Bye v. Munn et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
MICHAEL ROBERT BYE, 	Case No. 1:23-cv-1312
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
JUSTIN MUNN, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) considers sua sponte this Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant
Cunningham.
On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff Michael Robert Bye filed suit pursuant to 42
U.S.C § 1983 alleging Defendants – Building Official Justun Munn and Electrical
Inspector 	Dave 	Cunningham 	− 	violated 	his 	Fourth, 	Fifth, 	and 	Fourteenth
Amendment rights when they entered his dwelling without his authorization or an
administrative 	warrant. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	1 	(Initial 	Complaint), 	4 	(First 	Amended
Complaint).)
On December 3, 2025, the Court issued an opinion dismissing Defendant Munn
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 	(ECF No. 65.) 	In that opinion and order, the
Court instructed the undersigned to issue an additional report and recommendation
considering whether Plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims against Defendant
Case 1:23-cv-01312-JMB-MV ECF No. 66, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/17/25 Page 1
of 5

2
Cunningham and whether Defendant Cunningham is entitled to summary judgment.
(Id., PageID.339.) 	The Court explained:
The 	Magistrate 	Judge 	has 	recommended 	that 	the 	Court 	grant
Defendant Munn’s motion for summary judgment in part on standing
grounds—indicating that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claims—and the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning appears
to apply equally to Plaintiff’s claims against both Defendants Munn and
Cunningham (R&R, ECF No. 60 at PageID.290) (“Because Munn and
Cunningham entered the unoccupied house only after having received
permission to do so from Bye’s contractor, Bye suffered no invasion of a
legally protected interest and thus does not have an injury sufficient to
support standing or subject matter jurisdiction in this matter.”)
(Id.)
Now, the undersigned respectfully recommends dismissal of Bye’s remaining
claims – his claims against Cunningham – for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Factual Allegations
In the R. & R. addressing Defendant Munn’s motion for summary judgment,
the undersigned provided the following summary of Plaintiff’s allegations:
In his unverified amended complaint, Bye alleges that sometime in
2023, he requested an electrical inspection for his “dwelling.” (ECF No.
4, PageID.12.) Bye states that he sought the inspection so that the
energy company would restore power to the home. (Id.) Bye says that he
initially met with an electrical inspector and that the inspector approved
“all electrical work on interior of dwelling.” (Id.) While inspecting the
electrical work outside the dwelling, the inspector “cited” Bye for the
presence of vines on the electricity meter and the “weather head where
overhead power lines connect.” (Id.) Bye says that he had the vines
removed. (Id.)
Bye states that after removing the offending vines, he contacted the
electrical inspector to request a reinspection of the home. (Id.) However,
the inspector “would not” give Bye an exact day or time to meet for the
reinspection of the building. (Id.)
Case 1:23-cv-01312-JMB-MV ECF No. 66, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/17/25 Page 2
of 5

3
On October 16, 2023, Cunningham and Munn went to the house
“unannounced.” (Id.) Bye says that the Defendants “pushed open the
secured front door,” “entered without authorization or administrative
warrant,” and then “inspected [the] dwelling and took pictures for
approximately 20 minutes.” (Id.)
Bye says that on an unspecified date, he contacted Cunningham via text
and phone to request Cunningham contact the power company and
restore electricity to the dwelling. (Id.) Cunningham did not contact the
power company. (Id.)
Later, Bye says that the electrician who had “performed [the] work” on
the interior of the dwelling told him that he “was advised” power could
not be restored to the dwelling until Plaintiff applied for mechanical,
plumbing, and building permits for the home. (Id.) Bye alleges that
Cunningham “defamed” his character by telling the electrician that Bye
had a “Track Record” of not obtaining building permits and that Bye had
spent time in federal prison. (Id., PageID.13.)
Bye then contacted Munn, who confirmed power would not be returned
to the dwelling until permits were pulled. (Id., PageID.12.) Munn
informed Bye that he would cite Bye and that Bye could possibly be
arrested if he was observed working on the building without the
necessary permits. (Id., PageID.13.)
Bye says that before the events relevant to this complaint, he had never
interacted with the Defendants. (Id.) Still, Bye states that Munn and
Cunningham 	caused 	him 	financial 	harm 	by 	preventing 	him 	from
renovating his home. (Id.) Bye asserts that he pays $1,200 each month
towards the mortgage on the dwelling and that the dwelling remains
vacant, producing no income. (Id.) Bye says he has also suffered Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder in the form of nightmares, which began after
the 	incident. 	(Id.) 	Bye 	struggles 	to 	take 	his 	vehicle 	through 	the
automatic car wash “because of the claustrophobia [he] suffers from.”
(Id.)
(ECF No. 60, PageID.271-73.)
III. Analysis
For a plaintiff to invoke federal jurisdiction to bring suit in the federal courts,
he must demonstrate standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62
Case 1:23-cv-01312-JMB-MV ECF No. 66, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/17/25 Page 3
of 5

4
(1992); Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2004). 	Standing is central to the
“case-or-controversy” requirement associated with Article III of the Constitution.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). 	Plaintiff has the burden of
demonstrating that he (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision. 	Id. 	An injury in fact is a harm suffered by a plaintiff that
(1) concrete and particularized and (2) not conjectural or hypothetical. 	Nader v.
Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir. 2008).
Further expounding on these elements, the Supreme Court has explained that
an injury in fact is an “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and
particularized,” 	not 	“conjectural 	or 	hypothetical.” 	Lujan, 	504 	U.S. 	at 	560.
Traceability requires “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of” and that the conduct not be a result of “the independent action of some
third party.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 	And for an injury to be
redressable, it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the R. & R. addressing Defendant Munn’s motion for summary judgment,
the undersigned explained that Bye does not have standing because he has failed to
demonstrate an injury in fact. 	The undersigned explained:
In the opinion of the undersigned, Bye has not demonstrated that he
suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish the standing necessary
for subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. Bye has failed to provide
Rule 56 evidence establishing that he suffered an invasion of a legally
protected interest. In short, the record before the court indicates that
Bye’s 	house 	was 	unoccupied, 	that 	Bye’s 	contractor 	requested 	the
Case 1:23-cv-01312-JMB-MV ECF No. 66, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/17/25 Page 4
of 5

5
inspection 	of 	the 	residence 	and 	thus 	had 	notice 	of 	the 	intended
inspection 	of 	the 	residence. 	Munn’s 	agent, 	Cunningham, 	received
permission from the person in charge of the structure, Bye’s contractor,
to enter the house. As building instructor, Munn was authorized to
conduct the inspection, as was his agent. Munn and Cunningham did
not enter the structure until they were granted permission to do so from
Bye’s 	contractor. 	Because 	Munn 	and 	Cunningham 	entered 	the
unoccupied house only after having received permission to do so from
Bye’s contractor, Bye suffered no invasion of a legally protected interest
and thus does not have an injury sufficient to support standing or
subject matter jurisdiction in this matter.
(ECF No. 60, PageID.289-90.) 	The same analysis regarding standing applies
to Bye’s claims against Cunningham. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Bye
has not established an injury in fact sufficient to maintain a claim in this case.
Therefore, consistent with undersigned’s previous R. & R. (ECF No. 60) and
the Court’s Order and Opinion (ECF No. 65), the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the Court dismiss Bye’s remaining claims against Defendant
Cunningham for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 	If the Court adopts this
recommendation, no claims will remain in this matter.
Dated: 	December 17, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). 	All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any
further right of appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Case 1:23-cv-01312-JMB-MV ECF No. 66, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/17/25 Page 5
of 5