Barca et al v. Adib

8:25-cv-03480Mdd08.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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SALKA BARCA, et al., 	*
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Plaintiffs, 	*
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v. 	* 	Civil Case No.: SAG-25-03480
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MUSTAPHA ADIB, 	*
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Defendant. 	*
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Salka Barca and Najat Allili, who are self-represented, filed a Complaint against
Defendant Mustapha Adib. ECF 1. The Complaint, which is not a model of clarity, appears to raise
claims under two federal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Cyberstalking) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
(Civil RICO). ECF 1 at 4. Although Plaintiffs have yet to effect service on Defendant, they have
also filed an Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief. ECF 14. This Court has reviewed the motion
and has determined that no hearing is necessary. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2025). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ motion will be DENIED.1
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs, who are Maryland residents, are human rights
advocates. ECF 1 at 6. From July 2023 through the present, Defendant published “false and
damaging statements” about Plaintiffs on social media platforms, linked to their “human rights
work on Sahrawi issues.” Id. Defendant also used a “pro-Moroccan military online persona.” Id.
1 Also pending is a motion to seal an affidavit, ECF 15, which will be granted due to the nature of
the information contained therein.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Plaintiffs’ emergency request for injunctive relief does not specify the form sought. But
“[t]he standard for a temporary restraining order is the same as a preliminary injunction.” Maages
Auditorium v. Prince George’s County, 4 F. Supp. 3d 752, 760 n.1 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d, 681 F.
App’x 256 (4th Cir. 2017). A temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or a preliminary injunction is
warranted when the movant demonstrates that (1) the movant is likely to succeed on the merits,
(2) the movant will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the
balance of equities favors preliminary relief, and (4) injunctive relief is in the public interest.
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The movant must establish all four
elements in order to prevail. Accident, Inj. and Rehab., PC v. Azar, 943 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir.
2019); Frazier v. Prince George’s County, 86 F.4th 537, 544 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[A] preliminary
injunction can be granted only if every factor is met[,] [y]et denying a preliminary injunction only
takes the rejection of a single factor.”) (internal citations omitted).
Both types of injunctive relief afford ‘“an extraordinary and drastic remedy’ prior to trial.”
Ultimate Outdoor Movies, LLC v. FunFlicks, LLC, Civ. No. SAG-18-2315, 2019 WL 2642838, at
*6 (D. Md. June 27, 2019) (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)); see also
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating preliminary
injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remed[y] involving the exercise of very far-reaching power
[that is] to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.”) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v.
Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 816 (4th Cir. 1991)).
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III. 	ANALYSIS
This Court’s analysis proceeds no further than the first factor, because a party seeking
preliminary injunctive relief must establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their
case. “Although Plaintiffs ‘need not establish a “certainty of success,”’ they must ‘make a clear
showing that [they are] likely to succeed at trial.’” Roe v. Dep’t of Def., 947 F.3d 207, 219 (4th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (alteration in Roe)).
Here, Plaintiffs are not, because neither of their two federal claims is viable as pleaded.
First, Plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to the cyberstalking provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. That is a criminal statute, and it does not
provide a private right of action for civil litigants. Cain v. Christine Valmy Int’l Sch. of Esthetics,
Skin Care, & Makeup, 216 F. Supp. 3d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Case law is . . . unanimous that
no private right of action is available under § 2261A.”) (collecting cases).
Second, Plaintiffs assert a civil RICO claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Their
complaint, however, does not come close to meeting the elements of a RICO claim. As
background, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) law makes it unlawful,
inter alia, for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate
in the “enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In this
statute, Congress expressly “granted a private civil right of action to ‘[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of’ the RICO provisions.” ESAB Grp., Inc. v.
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
The standard for a civil RICO action is a high bar, because it “is a unique cause of action
that is concerned with eradicating organized, long-term, habitual criminal activity.” U.S. Airline
Pilots Ass’n v. Awappa, LLC, 615 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gamboa v. Velez, 457
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F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit “will not lightly permit ordinary
business contract or fraud disputes to be transformed into federal RICO claims.” Flip Mortg. Corp.
v. McElhone, 841 F.2d 531, 538 (4th Cir. 1988).
A civil RICO claim requires a plaintiff to allege four elements: “1) conduct [causing injury
to business or property] 2) of an enterprise 3) through a pattern 4) of racketeering activity.’” Morley
v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473
U.S. 479, 496 (1985)). As courts have noted, “Congress contemplated that only a party engaging
in widespread fraud would be subject to” the “serious consequences” available under the RICO
statute, such as treble damages. Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1989).
RICO “is not a cause of action to be pled lightly,” and “‘RICO treatment is reserved for conduct
‘whose scope and persistence pose a special threat to social well-being.”’” Biggs v. Eaglewood
Mortg., LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714 (D. Md. 2008), aff’d, 353 F. App’x 864 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting GE Inv. Priv. Placement Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 551 (4th Cir. 2001)).
While Plaintiffs have pleaded that they suffered financial injury, they have not pleaded any
of the other required elements of a RICO claim. RICO requires an “enterprise,” defined as “any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). As another judge
in this district has explained:
An “enterprise” requires proof of three elements: (1) an ongoing organization; (2) associates
functioning as a continuing unit; and (3) the enterprise is an entity “separate and apart from
the pattern of activity in which it engages.” Proctor v. Metro. Money Store Corp., 645 F.
Supp. 2d 464, 477–78 (D. Md. 2009). “[A]n associated-in-fact enterprise is one type of
enterprise defined in § 1961(4).” United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628, 631 n.2 (4th Cir.
1985). To satisfy § 1962(c)’s “distinctiveness” requirement, the Plaintiffs must further allege
that the RICO “enterprise” is distinct from the defendant “person” alleged to have violated
RICO. Levine v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 2d 442, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2010);
Toucheque v. Price Bros. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 341, 346–47 (D. Md. 1998).
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Mitchell Tracey v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 826, 842 (D. Md. 2013). Here,
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges actions by a single individual, with no enterprise alleged at all.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any racketeering activity whatsoever.
“[R]acketeering activity” is defined in § 1961(1) to include a lengthy list of “indictable” criminal
offenses. A “pattern of racketeering activity” requires “at least two acts of racketeering
activity . . . the last of which occurred within ten years . . . after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). To prove a pattern, a plaintiff is required to show that
the predicate acts “are [1] related[] and [2] that they amount to or pose a threat of continued
criminal activity.” H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged defamation and cyberstalking. Defamation, while tortious, is
not criminal conduct. Cyberstalking in violation of VAWA does not appear to be one of the
criminal acts enumerated in § 1961(1). Plaintiffs have therefore alleged no racketeering acts and
have fallen far short of alleging a pattern of racketeering activity.
Because Plaintiffs have not alleged an enterprise nor any racketeering activity, their civil
RICO claim is also deficient. They therefore cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits as
to either of the federal claims they assert.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, this Court
need not reach the remaining elements for injunctive relief. For the reasons set forth above,
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief, ECF 14, is DENIED. A separate Order
follows, denying the emergency motion, ECF 14, and granting Plaintiffs’ motion to seal, ECF 15.
Dated: December 8, 2025 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
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