Davis-Hussung v. Logan et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROMEL LEE DAVIS-HUSSUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOLDSMITH and FOLTZ,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:24-cv-12853
District Judge Robert J. White
Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANT
GOLDSMITH’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 16)
AND
TO SUA SPONTE DISMISS DEFENDANT DR. FOLTZ1
I. 	Introduction
This is a prisoner civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Romel
Lee Davis-Hussung, proceeding pro se, sued numerous defendants for retaliation,
access to the courts, excessive force, and cruel and unusual punishment that he
allegedly suffered while incarcerated. (ECF No. 1). Following a dismissal order,
only Davis-Hussung’s claims against Corrections Officer Goldsmith and Dr. Foltz
for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment
1 Upon review of the parties’ papers, the undersigned deemed this matter
appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); E.D.
Mich. LR 7.1(f)(1).
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remain. (ECF No. 7). On May 8, 2025, the matter was referred to the undersigned
for all pretrial proceedings. (ECF No. 9).
Before the Court is Goldsmith’s motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that Davis-Hussung has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
(ECF No. 16). As will be explained, Davis-Hussung has not filed a response to the
motion and the time for doing so has passed. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed
the motion and finds it to be well-taken. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow,
the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Goldsmith’s motion be GRANTED, and
that Dr. Foltz be SUA SPONTE DISMISSED. If this recommendation is adopted,
the case would be closed.
II. 	Procedural History
Davis-Hussung signed and dated his complaint on October 22, 2024, and it
was received for filing on October 29, 2024. (ECF No. 1). At the time the
complaint was filed, Davis-Hussung was housed at the Saginaw Correctional
Facility; however, he sued Goldsmith and Dr. Foltz for events that allegedly took
place while he was housed at the Charles E. Egeler Reception and Guidance
Center. (Id.). Shortly thereafter, on October 31, 2024, Davis-Hussung was
informed of his responsibility to notify the Court of any changes to his address and
warned that his failure to do so could result in his case being dismissed. (ECF No.
4). Indeed, on February 28, 2025, Davis-Hussung filed a change of address to the
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Carson City Correctional Facility. (ECF No. 6). The docket currently reflects this
as his address.
On May 7, 2025, the district judge entered an order dismissing all
defendants except for Goldsmith and Dr. Foltz (ECF No. 7) and directed Davis-
Hussung to complete service documents for service by the U.S. Marshal (ECF No.
8). Both of these orders were returned to the Court as undeliverable to Davis-
Hussung. (ECF No. 10). Nevertheless, Goldsmith waived service of the summons
and complaint. (ECF No. 12). Dr. Foltz has never been served or otherwise
appeared.
On July 15, 2025, the undersigned entered a notice regarding plaintiff’s
address on July 15, 2025. (ECF No. 13). In that notice the undersigned explained
that “[w]hile the docket reflects an address for Davis-Hussung at the Carson City
Correctional Facility (DRF), an online search of the Offender Tracking Information
System (OTIS) shows that he is now housed at the Macomb Correctional Facility
(MRF).” (ECF No. 13, PageID.200). As a one-time courtesy, the Court mailed
this notice and the Court’s screening opinion and order to Davis-Hussung at both
the Carson City and Macomb Correctional Facilities but instructed Davis-Hussung
that he “must file another change of address in order to change his address on this
docket.” (Id.). He was cautioned that if he did not and if future filings were
returned as undeliverable, his case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution. (Id.).
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Goldsmith then filed the instant motion for summary judgment based on a
failure to exhaust on July 30, 2025. (ECF No. 16). The Court ordered that Davis-
Hussung respond to the motion by September 2, 2025. (ECF No. 17). On August
13, 2025, the Court’s order requiring a response was returned as undeliverable.
(ECF No. 18). Further, Davis-Hussung has yet to file a change of address form as
required by the Court’s July 15, 2025 notice.
III. 	Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing
law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court “views
the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley
Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004).
“The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of
material fact exists. . . .” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486
(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)
(providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of
fact,” the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”).
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“Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’ ” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell
Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The fact that Davis-Hussung is pro se does not reduce his obligations under
Rule 56. Rather, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient
treatment of substantive law.” Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F. App’x 338,
344 (6th Cir. 2006). Additionally, “once a case has progressed to the summary
judgment stage, as is true here, the liberal pleading standards under the Federal
Rules are inapplicable.” J.H. v. Williamson Cnty., 951 F.3d 709, 722 (6th Cir.
2020) (quoting Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus., & Textile Employees, 407
F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005)) (cleaned up).
Regarding Davis-Hussung’s failure to respond to the motion for summary
judgment, “[e]ven when faced with an unopposed motion for summary judgment,
the district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment without first
considering supporting evidence and determining whether the movant has met its
burden.” Byrne v. CSX Transp., Inc., 541 F. App’x 672, 675 (2013); see also
Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v. United Plastics, Inc., 418 F. App’x 374, 380-381 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-5 (6th Cir. 1991)) (“[A] district
court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the
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adverse party has not responded. The court is required, at a minimum, to examine
the movant's motion for summary judgment to ensure that he has discharged that
burden.”). That said, when a motion for summary judgment is unopposed,
“[n]othing in either the Rules or case law supports an argument that the trial court
must conduct its own probing investigation of the record.” Guarino v. Brookfield
Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 1992). “The court may rely on the
moving party’s unrebutted recitation of the evidence in reaching a conclusion that
facts are uncontroverted and that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Jones
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 238 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2000) (table).
IV. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A. 	Standard
The PLRA requires prisoners to “properly” exhaust all “available”
administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit challenging prison conditions. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-90, 93 (2006). Proper
exhaustion of administrative remedies “means using all steps that the agency holds
out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (internal citations omitted). Requiring exhaustion
allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise
of their responsibilities before being haled into court and produces a useful
administrative record. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204. The PLRA does not
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detail what “proper exhaustion” entails because “it is the prison’s requirements,
and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. at 218.
“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the
defendant has the burden to plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 2015). But a prisoner countering a
motion alleging failure to exhaust “must offer competent and specific evidence
showing that he indeed exhausted his remedies, or was otherwise excused from
doing so.” Sango v. Johnson, No. 13-12808, 2014 WL 8186701, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 29, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 1245969 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 18, 2015). Dismissing a complaint because of a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is not on the merits and thus requires dismissal without
prejudice. Adams v. Smith, 166 F. App’x 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2006).
Although the Supreme Court in Jones held that exhaustion is an affirmative
defense, it explained that an affirmative defense may form the basis of a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal when “the allegations in the complaint suffice to establish that
ground.” 549 U.S. at 214–15. As one court in this district explained:
Although the failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense, because the affirmative defense appears on the face
of the complaint, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Spaulding v. Oakland Cnty. Jail Med. Staff, No. 4:07-cv-12727, 2007 WL
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2336216, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007); see also Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d
641, 645 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 1999) (“While we recognize that plaintiff made some
attempts to go through the prison’s grievance procedures, we must dismiss
plaintiff's complaint because he filed his federal complaint before allowing the
administrative process to be completed.”); Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d
743, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (finding that the complaint allegations “fail to state a
claim because it is obvious on their face that they are unexhausted”); Bonga v.
Abdellatif, No. 2:16-cv-13685, 2017 WL 6276194, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 11,
2017) (“It being obvious from the face of [the complaint allegations] that
[Plaintiff’s] claims . . . have yet to be exhausted as required by 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a), . . . Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.”) (cleaned up), adopted, 2018 WL 1312403 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2018).
The MDOC has established a three-step process to review and resolve
prisoner grievances. “Under the [Michigan] Department of Corrections’
procedural rules, inmates must include the ‘[d]ates, times, places and names of all
those involved in the issue being grieved’ in their initial grievance.” Reed-Bey v.
Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010). As noted by the Court in
Woodford, one of the purposes of requiring proper exhaustion is to “provide[ ]
prisons with a fair opportunity to correct their own errors.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at
94. To be sufficient, a grievance need not “allege a specific legal theory or facts
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that correspond to all the required elements of a particular legal theory.” Burton v.
Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2003) abrogated with respect to other principles
by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Nonetheless, the grievance must give “fair
notice of the alleged mistreatment or misconduct that forms the basis of the
constitutional or statutory claim made against a defendant in a prisoner’s
complaint.” Id. “The grievance process is exhausted once the final response is
issued in Step III.” Parker v. Turner, No. 20-12794, 2022 WL 1787037, at *2
(E.D. Mich. June 1, 2022).
B. 	Application
Goldsmith has attached Davis-Hussung’s Step III Grievance Report to his
motion. The report includes all grievances filed by Davis-Hussung while
incarcerated that were either denied or rejected through the final step of the
grievance process through June 23, 2025. (ECF No. 16-3). According to the
report, on or around November 20, 2023, Davis-Hussung filed eight grievances
related to his allegations. One of these, RGC-23-10-2116-28c related to the
injuries and lack of medical care that Davis-Hussung allegedly suffered on that
date. Goldsmith argues that this grievance does not exhaust administrative
remedies as to him because the grievance only names “Medical” as the party
responsible for the failure to provide medical care.
According to the grievance,
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On 11/20/23 [Davis-Hussung] was tazed & seriously assaulted by 6
officers. [He] suffered jaw, ear, chest, shoulder, neck, spine, wrist, and
leg injuries. Medical refused [him] medical twice, even with [his] jaw
severely, abnormally swollen, to the point [he] could not eat. [He] was
not given a[n] injury report, and was unable to eat anything from
11/20/23 – 11/22/23 until 11/22/23 when [he] was prescribed “Ensure,”
to obtain the calories and nutrition needed. 	[He] was never given ice
and medical needs was neglected.
(ECF No. 16-3, PageID.291). The grievance was filed on November 23, 2023, and
rejected for containing multiple issues on November 29, 2023. (Id.). The rejection
was upheld at Steps II and III. (Id., PageID.288-290). Goldsmith does not argue
that the grievance fails to exhaust because it was rejected. Instead, he says that the
grievance did not exhaust Davis-Hussung’s administrative remedies as to him
because he was not named in the grievance.
As noted above, the MDOC grievance policy requires that inmates include
the “ ‘[d]ates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being
grieved’ in their initial grievance.” Reed-Bey, 603 F.3d at 324. This requirement
serves the purpose of “providing prisons with a fair opportunity to correct their
own errors.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 94. The Sixth Circuit has found in some
instances that identifying information other than a defendant’s name is sufficient to
exhaust remedies as to that defendant. See Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583 (6th
Cir. 2017) (finding that identifying an “unnamed RMO” (the RMO being one of a
few Regional Medical Officers) who denied the grievant medication as the subject
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of the grievance was sufficient to exhaust claims against that individual); Brim v.
Welton, 704 F. App’x 585, 586 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that the grievant
sufficiently identified the defendant by referring to him as the “assistant resident
unit supervisor in Unit 7” at Step I). But where grievances are targeted at more
general entities, this is not enough to exhaust against individual defendants. See
Hill v. Buchanan, No. 21-1673, 2022 WL 16580149, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2022)
(finding that Step I references “only to ‘health care’ and ‘medical’ in general” fail
to exhaust claims against the unnamed and unidentified defendants); Bonga v.
Abdellatif, No. 18-2074, 2019 WL 4580389, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 26, 2019)
(rejecting argument that grievant exhausted claims against unnamed healthcare
personnel “by mentioning ‘medical providers’ in his grievances”).
Here, Davis-Hussung attributed his denial of medical care to “Medical,”
which does not serve to put corrections officer Goldsmith on notice that he
allegedly erred in referring Davis-Hussing for medical treatment after an assault.
Therefore, Goldsmith’s unopposed motion for summary judgment should be
granted.
V. 	Sua Sponte Dismissal of Remaining Defendant
Regarding Dr. Foltz, the undersigned recommends that he be dismissed for
failure to exhaust and for lack of prosecution. As to a failure to exhaust, a court
dismissing a plaintiff’s claims against moving defendants may sua sponte dismiss
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non-moving defendants as well where “it is clear that the same ruling would
inevitably apply to each of the defendants.” Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. &
Utility Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1189 n. 11 (W.D. Mo. 1983); see also Boykin v.
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-15308, 2012 WL 3029862, at *6
(E.D. Mich. July 6, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3030741
(E.D. Mich. July 25, 2012).
Here, it is clear that Davis-Hussung’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies as to his denial of medical care on November 20, 2023, also applies to
Dr. Foltz. This is because Davis-Hussung’s grievance relevant to the allegations
against Goldsmith and Dr. Foltz only named “Medical,” and did not place any
individual defendant on notice of a potential claim against them. Therefore, the
undersigned recommends sua sponte dismissal of Dr. Foltz for failure to exhaust.
As to failure to prosecute, “[i]t is well settled that a district court has the
authority to dismiss sua sponte a lawsuit for failure to prosecute.” Carpenter v.
City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2013). “Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure confers on district courts the authority to dismiss an action for
failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the claim or to comply with the Rules or any
order of the court.” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dept., 529 F.3d 731, 736
(6th Cir. 2008). Additionally, under Local Rule 41.2, “when ... the parties have
taken no action for a reasonable time, the Court may, on its own motion after
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reasonable notice or on application of a party, enter an order dismissing or
remanding the case unless good cause is shown.” E.D. Mich. LR 41.2.
Before sua sponte dismissing a lawsuit for failure to prosecute, a court
typically must warn a party that “further noncompliance would result in dismissal.”
Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 2005). Davis-Hussung was
provided with such a warning in the Court’s notice regarding plaintiff’s address.
(ECF No. 13). Indeed, parties who are not represented by counsel must keep the
Court informed of their contact information. E.D. Mich. LR 11.2. When a pro se
party fails to promptly update his contact information, he may face sanctions,
including dismissal of the complaint. Id.; Bugg v. Bauman, No. 2:19-CV-10262,
2020 WL 7346690, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2020). Davis-Hussung was also
specifically warned that a failure to keep his address updated may result in his case
being dismissed for lack of prosecution. (ECF No. 13, PageID.200). Thus, his
claims against Dr. Foltz may be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
VI. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that
Goldsmith’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) be GRANTED and Dr.
Foltz be SUA SPONTE DISMISSED. If this recommendation is adopted, the case
would be closed.
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Dated: November 12, 2025 	s/Kimberly G. Altman
Detroit, Michigan 	KIMBERLY G. ALTMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and
Recommendation. Any objections must be filed within 14 days of service, as
provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d).
Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of
appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 144 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991). Filing objections that raise some
issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a
party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of
Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Under Local Rule
72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.
Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,”
etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and
Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an
objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the
objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR
72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections,
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in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to
Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without
merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to
their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of
Electronic Filing on November 12, 2025.
s/Dru Jennings
DRU JENNINGS
Case Manager
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