Early v. Ferris

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DENZEL EARLY,
Plaintiff,
v.
LINDA FERRIS,
Defendant.
___________________________/
Case No. 25-13338
F. Kay Behm
U.S. District Judge
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1)
WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Denzel Early filed this complaint on October 20, 2025.
ECF No. 1. He also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis,
which this court GRANTS. ECF No. 2. For the reasons set forth
below, the court DISMISSES the complaint without prejudice under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) because this court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and his complaint fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is FURTHER ORDERED to
SHOW CAUSE as explained in detail below.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court is required to screen
for, and sua sponte dismiss, claims brought by pro se litigants
proceeding in forma pauperis based on an indisputably meritless legal
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theory, claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless, and
complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See § 1915(e)(2)(B); Gifford v. Grassley, No. 20-10762, 2020 WL
4006845, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 20-10762, 2020 WL 2028572 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2020);
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 (1989). Within the first category
fall those cases in which either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff’s
complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are
clearly entitled to immunity from suit; within the second are those cases
“describing scenarios clearly removed from reality.” 	Sultenfuss v. Snow,
894 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 1990); see Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,
452 (3d Cir. 2013); Barnaby v. Mayfield, No. 20-1564, 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13422, at *2-3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2021) (citing Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010)). A complaint is also frivolous and can
be dismissed if it provides no basis for federal jurisdiction. 	Carlock v.
Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Since
there is no basis for federal jurisdiction apparent on the face of
Carlock’s complaint . . . the district court properly dismissed the action
as frivolous and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citing 28
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U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Fed. R .Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1), all pleadings – even those brought pro se –
must properly invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts by “short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.”
In considering whether a complaint should be dismissed because it
lacks a basis in law under § 1915(e), the court is especially mindful that
a pro se litigant’s complaint is to be construed liberally. 	Dekoven v. Bell,
140 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citing Middleton v.
McGinnis, 860 F. Supp. 391, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1994)). Further, “because
access to the courts is essential to the enforcement of laws and
protection of the values that are rooted deeply in our democratic form of
government, this Court may not treat lightly the claims of any litigant,
even those whose contentions appear fantastic and baseless on their
face.” 	Dekoven, 140 F.Supp.2d at 754. Thus, every complaint is
“entitled to a thorough review to determine whether it has merit and
states a federally cognizable claim.” 	Id. 	However, a plaintiff, even
proceeding pro se, must still “plead factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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After a thorough and careful review of Plaintiff’s complaint,
taking all allegations as true and construing them liberally, Plaintiff
fails to invoke this court’s subject matter jurisdiction or state a claim on
which relief may be granted. Plaintiff claims that “Defendant, Nurse
Linda Ferris, contacted the Plaintiff stating she would arrive on
October 21, 2025, to pick up Plaintiff for a long-acting injectable shot
and perform a forced intake, despite Plaintiff’s refusal of such services
made in writing over a month ago.” ECF No. 1, PageID.1. He says he
“has a living will and medical directive refusing psychiatric or chemical
drug administration, and the Defendant’s threats disregard these
directives,” and “Defendant is acting without government authority.”
Id. 	He says he “identifies as a non-English Indigenous and African
descendant, thereby invoking protection against coercion and
involuntary treatment under international and domestic sovereignty
principles.” 	Id. 	He concludes that “Defendant’s attempt to compel the
Plaintiff’s movement into uncharted territory or medical confinement
constitutes a direct threat to liberty, bodily integrity, and interstate
safety.” 	Id. at PageID.2.
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He says his complaint is brought under 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1510, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 300 (what he calls the Health
Freedom Protection Act). His § 1983 claim fails; his complaint states
that the Defendant is “acting without government authority,” and so
accepting his Complaint as true, she is not a state actor under the
meaning of that statute. 	See § 1983 (for deprivations “under color of”
state law). His claims under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 1510 fail because
those are criminal statutes with no private civil right of action. 	United
States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003) (no private right
of action under either of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242); Leonard v. George
Wash. Univ. Hosp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 247, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307
(D.D.C. 2017) (no private right of action under § 1510,), aff’d, 2018 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18903 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2018). His complaint is framed as
a “criminal complaint for review by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Eastern District of Michigan,” and is not properly brought as a civil
action. His citation to 42 U.S.C. § 300 is not explained and does not
obviously invoke a particular right; that section (and subsequent
sections) are the so-called “Church Amendments” and regard healthcare
workers’ rights to refuse to participate in abortions or sterilizations due
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to religious or moral objections. Early does not allege that he is a
healthcare worker but rather appears to invoke a right to refuse
medical care. As far as his complaint can be read to invoke a right to
refuse treatment from a private actor, that seems to attempt to invoke a
state law right and fails to invoke this court’s federal jurisdiction (see,
perhaps, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.20201(f) (“A patient or resident is
entitled to refuse treatment to the extent provided by law and to be
informed of the consequences of that refusal.”)).
Therefore, the court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint in full
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim and for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court declines to grant permission to
appeal in forma pauperis, as Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and any
appeal would not be taken in good faith. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
Finally, the court notes that Plaintiff is a frequent flyer in this
federal district and has to date filed a substantial number of lawsuits
that multiple judges have found to be either frivolous or fail to state a
claim. 	See Early v. Sieg, No. 19-cv-11886 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2019)
(dismissed for failure to state a claim); Early v. U.S. Department of
Education et al., No. 19-cv-11908 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2019) (same);
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Early v. City of Detroit et al., No. 25-cv-12321 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2025)
(same); Early v. U.S. F.D.A., No. 25-cv-12345 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2025)
(same); Early v. Braxton et al., No. 25-cv-13054 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30,
2025) (same); Early v. Stonecrest et al., No. 25-mc-50019 (E.D. Mich.
June 3, 2025) (same); Early v. City of Detroit et al., No. 25-cv-12925
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2025) (same); Early v. Whitmer, No. 25-cv-1231
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2025) (same); Early v. Durhal, No. 25-cv-12407
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2025) (frivolous and failed to state a claim); Early
v. Midland Credit Management et al., No. 19-cv-11907 (E.D. Mich. July
11, 2019) (the same); Early v. Michigan First Credit Union, No. 25-cv-
12365 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2025) (Behm, J.) (same). A few of his cases
have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction instead. 	Early v. Porter, No.
25-cv-12319 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2025) (lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); Early v. Harry, No. 25-cv-1333 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2025)
(same); see also Early v. Pritzker, No. 25-cv-12344 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30,
2025) (improper venue). Several have been dismissed on the basis that
Early presented sovereign citizen-like theories regarding the “Treaty of
1796” and that he tried to invoke the court’s jurisdiction in that way, as
he likewise appears to do in this case by his reference to “international
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sovereignty” principles. 	See Early v. Hasan, No. 19-cv-11977 (E.D.
Mich. July 16, 2019) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and explaining the frivolity of such arguments); Early v. Abramo, No.
19-cv-11976 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2025) (same). The court did not
identify a single case filed by Mr. Early in this district that has not been
dismissed for failure to state a claim or for lack of jurisdiction.1
It appears that Plaintiff has engaged in a pattern of filing
repetitive, frivolous, and/or vexatious cases in this district. A district
court has discretion to impose pre-filing restrictions in cases “with a
history of repetitive or vexatious litigation.” 	United States ex rel. Odish
v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 843 F. App’x 748, 750 (6th Cir. 2021) (per
curiam) (quoting Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269
(6th Cir. 1998)). But before imposing such restrictions, due process
requires the court to give the litigant notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 	Puckett v. Ain Jeem, Inc., No. 24-5282/5537, 2025 LX 191371, at
*11 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025).
1 Not including several pending actions that were recently filed and have not
yet had significant docket activity.
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It is therefore FURTHER ORDERED that Early must SHOW
CAUSE, in writing and within 14 days of entry of this order, why the
court should not enter pre-filing restrictions on actions in this district
under Local Rule 5.2.
This is a final order that closes the case. The court retains
jurisdiction to consider the matter of pre-filing restrictions.
SO ORDERED.
Date: November 4, 2025 	s/F. Kay Behm
F. Kay Behm
United States District Judge
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