Sippell v. Allstate Insurance Company et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KRAIG SIPPELL ex rel.
ESTATE OF DAWN PALMER,
Civil Action No. 24-11853
Plaintiff,
David R. Grand1
v. 	United States Magistrate Judge
ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
OPINION & ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
(ECF Nos. 41, 53) AND ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE
SCHEDULING ORDER (ECF No. 55)
Background
On January 29, 2020, Dawn Palmer (“Palmer”) was severely injured in a car
accident. 	Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) is the first-party no-fault insurance
carrier providing benefits to Palmer pursuant to a claim she filed under her auto insurance
policy. Palmer was prescribed 24/7 attendant care by her treating physician, Dr. Parmod
Mukhi, and she eventually moved into a residential facility in Davison, Michigan, operated
by Charter Senior Living Davison, LLC (“Charter”), with their relationship being governed
by a “Michigan Adult Foster Care” “Resident Agreement” (the “Agreement”).2
1 The parties have consented to the undersigned exercising jurisdiction over all proceedings in this
civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 31).
2 The parties’ original Agreement is not in the record, though a later one, executed in mid-
December 2023, is. (ECF No. 41-3).
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Palmer resided at Charter for over three years, during which time Allstate paid “all
of the bills submitted by Charter [].” 	In April 2024, Allstate stopped paying, though the
parties dispute why. 	Palmer claims that when Allstate stopped making payments, it
indicated it was doing so because it hadn’t “received appropriate documentation” from
Charter about the services it was providing to Palmer. Allstate, on the other hand, appears
to claim that it stopped paying because it learned that Palmer no longer needed Charter’s
services.3
Palmer nevertheless remained at Charter, with Charter not being paid by either
Allstate or Palmer. 	Charter issued Palmer a letter threatening to “evict her on July 20,
2024, for non-payment of outstanding bills . . .” 	On July 12, 2024, Palmer, through a
conservator, Kraig Sippell, filed a lawsuit in the Genesee County Circuit Court against both
Charter and Allstate, which was later removed to this Court. 	Principally, Palmer claims
that Charter breached the Agreement by failing to “submit appropriate billing to Allstate
which [] resulted in Allstate’s failure to pay [Charter] and a resultant decision by Charter
to evict [] Palmer for non-payment of bills.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.16). Palmer also sought
an injunction against Charter, preventing it from evicting her. 	(Id., PageID.17). 	As to
Allstate, 	Palmer 	claims 	that 	“[t]he 	Michigan 	No-Fault 	Act 	does 	not 	require 	the
documentation Allstate indicates that it needs in order to pay the bill,” and that Allstate
violated the No-Fault Act “by refusing to pay a bill which has been incurred and submitted
. . .” (Id., PageID.16).
3 The Court notes that it is unclear from the record exactly when and how Allstate learned of that
purported fact .
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On July 29, 2024, Palmer fell out of her wheelchair while playing a virtual boxing
game with her son while visiting him, and was admitted to the hospital. (ECF No. 53-5).
As a result of that fall, she fractured her hip, which she promptly addressed surgically.
(Id.). 	She thereafter returned to Charter, and “in late 2024” was moved by Charter to a
different room, ostensibly because “Charter was performing scheduled room renovations”
at that time.4 She remained at Charter until she vacated her unit on January 18, 2025.
Charter brought a counterclaim against Palmer, her conservator (Sippell), and
Palmer’s son (Lee Macko) for failing to pay its invoices. 	Allstate also brought a
counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that:
(i) 	It is not reasonable or necessary for Dawn Palmer to maintain
her residence at Charter Senior Living Davison, LLC when
Charter does not provide any care to Dawn Palmer and Dawn
Palmer does not require the level of care that Charter provides;
(ii) 	Since Dawn Palmer’s residence at Charter is not reasonable or
necessary for Dawn Palmer’s care, recovery or rehabilitation,
any charges assessed by Charter are not allowable expenses as
defined by MCL 500.3107; and
(iii) 	Allstate is entitled to recovery from Sippell as conservator for
the Estate of Dawn Palmer for benefits paid to Charter since
January 2023 of an amount not less than $100,000.00 under a
mistake of fact, believing that Sippell had accurately portrayed
and represented the level of care required for Dawn Palmer due
to the extent of her injuries from the motor vehicle accident when
in fact, Dawn Palmer did not require the level of care provided
by Charter and Charter was not providing the care billed to
Allstate.
(iv) 	Allstate is entitled to recovery of from Sippell as Conservator for
the Estate of Dawn 	Palmer for benefits paid for ordinary
expenses at Charter that were not reasonably necessary for Dawn
4 While Charter asserts it moved Palmer due to “room renovations,” in somewhat contradictory
fashion it also admits that “[d]uring this time, Charter decided to rent Palmer’s former room to
another individual who would pay the required fees . . .” (ECF No. 41-4, PageID.634).
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Palmer’s care, recovery or rehabilitation, including private patio
fees, meal delivery services and housekeeping.
(ECF No. 30, PageID.475-76).
Allstate also brought a counterclaim related to Palmer’s July 2024 hip injury. As to
that matter, Allstate seeks a declaratory judgment that:
A. 	… 	Dawn 	Palmer’s 	claim 	for 	no-fault 	benefits 	for 	injuries
sustained as a result of the July 29, 2024 fall did not arise out of
the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
B. 	… Allstate does not have a statutory or contractual obligation
under the relevant policy of insurance, or MCL 500.3105(1) to
tender 	payment 	for 	Dawn 	Palmer’s 	care, 	recovery 	or
rehabilitation incurred as a result of the July 29, 2024 fall.
(Id., PageID.480).
Charter now seeks summary judgment on its counterclaim that Palmer’s failure to
pay breached the Agreement, and on Palmer’s claim that Charter breached the Agreement.
(ECF No. 41).5 Allstate seeks summary judgment as to Palmer’s claims against it and asks
the Court to enter an order on its counterclaims, “declaring that Allstate does not have a
statutory obligation under the No-Fault Act or the relevant policy of insurance6 to tender
payment for Dawn Palmer’s residency at Charter, or for medical treatment and care related
to Dawn Palmer’s July 29, 2024 fall.” (ECF No. 53, PageID.1098) (footnote added). For
her part, in addition to noting in her summary judgment briefing that she had not received
5 Charter also seeks summary judgment on Palmer’s claim for injunctive relief to stop Charter
from evicting her. (ECF No. 41-1, PageID.577-79). As there is no dispute that Palmer no longer
resides at Charter, the Court agrees with Charter that this claim is now moot and thus subject to
dismissal. Accordingly, the Court will grant this aspect of Charter’s motion.
6 As the Court noted at the hearing, Allstate did not attach a copy of the salient insurance policy to
its motion papers. Accordingly, there is no basis for the Court grant relief “under” the policy.
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needed discovery (e.g., ECF No. 42, PageID.719-20; ECF No. 56, PageID.1318), Palmer
filed a motion to extend the discovery deadline to complete additional discovery. 	(ECF
No. 55). The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court heard oral argument on June
5, 2025 (as to Charter’s motion only), and on October 29, 2025 (as to all three motions).
For the detailed reasons stated on the record and below, the Court will deny
Charter’s and Allstate’s summary judgment motions without prejudice, except that the
Court will grant Charter’s motion to the extent it seeks to dismiss Palmer’s claim for an
injunction preventing any eviction proceedings, and will grant Allstate’s motion to the
extent it seeks a declaration that Allstate does not have a statutory obligation under the No-
Fault Act to tender payment for medical treatment and care related directly to Dawn
Palmer’s July 29, 2024 fall. 	The Court will also grant Palmer’s motion to amend the
scheduling order.
Applicable Legal Standards
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court will grant summary
judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also
Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir.
2011). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court assumes the truth of the non-moving party’s
evidence and construes all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir.
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2006).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court
of the basis for its motion and must identify particular portions of the record that
demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir.
2009). 	“Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.,
256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 	In response to a summary judgment motion, the
opposing party may not rest on its pleadings, nor “‘rely on the hope that the trier of fact
will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact’ but must make an affirmative
showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion.” Alexander, 576 F.3d at 558
(internal quotations omitted).
Where the movant has the burden of proof at trial, it discharges its initial summary-
judgment burden by “show[ing] that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of
persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to
disbelieve it.” 	Trs. of Iron Workers Defined Contribution Pension Fund v. Next Century
Rebar, LLC, 115 F.4th 480, 489 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001)). If the movant discharges its burden, “the nonmoving
party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”
to avoid summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
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Discussion
Charter’s Summary Judgment Motion (ECF No. 41)
In October 2024, Charter filed counterclaims against Sippell (in his capacity as
Palmer’s conservator), Palmer, and Macko. 	(ECF No. 29). 	Charter claimed that Palmer
and Macko breached the Agreement by failing to pay its invoices after Allstate stopped
paying, and that they were jointly and severally liable for damages.7
In response, Palmer pleads a few affirmative defenses, including that “[a]ny alleged
breach of contract is the result of Charter breaching the agreement and … failing to honor
[the] implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” and that “Charter has breached its
agreement by failing to properly send resident invoices to Allstate Insurance where it was
accepting payment for residence fees and its services from Allstate under the No Fault
Act.” (ECF No. 35, PageID.529).
Charter now moves for summary judgment on its counterclaim that Palmer breached
the Agreement. 	Charter seeks $65,173.60 in damages, the amount of unpaid costs it has
invoiced for Palmer’s residency at the facility. 	Charter also seeks judgment on Palmer’s
claim that it breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
7 Charter also claimed that Palmer and Macko had been unjustly enriched and had breached an
implied contract, and sought an order of “equitable eviction” directing Palmer to vacate its facility.
(ECF No. 29, PageID.370.) And Charter sought damages “plus interest, costs, and reasonable
attorney fees.” (Id. at 370.) However, Charter did not address these claims and issues in its motion
and thus appears to have abandoned them. And, as the Court explained at the hearing, there is, at
a minimum, a clear question of fact as to whether Macko is liable to Charter under the Agreement
because the body of the Agreement identifies only Palmer as a “financially responsible party.”
Moreover, because Charter sues Sippell in his capacity as Palmer’s conservator, Palmer is the real
party in interest with respect to Charter’s claims against Sippell. 	Thus, for ease, the Court will
address Charter’s motion only as it relates to Palmer.
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As discussed at the hearing, the Court finds that Palmer is entitled to additional
discovery including regarding the parties’ discussions surrounding the Agreement’s
execution, as well as Charter’s billings and communications with Allstate. To that end, the
Court highlights the following:
• 	The parties’ original agreement and correspondence is not in the record, and
Palmer contends that there had been discussions between the parties (the
timing of which is unclear) and an agreement about how billing would work.
• 	Nor does the record contain the contemporaneous billings sent to Allstate,
which is apparent because the bills in the record bear dates near when the
documents were filed with the Court rather than when they were first
generated. (E.g., ECF No. 41-5, PageID.637) (showing a payment due date
of “3/10/25”). While the Court has no reason to believe the contemporaneous
invoices will themselves be any different than what is in the record, Palmer
has the right to assure herself that that is the case and, perhaps more
importantly given the nature of the parties’ dispute, to determine whether the
contemporaneous invoices were accompanied by any other communications.
Thus, discovery is warranted on those issues.8 	(See, e.g., ECF No. 42,
PageID.720) (requesting discovery “related to the [Agreement], Charter’s
billing practices, the specific invoices sent by Charter to Allstate, and
information requested by Allstate that Charter failed to provide.”).
• 	While the Agreement identifies Palmer as the “Financially Responsible
Party” “who agrees to be financially responsible for all or any part of the
applicable charges,” the Agreement’s provision regarding the actual billing
of invoices is vague. 	Indeed, it merely provides, “A monthly invoice will
contain the Resident’s Monthly Fees.” 	It makes no representations about
how or to whom the bills will be sent, and that is despite Charter’s admission
that it is not unusual for it to receive payments directly from third-party
insurers. Moreover, Palmer’s claim centers around Charter’s alleged failure
to provide certain billing information to Allstate, making Palmer’s need for
discovery 	on 	those 	matters 	before 	having 	to face Charter’s 	summary
judgment motion all the more acute. The Court also notes the vagueness of
Allstate’s position as to how and when it determined that Palmer no longer
required Charter’s services, which is another potentially related topic on
8 The Court notes that Charter filed its summary judgment motion only four days after the parties
had agreed to extend the discovery deadline in this case. (ECF No. 40).
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which additional discovery is warranted.
For all of these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Charter’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 41) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE except that the motion is
GRANTED as to Palmer’s request for an injunction against any eviction proceedings
because that issue is now moot.
Allstate’s Summary Judgment Motion (ECF No. 53)
Allstate admits that as a result of the serious injuries Palmer sustained in the January
29, 2020 motor vehicle accident, it “became obligated to pay Michigan no-fault benefits
for [her] care, recovery, and rehabilitation pursuant to a policy of automobile insurance and
MCL 500.3101, et seq. of the Michigan Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.” (ECF No.
53, PageID.1081). 	Allstate also admits that it “paid for [] Palmer’s residency at Charter
from June 2021 until April 2024,” but, importantly, it does not provide any details about
how or when it made the determination to cease paying her Charter invoices. Allstate now
moves for summary judgment as to both Palmer’s claim and its counterclaims for
declaratory relief, arguing that “Palmer is not entitled to payment for ordinary, residential
expenses that she incurred while living at Charter, nor is Palmer entitled to payment for
her medical treatment, care and rehabilitation related to the July 29, 2024 incident resulting
in the broken hip because her hip fracture did not arise out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. MCL 500.3105(1).” 	(Id.,
PageID.1086).
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i. 	“Care, Recovery, and Rehabilitation” vs. “Ordinary, Residential”
Expenses
Allstate’s motion first asks the Court to find that Palmer “cannot establish that [her]
residency fees at Charter are compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a),” which provides,
in relevant part, that “personal protection insurance benefits” are payable for “(a)
Allowable expenses consisting of reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary
products, 	services 	and 	accommodations 	for 	an 	injured 	person's 	care, 	recovery, 	or
rehabilitation.” 	(ECF No. 53, PageID.1087). 	Allstate argues that this is so because the
expenses it is being asked to pay for Palmer’s stay at Charter were not “for [her] care,
recovery, or rehabilitation,” but rather were merely “ordinary, residential expenses that she
incurred while living at Charter.” (ECF No. 53, PageID.1086).
Allstate’s motion fails on the present record in a few related respects. 	First,
Allstate’s 	motion 	speaks 	in 	sweeping 	terms 	about 	her 	“residency 	fees” 	not 	being
“compensable” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) of the No-Fault Act. (Id., PageID.1087). But
Allstate does not even appear to be arguing that it should recover 100% of all the fees it
paid to Charter on Palmer’s behalf. 	More precision is thus required about exactly what
fees Allstate is claiming it was not required to pay, and, more importantly, when, why, and
on what information, its obligation to pay those fees ceased.
Second, Allstate’s argument appears to rest in large part on the affidavit of Charter
employee Cynthia Smith, who avers that Palmer “recovered from her auto injury and was
highly independent,” and that as of October 2023, Charter provided Palmer nothing but
“residency and meals.” (ECF No. 41-4, PageID.632). But at her deposition, Smith testified
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to a lack of personal knowledge about much of the care Palmer did and did not receive
from Charter staff while she resided there and agreed that Charter’s nurses would know
about those matters. (ECF No. 56-3, PageID.1387-91, 1404-13). This again speaks to the
need for additional discovery on those issues. (ECF No. 56, PageID.1317-18).
Moreover, Palmer presented evidence, both from Charter’s records and her own
doctors, that appears to be at odds with Smith’s averments regarding her capabilities and
the care she received. 	For example, on December 9, 2023, Charter employee Marissa
Shefsky noted that Palmer needed assistance with getting dressed, as she could not grip
with her right arm, and that she also needed assistance transferring to her wheelchair. (ECF
No. 56-3, PageID.1425-27; ECF No. 56-10).
Records from Palmer’s doctors also appear to paint a very different picture than the
one gleaned from Smith’s averments. For example, Dr. Parmed Mukhi, certified monthly,
including throughout 2024 and well into 2025, that she “needs help taking care of []her
own personal needs … 24 hours a day, 7 days per week.” (ECF No. 56-6, 1547-74.) And,
in April 2024, while Palmer was still residing at the facility, a licensed phycologist, Dr.
Nida Hamid, found that Palmer “has ongoing challenges that affect various aspects of her
daily life.” 	(ECF No. 56-5, PageID.1540). 	Palmer has trouble “switch[ing] between
thinking about different concepts”; “forming and retaining information”; “recognizing
stimuli through touch”; “perform[ing] fine motor tasks”; “perform[ing] tasks requiring
visual coordination”; and “recognizing her fingers on both hands.” (Id.). Again, the Court
agrees with Palmer that “further discovery regarding the attendant care Ms. Palmer
received [at Charter] is necessary . . .” (ECF No. 56, PageID.1306).
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Finally, Allstate’s motion fails to appreciate the context in which the challenged
fees arise, a residential care setting that operates as an “Adult Foster Care Large Group
Home . . . that provides 24-hour personal care, protection, and supervision for individuals
who are developmentally disabled, mentally ill, physically handicapped, or aged who
cannot live alone but who do not need continuous nursing care.” 	(ECF No. 41-3,
PageID.587). 	Allstate argues that Charter’s “$6,178.00 [monthly] fee included a room,
microwave, fridge, telephone line, cable and internet,” as well as “laundry, housekeeping,
and meals.” 	(ECF No. 53, PageID.1088). 	Citing Admire v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 494
Mich. 10 (2013), Allstate characterizes all of those as “ordinary, everyday expenses which
are incurred by all individuals, injured or otherwise,” and thus it concludes they are for her
everyday living, not her “care.” But as explained in Admire, “[a]n ‘integrated’ product or
accommodation involves the blending of an ordinary expense with one that is for the
injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation in a way that the resulting product or
accommodation cannot be separated easily into unit costs,” and a residential care facility
that provides services to individuals like Palmer who suffered catastrophic injuries which
they are learning to manage would seem, at least in large part, to constitute such an
integrated product. 	And, Admire held that “MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires the insurer to
cover a truly integrated product or accommodation in full because the entire expense,
including the portions that might otherwise be considered ordinary, is necessary for the
injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” Id. At any rate, the issue highlights the
interplay between the individual’s required level of care and the level of care provided by
the facility in question, and as explained above, those are issues on which additional
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discovery would be beneficial.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Allstate’s motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 53) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent it requests a
declaration that “the costs for [] Palmer’s residency at Charter are not ‘allowable expenses’
but rather ‘ordinary, everyday products, services or accommodations,’ which are not
compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).”9
ii. 	July 2024 Virtual Boxing Game Fall
The last issue before the Court is Allstate’s argument that it “is not obligated to
provide benefits for Palmer’s care as a result of the July 29, 2024 hip fracture unrelated to
the January 29, 2020 automobile accident.” (ECF No. 53, PageID.1091). Allstate seeks a
declaration “that [it] does not have a statutory obligation under the No-Fault Act [] to tender
payment . . . for medical treatment and care related to Dawn Palmer’s July 29, 2024 fall”
that occurred while she was playing a virtual boxing game with her son. 	(ECF No. 53,
PageID.1098). 	Allstate’s argument is based on MCL 500.3105(1), which provides, “(1)
Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily
injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a
motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter.” 	In short, Allstate argues that
Palmer’s July 2024 fall is “too remote and too attenuated from the use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle to permit a finding of causal connection,” that is, that the fall “arose out
9 In light of this ruling, the Court need not address at this time Allstate’s argument that Palmer is
not entitled to “replacement services” more than three years after the motor vehicle accident. (ECF
No. 53, PageID.1090).
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of” her 2020 motor vehicle accident. (ECF No. 53, PageID.1098). The Court agrees.
Allstate relies principally on two cases, McPherson v. McPherson, 493 Mich. 294
(2013) and Kovach v. Citizens Ins. Co., No. 359474, 2023 WL 2334352 (Mich. App. Mar.
2, 2023), both of which are instructive.
In McPherson, the plaintiff developed a neurological disorder as a result of injuries
he sustained in a 2007 motor vehicle accident. 	Subsequently, in 2008, while driving a
motorcycle, he experienced a seizure consistent with that disorder, lost control of the
motorcycle, crashed, and sustained a severe spinal cord injury. 	The plaintiff claimed he
was entitled to no-fault benefits for the spinal cord injury not as a result of the 2008
motorcycle crash, but rather as a result of his 2007 accident. In short, he claimed that his
2008 spinal cord injury “arose out of” the 2007 accident for purposes of MCL 500.3105(1).
The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff’s insurer, and that ruling
was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. 	Plaintiff appealed to the Michigan
Supreme Court, which upheld the ruling, explaining:
. . . the only question here is whether the spinal cord injury plaintiff
suffered in the 2008 crash “ar[ose] out of” the 2007 accident for
purposes of MCL 500.3105(1).
Pursuant to MCL 500.3105(1), a PIP provider is liable “to pay benefits
for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle....” 	In
Griffith v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 472 Mich. 521, 531, 697
N.W.2d 895 (2005), this Court explained this causal requirement:
[A]n insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury only
if those injuries “aris[e] out of” or are caused by “the ownership,
operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle....” 	It is not any
bodily injury that triggers an insurer’s liability under the no-fault act.
Rather, it is only those injuries that are caused by the insured’s use of
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a motor vehicle.
Regarding the degree of causation between the injury and the use of
the motor vehicle that must be shown, this Court has established that
an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle
when “the causal connection between the injury and the use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle is more than incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but
for.’” Thornton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 Mich. 643, 659, 391 N.W.2d
320 (1986).
In this case, the causal connection between the 2008 spinal cord injury
and the 2007 accident is insufficient to satisfy the “arising out of”
requirement of MCL 500.3105(1). Plaintiff did not injure his spinal
cord while using the vehicle in 2007. Rather, he injured it in the 2008
motorcycle crash, which was caused by his seizure, which was caused
by his neurological disorder, which was caused by his use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle in 2007. 	Under these circumstances, we
believe that the 2008 injury is simply too remote and too attenuated
from the earlier use of a motor vehicle to permit a finding that the
causal connection between the 2008 injury and the 2007 accident “is
more than incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but for.’” Thornton, 425 Mich. at
659, 391 N.W.2d 320.
McPherson, 493 Mich. at 295-98 (bold italics added).
In addressing the lone dissenter’s contention that the plaintiff’s 2008 accident was
“an inextricable aspect of his seizure,” the majority found that contention focused on the
wrong connection. 	As the majority explained, even if “plaintiff’s second seizure and
resultant fall came about as a result of the neurological disorder suffered in the first
accident, it does not follow, as the dissent concludes, that ‘the 2008 injuries were an
inextricable result of [plaintiff's] seizure disorder’ as well. [] Indeed, had plaintiff been
in bed or on the couch when he had the seizure, the ‘inextricable’ injury would not have
occurred.” Id., at 298 (bold italics added).
Kovach is similar to McPherson both factually and analytically. 	In Kovach, the
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plaintiff suffered injuries on February 26, 2020, when a car he was in was rear-ended by a
motor vehicle driven by another person. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a concussion, but a
CT scan of his head did not reveal any hemorrhages or other abnormalities, though an MRI
of plaintiff’s neck taken one month later revealed a “[s]ignificant attenuated flow void
involving plaintiff’s right vertebral artery.” Plaintiff suffered three falls in May 2020, and
during the last one he struck his head on the wall “pretty hard.” His headaches worsened
and on July 2, 2020, a CT scan of his head “revealed a right subdural hematoma” that
plaintiff contended “was caused when he struck his head against the wall.” A few weeks
later, the plaintiff had surgery to evacuate the hematoma.
The plaintiff sued his first-party insurance 	company for 	personal protection
insurance benefits, and the insurer moved for partial summary disposition arguing that
because plaintiff’s subdural hematoma was caused by his May 2020 fall, it was too far
removed from the February 2020 car accident to satisfy MCL 500.3105(1)’s “arising out
of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle” language. 	The trial
court agreed and the plaintiff appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. After
noting that McPherson “controls” and reciting the straightforward facts and holding of that
case, the Court of Appeals went on to explain:
In both McPherson and this case, a second incident caused the relevant
injury. Here, plaintiff did not suffer a subdural hematoma in the motor
vehicle accident. Rather, he developed the hematoma after falling and
hitting his head, which was caused by his vertigo, which was caused
by his use of a motor vehicle in February 2020. 	In other words, the
facts alleged by plaintiff only support a finding that the “first injury
directly caused the second accident, which in turn caused the second
injury.” McPherson, 493 Mich at 298-299.
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Under McPherson, there is not a sufficient connection between the
subdural hematoma and the motor vehicle accident. Even if plaintiff’s
fall was caused by vertigo caused by the motor vehicle accident, the
accident would not be more than an incidental, fortuitous, or “but
for” cause of his subdural hematoma. Therefore, plaintiff’s subdural
hematoma did not “arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance
or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” pursuant to MCL
500.3105(1).
Kovach, 2023 WL 2334352, at *2-3.
McPherson and Kovach are on all fours with the facts of this case. 	Just as
McPherson did not injure his spinal cord in the first car accident, and Kovach did not suffer
a hematoma in the first car accident, Palmer did not fracture her hip during the February
2020 car accident. Rather, she injured her hip more than four years later while playing a
virtual boxing game with her son. (ECF No. 53-5). That injury is “simply too remote and
too attenuated from the earlier use of a motor vehicle to permit a finding that the causal
connection between the [February 2020] injury and the [2024] accident ‘is more than
incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but for.’” McPherson, 493 Mich. at 98.
In her response brief, Palmer failed to even mention McPherson or Kovach and did
not otherwise meaningfully address the issue at hand. Instead, she asserted basic and vague
“denials” of the enumerated paragraphs of Allstate’s motion, and provided the following
“additional response to Allstate’s position regarding Ms. Palmer’s hip fracture in July
2024”:
In July 2024, Ms. Palmer sustained a hip fracture while visiting her
son, Lee Macko. 	She was hospitalized at Hurley Medical Center.
Following Ms. Palmer’s hospitalization, she returned to Charter Senior
Living. 	Ms. Palmer’s pre-hospitalization condition, i.e. that she was
paralyzed and had cognitive limitations, did not change. 	Ms. Palmer
continued 	to 	need 	monitoring, 	24/7 	safety 	and 	supervision, 	and
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ongoing care. As set forth by Dr. Mukhi, Ms. Palmer’s limitations are
anticipated to be lifelong conditions. See Ex. 3, 4, 5. As such, the care
received at Charter Senior Living (From August 2024 to January 2025)
was necessary for her care and rehabilitation related to the January 29,
2020 motor vehicle accident.
* * *
Allstate is obligated to pay for Dawn Palmer’s residency after the
July 	2024 	hospitalization, 	where 	the 	residence 	at 	Charter
continued to be as a result of the January 29, 2020 motor vehicle
accident.
Prior to her July 2024 hospitalization, Dawn Palmer was a resident of
Charter Senior Living, where she was receiving ongoing medical
monitoring, care, and services. These were allowable expenses related
to her injuries from the January 29, 2020 motor vehicle accident.
While she broke her hip while visiting her son in July of 2024, doing
so did not change the fact the [sic] she continued to need services from
Charter related to her traumatic brain injury and paraplegia. 	Indeed,
whether she had suffered the hip injury or not, Ms. Palmer would have
had to remain at Charter Senior Living – Davison to receive 24/7
supervision and safety monitoring. Allstate is obligated to pay for the
allowable expenses related to her residence at Charter, where those
expenses were a result of the January 29, 2020 motor vehicle accident.
(ECF No. 56, PageID.1319, 1323-24) (emphasis in original).
In this regard, the parties seem to be talking past one another a bit. Allstate’s request
at least facially appears to be focused on care “as a result of the July 29, 2024 hip fracture,”
whereas Palmer appears to focus more broadly on the “allowable expenses related to her
residence at Charter” that were “as a result of the January 29, 2020 motor vehicle accident,”
but incurred after her July 29, 2024 hip fracture.10 	The two are not mutually exclusive,
10 Palmer apparently had good reason for her approach to Allstate’s request because, at oral
argument, Allstate seemed to take a broader position than it had previously espoused. 	That is,
Allstate seemed to argue that, in light of its view that Palmer required no care immediately prior
to her July 29, 2024 fall, it was really arguing that any care she required after that fall would
necessarily be attributable only to that fall. As discussed herein, at least on the present record, the
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and the Court will address both issues separately.
First, Palmer presents no evidence, and makes no argument that her July 2024 fall
“ar[ose] out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor
vehicle,” MCL 500.3105(1), and the Court has no qualms finding that, under McPherson
and Kovach, that fall did not so arise, and that Allstate is therefore not liable under that
statute for the medical care Palmer required that was directly attributable to that fall, such
as the ambulance ride to the hospital and the hip surgery. However, for all of the reasons
discussed above, the Court finds that factual questions remain – and that more discovery is
warranted – as to the care Palmer needed after the July 2024 fall for injuries “arising out
of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” in
connection with the 2020 accident.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Allstate’s motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 53) is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a declaration that Allstate does not have
a statutory obligation under the No-Fault Act to tender payment for medical treatment and
care related directly to Dawn Palmer’s July 29, 2024 fall. 	However, IT IS ORDERED
that Allstate’s motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent Allstate seeks
a broader declaration that it has no statutory obligation under the No-Fault Act to tender
payment for any of Palmer’s “residency” or “medical treatment and care” after her July 29,
2024 fall.
Court declines to make such a finding.
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Palmer’s Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order (ECF No. 55)
In her motion to amend the scheduling order, Palmer requests an additional 120 days
to conduct discovery. (ECF No. 55). At the hearing, however, her counsel indicated that
only 90 days was needed.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) a court’s scheduling order “may be modified only
for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” 	For the reasons stated on the record and
above, the Court finds that Palmer established good cause for the requested additional
period of discovery. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Palmer’s motion to amend the
scheduling order (ECF No. 55) is GRANTED. 	All discovery shall be completed by
February 2, 2026. 	The parties shall participate in a mediation as ordered by the Court,
and in the event the case does not resolve through that process, the Court will set a
dispositive motion deadline at that time.
Dated: October 31, 2025 	s/David R. Grand
Ann Arbor, Michigan 	DAVID R. GRAND
United States Magistrate Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email
or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on October
31, 2025.
s/Julie Owens
JULIE OWENS
Case Manager
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