Grossman #621120 v. Schutt et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHAWN GROSSMAN, #621120,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Philip J. Green
v. 	Case No. 1:23-cv-500
MICHAEL SCHUTT, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 56). The parties have consented to proceed in this Court for
all further proceedings, including trial and an order of final judgment, (ECF No. 1,
23). For the reasons articulated herein, Defendant’s motion will be granted and
this action terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action asserting numerous claims against several
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) officials, including Sergeant Michael
Schutt who is the only defendant remaining in this matter. (ECF No. 1, 5-6). With
respect to Schutt, Plaintiff alleges the following. On December 16, 2021, Defendant
Schutt arrived at Plaintiff’s cell. Schutt began “kicking and screaming” in an effort
to wake Plaintiff. When this proved ineffective, Schutt opened the food slot an
“threw some liquid directly in [Plaintiff’s] face.” Schutt then entered Plaintiff’s cell
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and punched Plaintiff in the face. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Schutt utilized
excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Defendant Schutt now
moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded to Defendant’s motion.
The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on
“whether its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman,
993 F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating
that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints,
398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the
non-moving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible
evidence, which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College,
440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in
support of the non-moving party’s position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v.
Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-
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moving party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present
“significant probative evidence” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-
moving party cannot merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,’ and have a trial on
the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM
Group Holdings Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels,
396 F.3d at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence
presents a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the
jury, or whether the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail
as a matter of law.” Harden, 993 F.3d at 474.
ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The excessive use of force which
results in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates this provision. See
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Claims alleging the excessive use of
force have both a subjective and an objective component. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991).
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The objective component of the analysis examines whether the pain or
deprivation allegedly suffered by the prisoner was “sufficiently serious” to implicate
the Eighth Amendment. Ibid. To be “sufficiently serious,” the prison official’s act
or omission must deny the prisoner of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), as defined by
contemporary standards of decency. See Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th
Cir. 2004). While the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit every de minimis use of
physical force, where “prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm,” contemporary standards of decency “always are violated” regardless whether
the force applied was de minimis or resulted in injury. Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992).
The subjective component of the analysis examines whether the prison
official’s conduct reflected “obduracy and wantonness” or was instead the product of
“inadvertence or error in good faith.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299. In this respect, the
relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. 320-21. When evaluating whether a prison official’s
conduct falls short of this standard, the Court must consider the following factors:
(1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship between such need and
the force used, (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the prison official, and (4) any
efforts undertaken to temper the severity of the response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
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The absence of injury, while relevant, is not dispositive. Ibid. As the Supreme
Court recently observed:
When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, the Court recognized, contemporary standards of decency always
are violated. . .whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise,
the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no
matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary
quantity of injury.
This is not to say that the absence of serious injury is irrelevant to the
Eighth Amendment inquiry. [T]he extent of injury suffered by an
inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could
plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. The
extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force
applied. As we stated in Hudson, not every malevolent touch by a
prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. The Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily
excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical
force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the
conscience of mankind. An inmate who complains of a push or shove
that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid
excessive force claim.
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the
latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by
guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely
because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 36-38 (2010) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Schutt violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by throwing water at him and then punching him in the face. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3).
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant Schutt has submitted an
affidavit (ECF No. 57-6, PageID.444-46) in which he asserts the following.
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On the morning in question, Defendant was instructed to perform a “wellness
check” on Plaintiff. This obligated Defendant to “get a visual” on Plaintiff “to make
sure [he was] physically safe.” Upon arriving at Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant
attempted to get Plaintiff’s attention. Plaintiff, however, simply ignored Defendant.
Defendant then exited the area and returned with a flashlight, which he shone into
Plaintiff’s cell, via the food slot, in an attempt to get Plaintiff’s attention. When
Plaintiff responded that he wanted a glass of water, Defendant complied. But, when
Defendant extended the glass through the food slot, Plaintiff knocked it from his
hand. At this point, Defendant requested assistance from another officer, Ian
Rideout. When Defendant and Rideout returned to Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant
“quickly reached in [Plaintiff’s cell], pulled the sheets back and saw [that Plaintiff]
looked to be physically fine.” Defendant and Rideout then exited the area.
Defendant Schutt has also submitted an affidavit executed by Ian Rideout.
(ECF No. 57-8, PageID.450-51). In his affidavit, Rideout asserts the following. On
December 16, 2021, Rideout was asked to assist Defendant Schutt “with a wellness
check on inmate Shawn Grossman.” When Schutt and Rideout arrived at Plaintiff’s
cell, Plaintiff “had a sheet covering him.” Defendant Schutt then “pulled the sheet
back so that we could visually see him.” Defendant Schutt “never touched” Plaintiff.
Defendant Schutt has also submitted the video recording of the incident in
question. (ECF No. 61). The video refutes Plaintiff’s version of events, specifically
Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant Schutt threw water on him and punched him.
Rather, the video confirms Defendant Schutt’s version of events detailed above. As
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is well recognized, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Rather, the Court
should “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 380-81; see
also, Whittaker v. Leonard, 2025 WL 2924594 at *2 (W.D. Mich., Aug. 14, 2025)
(same).
As noted above, Plaintiff must present “significant probative evidence”
establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack, 434 F.3d at 813-14.
Other than assertions that are refuted by video evidence, Plaintiff has failed to
present evidence creating a genuine issue for trial. Thus, Defendant has satisfied
his burden to demonstrate the absence of genuine factual dispute necessitating a
trial. Accordingly, Defendant Schutt is entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for the reasons articulated herein, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 56) is GRANTED and this action terminated. The
Court further finds that an appeal by Plaintiff of this decision would be frivolous and
not in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A Judgment
consistent with this Opinion will enter.
Date: December 3, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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