Boyd v. Norfolk Southern Corporation et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Charles Boyd,
Plaintiff,
v.
Norfolk Southern Corporation, et
al.,
Defendant.
________________________________/
Case No. 24-13158
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge
Mag. Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINITFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [15]
Before the Court is Plaintiff Charles Boyd’s motion for leave to file
his first amended complaint. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff brings suit against
Horizon Freight System, Inc., Norfolk Southern Corporation, and
Norfolk Southern Railway Company, alleging that Defendants
negligently loaded his semi-truck and caused it to tip and fall. (See ECF
No. 11, PageID.39–40.)
Plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 15.)
The proposed amended complaint adds several additional defendants,
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which Defendants do not object to. (Id. at PageID.53, 56.) The proposed
amended complaint also adds additional claims, which Norfolk
Southern Corporation and Norfolk Southern Railway Company (the
“Norfolk Defendants”) oppose. (See id. at PageID.56; ECF No. 17.)
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a
first amended complaint is granted in part and denied in part.
I. 	Legal Standard
A party seeking to amend a claim, when such an amendment
would not be as a matter of course, “may amend its pleading only with
the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). Leave should be denied where the amendment demonstrates
defects “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Brown v.
Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “A proposed amendment is futile if the
amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”
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Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir. 2017)).
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must “construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys
v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff’s claim is facially plausible
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. A plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
II. Analysis
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint adds
as Defendants ITS Technologies & Logistics, LLC, Hapag-Lloyd
(America) LLC, John Doe, and Jane Done. (ECF No. 15-1, PageID.62.)
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Plaintiff’s motion regarding these additional Defendants is granted.
Defendants do not object to these additions and permitting these
additional Defendants is in the interest of justice. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2).
Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint also adds new claims.
Plaintiff’s original complaint asserts claims of negligence and “res ipsa
loquitur” against all Defendants, and “negligent hiring, training, and
supervision” against the Norfolk Defendants. (ECF No. 1, PageID.9–10.)
Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint asserts claims of negligence,
negligence per se, and gross negligence against all Defendants and a
claim of breach of bailment duty against Hapang-Lloyd and Jane Doe.
(ECF No. 15-1, PageID.64–67.)
The Norfolk Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s proposed amended
complaint on two bases. First, they argue that Plaintiff’s claim of
negligence per se based on violations of Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) regulations and Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (“FMCSR”) is futile. (ECF No. 17, PageID.71.) Second, the
Norfolk Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for gross negligence is
futile. (Id.)
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A. Negligence per se
The Norfolk Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim of negligence
per se based on violations of OSHA regulations and FMCSR is futile.
(ECF No. 17, PageID.71.) Plaintiff did not file a reply brief nor discuss
this issue in his motion. (See ECF No. 15.)
Pursuant to Michigan law, “the violation of a statute is negligence
per se.” Douglas v. Edgewater Park Co., 369 Mich. 320, 328 (1963).
Although the violation of a regulation can be “evidence of negligence,” it
does not itself constitute negligence per se. Id. (“The rigidity of the
negligence per se doctrine should not be extended to administrative
rules and regulations.”). Michigan courts and federal courts
interpreting Michigan law have previously held that violations of OSHA
regulations and FMCSR cannot constitute negligence per se because
they are regulations, not statutes. See Sanderson v. Cahill Const. Co.,
No. 294939, 2011 WL 1262141, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011)
(“OSHA and MIOSHA violations may supply evidence of negligence, but
do not constitute negligence per se.”); Longton v. Burgart, 914 F.2d 257
(6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendants’ violations of the FMCSR
regarding hazard warning signal flashers is not negligence per se). As
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such, Plaintiff’s claim of negligence per se based on these regulations
could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and is futile.1
B. Gross Negligence
The Norfolk Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s gross
negligence claim is futile. (ECF No. 17, PageID.79–80.) Again, Plaintiff
did not file a reply brief nor discuss this issue in his motion. (See ECF
No. 15.)
In Jennings v. Southwood, 446 Mich. 125 (1994), “the Michigan
Supreme Court barred all claims of common-law gross negligence under
Michigan law except in certain contexts in which Michigan law
exculpates actors for mere negligent conduct.” Biegas v. Quickway
Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 377 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Jennings, 446
Mich. at 232–34). “The contexts in which gross negligence survives in
Michigan include situations where ‘certain actors are immune from
liability for ordinary negligence but may be liable for conduct reaching a
grossly negligent level.’” Genaw v. Garage Equip. Supply, Inc., 604 F.
Supp. 3d 653, 662 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (quoting Biegas, 573 F.3d at 377).
1 Although only the Norfolk Defendants challenge this portion of the
amended complaint, the Court will not permit that claim as to all Defendants
because it is futile as to all Defendants.
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Here, Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim appears to arise under
common law because Plaintiff does not identify a statute under which
his gross negligence claim arises. As such, Plaintiff may not assert a
claim of common-law gross negligence because such a claim is not
recognized under Michigan law. The proposed amended complaint’s
common-law gross negligence claim could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion and is futile.23
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a
first amended complaint (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a first amended
complaint that comports with this order within 14 days of its entry.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 28, 2025 	s/Judith E. Levy
Ann Arbor, Michigan 	JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge
2 The Court will not permit Plaintiff’s claim of gross negligence to proceed as
to all Defendants because it is futile as to all Defendants.
3 The Norfolk Defendants also ask that the Court not permit Plaintiff to seek
punitive damages. Plaintiff only requests punitive damages as to his gross
negligence claim. (ECF No. 15-1, PageID.67.) Because Plaintiff may not amend his
complaint to include a claim of gross negligence, Plaintiff’s request for punitive
damages will also not proceed.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or first-class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on October 28, 2025.
s/William Barkholz
WILLIAM BARKHOLZ
Case Manager
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