Lockett et al v. LVNV Funding LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ARTHUR L. LOCKETT, and
MAMIE L. LOCKETT,
Plaintiffs, 	Case Number 24-12165
v. 	Honorable David M. Lawson
Magistrate Judge David R. Grand
LVNV FUNDING LLC, CREDIT ONE
BANK, N.A., US BANK NA, SCOTT &
ASSOCIATES P.C., ELAN FINANCIAL
SERVICES, JOHNSON MARK LLC, MICHAEL
J. SCOTT, MATTHEW W. COOPER, LACIE
ELIZABETH FRIEND, SEAN MORRISSEY,
MATTHEW CLARK, VICTORIA BARBOZA,
LAUREN JONES, and GREGORY JOHNSON,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND DISMISSING CASE
Presently before the Court is a report issued on June 20, 2025 by Magistrate Judge David
R. Grand under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) recommending that the Court screen the plaintiffs’ complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and dismiss it on the Court’s own motion for failure to state a claim.
The plaintiffs’ allegations concern the attempt to collect an alleged debt owed by plaintiff Mamie
Lockett — who apparently suffers from some form of dementia — and connected legal
proceedings in a Texas state court. However, Judge Grand could not ascertain any viable claim in
the complaint, which spans nearly 148 pages and appears to focus primarily on the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et. seq.
After the deadline for filing objections to the report and recommendation passed with no
word from the plaintiffs, the Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the case. However,
when the Court learned that plaintiff Arthur L. Lockett had made a good faith attempt to file timely
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objections, only to be foiled by his confusion with the electronic filing system, the Court vacated
the dismissal and accepted the objections as timely. 	Nonetheless, after reviewing them, it is
apparent that Judge Grand’s recommendations are correct. 	The Court will adopt them, and the
complaint will be dismissed because it fails to state a cognizable claim.
I.
A.
Plaintiff Arthur Lockett filed this complaint on August 18, 2024, attempting to bring claims
as next friend for his mother, Mamie L. Lockett. The Court granted him leave to proceed without
prepaying the filing fee and referred the case to Magistrate Judge Grand under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
to conduct pretrial proceedings. See ECF Nos. 11, 12.
As Judge Grand observed in his report, the complaint spans nearly 150 pages and “is
extremely difficult to follow.” Lockett ex rel. v. LVNV Funding LLC, No. 24-12165, 2025 WL
1909316, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 2025). 	However, it appears that its main focus is Mr.
Lockett’s concern that several individuals and debt collection companies are unfairly taking
advantage of Mrs. Lockett, who is vulnerable because of her age and because she suffers from
dementia. Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.165. Although her relationship to Arthur Lockett is not
specified in the complaint, he refers to her as his mother in his objection to the magistrate judge’s
report. ECF No. 17, PageID.350.
The complaint names fourteen defendants: 1) LVNV Funding LLC; 2) Credit One Bank
N.A.; 3) US Bank NA; 4) Scott & Associates P.C.; 5) Elan Financial Services; 6) Johnson Mark
LLC; 7) Michael J. Scott; 8) Matthew W. Cooper; 9) Lacie Elizabeth Friend; 10) Sean Morrissey;
11) Matthew Clark; 12) Victoria Barboza; 13) Lauren Jones; and 14) Justice Gregory Johnson.
ECF No. 1, PageID.161.
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Despite its length, the complaint is relatively light on details. Mr. Lockett alleges that an
employee of an entity called Resurgent Capital Services L.P. contacted him in response to a
“Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) inquiry” submitted about one of Mrs. Lockett’s
accounts. 	Id. at 164. The employee informed Mr. Lockett that Resurgent could not communicate
directly with him about the matter because he was not listed as an authorized third-party
representative for Mrs. Lockett.
Mr. Lockett says that he then filed a complaint in justice court in Bell County, Texas before
Justice of the Peace Gregory Johnson, but the complaint was returned to him. The nature of that
case is not specified, but according to the docket sheet attached to the complaint, it was connected
to two other cases, one of which was non-suited and another of which was “passed appeal time.”
ECF No. 1, PageID.165.
The complaint in this case proceeds to describe Mrs. Lockett’s various health and financial
issues, explaining that she is “well into her 70’s” (although he refers to her as 88 elsewhere), has
dementia, struggles to pay her bills, and is alone most of the time. 	Mr. Lockett accuses the
defendants of “tak[ing] advantage . . . of her” diminished capacity by “contract[ing] loan after
loan” with her. 	Id. at PageID.166. 	He also says that the defendants are “making[] prohibited[]
attempts to collect on a set of time-barred debts,” but further information is not provided. Ibid.
Finally, he alleges that Mrs. Lockett’s children have attempted to help her by paying some of the
debts. Ibid.
As Judge Grand observed, the remainder of the complaint — approximately 140 pages —
consists of an extensive list of statutes, court rules, legal terminology, and reference information
about dementia and financial abuse of the elderly. Judge Grand also observed that the complaint’s
caption mentions Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), and Mr. Lockett placed a great deal of
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emphasis on certain provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §
1692, et. seq.
Mr. Lockett attached to the complaint several documents from a case in the Bell County,
Texas justice court, including a notice for Mrs. Lockett to appear and a “Notice of Nonsuit with
Prejudice” signed by an attorney on behalf of defendant Scott & Associates, P.C. Id. at 310. He
also includes materials from a civil case brought by LVNV Funding, LLC against Mrs. Lockett on
a debt, id. at PageID.309-13, and a bank statement reflecting an April 2023 payment of $1,925.12
to “SCOTTANDASSOCA” from a Bank of America account held by Mrs. Lockett, id. at
PageID.314. Judge Grand found that the connection between these materials and the plaintiff’s
claims was not clear. R&R, ECF No. 14, PageID.339.
On June 20, 2025, Judge Grand issued a report recommending that the Court screen the
case 	and 	dismiss 	the 	complaint. 	As 	stated 	above, 	the 	Court 	adopted 	Judge 	Grand’s
recommendation and dismissed the complaint when no timely objections were filed. ECF No. 15.
However, Mr. Lockett eventually filed an objection on July 14, 2025 via the pro se upload portal.
The Court consulted with the Clerk of Court, who confirmed that she had communicated with Mr.
Lockett, and he believed he had successfully uploaded his objections on June 30, 2025, which
would have been within the deadline to object. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). When Mr. Lockett
inquired of the Clerk’s office about the status of his objections, he discovered that he did not
complete a security verification step. Under the circumstances, the Court vacated its prior order
dismissing the case and the corresponding judgment. ECF No. 18.
B.
Judge Grand screened the complaint for merit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and recommended
that the Court summarily dismiss it for failure to state a claim. 	He first determined that the
complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 8 because it is “unwieldy and unmanageable,” and
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Mr. Lockett had made “no effort whatsoever” to tie any of the various legal citations to any of the
named defendants. Judge Grand nevertheless tried to find a claim based on two provisions of the
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA): 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692g. But he concluded
that Mr. Lockett failed to include sufficient details to set out a viable claim under either provision.
Judge Grand also recognized that the complaint would be subject to dismissal under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to the extent he asked the Court to vacate judgments issued by the Texas courts.
II.
Mr. Lockett’s objections were docketed on July 14, 2025. Although late, the Court will
consider them as if they were filed on time.
When a party files timely objections to a report and recommendation, the court must “make
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). This fresh
review requires the court to re-examine all of the relevant evidence previously reviewed by the
magistrate judge in order to determine whether the recommendation should be accepted, rejected,
or modified in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
This review is not plenary, however. “The filing of objections provides the district court
with the opportunity to consider the specific contentions of the parties and to correct any errors
immediately,” Walters, 638 F.2d at 950, enabling the court “to focus attention on those issues —
factual and legal — that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute,” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147
(1985). As a result, “[o]nly those specific objections to the magistrate’s report made to the district
court will be preserved for appellate review; making some objections but failing to raise others
will not preserve all the objections a party may have.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474
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F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Tchrs. Loc. 231, 829 F.2d 1370,
1373 (6th Cir. 1987)).
Objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation must be “specific in order to focus
the busy district court’s attention on only those issues that were dispositive and contentious.”
Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). “A general objection
to the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same effects as would a failure to object,” because
it does not focus the Court’s attention on any specific issues for review, “thereby making the initial
reference to the magistrate useless.” Ibid. 	Moreover, the plaintiff may not raise new claims or
theories not raised previously. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the Magistrate Judges Act does not permit “parties to raise at the district court
stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to the magistrate”).
Mr. Lockett’s objections consist of a 28-page document that — like the complaint itself —
is somewhat difficult to understand. 	He starts by reiterating that he “is seeking justice for his
[d]emented [m]other against a group of lawless [a]ttorneys who intentionally brought court actions
illegally against an incapacitated 88-year-old.” It appears that his specific disagreements with the
report and recommendation can be broken down as follows: (1) Mr. Lockett contends that he
adequately pleaded that the defendants had committed “[f]raud [u]pon the Court” and that the
magistrate judge failed to accept as true his allegations that Mrs. Lockett suffers from dementia
and experienced fraud at the hands of the defendants. 	ECF No. 17, PageID.350-51. 	(2) Mr.
Lockett cites numerous court cases and rules, with a particular focus on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(d)(3), as a basis for his complaint. (3) He says that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not apply “because of the nature of the [f]raud in this case.” 	Id. at PageID.352. 	(4) He
contends that the magistrate judge should have recused himself from adjudicating the case because
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of his “willful blindness.” 	Id. at PageID.354-55. 	(5) Finally, Mr. Lockett asks the Court to
“remove the case” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and appears to include in his objection an “answer”
to a complaint he says defendant LVNV Funding, LLC filed against him in Detroit’s 36th District
Court.
Before turning to these arguments, it may be useful to explain why the case is under review
at this stage of the proceedings. When, as here, a plaintiff has asked the Court to waive fees and
costs because he cannot afford to pay them, the Court has an obligation to screen the case for merit
and dismiss the case if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
if it . . . is based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863,
866 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
Although a complaint filed by an unrepresented party must be construed liberally, Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), “[t]he leniency granted to pro se [litigants] . . . is not boundless.”
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). 	As Judge Grand recognized here, the
screening mandated by Congress in section 1915(e)(2) includes the obligation to dismiss civil
complaints filed by prospective pro se filers if they “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Now for the objections.
A.
Mr. Lockett first takes issue with Judge Grand’s conclusion that he had not set out any
viable claims. 	He seems to reason that the complaint was clear and that Judge Grand failed to
accept as true certain allegations regarding his mother’s dementia and the fraudulent scheme. But
the complaint is far from clear, and accepting as true the allegations about the dementia and fraud
schemes does not suffice to establish a legal claim.
The problem is not that Judge Grand failed to credit the factual allegations or that Mr.
Lockett’s concerns about his mother are not apparent. 	Mr. Lockett obviously cares for Mrs.
Lockett and is worried that she is being mistreated by individuals and entities charged with
collecting debts. His concern is commendable. Judge Grand did not contest the facts he alleged
about her mistreatment.
Instead, the problem — as Judge Grand explained — is that the complaint offered only
generalized allegations of wrongdoing without tying each — or any — defendant’s conduct to the
elements of a legal cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687 (explaining that a party may not
“plead the bare elements of [a] cause of action, affix the label ‘general allegation,’ and expect [the]
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”). 	Of course, a complaint need not include “detailed
factual allegations,” but it must offer “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” 	Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	The complaint here recites
numerous statutes and court rules and features a lengthy list of defendants, yet it fails to include
allegations tying those defendants to any cause of action. Clearly, Mr. Lockett believes that the
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way Mrs. Lockett has been treated is improper and, to borrow his term, “fraudulent.” But he does
not explain what each defendant did; most of the defendants only are mentioned in the caption of
the complaint and then never again. His objection, although lengthy, offers little further guidance
about how to find such detail in his sprawling complaint.
Despite this basic problem, Judge Grand generously construed the complaint as an attempt
to raise claims under two FDCPA provisions that Lockett cited several times, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e
and 1692g. Juge Grand recited the elements of each cause of action, and then he concluded that
Mr. Lockett had not set out a claim under either provision.
Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from making false, deceptive, or misleading
representations with respect to their debt collection efforts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. As Judge Grand
explained, to proceed under this statute, “(1) plaintiff must be a ‘consumer’ as defined by the Act;
(2) the ‘debt’ must arise out of transactions which are ‘primarily for personal, family or household
purposes;’ (3) defendant must be a ‘debt collector’ as defined by the Act; and (4) defendant must
have violated § 1692e’s prohibitions.” Wallace v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323, 326
(6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). As Judge Grand recognized, the complaint does not offer any
explanation as to many of these elements and certainly not as to each of the fourteen defendants,
or any of them for that matter. Mr. Lockett’s core contention is that the defendants took advantage
of Mrs. Lockett’s diminished capacity, but he does not explain how they did so as connected to
debt collection activities prohibited by the FDCPA. He repeatedly invokes the word “fraud,” but
he does not clearly describe what was the fraudulent conduct or how it amounted to unlawful
conduct under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1)-(16) (listing prohibited conduct). 	And he
seems to suggest that the fraud occurred in the defendants’ efforts to execute contracts with the
defendants rather than in attempts to collect debts.
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The complaint also invokes section 1692g of the statute, which generally requires debt
collectors to furnish debtors with information about putative debts and cease collection efforts if
the debtor disputes the debt until the debt collector confirms its validity. See Bates v. Green Farms
Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 478 (6th Cir. 2020). Again, however, the complaint does not include
sufficient detail about any specific debt or debt collector to suggest a plausible violation. Judge
Grand appropriately suggested that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under either of these statutes,
and the objections do not alter the Court’s similar conclusion.
B.
Mr. Lockett’s objection repeatedly invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3),
which validates the Court’s authority to “to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(d)(3). Judge Grand did not analyze this potential claim in depth, probably because it
only was mentioned in the complaint’s caption. However, he clearly recognized why such a claim
would fail.
Prevailing in an action under Rule 60(d)(3) is no small feat. 	The plaintiff must point to
conduct “1) on the part of an officer of the court; that 2) is directed to the judicial machinery itself;
3) is intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard of the truth; 4) is a
positive averment or a concealment when one is under a duty to disclose; and 5) deceives the
court.” Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 339 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carter v. Anderson, 585 F.3d
1007, 1011 (6th Cir. 2009)). Relief under this avenue is limited to “extraordinary” cases, where
“the most egregious conduct involve[ed] a corruption of the judicial process itself.” Gen. Med.,
P.C. v. Horizon/CMS Health Care Corp., 475 F. App’x 65, 71 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting 11 Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2870 (West 2011)). 	Sufficiently egregious
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conduct might include “bribing a judge, employing counsel to exert improper influence on the
court, and jury tampering.” Ibid. The plaintiffs have not alleged any of this or similar activity.
It appears that Mr. Lockett’s purpose in highlighting this Rule is to focus attention on his
claim that the defendants committed “fraud upon the court,” so certain judgments issued by the
Texas courts as to Mrs. Lockett must be vacated. 	See ECF No. 1, PageID.307; ECF No. 17,
PageID.351. 	As Judge Grand recognized, however, that request is problematic because it
represents an attempt collaterally attack a state court judgment, which is barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 	Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars lower federal courts from conducting appellate review of final state-court judgments
because 28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests sole jurisdiction to review such claims in the Supreme Court.”)
(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)).
C.
Mr. Lockett argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here. 	“Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983), hold that only the Supreme Court may review judgments entered by state
courts in civil litigation.” Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 254 (6th Cir. 2019). The eponymous
“doctrine, therefore, bars a lower federal . . . court from reviewing a plaintiff’s claim when a state
court’s judgment is the source of the plaintiff’s injury.” 	Ibid. 	The court looks to the relief
requested in the plaintiff’s complaint to determine the source of the injury. VanderKodde v. Mary
Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020).
Notably, the complaint here seeks, among other things, an order “vacat[ing] all improper
judgments.” ECF No. 1, PageID.307. That request is within the heartland of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine: to grant such relief would require this Court to review judgments entered by the Texas
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state courts. In his objection, Mr. Lockett asserts that Rooker-Feldman “do[es] not apply because
of the nature of the [f]raud in this case.” ECF No. 17, PageID.352. But that is no answer to the
fact that he asks the Court to vacate a state court judgment, something it plainly lacks jurisdiction
to do. See Hollins v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 23-3518, 2024 WL 156298, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 12,
2024). Those aspects of the plaintiffs’ complaint ordinarily would be dismissed without prejudice
if no other defect in the pleading were found.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar all of the plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they
seek to hold the defendants liable for conduct that does not turn on review of the judgments
themselves. See McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394 (6th Cir. 2006). And the complaint
does seek a damages award. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.307. 	Yet, for the reasons stated above, the
complaint fails to set out a clear theory of how each defendant committed wrongful conduct under
the statutes and rules he cites.
Focusing again on his allegations of “fraud,” Mr. Lockett objects that the magistrate judge
ignored how Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 “applies in this case.” ECF No. 17, PageID.351.
But that rule actually helps explain the inadequacy of the pleadings. Rule 9(b) obligated him to
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting” a fraud. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To put it
more plainly, this means that the complaint must “specify the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’
of the alleged fraud.” Sanderson v. HCA-The Healthcare Co., 447 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). 	The answers to these questions are not evident from the complaint. 	Judge
Grand appropriately suggested that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be
granted. After fresh review, the Court agrees.
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D.
Mr. Lockett also argues in his objection that the magistrate judge should have recused
himself from the case under 28 U.S.C. § 455 due to his “willful[] blindness.” 	ECF No. 17,
PageID.354. He suggests that the magistrate judge’s recommended disposition ignores the fraud
upon the Court committed by the defendants “against defenseless citizens, around this Country,
unabated,” and compares the situation to a “two-year-old [who] sits on the floor and covers her
eyes and thinks no one can see her.” Ibid.
The statute cited by Mr. Lockett requires a judge to disqualify himself “in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or “[w]here he has
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). 	The Court must ask whether “a
‘reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.’” United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir. 1993),
as amended (Aug. 11, 1993) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1990))
(some internal marks omitted). This standard is “objective” and is “‘not based on the subjective
view of a party.’” Ibid. 	And the source of the alleged bias must be “extrajudicial,” that is, not
arising from the judge’s experience on the case. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
For multiple reasons, Mr. Lockett’s contention that the magistrate judge should have
recused comes up short. To start, it does not appear that he ever presented his request to Judge
Grand directly, which would be the typical procedure for dealing with such circumstances. See
Goward v. United States, 569 F. App’x 408, 410 (6th Cir. 2014) (“A motion to disqualify must
first be presented to the judge whose impartiality is questioned.”); see also Peterson v. Dow, No.
23-11401, 2025 WL 685458, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2025). It may be that Mr. Lockett did not
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do so because he did not perceive Judge Grand’s “willful blindness” — the only basis he cites for
his recusal — until after he had issued the report and recommendation. But even considering the
argument now reveals no cause for Judge Grand to have recused.
Again, Mr. Lockett’s sole discernable explanation of Judge Grand’s bias is that he was
“willfully blind” to the “fraud upon the Court” he attempts to describe in the complaint. Yet this
argument is not meaningfully distinguishable from a mere disagreement with Judge Grand’s
recommendation. 	“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.” 	Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. 	“Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for
appeal, not for recusal.” Ibid. Mr. Lockett may believe that the claims outlined in his complaint
are so obvious that Judge Grand’s recommendation to screen the complaint plainly evinces some
form of bias, but for the reasons stated above, the complaint fails to satisfy the basic pleading
standards, so Judge Grand could not have been “willfully blind.”
Moreover, Judge Grand’s filing is properly characterized as a “recommendation,” which
this Court reviews anew. 	There is no demonstrated bias, but even if there were, the “de novo”
review process consists of a re-examination by this Court of all the relevant evidence previously
reviewed by the magistrate judge, which would insulate the plaintiffs’ interests from any such bias.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
E.
The document containing Mr. Lockett’s objection also appears to include a motion
requesting that the Court “remove the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446.” 	ECF No. 17,
PageID.348. Aside from violating this Court’s local rules specifying that “[m]otions must not be
combined with any other stand-alone document” — in this case, the objections to the report and
recommendation, see E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(i), the nature of his request is quite unclear. Removal is
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a procedure by which defendants in certain state court cases can bring their case to be heard in
federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In this case, Mr. Lockett is a plaintiff, and the matter already
is in federal court, so it is not apparent what purpose would be served by removal. Mr. Lockett’s
objections do include a section titled “Answer and Response to LVNV Funding LLC State Court
Complaint.” ECF No. 17, PageID.360. 	This portion appears to refer to a case pending in
Michigan’s 36th District Court where he is a defendant. However, Mr. Lockett may not attempt
to remove that case by filing the notice of removal in this case. Instructions setting out the proper
procedure for removing a case are available on the Court’s website.
III.
It is commendable that Mr. Lockett seeks to assist his mother, but as Judge Grand
concluded, his complaint fails to state any viable claim on which the Court can grant relief. The
objections to the report and recommendation are without merit.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the report and recommendation (ECF No. 14) is
ADOPTED and the plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 17) are OVERRULED.
It 	is 	further 	ORDERED 	that 	the 	plaintiffs’ 	complaint 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITH
PREJUDICE.
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge
Dated: 	November 12, 2025
Case 2:24-cv-12165-DML-DRG ECF No. 20, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/12/25 Page 15 of 15