USA v. HILL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
BARRON HILL,
Defendant.
2:22-CR-20452-TGB-JJCG
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION OF
AWARENESS TO THE COURT
(ECF NO. 118)
For 	some 	time 	now, 	Defendant 	Barron 	Hill, 	who 	is 	currently
representing himself with the assistance of stand-by counsel after having
been unable to work with seven previous attorneys, has been trying to
articulate a constitutional challenge to his prosecution based on his
understanding that the state search warrants that led to his arrest are
not recorded 	in the Register of Actions in the 19th District Court in
Dearborn, Michigan, allegedly in violation of various state laws. The
Court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue and spent considerable
time on the record and in writing explaining why the alleged failure to
return or record the executed warrant did not justify suppression of the
evidence under the Fourth Amendment. See ECF Nos. 83, 109 & 117.1
1 	The 	Government 	produced 	the 	three 	signed 	warrants 	before 	the
hearing. House Search Warrant, ECF No. 75- 2, PageID.620–37; GPS
Tracker 	Warrant, 	ECF 	No. 	75-3, 	PageID.638–45; 	Safe 	Deposit 	Box
Warrant, ECF No. 80-1, PageID.658–666. During the hearing, Detective
Stephen Dluzynski testified he swore to the affidavits and saw Judge
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In a recent pre-trial conference on October 20, 2025, and in a motion
titled “Motion of Awareness to the Court” (ECF No. 118), Hill stated that
he understood that the Fourth Amendment was not violated, but for the
first time raised the issue that the failure to file the search warrant
return 	violated 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment’s 	Due 	Process 	Clause.
Notwithstanding the untimeliness of such a request, as the time for
substantive pre-trial motions in this case has long expired, the Court is
cognizant of the fact that this issue is crucially important to Hill, and will
therefore address it and explain why this argument would also fail on the
merits.2 For the reasons discussed below, therefore, Hill’s “Motion for
Awareness to the Court” will be DENIED.
The 	Fifth 	Amendment, 	applicable 	to 	state 	action 	under 	the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “no person shall . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.,
amends. V, XIV. The procedural steps that must be taken to ensure that
due 	process 	is 	afforded 	before 	someone 	is 	deprived 	of 	an 	interest
involving life, liberty, or property vary depending on the situation, but
typically include notice and an opportunity to be heard, an unbiased
Somers sign the warrants and file them in his file cabinet. Hearing Tr.,
ECF No. 83, PageID.694–95. Based on the signed warrants and the
detective’s testimony, the Court found sufficient evidence to conclude
that the warrants were validly issued by Judge Somers and satisfied the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at PageID.702–04.
2 	The Court is not deciding whether Hill waived the argument for
appellate purposes.
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decision-maker, a right to present evidence, a right to cross-examine
opposing witnesses, and an opportunity to be represented by counsel,
among other protections. “The elements of a procedural due process claim
are: (1) a life, liberty, or property interest requiring protection . . ., and
(2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without adequate process.” Fields v.
Henry Cnty., Tenn., 701 F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 2012).
Based 	on 	his 	statements 	in 	Court 	and 	in 	his 	“Motion 	for
Awareness,” the Court understands Hill to be arguing that he was
deprived of his right to due process because the officers allegedly violated
various state laws when they did not file or record certain documents in
his Register of Actions (such as the three executed warrants, affidavit,
and return) after executing the valid search.
But even if it were true that the documents were never filed, such
a failure does not amount to a deprivation of due process because
“[v]iolation of a state statute regulating procedure in criminal cases does
not rise per se to a due process violation.” See Dewberry v. Warden,
Lebanon Corr. Inst., No. 3:21-CV-158, 2022 WL 168687, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 19, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Dewberry
v. Warden, London Corr. Inst., No. 3:21-CV-158, 2022 WL 848245 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 22, 2022) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not constitutionalize
every state criminal procedure statute.”); Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d
720, 726 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The mere failure to comply with a state
regulation is not a constitutional violation.”); Toney v. Bobby, No. 4:22-
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CV-683, 2024 WL 3488017, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2024) (“[A state rule
of criminal procedure] violation does not necessarily translate into a due
process violation.”).
Here, 	Hill’s 	due 	process 	argument 	rests 	entirely 	on 	(alleged)
violations of state law as proof that his federal constitutional due process
rights were violated. Hill’s argument “appears to be conflating a criminal
defendant’s 	rights 	under 	[a 	state 	criminal 	rule 	of 	procedure] 	with
the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.” Toney v. Bobby,
2024 WL 3488017, at *4; see also Dewberry, 2022 WL 168687, at *3
(rejecting due process claim even where defendant identified a “minor
deviation” from a state criminal procedure adopted to improve reliability
of 	evidence 	because 	he 	“offer[ed] 	no 	citation 	of 	authority 	for 	[the]
proposition” that there is a “duty to follow all procedures which concern
one’s freedom of liberty”).
Precedent is clear that “[a] State simply has no ‘federal due process
obligation to follow all of its procedures.” Trusty v. Centurion Health
Servs., No. 19-5872, 2020 WL 548225, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2020) (citing
Levine 	v. 	Torvik, 	986 	F.2d 	at 	1515). 	Rather, 	a 	“[s]tate-law 	error
establishes a federal constitutional claim only where the error ‘is so
fundamentally unfair that it rises to the level of a due-process violation.’”
Henry v. Burgess, No. 22-CV-11159, 2025 WL 2775948, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 29, 2025) (citing Collier v. Lafler, 419 F. App’x 555, 558 (6th Cir.
2011)); Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he
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constitutional 	issue 	is 	whether 	the 	state 	court’s 	application 	of 	its
constitutionally adequate standard was so erroneous as to raise an
independent due process violation.”).
Thus, Hill would need to demonstrate not only violation of a state
law rule, but also that the state law violation was “so fundamentally
unfair” or “so erroneous” that it rose to the level of a due process violation
under the Fifth Amendment. See id. Hill failed to demonstrate both.
First, Hill has not shown that state law required an executed
warrant be returned and recorded in the Register of Actions for a
particular 	case. 	The 	19th 	District 	Court 	clerk 	told 	the 	defense
investigator there was “no specific legal requirement mandating that a
returned search warrant be recorded in the judge’s official records.”
Affidavit of Legal Investigator, ECF No. 72-4, PageID.604. And neither
did the statutes previously mentioned by Hill or his counsel contain such
a requirement. See ECF No. Nos. 109 & 117.3
At the October 20, 2025 pre-trial conference and in a filing titled
“Motion of Awareness to the Court” (ECF No. 118), Hill insisted that
MCL § 780.653 required that an executed warrant be returned and
recorded. 	However, 	that 	statute 	sets 	forth 	the 	requirement 	that 	a
magistrate judge find probable cause based on a reliable affidavit. It does
3 The Court considered Article I, Sections 2 and 11 of the Michigan
Constitution, MCR 2.003, and MCL 780.651 (including the 56-day rule),
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(2)(C), Fed. R. Crim. P. 55, and Fed. R. Crim. P.
49.1(b).
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not discuss any return or recording requirement for an executed warrant.
The statute reads as follows:
MCL 780.653. Judge or district court magistrate's finding of
reasonable 	or 	probable 	cause; 	basis 	of 	finding; 	basis 	and
contents of affidavit.
Sec. 3.
The judge or district court magistrate's finding of reasonable or
probable cause shall be based upon all the facts related within the
affidavit made before him or her. The affidavit may be based upon
information supplied to the complainant by a named or unnamed person
if the affidavit contains 1 of the following:
(a) If the person is named, affirmative allegations from which the
judge or district court magistrate may conclude that the person spoke
with personal knowledge of the information.
(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative allegations from which the
judge or district magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with
personal knowledge of the information and either that the unnamed
person is credible or that the information is reliable.
History: 1966, Act 189, Eff. Mar. 10, 1967 ;-- Am. 1988, Act 80, Eff. June
1, 1988 ;-- Am. 2014, Act 383, Imd. Eff. Dec. 18, 2014
The Court previously found, and Hill conceded during the conference,
that his warrants were validly issued by a neutral magistrate upon
probable cause. Therefore, this statute does not support Hill’s due process
argument either.
Nonetheless, 	to 	the 	extent 	Hill’s 	argument 	evolved 	from
complaining about the alleged failure to file his search warrants in the
Register of Actions to the alleged failure to file the search warrants
returns with the court, it appears a different section, MCL § 780.655, not
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cited by Hill, may provide more support to his argument. This statute
provides as follows:
780.655 	Property 	seized 	upon 	search; 	tabulation; 	filing;
suppression order; custody; restoration to owner; disposition of
other property.
Sec. 5.
(1) When an officer in the execution of a search warrant finds
any property or seizes any of the other things for which a search
warrant is allowed by this act, the officer, in the presence of the
person from whose possession or premises the property or thing
was taken, if present, or in the presence of at least 1 other
person, shall make a complete and accurate tabulation of the
property and things that were seized. The officer taking property or
other things under the warrant shall give to the person from whom or
from whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and
shall give to the person a copy of the tabulation upon completion, or shall
leave a copy of the warrant and tabulation at the place from which the
property or thing was taken. The officer is not required to give a copy of
the affidavit to that person or to leave a copy of the affidavit at the place
from which the property or thing was taken.
(2) The officer shall file the tabulation promptly with the judge
or district court magistrate. The tabulation may be suppressed by
order of the judge or district court magistrate until the final disposition
of the case unless otherwise ordered. The property and things that were
seized shall be safely kept by the officer so long as necessary for the
purpose of being produced or used as evidence in any trial.
(3) As soon as practicable, stolen or embezzled property shall be
restored to the owner of the property. Other things seized under the
warrant shall be disposed of under direction of the judge or district court
magistrate, except that money and other useful property shall be turned
over to the state, county or municipality, the officers of which seized the
property under the warrant. Money turned over to the state, county, or
municipality shall be credited to the general fund of the state, county,
or municipality.
History: 1966, Act 189, Eff. Mar. 10, 1967 ;-- Am. 2002, Act 112, Eff.
Apr. 22, 2002 ;-- Am. 2014, Act 383, Imd. Eff. Dec. 18, 2014
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MCL § 780.655 (emphasis added). This statute does require state
law enforcement officers to file the “tabulation” with the court and leave
a copy with the person searched—and Hill claims these steps were not
taken here.4
But even assuming for the sake of argument that Hill is correct,
and the search warrant returns were never filed with the court, there is
a second problem for Hill to overcome. In order to make out a claim for
violating his Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment, Hill would
need authority showing that the post-search failure to return an executed
warrant 	or 	record 	it 	in 	an 	individual’s 	Register 	of 	Actions 	is 	“so
fundamentally unfair” that it can be considered a Due Process violation.
See Henry v. Burgess, 2025 WL 2775948, at *6. But the authority is to
the contrary. Michigan courts have repeatedly held that because the
requirements of MCL § 780.655 “are ministerial in nature, and do not in
any way lead to the acquisition of evidence,” courts are not justified in
excluding evidence “as a remedy for the statutory violation of . . . . the
post seizure, administrative requirements of” MCL § 780.655. People v.
Flores, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 2028, *7-8 (2001) (citations omitted); see
also 	People 	v. 	Parks, 	2021 	Mich. 	App. 	LEXIS 	1090, 	*7-8 (2021)
(“Assuming, as here, that a valid warrant has been obtained, the decision
4 Because this is a new argument, no testimony was presented on this
question during the evidentiary hearing held by the Court. The Court
heard testimony about the issuance of the warrants, not about the return
of the warrants.
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to present or not present the warrant bears little on the validity of the
search. . . . Thus, . . . failure to present the warrant did not affect the
validity of the ensuing search[.]”) (citing MCL § 780.655(1)).
Similarly, even though post-search procedural requirements are
“important,” “irregularities in these procedures do not void an otherwise
valid search” absent a “showing of prejudice.” Frisby v. United States, 79
F.3d 29, 32 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)’s property
receipt requirement); see also Graham v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 546, 549 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“[I]n order to prevail on a procedural due process challenge,
[petitioner] must also show prejudice.”). Prejudice requires a showing
“that the due process violations led to a substantially different outcome
from that which would have occurred in the absence of those violations.”
Graham v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d at 549–50; see also Scott v. Elo, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3026, *22-23 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2021) (noting that “[m]ere
speculation” 	of 	prejudice 	is 	insufficient 	to 	support 	“a 	finding 	of 	a
constitutional violation”).
Here, assuming that the officers failed to comply with state law by
not filing a search warrant return and having that return recorded in the
Register of Actions, it is unclear how the outcome would have been
substantially different if the filing procedure had been correctly followed.
Either way, there was a warrant issued based on sufficient probable
cause, and the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admissible. No
prejudice accrued to Hill simply because the return was not filed. See
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United 	States 	v. 	Dudek, 	530 	F.2d 	684, 	690 	(6th 	Cir. 	1976)
(“[N]onconstitutional, nonprejudicial and inadvertent failures to follow
the post-search and seizure requirements of [a State’s] rule . . . do not
require application of the federal exclusionary rule.”); People v. Flores,
2001 	Mich. 	App. 	LEXIS 	2028, 	*7-8 	(noting 	that 	MCL 	§ 	780.655’s
requirements “do not in any way lead to the acquisition of evidence”);
People v. Parks, 2021 Mich. App. LEXIS 1090, *7-8 (“[T]he decision to
present or not present the warrant bears little on the validity of the
search.”).
Of course, Hill has yet to be tried on the charged offenses, is
presumed innocent, and the verdict cannot be foretold. But he has not
suggested how the outcome of his criminal case would be substantially
different had the warrants been returned after execution. And any
argument that the search would not have occurred had the warrants been
returned and recorded fails. Had the warrants been recorded the way Hill
claims they should have been, the search would have still taken place in
the 	same 	way, 	that 	is 	in 	a 	manner 	this 	Court 	already 	deemed
appropriate. 	Finally, 	Hill 	had 	previously 	argued 	that 	the 	lack 	of
recording of his warrants in his individual Register of Actions denied him
the ability to challenge the validity of the search warrants. ECF No. 105,
PageID.770. But Hill does not dispute the validity of the warrants
anymore, and the Court already explained that:
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Defendant is quite capable of challenging the validity of the
search warrants because (1) there [is] a physical record of the
signed 	search 	warrants, 	which 	were 	produced 	by 	the
Government and presented in Court; and (2) Defendant has
already forcefully challenged the authenticity of the warrants
during an evidentiary hearing held precisely for that purpose.
. . . At that hearing, Detective Dluzynski testified that he saw
Judge Somers sign the warrants and file them in his file
cabinet.
ECF No. 109, PageID.796. Thus, Hill has not demonstrated any type of
prejudice that could render the alleged state law violation “so erroneous”
to rise to the level of a due process violation.
The Court has endeavored to give Hill the benefit of the doubt by
considering his pro se arguments in the most favorable light, but there is
no authority that supports his contention that a failure to file a search
warrant return, even if required by state law, would violate his Fifth
Amendment right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process. Indeed, from the Court’s review, it is clear that Hill has
received due process.5 Therefore, to the extent that Hill’s “Motion for
Awareness to the Court” is seeking relief, as he argued during the Pre-
Trial Conference on October 20, 2025, based on the theory that the failure
to file a search warrant return and have it recorded in the Register of
5 The Court will not entertain any additional motions or arguments from
Hill regarding whether the search in this case, or the officers’ compliance
with 	state 	law 	requirements, 	violated 	Hill’s 	rights. 	Any 	additional
pleadings raising these general issues will be stricken. If convicted, Hill
will have a full opportunity to raise any perceived errors this Court has
made before the court of appeals.
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Actions amounts to a violation of his Fifth Amendment Due Process
Rights, that motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 3, 2025 	/s/Terrence G. Berg
TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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