Stanfill #879012 v. Morford

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOSEPH LEE STANFILL, #879012,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-148
UNKNOWN MORFORD,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 22).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s
motion be granted in part and denied in part as detailed herein.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility. Plaintiff initiated this action
against Corrections Officer Roger Morford concerning events that occurred while
incarcerated at the Carson City Correctional Facility. In her complaint (ECF No. 1),
Plaintiff alleges the following.
Plaintiff, a biological male, has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria and
identifies as a female. The treatment Plaintiff receives for this condition includes
hormone therapy, which has resulted in Plaintiff becoming “fully feminized.”
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On January 28, 2024, Plaintiff was in the visiting area waiting for a visitor to
arrive. While waiting, Plaintiff went to the restroom where she encountered
Defendant Morford who stated to Plaintiff, “show me your breast and jack me off.”
When Plaintiff refused, Defendant responded, “I’m giving you a direct order and if you
don’t do this I will get you sent up north so you can’t see your family again.” Plaintiff
then complied with Defendant’s request.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Morford’s conduct violated her Eighth
Amendment rights, as well as her right to equal protection of the law. Plaintiff
requests compensatory and punitive damages, as well as damages for emotional injury.
Defendant Morford moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff has responded to
this motion. The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. Mich.
LCivR 7.2(d).
LEGAL STANDARD
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has
held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
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unlawfully.” If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly.
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice. . .Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from
the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
with nothing more than conclusions. 	Second, only a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss. . .Determining whether a complaint states
a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals
observed, be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense. But where the well pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged – but it has not “show[n]” – “that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. 	Eighth Amendment
Federal law provides that “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission
of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Defendant
argues that because Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite physical injury or sexual
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act, her Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed. The undersigned only partly
agrees.
Defendant is correct that Plaintiff has failed to allege that she suffered a physical
injury as a result of the incident in question. Likewise, Defendant is correct that
Plaintiff was not the victim of a “sexual act,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). But
Defendant’s argument that this requires the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
claim is completely lacking in merit.
As the Sixth Circuit has concluded, even where a prisoner cannot satisfy the
requirements of § 1997e(e), such does not require the dismissal of a claim but rather
merely precludes the recovery of compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury.
See, e.g., Small v. Brock, 963 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2020). As the Brock court
concluded, even in the absence of physical injury or a sexual act, § 1997e(e) allows
prisoners to pursue claims for nominal damages and punitive damages as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. (citations omitted); see also, Westley v. Harris,
2024 WL 4111143 at *3 (6th Cir., Sept. 4, 2024) (same).
Accordingly, to the extent Defendant seeks to limit Plaintiff from recovering
compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury, the undersigned recommends
that Defendant’s motion be granted. To the extent, however, Defendant seeks to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim or otherwise restrict the type of damages
she is permitted to pursue, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s motion be
denied.
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II. 	Equal Protection
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “targeted [her] for sexual exploitation” because of
her transgender status in violation of her rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for violation of her equal
protection rights. The undersigned agrees.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To prevail on an equal
protection claim, Plaintiff must establish that she was treated “disparately as compared
to similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a
fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.” Center for Bio-
Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011). The Supreme
Court has also recognized what is referred to as a “class-of-one” equal protection claim
in which the plaintiff does not allege membership in a particular class or group but
instead establishes that she “has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
Davis v. Prison Health Services, 679 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012).
Regardless of the particular theory advanced, however, the threshold element of
any equal protection claim is disparate treatment. Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano,
648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[t]o state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must
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adequately plead that the government treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to
similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a
fundamental right, targets a suspect class or has no rational basis’”).
Plaintiff has failed to allege that she was treated differently than any other
similarly situated person. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
Equal Protection claim be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
III. Qualified Immunity
Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim. The undersigned is not persuaded.
The doctrine of qualified immunity recognizes that government officials must be
able to carry out their duties without fear of litigation. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S.
183, 195 (1984). They can do so only if they reasonably can anticipate when their
conduct may give rise to liability for damages and if unjustified lawsuits are quickly
terminated. Ibid. When government officials perform discretionary functions, they
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also, Behrens v.
Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 301 (1996).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff “cannot show any constitutional violation that
was clearly established at the time of the events giving rise to her complaint.” (ECF No.
23, PageID.87). Specifically, Defendant argues that it was not established, as of
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January 28, 2024, that “where a prison guard has sexual contact with an inmate on one
occasion, that [such] contact rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.” (ECF
No. 23, PageID.88). In support of his position, Defendant relies on the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Rafferty v. Trumbull County, Ohio, 915 F.3d 1087 (6th Cir. 2019).
Defendant’s reliance on this case is unpersuasive. The facts in Rafferty are brief.
Between February 1, 2014 and [Plaintiff] Sherman’s release on April 30,
2014, [Defendant] Drennan demanded that Sherman expose her breasts for
him to view on three or four occasions. Sherman complied with Drennan’s
demands. On one or two occasions, Sherman masturbated in Drennan’s
presence ‘because he asked for it.’ Sherman does not allege that Drennan
ever touched her. And Drennan never explicitly threatened Sherman.
Id. at 1091.
Drennan’s request for qualified immunity was denied by the district court after
which Drennan appealed the matter to the Sixth Circuit which affirmed the district’s
court’s decision. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit held that Sherman’s allegations stated a
claim for violation of her Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 1093-96. Specifically, the
court observed that “[f]ederal courts have long held that sexual abuse is sufficiently
serious to violate the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the sexual abuse is
perpetrated by other inmates, or by guards.” Id. at 1985 (citations omitted). The court,
therefore, had no difficulty concluding that Sherman satisfied the objective element of
the Eighth Amendment analysis. In response to Drennan’s argument that “he did not
violate the Eighth Amendment because he did not physically touch Sherman,” the court
observed:
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this Court held nearly three decades ago that sexual abuse of inmates can
violate the Eighth Amendment even in the absence of physical touching by
a corrections officer. . .Furthermore, the abuse alleged to have occurred in
this case did not merely consist of words. It also entailed forced sexual
acts. The fact that Drennen effectuated this sexual abuse by ordering
Sherman to expose her breasts and masturbate, rather than by touching
Sherman himself, does not change the fact that Sherman was repeatedly
required to engage in sexual acts against her will.
Id. at 1096.
In likewise finding the subjective element of Sherman’s claim satisfied, the court
concluded that “a jury could conclude that Drennan acted with deliberate indifference or
acted maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing [Sherman] harm.” Id.
On the question whether it was clearly established, as of 2014, that Sherman’s
allegations stated a claim for violation of her Eighth Amendment rights, the court again
rejected Drennan’s arguments concluding that “a reasonable officer in Drennan’s
position would have known that repeatedly ordering Sherman to expose her breasts and
masturbate in his presence could violate her Eighth Amendment rights.” Id. at 1097.
Defendant’s reliance on Rafferty boils down to the argument that he knew it was
unlawful to sexually assault Plaintiff repeatedly but was unclear whether it was
unlawful to sexually assault her once. Defendant has badly misinterpreted Rafferty.
In finding Drennan’s conduct in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Sixth
Circuit recognized that
It is true that this Court has held that ‘isolated, brief, and not severe’
instances of sexual harassment do not give rise to Eighth Amendment
violations. But Drennan’s sexual abuse was not ‘isolated, brief, and not
severe’ – Sherman alleges that Drennan demanded that she engage in
sexual conduct on up to six occasions. This distinguishes Drennan’s
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alleged actions from cases where this Circuit has held that less-severe
episodes of sexual harassment did not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation.
Id. at 1095.
Thus, Rafferty does not, as Defendant asserts, stand for the proposition that a
prison guard violates an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights only when the inmate is
repeatedly subjected to sexual assault. The absurdity of Defendant’s argument should
be obvious. Under Defendant’s interpretation, he would be entitled to qualified
immunity even if he subjected Plaintiff to violent rape so long as he only did so once.
What Rafferty teaches, however, is that only where the alleged sexual assault is
(1) isolated; (2) brief; and (3) not severe does a prison guard avoid Eighth Amendment
liability. See, e.g., Lee v. Winn, 2023 WL 8264524 at *2-3 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 25, 2023)
(citing Rafferty, 915 F.3d at 1091-96); Poe v. Ogemaw County, 2020 WL 1041221 at *7-8
(E.D. Mich., Mar. 4, 2020) (citing Rafferty, 915 F.3d at 1091-96).
Here, even if the Court presumes that the alleged incident was isolated and brief,
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the nature of her alleged assault are sufficient to state
a claim. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s request for
qualified immunity be denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the
undersigned recommends that (1) Plaintiff be precluded from seeking compensatory
damages for mental or emotional injury; (2) Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim be
dismissed; and (3) Defendant’s request for qualified immunity be denied.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: October 31, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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