Dangelo Weaver or any other inmate.1
1 The Court has no opinion whether such statements would support some other,
unasserted, cause of action.
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Third, Plaintiff argues that he requested that Defendant close his cell door before
leaving the area. There is no evidence, however, that this was anything more than a
general request. Plaintiff did not express any particular concern for his safety or
identify any particular prisoner who might constitute a threat. Again, while
Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s request may very well support a claim of negligence,
such is not sufficient to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim. Finally, Plaintiff’s
argument that Defendant “knew” that the Gangster Disciples “had a hit on” Plaintiff is
simply unsupported by the record.
In conclusion, and for the reasons articulated above, the undersigned concludes
that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant failed to reasonably respond to any risk
to Plaintiff of which she was subjectively aware. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends that Defendant Siwanowicz is entitled to summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.
C. 	State Law Claim
Plaintiff has also asserted a state law claim for negligence. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3), the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
state law claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
Indeed, “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial. . .the state claims should be
dismissed as well.” Taylor v. First of America Bank - Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)); see also,
Bah v. Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, 610 Fed. Appx. 547, 555 (6th Cir., May
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8, 2015) (same). As discussed above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
federal law claim be dismissed. Accordingly, the undersigned further recommends that
the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim and instead
dismiss such without prejudice so that Plaintiff may pursue them in the appropriate
state forum.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 49) be granted and this matter terminated.
For the same reasons the undersigned makes these recommendations, the undersigned
finds that an appeal of such would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the undersigned further recommends that an appeal of
this matter by Plaintiff would not be in good faith.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: October 27, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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