Martin v. Henn Lesperance PLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRITTANY E. MARTIN,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 1:24-cv-72
v. 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
HENN LESPERANCE PLC,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff Brittany E. Martin has filed her third amended complaint (“TAC”)
(ECF No. 124). 1 This matter is now before the Court on a motion to dismiss the third amended
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed defendants Henn Lesperance PLC
(the “Firm”), William Henn, Levin Lesperance, Andrew Cascini, Malgorzata (“Gosia”) Walker,
and Roy Johnson (collectively the “Firm Defendants”) (ECF No. 129) and a motion to dismiss
the third amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed by defendant Thomas C.
Walker (ECF No. 133).
I. 	Plaintiff’s TAC
Plaintiff’s claims arise from her employment at the Firm where she worked as “a
legal assistant/paralegal from Sept. 25, 2019, until her termination on Jan. 26, 2021”. 	TAC at
1 Plaintiff filed her original complaint on January 26, 2024. See Complaint (ECF No. 1). Then, plaintiff filed the First
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) which consisted of 1,440 paragraphs, 32 counts, and about 1,000 pages (including
exhibits). This was stricken and removed from the record. See Order (ECF No. 105). Plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint which was also stricken. See Order (ECF No. 123). This resulted in plaintiff filing the TAC (ECF No.
124), which is the operative pleading in this case. While plaintiff’s response states that the TAC was filed under
“court-imposed constraints” (see Response (ECF No. 136, PageID.2207)), the Court notes that plaintiff, a paralegal,
had years to draft a complaint. In this regard, plaintiff filed the TAC (her fourth attempt at a complaint) on May 21,
2025, nearly 4 1/2 years after her employment was terminated.
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PageID.124. Plaintiff identified the defendants as follows: the Firm (a Michigan professional LLC
and her former employer); Henn (licensed attorney and the Firm’s managing partner and co-
owner); Lesperance (licensed attorney, managing partner, and co-owner); Cascini (licensed
attorney and non-equity partner); Gosia Walker (the Firm’s Human Resources/Office Manager
before, during, and after plaintiff’s employment); Johnson (private investigator and agent of the
Firm); and, Thomas Walker (professor at Grand Valley State University). TAC at PageID.2086-
2807. 	Plaintiff’s TAC alleged 15 counts related to her employment.2 Defendants seek to dismiss
all claims.
II. 	New defendants
Plaintiff’s original complaint filed on January 26, 2024, did not name defendants
Henn, Cascini, and Thomas Walker. Plaintiff added these three defendants in her First Amended
Complaint (filed April 12, 2024) (ECF No. 17) (which was stricken) and in the Second Amended
Complaint (filed April 23, 2025) (ECF No. 119) (which was stricken). These three defendants
appear in the TAC (filed on May 21, 2025). Plaintiff’s claims alleged against defendants Henn,
Cascini, and Thomas Walker do not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. See Asher
v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 15(c)(1)(B) allows
relation back of an amendment asserting a ‘claim or defense,’ but it does not authorize the relation
back of an amendment adding a new party.”).
2 It appears that plaintiff’s TAC involves at least 86 discrete claims: Count 1 (7 claims for computer fraud); Count 2
(5 claims for FLSA violations); Count 3 (5 claims under the Michigan IWOWA); Count 4 (7 claims for conversion);
Count 5 (7 claims for invasion of privacy); Count 6 (5 claims under Title VII with subparts); Count 7 (5 claims under
ELCRA with subparts); Count 8 (3 claims for “Negligent Retention and Supervision of Gosia Walker”); Count 9 (7
claims for defamation with subparts); Count 10 (4 claims for breach of contract with subparts); Count 11 (7 claims
for tortious interference with employment relationship with a subpart); Count 12 (5 claims under the ADA and
PWDCRA with subparts); Count 13 (5 claims under the PWDCRA with subparts); Count 14 (7 claims for conspiracy);
and, Count 15 (7 claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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III. 	Motion to dismiss
Defendants have moved to dismiss the TAC pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.3 A complaint may be dismissed for
failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendants a fair notice of the claim and the grounds
upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 	A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. 	The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability
requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. 	Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants also seek dismissal of claims based on the statute of limitations. “[A]
motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds should be granted when the statement of the
claim affirmatively shows that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to
relief.” 	New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F.3d
495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	See Hensley Manufacturing v.
ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]here is no reason not to grant a motion to
dismiss where the undisputed facts conclusively establish an affirmative defense as a matter of
law.”); Rauch v. Day & Night Manufacturing Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978) (“[w]hile
the seven enumerated defenses in Rule 12(b) do not expressly mention an objection based on the
bar of the statute of limitations, the prevailing rule is that a complaint showing on its face that
3 As discussed, the Firm Defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). However, defendants do not rely on lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction as a basis to
dismiss this case and raised jurisdictional issue only as an alternative argument. Accordingly, the Court construes
defendants’ motion as one to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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relief is barred by an affirmative defense is properly subject to a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
In making this determination, the complaint must be construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and its well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. 	Morgan v. Church’s
Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). 	While pro se pleadings are to be liberally
construed, see Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), “this court is not required to
conjure up unpled allegations.” Dietz v. Sanders, 100 Fed. Appx. 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2004). Thus,
“an unadorned, the - defendant - unlawfully - harmed - me accusation” is insufficient to state a
claim for relief. 	See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Finally, “[w]hen a court is presented with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records,
items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.”
Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
IV. 	Plaintiff’s federal claims
Plaintiff has alleged federal claims in Counts 1, 2, 6 and 12.
A. 	Count 1 “Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act”
Plaintiff alleged that all defendants engaged in unauthorized access to her personal
and work electronic devices. 	TAC at PageID.2092. It appears that plaintiff is suing defendants
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1030 “Fraud and related activity in connection with computers”.
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), a person “who suffers
damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action
against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other
equitable relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
Courser v. Allard, 969 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2020). However, “[n]o action may be brought under
this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or
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the date of the discovery of the damage.” Id. 	Here, plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the
CFAA when they remotely accessed her personal laptop between December 11 and 13, 2021. TAC
PageID.2093. Assuming that is true, plaintiff’s claim is untimely. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on
January 26, 2024, more than two years after the alleged violation. 	Accordingly, Count 1 is
untimely and should be dismissed.
B. 	Count 2 “FLSA Violation”
Plaintiff directed this Court against the Firm, Lesperance, Henn, Cascini, and Gosia
Walker. 	Plaintiff alleged that she was employed as a legal assistant/paralegal at the Firm from
September 25, 2019, until her termination on January 26, 2021. It appears that this is an FLSA
claim for unpaid overtime claim brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 4
The gist of plaintiff’s claim is that “[h]er position was misclassified as ‘exempt’
from overtime under the FLSA”. TAC at ¶ 66, PageID.2093. As a result, she “routinely worked
over 40 hours per week, including nights, weekends, and holidays, without receiving overtime
compensation at 1.5x her regular rate.” Id. at ¶ 69, PageID.2094.
However, plaintiff also alleged that she was compensated for overtime under the
“FWW” (Fluctuating Work Week) method of overtime compensation. 	Id. at ¶¶ 68-69,
PageID.2094. In other words, plaintiff alleged that she was compensated for overtime as a non-
exempt employee. 	See 29 C.F.R. § 778.114(a) (allowing an employer to use the fluctuating
workweek method to properly compute overtime compensation based on the regular rate for a
4 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his
employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for
his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times
the regular rate at which he is employed.
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nonexempt employee). See also, Mitchell v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 725, 733–
34 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“[a]lthough the fluctuating work week method of overtime compensation
results in lower earnings per hour as the number of hours increases, the [Fair Labor Standards] Act
permits its implementation”) (quoting Highlander v. K.F.C. National Management Co., 805 F.2d
644, 647-48 (6th Cir.1986)).
Defendants point out that, “Plaintiff pleads that she was misclassified as an exempt
employee; however, she also alleges that she was paid pursuant to the Fluctuating Work Week
Method, which is a lawful method of computing overtime for non-exempt workers under 29 CFR
778.114.” Defendants’ Brief (ECF No. 130, PageID.2147, fn. 7). Thus, plaintiff alleged that she
was both an exempt employee and a non-exempt employee. 	Having alleged that she received
overtime compensation as a non-exempt employee, plaintiff cannot set forth a plausible claim for
relief that defendants misclassified her as an exempt employee and failed to pay her overtime in
violation of § 207(a)(1).5
In addition, plaintiff’s attempt to claim an FLSA violation is barred by the statute
of limitations as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), which provides in pertinent part that,
Any action commenced on or after May 14, 1947, to enforce any cause of action
for . . . unpaid overtime compensation . . .
(a) if the cause of action accrues on or after May 14, 1947 -- may be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be
forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action
accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued[.]
5 The Court notes that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3), “[a] party may state as many separate claims or defenses as
it has, regardless of consistency.” Here, plaintiff has made contradictory allegations of fact, i.e., plaintiff alleged that
while employed at the Firm, she was both an exempt employee who did not receive overtime compensation and a non-
exempt employee who did receive overtime compensation. Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. “[C]ourts have held
that Rule 8(d)(3)’s ‘alternative pleadings rule’ does not cover inconsistent assertions of fact when the pleader holds
the knowledge of which of the inconsistent facts is the true one.” Mrla v. Federal national Mortgage Association,
No. 15-CV-13370, 2016 WL 3924112 at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 21, 2016).
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29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
As discussed, plaintiff’s employment was terminated on January 26, 2021.
However, she did not file this lawsuit until three years later on January 26, 2024. Under the FLSA,
a cause of action accrues with each paycheck. 	See Gandy v. Sullivan County, 24 F.3d 861, 864
(6th Cir.1994). Here, there is no allegation that plaintiff received post-termination paychecks that
would extend her cause of action beyond the termination date. That being said, in her response,
plaintiff contends that she received “two post-termination paychecks dated January 29 and
February 12, 2021”. Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 136, PageID.2213).6 Assuming that a cause
of action accrued with each paycheck, plaintiff’s complaint is still untimely under the two-year
statute of limitations.
Finally, in an apparent attempt to avoid the two-year statute of limitations, plaintiff
included allegations to show that defendants’ conduct was “a willful violation” subject to the three-
years statute of limitations. See TAC at ¶¶ 75-79, PageID.2095. As one court explained:
Under the FLSA, claims are bound by two-year statute of limitations, unless
a plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant committed a “willful violation” of the
Act. If a plaintiff shows willfulness, a three-year limitations period applies. 29
U.S.C. § 255(a). For an FLSA violation to be considered willful, a plaintiff must
show “that the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by statute.” McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.,
486 U.S. 128, 130, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988). Noncompliance with
the FLSA that is merely negligent, even if unreasonable, is not considered willful.
Id. at 135 n. 13, 108 S.Ct. 1677. Indeed, allegations of willfulness “must be far
stronger” than a mere allegation that a defendant “knew or had reason to know” of
its alleged FLSA violations. Hurd v. NDL, Inc., No. CIV. CCB-11-1944, 2012 WL
642425, at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2012).
Scheck v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d 751, 758 (N.D. Ohio 2018).
6 The Court notes that plaintiff’s January 29, 2021 paycheck is for the full pay period and includes overtime pay. The
February 12, 2021 paycheck is only for a few days’ work.
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As discussed, plaintiff alleged that defendants paid her overtime under the FWW
method as allowed under the FLSA. Even if defendants “knew or had reason to know” that there
was a flaw in this method, this action does not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the FLSA
requirements. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish that the three-year statute of limitations
applies to her alleged FLSA violation. 	For all of these reasons, the FLSA claim should be
dismissed.
C. 	Count 6 “Violation of Title VII: Sex Discrimination, Hostile Work
Environment, Retaliation, and Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment”
Plaintiff directed this Count against the Firm, Lesperance, Henn, Cascini, and Gosia
Walker alleging sex based discrimination. “The Title VII plaintiff satisfies the prerequisites to a
federal action (1) by filing timely charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission], and (2) receiving and acting upon the EEOC’s statutory
notice of the right to sue.” Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir. 1989).
“In order to recover for illegal discrimination in employment under Title VII, a
plaintiff must first timely file a charge with the EEOC.” Doan v. NSK Corp., 97 Fed. Appx. 555,
557 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir.2001). Pursuant
to Title VII, plaintiff was required to file charges with the EEOC or an equivalent state agency no
later than 300 days after learning of the alleged discriminatory action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
5(e)(1).7 Here, plaintiff did not file a charge with the EEOC while she was employed at the Firm.
7 Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) states as follows:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place
and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person
against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful
employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings
with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute
criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed
by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful
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Although plaintiff’s employment was terminated on January 26, 2021, she waited over two years
(1, 022 days), ultimately filing EEOC charges on November 14, 2023.
In her “Charge of Discrimination”, plaintiff stated that, “I was discriminated against
by my former employer Henn Lesperance PLC due to my disability or perceived disability, sex,
genetic information, and in retaliation.” 	EEOC Charge (Nov. 14, 2023) (ECF No. 130-3,
PageID.2184). Because plaintiff waited more than the statutory 300 days after her termination to
file her charge of discrimination, the EEOC dismissed her claim as untimely. See EEOC Dismissal
of Charge (ECF No. 130-4, PageID.2187) (“The EEOC is closing this charge because your charge
was not filed within the time limits under the law; in other words, you waited too long after the
date of the alleged discrimination to file your charge.”).
An untimely EEOC charge results in an untimely Title VII claim. 	As one court
explained:
[T]imely filing of an EEOC complaint with the EEOC is a prerequisite to an
employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–5(e); E.E.O.C. v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 839 (6th Cir.
1994); Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1982). The purpose of
the Title VII filing requirement is to give notice of potential Title VII liability to an
alleged wrongdoer and to allow the EEOC to attempt to conciliate with the
wrongdoer rather than go to court. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d at 839 (citing
Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Here, Plaintiff’s right-to-
sue letter states that she waited too long after the date of the alleged discrimination
to file her charge with the EEOC. DN 11-1, PageID #: 220.
Because Plaintiff's employment discrimination claims relate to employment
which ended over 25 years ago, her 2022 complaint to the EEOC was untimely. See
Ryker v. Abbott Lab’ys, 38 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Because Ryker filed her
charge with the EEOC more than 180 days after the latest allegedly discriminatory
action, the EEOC dismissed the complaint as untimely. Consequently, Ryker’s
Title VII complaint is likewise untimely and the defendant is entitled to judgment
on this basis as well.”); Shaw v. Nashville Gas Co., No. 99-5958, 2000 WL 1871716
employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local
agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy
of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.
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(6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2000) (dismissing lawsuit based on EEOC charge filed over three
years after the allegedly discriminatory demotion).
Donald v. United States Enrichment Corp., No. 5:23-CV-50-CRS, 2024 WL 1446469 at *3 (W.D.
Ky. April 3, 2024). Similarly, because plaintiff’s EEOC claim was untimely by over two years,
her Title VII complaint is likewise untimely. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be
dismissed.
D. 	Count 12 “Disability Discrimination, Failure to Accommodate, Hostile
Work Environment, Retaliation, and Interference under the ADA”
Plaintiff directed this Count against the Firm, Lesperance, Henn, Cascini, and Gosia
Walker. 	The ADA also has a 300-day period to file claims with the EEOC. 	See 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-5(e)(1) and 12117(a). See O'Donnell v. University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center,
833 Fed. Appx. 605, 613 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that plaintiff “had 300 days to file her ADA
claims with the EEOC” citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1) and 12117(a)); Parry v. Mohawk Motors
of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Under the ADA, a claimant who wishes to
bring a lawsuit claiming a violation of the ADA must file a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.”). In O’Donnell, because plaintiff waited
more than 300 days to file her EEOC charge, her untimely ADA claim was barred. See id. (“Dr.
O'Donnell failed to timely file her ADA claims (other than constructive discharge) with the EEOC
within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory acts. Thus, her constructive-discharge claim is her
only timely federal claim.”). Similarly, because plaintiff’s ADA claim was untimely by over two
years, her ADA complaint is likewise untimely. 	Accordingly, plaintiff’s ADA claim should be
dismissed.
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V. 	Plaintiff’s state law claims
The balance of plaintiff’s complaint alleged 11 state law claims: Count 3 (Violation
of Michigan IWOWA [Improved Workforce Opportunity Wage Act]); Count 4 (Conversion);
Count 5 (Invasion of Privacy); Count 7 (Violation of Michigan ELCRA [Elliott-Larsen Civil
Rights Act]); Count 8 (Negligent Retention of Gosia Walker); Count 9 (Defamation Slander and
Libel (Per Se)); Count 10 (Breach of Contract (Bonus Agreement, Raise, Job Security); Count 11
(Tortious Interference with Employment Relationship and Attorney-Client Relationship); Count
12 (Disability Discrimination, Failure to Accommodate, Hostile Work Environment, Retaliation
and Interference under PWDCRA [Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act]); Count
13 (Disability Discrimination – Actual and Regarded As; Failure to Accommodate; Retaliation;
Hostile Work Environment under the PWDCRA); Count 14 (Conspiracy); and Count 15
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state law claim
solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the
court will dismiss the remaining state law claims. See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503
F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff's federal
law claim, it should not reach state law claims.”); Landefeld v. Marion General Hospital, Inc., 994
F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, “[a]
district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity
of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld,
994 F.2d at 1182; see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial economy
and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state
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law 	issues.” 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted)). 	Dismissal, 	however, 	remains 	“purely
discretionary.” Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s numerous state law claims. Accordingly,
plaintiff’s state law claims against defendants should be dismissed.
VI. 	RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that defendants Henn Lesperance PLC,
Henn, Lesperance, Cascini, Malgorzata Walker, and Johnson’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 129)
and defendant Thomas C. Walker’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 133) be GRANTED as to all
federal claims (Counts 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12).
I further recommend that plaintiff’s state law claims be DISMISSED without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
I further recommend that this action be terminated.
Dated: February 4, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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