Lewis v. Maryland Department of Transportation, Maryland Transit Administration et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document17 Filed 10/13/26 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

KIESHA LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND,
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, . ~ Civil Action No. 26-0248-TDC
MARYLAND TRANSIT _
ADMINISTRATION,

MARYLAND TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY and

STATE HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Kiesha Lewis has filed this civil action against Defendants the State of Maryland,

\

the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”), the Maryland Transit Administration

MTA”), the Maryland Transportation Authority (““MDTA”), and the Maryland State Highway
Administration (“SHA”). She alleges claims of race and sex discrimination, as well as a claim of

retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§
| 2000e-2000e-17, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MF EPA”), Md. Code Ann.,

State Gov’t §§ 20-601 to 20-61 1 (LexisNexis 2021). She also asserts claims of disability
| discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
USC. §§ 12111-12117, and the MFEPA. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the

Alternative, for Summary Judgment, which is fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, the

Motion will be GRANTED.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document1i7_ Filed 10/13/26 Page 2 of 20

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kiesha Lewis is an African American woman who has worked in “administrative
operations, procurement support, program coordination, and contract oversight” for over 12 years.
Am. Compl. J 9, ECF No. iL. Lewis also has a “documented” disability. Jd. ¥ 32.

Lewis’s employment history includes positions as.a Frontline Manager for the Internal
Revenue Service; a Management Analyst for the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts; a Project Manager for Premier Management, a private company; a Program Analyst for
the United States Census Bureau; and an Information Technology (“IT”) Specialist for the National

‘ Science Foundation. She holds two master’s degrees, a Master of Business Administration and a
Master of Science in IT Systems, as well as multiple upper-level certifications,
I, Job Applications

Between May 2025 and July 2025, ‘Lewis applied for and was denied at least five
‘procurement or administrative positions with various Maryland ‘state agencies, including
Defendants MDOT, MTA, MDTA, and SHA. Lewis alleges that these failures to hire her were

the result of discrimination based on race, sex, and disability.

First, Lewis applied for a Procurement Officer III position with MDOT. On June 5, 2025,
she received an email from a hiring officer at MDOT informing her that MDOT was “unable to
approve her application” due to “insufficient experience.” Joint Record (“J .R.”) 13, ECF No. 16-
1; see Am. Compl. q 13(a). |

Subsequently, Lewis applied for and was rejected from four other positions at the same or
similar state agencies. She applied for a Procurement Officer II position at the MTA but was

notified on June 16, 2025 that she had been deemed “not qualified.” Am. Compl. ¢ 13. Lewis

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document 17. Filed 10/13/26 Page 3 of 20

~N

also applied for a Procurement.Officer position with the SHA and asserts that she was eventually
rejected from the position as “not qualified.” Jd.

Lewis applied for a position as a Management Support Associate at MDTA but was
informed by email on June 30,2025 ‘that she did not meet the minimum qualifications for the
position due to her “Insufficient Selective Qualifications Experience.” 6/30/2025 9:10 a.m. Email
at 1, Compl. Ex. B, ECF No. 2; see J.R. 2. That same day, her application for an Office Manager
position with the SHA was rej ected for the same reason.

II. Alleged Retaliation |

Following this series of unsuccessful applications, Lewis became suspicious that she was
being subjected to discrimination. On June 30, 2025, Lewis responded to the email notifying her
that she was deemed insufficiently qualified for thé Office Manager position at the SHA by asking |
for clarification on the decision and guidance on how to challenge the determination. Later that
day, Lewis responded. again in the same email chain and stated that she had “contacted the
Governor’s Office” and “would like to contact senior management” within the SHA. 6/30/2025
12:19 p.m. Email at 1, Compl. Ex: B, ECF No. 2..

| On July 11, 2025, Lewis filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in which she alleged race and sex discrimination
‘in the decisions to deny her the positions to which she had applied. She stated in her charge of
discrimination (“the EEOC charge”) that she had received numerous rejection emails informing
her that she did not meet the “minimum or selective criteria” for the positions to which she had
applied, that those determinations were “factually inaccurate” in light of her extensive experience,
- and that they were “potentially discriminatory in nature” in that they suggested “a systemic bias

that disproportionately excludes Black women and other historically marginalized professionals

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document 17 Filed 10/13/26 Page 4 of 20

from advancing through the state’s hiring pipeline.” J.R. 1. On August 19, 2025, the EEOC issued
a Determination and Notice of Rights informing Lewis that the investigation into her EEOC charge

had ended and notifying her of her right to file a private civil action in court.

In addition to her EEOC charge, Lewis also “rais[ed] concerns with state officials regarding .

discriminatory hiring practices.” Am. Compl. 18. On July 13, 2025, she senta written complaint

by email to MDOT at mdotfairpractices@mdot.maryland.gov in which she alleged discrimination
based on race, sex, and disability. Her complaint was reviewed by the MDOT Director of Fair
Practices, who requested clarification from Lewis on the basis of the disability discrimination
claim. Lewis responded by stating that she had disclosed on her various applications that she had
a “documented disability” and claimed that she may have been subjected to disparate treatment in
the hiring process because of this disclosure. 7105/2025 Email at 1, Opp’n Ex. 1, ECF No. 14.
| Lewis asserts that. following these complaints, Defendants retaliated against her by
“alterfing] her eligibility determinations and continu[ing] to deny her fair consideration.” Am.
Compl. § 19. On July 18, 2025, Lewis received an email notifying her that she had not been
selected for a Procurement Officer IT position at the MTA for which she had previously applied.
The email stated that she did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position because she had
insufficient experience. 7/18/25 Email at I, Compl. -Ex. B, ECF No. 2. |
During this time frame, Lewis applied for a “materially similar” > Procurement Officer II
position with the MDTA. Jd. 914. As part of an initial screen, her application received a training
and experience rating of “best qualified,” which was communicated to Lewis ina September 17,
2025 email. 9/17/2025 Email at 1, Compl. Ex. C, ECF No. 2. Then, on October 24, 2025, Lewis
received an email from an MTA Talent Acquisition Manager informing her that an error had been

made in the initial screening process for her application for an MTA Procurement Officer II

)

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document17_ Filed 10/13/26 Page5of 20.

position, presumably the one from which she was rejected on July 18, 2025. 10/24/2025 Email at
1, Compl. Ex. D, ECF No. 2. The email stated that after Lewis had raised a concern about the
determination, MTA conducted a secondary review and determined that Lewis did, in fact, meet
the minimum qualifications for the position and that the initial determination of “unqualified,”
presumably the same one originally communicated to Lewis in the July 18, 2025 email, had been
reversed. Id. The Amended Complaint and attachments provide no further information about
these two job applications. |

III. Procedural History

On October 31, 2025, Lewis filed the original Complaint in this case in the Cireuit Court .

for Prince George’s County, Maryland. After Defendants removed the case to this Court, Lewis
filed the presently operative Amended Complaint in which she alleges the following claims in the
following numbered counts: (1) race discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the MFEPA; (2)
sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the MFEPA; (3) disability discrimination, in
violation of the ADA and the MFEPA; and (4) retaliation, in violation of Title VI, the ADA, and
_ the MFEPA. |
: | DISCUSSION.

In their Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue |
that the claims should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6), or summary judgment should be granted pursuant to Rule 56, because: (1) the Court
. lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the MFEPA claims because Lewis did not comply with a
precondition for filing; (2) the ADA claims are barred by state sovereign immunity; (3) Lewis
failed to exhaust administrative remedies relating to the ADA claims; and (4) Lewis failed to allege

sufficient facts to support a plausible claim for relief on any of her claims.

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document17 - Filed 10/13/26 Page 6 of 20

I. Legal Standards . |

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts .
to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is
plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the |
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements
do not suffice. Jd. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations
in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations. in the light most favorable to the
- plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Ed of Comm rs of Davidson
| Cuty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed |
liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 US. 89, 94 (2007). However, “liberal construction does not
mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing v.
Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir, 2020).

Typically, when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court considers only
_ the complaint and any attached documents.’ Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd.,
484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). Based on this rule, the Court will consider the exhibits attached.
to Lewis’s original Complaint. Courts are also permitted to consider a document attached to
a motion to dismiss “when the document is ‘integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint,
and when ‘the plaintiffs do not challenge the document’s authenticity.’” Zak v. Chelsea
Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606—7 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v.
Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F 3 d2 12, 234 (4th Cir. 2004). Here, in the Joint Record, Defendants
have submitted Lewis's original EEOC charge-and the documents she attached to it, which include
emails notifying her that she was not selected for the positions to which she applied, and Lewis

has submitted email records reflecting her internal complaint to the MDOT Office of Fair

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Documenti17 _ Filed 10/13/26 Page 7of20 .

- Practices. In the Amended Complaint, Lewis references her filing of an EEOC charge and her
discrimination complaint to state officials, and, in fact, Lewis explicitly relies on these complaints
as the basis for her retaliation claims, so they are integral to the complaint. See Wooten v. Univ,
of Md., Baltimore, 733 F. Supp. 3d 402, 417-18 (D. Md. 2024) (finding that an administrative
charge of discrimination attached to the defendant’s motion was integral to the complaint).

Further, where Lewis referenced the notices of non-selection in the Amended Complaint, the
emails in the Joint Record that constitute those notices are also integral to the complaint. Where

_ Lewis has not challenged the authenticity of any of the submitted records, the Court will thus
consider these documents in resolving the Motion to Dismiss.

| As for whether the Court may construe the Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment, -
before converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, courts must give the
nonmoving party “a reasoriable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the
motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “Reasonable opportunity” has’ two requirements: (1) the

nonmoving party must have some notice that the court is treating the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a
motion for summary judgment; and (2). the nonmoving party must be afforded “a reasonable
opportunity. for discovery” to obtain information essential to oppose the motion. Gay v. Wall, 761
F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985), |

Here, the notice requirement has been satisfied by the title of Defendants’ Motion. To
show that a reasonable opportunity for discovery has not been afforded, the nonmoving party must
file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), or another filing, explaining why “for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); see

Harrods Ltd. y Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2002). Lewis, in

her memorandum in opposition to the Motion, has included a Rule 56(d) declaration in which she

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document 17 Filed 10/13/26 Page 8 of 20

stated that key evidence needed to oppose a summary judgment motion remains in Defendants’
. exclusive possession. “Because Lewis has provided a sufficient basis to conclude that discovery is
necessary before summary judgment could be fairly considered, the Court will not construe the
Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment and will construe it only as a Motion to
Dismiss. See MeCray v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., Md. Transit Admin., 741 F.3d 480, 484 (4th Cir.
2014) (declining to consider summary judgment without first granting discovery where “the main
issue is one of motive and where most of the key evidence lies in the control of the moving party”).
I. ADA Claims

In Count 3, Lewis alleges claims of disability discrimination under the ADA and the
MFEPA. Specifically, she asserts that she “has a disability or was regarded as disabled, which ©
was reflected in each of her job applications,” and that “Defendants took adverse actions because
of [her] disability.” Am. Compl. {¥[ 32-33.

A. Sovereign Immunity —

At the outset, Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss Lewis’s ADA claims because
| they are barred by state sovereign immunity. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
V. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held that Congress, in enacting
the ADA, did not validly abrogate the States’ immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution from suits for disability discrimination under Title I of the ADA
| because it had not demonstrated “a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States” that
would warrant abrogation pursuant to Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 365, 372-74. Based on the same reasoning, multiple United States Courts of Appeals have
found that Congress did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to

claims for retaliation under Title V of the ADA for asserting a violation of Title I. See Yerdon v.

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document 17 Filed 10/13/26 Page 9 of 20

Poitras, 120 F.4th 1150, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 2024); Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ., 105 F.4th 856, 864—
66 (6th Cir. 2024); Block v. Tex. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 952 F.3d 613, 619 (Sth Cir. 2020); Demshki
v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

Lewis correctly asserts that, by removing this case from state court to this Court,
Defendants have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, but Defendants still retain any state
sovereign immunity they would have had in state court. Biggs v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 953
F.3d 136, 241 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that “a state’s removal of a suit to federal court waives
sovereign immunity only if the state. has consented to suit in its own courts”); Stewart v. North |
Carolina, 393 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2005). The relevant question is therefore whether Maryland

_ has consented to suit under the ADA or otherwise waived its sovereign immunity in its own courts
through “a clear statement” of waiver. See Passaro v. Virginia, 935 F.3d 243, 247-48 (4th Cir.
2019) (assessing whether Virginia had waived its sovereign immunity from claims under Title I
of the ADA). The Supreme Court of Maryland has held that the Maryland Tort Claims Act, the
most likely potential source of waiver, did not waive sovereign immunity from suit for “federal
statutory claims.” Williams v. Morgan State Univ., 300 A.3d 54, 59-60 (Md. 2023). Lewis has
identified no other potential source of waiver. Therefore, even though Defendants waived
Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing the case to federal court, where there has been no
“clear statement” of a waiver of state sovereign immunity as to the relevant ADA claims, the
Motion will be granted as to the ADA claims. Passaro, 935 F.3d at 248; Williams, 300 A.3d at
59-60; Bozarth v. Md. State Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-3615-DLB, 2021 WL 1225448, at *11 (D.
Md. Mar. 31, 2021) (dismissing an ADA disability discrimination claim because Maryland has not

waived state sovereign immunity in relation to such a claim).

/

Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document17 Filed 10/13/26 Page 10 of 20

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants also assert that the Court should dismiss Lewis's. ADA disability
discrimination claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Lewis failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Such a failure is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction but is instead
an affirmative defense. See Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551 (2019) (holding that the
Title VII requirement to file an EEOC charge is a “mandatory” claim processing rule but “not a
jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts”); Bush v. Frederick
Cnty. Pub, Schs., No. 23-1127, 2024 WL 639255, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2024) (stating that a
. defendant must assert a failure to comply with EEOC filing requirements as an affirmative
defense). This claim is therefore properly construed as seeking dismissal for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6).
. In general, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests only the sufficiency of the complaint such that
~ consideration of an affirmative defense is premature. See Goodman y Praxair, Inc. , 494 F.3d 458,
464 (4th Cir. 2007). However, courts may consider affirmative defenses like a failure to exhaust
administrative requirements in relation to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when “all facts necessary to the
affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of the complaint.” and “the plaintiff's potential
response to the affirmative defense was foreclosed by the allegations in the complaint.” L.N.P. v.
Kijakazi, 64 F.4th 577, 586 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464, 466). In the
. context of employment discrimination claims, courts have considered a claim that the plaintiff
failed to exhaust administrative remedies ona Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Hoffman v. Inova Health
Care Servs., 169 F.4th 207 (4th Cir, 2026) (considering the contents of an EEOC charge and
dismissing discrimination claims under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the failure to exhaust

‘ administrative remedies); Wooten, 733 F. Supp. 3d at 423-26 (considering the contents of an

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Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document17 Filed 10/13/26 Page 11 of 20

administrative charge of discrimination and dismissing retaliation claims under Rule 12(b)(6) that
were not properly alleged in the charge).

Congress modeled the ADA on Title VII and incorporated its enforcement remedies and
procedures into the ADA. 42 US.C. § 12117(a); Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th
Cir.2012). Before filing a federal lawsuit under Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must first exhaust
administrative remedies by filing and pursuing acharge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
5(b), (f), 12117(a); Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 593. The “EEOC charge defines the scope of the plaintiff’ s
right to institute a civil suit.” Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Ma, Inc., 288. F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002).
Thus, the “allegations contained in the administrative charge of discrimination generally operate
to limit the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst. , 429 F.3d 505,
509 (4th Cir, 2005) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962-63 (4th
Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, a plaintiffs claim “generally will be barred if his charge alleges
disctimination on one basis—such as race—and he introduces another basis in formal litigation—
such as sex.” Jd. In Bryant, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that
a plaintiff did not satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement in relation to his claims of
color and sex discrimination where his EEOC charge did not reference those forms of
discrimination and instead alleged only race discrimination. Bryant, 288 F.3d at 132-33.

Here, Defendants assert that Lewis did not properly exhaust administrative remedies
because, although it is undisputed that Lewis filed an EEOC charge, she did not allege disability
discrimination in that charge and instead alleged only race and sex discrimination. Where Lewis
does not contest that her EEOC claim fails to reference disability discrimination, and the facts
necessary to. determine that she failed to do so are apparent from the complaint and the EEOC

charge integral to it, the Court finds that the ADA disability discrimination claim is subject to

11

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dismissal. See id.; Chacko, 429 F.3d at 509. Lewis argues that the failure to allege disability
discrimination in the EEOC charge should be overlooked because EEOC charges must be
construed liberally and, between her EEOC charge and her internal complaint to the MDOT Office
of Fair Practices, she satisfied the purposes sof administrative exhaustion by putting Defendants on
notice to investigate and potentially resolve the dispute. Although the scope of an EEOC charge
"does not “strictly limit” a plaintiff's subsequent suit, the claims asserted in a federal lawsuit must
be “reasonably related” to and “expected to follow from.a reasonable administrative investigation”
into the claims in the EEOC. Sydnor,. 681 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted). As the Fourth Circuit
recognized in Bryant, an administrative investigation of one type of discrimination “could not
reasonably be expected to occur” when the plaintiff's charge alleged an entirely different type of
discrimination. Bryant, 288 F.3d at 133. While Lewis may have mentioned disability
discrimination in her internal complaint to the MDOT, such a complaint does not substitute for
administrative exhaustion. See Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 593 (stating that the goal of administrative .
~ reporting is to put not only the employer, but also the administrative agency, on notice so that they
can investigate and potentially resolve the claim. without litigation). The ADA disability
discrimination claim will therefore also be dismissed based on the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
i. Discrimination
In Counts 1 and 2, Lewis alleges claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII and
the MFEPA arising from the failure to hire her for the various positions at state agencies for which
she applied. In Count 3, Lewis alleges disability discrimination under the ADA and the MFEPA

based on the same incidents. Defendants seek dismissal of these counts on the grounds that Lewis

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Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document 17 . Filed 10/13/26 Page 13 of 20

has. not alleged sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendants actions were
motivated by Tace, SEX, OF disability discrimination.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire ... or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To state a Title VI discrimination claim, a plaintiff may
demonstrate through direct or circumstantial evidence that race or sex “motivated the employer's
-adverse employment decision. * Hill V. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Alternatively, a plaintiff t may proceed through the approach adopted
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), “under which the employee,
after establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrates that the employer’s proffered
~ permissible reason for taking an adverse employment action is actually a pretext for

discrimination.” Hill, 354 F.3d at 285. On a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not necessarily
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but “the complaint’s factual allegations must allow
a ‘court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is _liable’” for
discrimination. McCleary-Evans v.. Md Dep tof Transp., State Hwy. Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585
(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jgbal, 556 U. S. at 678).

To allege a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination based on a failure to hire, a
complaint must include facts showing that the plaintiff: (1) isa member of a protected class; (2)
applied for the position i in question; (3) was qualified for the position; and (4) was rejected for the
position “under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. ” Brown v.

McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 902 (4th Cir. 1998). As to the fourth prong, the fact that the position at

issue was filled by an individual from outside the protected class, without plausible allegations

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that the plaintiff was more qualified or better suited for the position, is not alone sufficient to
support an inference of discrimination. MeCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 586, 588.

| Title I of the ADA, which addresses employment discrimination against persons with
disabilities, provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on
the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 US.C. § 12112(a). The statute defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the .
employment ‘position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 USC. § 12111(8). The term
“essential functions” refers to the “fundamental job duties of the employment position the
individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). As under Title VI, a plaintiff
can proceed on an ADA employment discrimination claim either with direct evidence of
discrimination or by establishing a prima facie case for discrimination under the MeDonell
Douglass burden-shifting framework. a v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d
55, 58 (4th Cir..1995) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to an ADA claim). Generally,
to establish a claim for employment discrimination on the basis of disability under Title I of the
ADA, much like under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the plaintiff has a disability; (2)
the plaintiff was a qualified individual for the position; and (3) the employer took an adverse
employment action, such as failing to hire the plaintiff, because of the disability. See Jacobs v.
N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015).

The MFEPA similarly prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and

disability. Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606(a)(1)(i (LexisNexis 2021). Because the MFEPA

is the state law counterpart to Title VII and courts typically apply Title VII analysis to MFEPA

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Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document 17 Filed 10/13/26. Page 15 of 20

claims, the Court will address the Title VII and MFEPA claims for race and sex discrimination
together under the federal standards. See Clarke v. DynCorp Int'l LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d 781, 788

(D. Md. 2013) (citing Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 914 A.2d 735, 743 n.8 (Md. 2007)).

- Likewise, consistent with prevailing legal authority, the Court will jointly evaluate Lewis’s claims

for disability discrimination under standards applicable to claims under Title I of the ADA. See
Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Adkins, 137 A.3d 1 1, 220 (2016) (applying the ADA standard in
evaluating a disability discrimination claim under the MFEPA); Taylor v. Giant of Md., LLC, 33
A.3d 445, 459 (Md. 2011) (stating that Maryland courts have a “history of consulting federal
precedent in the equal employment area” when evaluating employment discrimination claims).
Here, Lewis has alleged the first two prongs of a prima facie case for race and sex
discrimination and the first prong of a case for disability discrimination by asserting that she is an

African American woman with a disability. who applied to at least five different positions with

‘Defendants. She has also alleged that she was qualified for the positions due to her years of

experience in administration and ‘procurement and has attached | her resume and academic
transcripts, which demonstrate a long history of employment and multiple advanced degrees and
certifications. However, even assuming that Lewis has plausibly alleged that she was qualified for
the positions to which she applied, she has failed to allege facts sufficient facts to satisfy the fourth

prong of a claim for race and sex discrimination, that there are “circumstances giving rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination,” Brown, 159 F.3d at 902, or the third prong of a claim for

disability discrimination, that Defendants failed to hire the her “because of her disability,” Jacobs,
780 F.3d at 572. For each position, Lewis has not even alleged facts showing that the individuals
selected for the positions were from outside the relevant protected class, such as that they were not

African American, female, or a person with a disability, and she has provided no facts that would

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Case 8:26-cv-00248-TDC Document17 Filed 10/13/26 Page 16 of 20 |

plausibly demonstrate that they were less qualified for the positions than Lewis. See McCleary-
Evans, 780 F.3d at 586, 588. She has also failed to allege facts showing that anyone from any of .
the relevant state agencies made any statements that arguably demonstrated discriminatory animus
. based on race, sex, or disability.

Rather, Lewis relies almost entirely on her allegations that she was repeatedly rejected for
positions for which she “met ot exceeded the minimum qualifications.” Am. Compl. 9 12. Even
if true, this allegation does not support a reasonable inference of discrimination. Although Lewis
generally alleges that Defendants “treated [her] less favorably than similarly situated applicants
outside of her protected racial class,” id. { 26, she has provided no facts supporting the conclusion
that applicants with similar qualifications, but who were not Black, female,.or a person with a
disability, were deemed more qualified that Lewis. See Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d
187, 191 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming the dismissal of a Title’ VII discrimination claim where the
plaintiff had not provided facts showing that a similarly situated person outside the protected class
was treated differently); Bing, 959 F.3d at 617 (affirming the dismissal of a Title ‘VII claim based
in part on the plaintiff's failure to allege facts showing that non-Black employees were treated
more favorably). Finally, although Lewis also points to her allegation that she received
contradictory qualification ratings for materially similar Procurement Office II positions, any such
discrepancy does not support a reasonable inference of discrimination, particularly where the email
records attached to the original Complaint show that, after Lewis brought the issue to Defendants’
attention, they acknowledged that one of the ratings was erroneous and changed Lewis’s rating to
reflect that she met the minimum qualifications for the Procurement Officer II position.

These same facts demonstrate that even recognizing that a plaintiff need not establish a

prima facie case of discrimination to preclude the granting of a motion to dismiss, Lewis’s

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discrimination claims fail because the Amended Complaint does not provide factual allegations.
that “allow a court to draw the reasonable inference” of discrimination. McCleary-Evans, 780.
. F.3d at 585. In McCleary-Evans, the Fourth Cireuit upheld the dismissal of a complaint where the
plaintiff, as here, had alleged race and sex discrimination when the SHA failed to hire her for two
positions for which she was qualified based on the claim that the decisionmakers were biased and
had “predetermined” that they would hire White candidates for the positions. McCleary-Evans, — .
780 F.3d at 583. The court held that these “‘naked’ allegations” were “too conclusory” to preclude
dismissal because they were supported only by the facts that the two decisionmakers who
interviewed the plaintiff were not Black, the two applicants hired were not Black, and there was
an unspecified history of discriminatory hiring at the relevant division, such that the plaintiff could
“only speculate that the persons hired were not better qualified, or did not perform better during
their interviews, or were not better suited based on experience and personality for the positions.”
Id. at 585-86, Here, Lewis has made a broad allegation of discrimination based on even fewer
facts, as she cannot even assert that either the decisionmakers or the successful applicants were.
from outside the relevant protected classes, and she offers no facts that would support a reasonable
inference of discrimination. The Court therefore finds that Lewis has failed‘to state a plausible
claim of race, sex, or disability discrimination.
IV. Retaliation 7

Defendants also seek dismissal of Count 4, which alleges retaliation in violation of the
ADA, Title VI, and the MFEPA. To state a retaliation claim under all three of these statutes, a
plaintiff must allege facts supporting the conclusion that (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected

activity; (2) the employer took a materially adverse action against the plaintiff; and (3) “the

protected activity was causally connected to the employer’s adverse action.” . Okoli v. City of

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5

Baltimore, 648 Pad 216, 223 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619
(4th Cir. 1997)); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2001) (setting
the retaliation standard under the ADA); Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 914 A.2d 735 » 742 &
n.8 (Ma. 2007) (recognizing that Maryland courts look to federal law in analyzing the MFEPA).

~ Lewis’s claims for retaliation under Title VII, the MFEPA, and the ADA fail on the merits.
First, Lewis alleges in the Amended Complaint that she engaged in protected activity by “filing
complaints with the EEOC and raising concems with state officials regarding discriminatory hiring
practices.” Am. Compl. q 18. There is no serious dispute that Lewis’s July 11, 2025 EEOC

charge, in which Lewis alleged race and sex discrimination, and her July 13, 2025 complaint to

_ MDOT, in which she alleged race, sex, and disability discrimination, constituted protected activity.

As for a materially adverse action, Lewis asserts that Defendants retaliated against her by

_ “alter[ing] her eligibility determinations and continuing to deny her fair consideration.” Id. § 19.

Lewis’s claim that Defendants retaliated against her by altering her eligibility determinations does

not amount to a materially adverse action because the changes made after her protected activity

were favorable to her. Specifically, on October 24, 2025, the MTA informed Lewis that it was

changing the adverse determination about her qualifications to “meet[s] the minimum

qualifications” for the position. 10/24/2025 Email at 1. Lewis has cited no example of an agency

é

taking an action after she engaged in protected activity to change its evaluation of het qualifications
ina way that was unfavorable to her. Nevertheless, the MTA’s decision not to hire Lewis based
on. the determination that she was unqualified for a Procurement Officer II position, which was
communicated to Lewis on July 18, 2025, one week after she filed her EEOC charge, is fairly

construed as a materially adverse action.

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‘As for causation, this requirement “can be shown in two ways: ‘by showing that the
adverse act bears sufficient temporal proximity to the protected activity,’ or by showing ‘the
existence of facts that suggest that the adverse action occurred because of the protected activity,
or a combination of the two.” Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F.4th 201, 218-19 (4th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Smith v. CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 417 (4th Cir. 2021)). |

Despite the temporal proximity of this failure to hire to the protected activity, the Court
finds that the Amended Complaint does not support an inference that it was causally connected to
the protected activity. First, this action was fully consistent with the multiple determinations made
prior to the protected activity that Lewis lacked the qualifications for such a procurement position.
In fact, Lewis alleges that she was rejected from a position with the same title, Procurement Officer
II, at the same agency, the MTA, on June 16, 2025. Where the. materially adverse action was the
exact same decision made prior to the protected activity; it cannot fairly be viewed as having been
caused by the protected activity.

_ Second, this conclusion is bolstered by the fact that on October 24, 2025, the MTA
acknowledged an error in its initial screening process, concluded that Lewis was actually qualified
for that position, and updated her application to show that she met the qualifications for the
position. Such an action favorable to Lewis, which reversed the materially adverse action, is the
opposite of retaliation and significantly undermines any potential inference of causation. F inally,
Lewis has not alleged facts showing that, at the time of the July 18, 2025 determination, the MTA |
had even been informed of the discrimination complaints made to the EEOC and the state agency
that occurred within a week before its July 18, 2025 decision. See Dowe v. Total Action Against
Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998) (Since, by definition, an employer

cannot take action because of a factor of which it is unaware, the employer’s knowledge that the

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plaintiff engaged in a protected activity is absolutely necessary to establish the third element of
~ the prima facie case’’); Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 1 11, 124 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting
‘that the Fourth Circuit has “consistently required proof of ‘a decisionmaker’s knowledge of
protected activity to support a Title VII retaliation claim”) Miller v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 813 F.
App’x 869, 879 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that while the required showing of causation in relation to
a motion to dismiss may not always require a plaintiff to prove an employer’s knowledge, the
plaintiff must plead “some facts supporting a ‘reasonable inference’ of causation”. Notably,
Lewis’s complaint toa state agency on July 13, 2025 was sent to MDOT, not the MTA, and MDOT
did not acknowledge receipt of that complaint until July 25, 2025. |
. Under these circumstances, where the protected activity was not followed by any new form
of adverse action, and the one negative action was later reversed voluntarily, the Court finds that
Lewis has failed to state a plausible claim of retaliation.
CONCLUSION |

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants” Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED: A separate

Order shall be issued.

Date: October 13, 2026 (sl
a THEODORE D. CHUANG
United States District Judge

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