Gentry #132047 v. Grand Prairie Healthcare Services, P.C. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD CHARLES GENTRY #132047,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-240
GRAND PRAIRIE HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, P.C., et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court has before it Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Brandi
Avery, R.N. (ECF No. 117) and Defendant Avery’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
122). Both motions are fully briefed and ready for decision. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),
I recommend that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion and GRANT Defendant Avery’s motion.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff Richard Gentry, a prisoner incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC), sued several MDOC employees and contractors pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging that they violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment due to deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, namely his back, leg, and foot pain and numbness. The
events at issue occurred at the Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF). The remaining Defendants
are Nurse Avery and Rickey Coleman, D.O.
The Court previously summarized Gentry’s claims against Nurse Avery as follows:
Plaintiff claims that, on April 8, 2024, after exercising the previous day, Plaintiff
began experiencing intense pain in his right thigh and lower extremities. ([ECF No.
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17,] PageID.99.) The pain seemed to be expanding the following day and worsened
on April 10, 2024. (Id.)
At 9:00 a.m. on April 10, 2024, Plaintiff spoke with non-party Officer Heath and
asked that he contact healthcare; Officer Heath complied. (Id.) When healthcare did
not return Officer Heath’s call by 11:00 a.m., Plaintiff asked that Officer Heath call
again. (Id.) When “the call came,” Plaintiff told Nurse Avery that he had been
experiencing excruciating pain for three days and had to shower while sitting for
the first time in his life. (Id.) Nurse Avery advised that it seemed to be a “nerve
issue,” and instructed Plaintiff to continue taking naproxen. (Id.)
After his call with Nurse Avery, Plaintiff submitted a medical kite and told non-
party Sergeant Clemens of his “dilemma” and that going over bumps in his
wheelchair intensified his pain. (Id., PageID.100.) Sergeant Clemens instructed
Plaintiff to ask a second shift officer to call healthcare again, which he did;
however, he did not receive a return call. (Id.)
On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff was examined by non-party Nurse Bowerman, who
took Plaintiff’s vitals, except for his weight, and spoke with Plaintiff. (Id.) Nurse
Bowerman provided Plaintiff with ibuprofen and Tylenol to take with the naproxen
that Plaintiff had been previously ordered, gave Plaintiff a page of exercises, and
supplemented Plaintiff’s medical detail to include “no work, lay in, and wheelchair
for distance, for 5 days.” (Id.)
On April 18, 2024, after experiencing no changes to his condition, Plaintiff
presented to healthcare and met with non-party Mr. Baker. (Id., PageID.101.)
Plaintiff asked Mr. Baker how Mr. Baker could assist Plaintiff in “getting back on
[his] feet.” (Id.) However, when Mr. Baker told Plaintiff that he would need to
perform an assessment, including taking Plaintiff’s vitals, Plaintiff declined the
assessment. (Id.)
(ECF No. 25 at PageID.150–51.)
Gentry, who is 71 years old,1 has a history of back, leg, and foot pain due to degenerative
spine issues, for which he has received treatment while incarcerated with the MDOC. As of
December 2018, Gentry had acute radiculopathy bilaterally with low back pain and numbness.
(ECF No. 123-2 at PageID.1027.) During an August 22, 2018 visit with a neurologist, Gentry
reported symptoms of paresthesia and difficulty walking. The doctor diagnosed radiculopathy of
the lumbosacral region and polyneuropathy. (Id. at PageID.1030–31.) In September 2019, Gentry
1 See https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=132047.
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underwent 	an 	open 	laminectomy 	of 	L4-S1 	with 	bilateral 	medial 	foraminotomy. 	(Id. 	at
PageID.1038.) Still, he continued to experience back pain with radicular pain. (Id.)
In early February 2024, Gentry was seen at the Henry Ford Hospital pain clinic for back
pain and radicular pain. (Id. at PageID.1038.) Following the visit, Gentry’s medical provider,
Suzanne Groff, NP, established a plan of care (POC). NP Groff noted that Plaintiff had a history
of chronic low back pain and expressed “complaints of continued low back pain down his posterior
thighs,” “occasional sharp shooting/burning pains with movement,” “numbness/tingling down his
legs into his feet,” “difficulty getting of bed in the morning,” and a need to stop and rest frequently
due to pain. (Id.) NP Groff also noted that a lower extremity EMG study conducted in October
2023 indicated advanced acute radiculopathy bilaterally, and a December 2023 MRI study of the
lumbar spine indicated that Gentry had multilevel degenerative changes and lumbar spondylosis.
(Id.)
The pain clinic visit resulted in a recommendation for a trial of Caudal ESI (epidural steroid
injection), which required MDOC staff approval. (Id.) By February 6, 2024, Caudal ESI had been
approved and was pending scheduling. (Id. at PageID.1040.) NP Groff prescribed Gentry
Naproxen 375 mg. twice per day as needed and encouraged him to continue with activity
modifications, HEP (home exercise program) stretches, and over-the-counter medications as
needed. (Id. at 1040, 1043.) Gentry received the Caudal ESI on March 19, 2024. (Id. at
PageID.1047.)
Gentry’s single phone call with Nurse Avery occurred about three weeks later, on April
10, 2024. During the call, Gentry said that he was experiencing back pain radiating down his right
leg and into his right arm, accompanied by numbness and tingling. (ECF No. 123-2.) Gentry
reported that he had been experiencing these symptoms for three days. Nurse Avery instructed
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Gentry to continue taking Naproxen and doing HEP stretches to help alleviate the pain. (Id.) Gentry
insisted on being seen right away and asked for Nurse Avery’s name. However, Nurse Avery
instructed Gentry to kite healthcare and look for a nursing callout. (Id.) At the time of this
conversation, Nurse Avery was aware of Gentry’s medical history and the POC that NP Groff had
in place for his back issues, and she instructed him on steps to alleviate his pain consistent with
the POC. (ECF No. 123-3 at PageID.1058.) Based on the information Gentry provided, Nurse
Avery did not believe that Gentry was experiencing a medical issue that required immediate
examination. (Id.)
Gentry submitted a kite as instructed and received a nursing callout the following day.
Nurse Bowerman examined Gentry and noted gait abnormality, but she observed no abnormalities
in his back or muscle area, and he had normal motor strength. The POC was to continue taking
Naproxen as ordered and alternate with Tylenol and apply a warm compress to the area before
doing light stretching. (Id. at PageID.1053–54.)
One week later, on April 18, 2024, Gentry went to healthcare after kiting about continued
back pain and was seen by Nurse Baker. (Id. at PageID.1056.) Gentry appeared agitated and spoke
to Nurse Baker with a raised voice in rapid succession. He refused to allow Nurse Baker to do an
assessment and told her to “just use the information from my last assessment and do something.”
(Id.) Nurse Baker explained that he would need to do an assessment before making a POC, but
Gentry refused and continued to speak with a raised voice and agitated tone. Gentry left after Nurse
Baker told him to stop, indicating that he would just wait for his upcoming chronic care
appointment. Nurse Baker told him to re-kite if he changed his mind and wanted an assessment.
(Id. at PageID.1056.)
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II. 	Motion Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable
jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the opponent cannot
sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially higher
hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the
burden, “his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could
find other than for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir.
1986). The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof “must show that
the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so
powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561.
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion “is
inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier
of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
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III. 	Discussion
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies not
only to punishment imposed by the state, but also to deprivations that occur during imprisonment
and are not part of the sentence imposed. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1976). Punishment that is without penological justification or
involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain also violates the Eighth Amendment’s
proscriptions. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). In other words, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits “the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183
(1976).
The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain encompasses “deliberate indifference” to an
inmate’s “serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-06; Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d
739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001). Determining whether denial of medical care amounts to an Eighth
Amendment violation involves two steps. First, the court must determine, objectively, whether the
alleged deprivation was sufficiently serious. A “serious medical need” sufficient to implicate the
Eighth Amendment is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, the objective component is
satisfied where a prisoner receives no treatment for a serious medical need. See Rhinehart v. Scutt,
894 F.3d 721, 737 (6th Cir. 2018). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s failure
to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-
obvious,” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff must
“place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in
medical treatment.” Napier, 238 F.3d at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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If the plaintiff satisfies the objective component, he must then demonstrate that the
defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind:
a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying
an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In other words, the plaintiff “must present evidence from which a trier
of fact could conclude ‘that the official was subjectively aware of the risk’ and ‘disregard[ed] that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th
Cir. 2004) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 847). To satisfy this part of the analysis, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant acted with “deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish.”
Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 813 (6th Cir. 2005).
A. 	Defendant Avery’s Motion
Defendant Avery contends that Gentry’s claim fails as to both components of his deliberate
indifference claim. I agree.
1. 	Objective Component
Gentry has not presented evidence necessary to establish the objective component of his
claim. The medical evidence of record shows that Gentry’s degenerative spine issues that caused
his pain in his back, legs, and feet were a chronic condition that the MDOC had treated for years.
The most recent POC issued by his medical provider, NP Goff, called for Caudal ESI, Naproxen
375 mg. tablets or other over-the-counter medication, and stretching. The low back pain that
Gentry reported to Nurse Avery on April 10, 2024, arose from the same medical condition for
which he had received ongoing treatment. In other words, the pain arose from a flare-up of his
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chronic condition and not from injury requiring emergent treatment. Under these circumstances,
Gentry’s need for immediate medical care was non-obvious.
To prevail on a claim of this nature, Gentry must “place verifying medical evidence in the
record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment.” Johnson v. Karnes,
398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Generally, the required medical evidence
must be in the form of expert testimony. Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021).
Because Gentry presents no expert testimony, his claim fails. Moreover, Gentry’s medical records
show that Nurse Bowerman examined Gentry the following day, did not report significant positive
objective findings on examination other than an abnormal gait, and gave him essentially the same
instructions as Nurse Avery had given him the day before, indicating no detrimental effect from a
24-hour delay.
Alternatively, Gentry’s claim might be viewed as one of inadequate care. That is, based on
the information Gentry provided over the phone, Nurse Avery assessed Gentry’s situation and
determined he should continue to follow NP Groff’s POC and could kite if he wanted a nursing
callout. To the extent Gentry contends that Nurse Avery should have seen him immediately or
done something different, his claim still fails. As explained in Phillips:
More frequently, doctors provide some care and prisoners challenge their treatment
choices as inadequate. To establish the objective element in this common situation,
prisoners must show more. Objectively speaking, this care qualifies as “cruel and
unusual” only if it is “so grossly incompetent” or so grossly “inadequate” as to
“shock the conscience” or “be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Ordinary
individuals outside a prison’s walls and inmates within those walls both face a risk
that their doctors will perform incompetently. . . . But mere malpractice does not
violate the Eighth Amendment. Only grossly or woefully inadequate care – not just
care that falls below a professional standard – can be called “cruel and unusual.”
For prisoners to prove grossly inadequate care, moreover, courts generally require
them to introduce medical evidence, typically in the form of expert testimony.
Phillips, 14 F.4th at 534–35 (internal citations omitted). Thus, even if viewed as an inadequate
treatment claim, Gentry still fails to support it with the requisite evidence.
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Gentry’s response largely consists of unsupported argument and conclusory assertions. To
the extend Gentry suggests that NP Groff’s entries in the medical records are “false,” (ECF No.
127 at PageID.1078), his conclusory assertions are unpersuasive. See May v. Akers, No. 5:21-cv-
182, 2023 WL 3018005, at *6 n.3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 2, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,
2023 WL 2611034 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2023) (“May asserts that the portion of the medical record
indicating that he was given a pain injection is fabricated. He also alleges that many of the other
medical records from the LAC and UK HealthCare contain false information. However, May
provides nothing more than his bare assertions and conclusory allegations that staff at the LAC
and UK HealthCare fabricated his medical records, which are insufficient to survive a motion for
summary judgment.”). In any event, his argument that NP Groff inaccurately attributed use of the
word “radiating” to him does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
2. 	Subjective Component
As for the subjective component, Gentry “must present evidence from which a trier of fact
could conclude ‘that [Nurse Avery] was subjectively aware of the risk’ and ‘disregard[ed] that risk
by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Greene, 361 F.3d at 294 (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 829, 847). Although Gentry argues that Nurse Avery was aware of his “serious medical
need and did not respond reasonably,” (ECF No. 127 at PageID.1079), Nurse Avery states in her
declaration that, while speaking with Gentry on April 10, 2024, she did not believe that he required
immediate attention as she was aware of both his medical history and the POC that NP Groff had
provided and relied on her training and experience to conclude that Gentry did not need to be seen
right away. (ECF No. 123-3 at PageID.1058–59.) Gentry fails to present evidence that Nurse
Avery was subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm to Gentry’s health and ignored that risk by
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instructing him to follow NP Groff’s POC. The absence of such evidence creating a genuine issue
of material fact provides an additional basis for summary judgment.
3. 	Qualified Immunity
Nurse Avery also argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified
immunity provides that government officials performing discretionary functions are generally
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate a clearly
established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th
Cir. 1999). An “objective legal reasonableness” test is used to determine whether the official could
reasonably have believed her conduct was lawful. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639
(1987). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
The qualified immunity inquiry requires a court to decide whether the facts as alleged or
shown make out a constitutional violation and whether the right that was allegedly violated was a
clearly established right at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 232. If the court can conclude
that either no constitutional violation occurred or that the right was not clearly established,
qualified immunity is warranted. The court may consider either prong of the inquiry without regard
to sequence. Id. at 236. Because Gentry has failed to establish that a constitutional violation
occurred, I further recommend that Nurse Avery is entitled to qualified immunity.
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B. 	Gentry’s Motion
Having reviewed Gentry’s motion, I conclude that he fails to carry his burden of
demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment. That is, he has not shown that his “evidence is
so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561. Rather,
Gentry’s motion and supporting arguments essentially reflect his dissatisfaction and disagreement
with Nurse Avery’s medical judgment during the April 10, 2024 phone call, but these are
insufficient grounds for a deliberate indifference claim. “Where a prisoner has received some
medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally
reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state
tort law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit
has firmly established that a prisoner’s disagreement with a medical provider’s judgment or
approach to medical treatment fails to support an Eighth Amendment claim. See White v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 94 F. App’x 262, 264 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, Gentry’s motion should be denied.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the Court grant Nurse Avery’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 122) and deny Gentry’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF
No. 117.)
Dated: January 26, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
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objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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