Smith #482352 v. Goostrey et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BOBBY J. SMITH #482352,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v. 	Case No. 1:22-cv-00753-PLM-PJG
UNKNOWN GOOSTREY, et al.,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 59). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
Defendants’ motion be granted and this action terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan. The events
giving rise to this action, however, occurred at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional
Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Michigan. Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against
six individuals employed at LRF. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) was
dismissed on screening. (ECF No. 11). Following Plaintiff’s appeal, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed in part, concluding that Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims against
four Defendants were improperly dismissed. (ECF No. 18). Plaintiff subsequently
amended his complaint to add state law claims. (ECF No. 22). The Court then
dismissed two Defendants on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to properly exhaust
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his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 42, 45). At this juncture, all that remain are
Plaintiff’s retaliation-by-segregation claims against Defendants Goostrey and Johnson,
and Plaintiff’s state gross-negligence claim. Defendants now move for summary
judgment. Plaintiff has responded to the motion. The Court finds that oral argument
is unnecessary. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR 7.2(d).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on “whether
its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman, 993 F.3d 465,
474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating
that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398
F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the non-
moving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible evidence,
which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350,
357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the non-
moving party’s position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730,
734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
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While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-moving
party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present “significant
probative evidence,” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack v.
Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving party
cannot merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a
jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings
Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d
at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence presents a
sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury, or whether
the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of law.”
Harden, 993 F.3d at 474.
ANALYSIS
1. 	Retaliation
To prevail on his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) he
was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) a defendant took adverse action
against him which would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage
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in protected conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated by Plaintiff’s protected
conduct. See Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff was placed in temporary segregation on December 8, 2021, after he
fought with another inmate. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants kept him in segregation
longer than was mandated in retaliation for a grievance Plaintiff submitted against
Defendant Goostrey on October 5, 2021, which alleged that Defendant Goostrey
interfered with Plaintiff’s legal mail, and because Plaintiff refused to provide information
on drug smuggling at LRF. Plaintiff asserts that “confinement to segregation housing
extremely exacerbate[d] his [pre-existing] mental health condition.” (ECF No. 22).
Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff can satisfy the first two elements of these
claims, Plaintiff’s claims fail because he cannot demonstrate the requisite causal
connection.
With respect to causation, courts recognize that retaliation is easy to allege and
“is often very difficult to prove with direct evidence.” King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686,
695 (6th Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, “bare allegations of malice” are insufficient to state a
constitutional claim, as Plaintiff must instead establish “that his protected conduct was
a motivating factor” behind the allegedly retaliatory action taken. Thaddeus-X, 175
F.3d at 399 (citations omitted). Conclusory allegations of retaliatory motive are
insufficient. See Skinner v. Bolden, 89 Fed. Appx. 579, 579-80 (6th Cir., Mar. 12, 2004).
Instead, Plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege a chronology of events from which
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retaliation can plausibly be inferred. See Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417-18
(6th Cir. 2004).
On summary judgment, the causation element is analyzed under the burden-
shifting framework articulated in Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff must first present evidence that his protected conduct was a motivating factor
in the defendant’s action. Even if Plaintiff makes this showing, Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment if they demonstrate that he “would have taken the same action
even without the protected activity.” Eby, 481 F.3d at 441-42. Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has held, when alleging retaliation “it is not enough to show that an
official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured—the motive
must cause the injury. Specifically, it must be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the
adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory
motive.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398-99 (2019). Moreover, if Defendants
demonstrate that they “would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected
activity, [they are] entitled to prevail on summary judgment.” Maben v. Thelen, 887
F.3d 252, 267 (6th Cir. 2018).
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants have submitted,
inter alia, the following evidence. Plaintiff filed a Step I grievance on October 5, 2021,
alleging that Defendant Goostrey interfered with Plaintiff’s legal mail, which was
rejected on the grounds that Defendant Goostrey followed the prisoner-mail policy.
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(ECF No. 35-3 at PageID.177). Plaintiff’s Step II and Step III grievances were also
rejected. (ECF No. 174-176). On October 19, 2021, Plaintiff was examined by Health
Care. (ECF No. 60-2 at PageID.277). Plaintiff alleged that he had been stabbed (ECF
No. 60-3 at PageID.321), but an examination revealed “superficial scratches” to his
shoulder (ECF No. 60-2 at PageID.277). In “late October, mid-November, 2021,”
Plaintiff spoke with a prison counselor, requesting transfer to a new facility because of
“safety concerns.” (ECF No. 60-3 at PageID.328-29). According to Plaintiff, the prison
counselor contacted Defendant Johnson about Plaintiff’s request, and Defendant
Johnson purportedly wanted information on drug smuggling in exchange for the
transfer, but Plaintiff refused. (ECF No. 60-3).
On December 8, 2021, Plaintiff was transferred to temporary segregation for
exchanging punches with another inmate. (ECF No. 60-6 at PageID.354-55).
Following an administrative hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of fighting, a Class I
misconduct. (Id.). In light of this, the Security Classification Committee (SCC)
increased Plaintiff’s security classification from Level II to Level IV and decided to
transfer Plaintiff to another MDOC facility. (ECF No. 60-9 at PageID.383). On
December 20, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a Step I grievance against Defendants, asserting
that they were retaliating against him for refusing to be an informant and not dismissing
his October 5 grievance against Defendant Goostrey. (ECF No. 35-3 at PageID.172).
Assistant Deputy Warden (ADW) Kevin Brege, a member of the SCC reviewing the
incident, averred that, during the grievance appeal process, Plaintiff chose to remain in
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segregation despite being given the option to return to general population pending his
transfer. (ECF No. 60-8 at PageID.380). The SCC permitted Plaintiff to remain in
segregation until his transfer. (Id.). Thus, Defendants have demonstrated that
Plaintiff was placed and remained in segregation for reasons not involving Defendants.
Plaintiff’s arguments in response to Defendants’ motion do not address the
question of causation, and Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusions in opposition of
Defendants’ motion do not advance his position. Ultimately, Plaintiff has failed to
present evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual dispute on the
question of causation.
In sum, the record does not support a finding that Defendants retaliated against
Plaintiff. Rather, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff was placed in segregation and
remained there for reasons not involving Defendants: the October 5 grievance was
resolved months before Plaintiff was sent to segregation for fighting on December 8, and
Plaintiff opted to remain in segregation pending his transfer. Defendants have
demonstrated that Plaintiff would have remained in segregation in the absence of any
protected activity because they were uninvolved in the circumstances leading to his
placement and stay in segregation. See Maben, 887 F.3d at 267. In other words,
Defendants were not “a ‘but-for’ cause” of Plaintiff remaining in segregation. See
Nieves, 587 U.S. at 399.
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Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining retaliation claims.
2. 	State Law Claims
As noted above, Plaintiff asserts state law claims against Defendants. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a state law claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” Indeed, “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial. . .the state claims
should be dismissed as well.” Taylor v. First of America Bank - Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284,
1287 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966));
see also Bah v. Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, 610 Fed. Appx. 547, 555 (6th
Cir., May 8, 2015) (same). For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned
recommends that Plaintiff’s remaining federal law claims be dismissed. Accordingly,
the undersigned recommends that the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims and instead dismiss such without prejudice so that Plaintiff
may pursue them in the appropriate state forum.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court recommends that Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 59) be granted and this action terminated.
For the same reasons the undersigned makes these recommendations, the undersigned
finds that an appeal of such would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
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438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the undersigned further recommends that an appeal of
this matter by Plaintiff would not be in good faith.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985);
United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: January 22, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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