Siguel v. King Farm Citizens Assembly, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
EDWARD SIGUEL, 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civ. No. DLB-25-3145
KING FARM CITIZENS 	*
ASSEMBLY, INC., et al.,
*
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Since 2019, Edward Siguel has been in an ongoing dispute with his homeowners’
association over the requirement that he install and maintain a balustrade (or decorative balcony)
on the front of his home. Siguel insists that requirement, among others, violates the law, and so he
filed suit against the association in 2022—a suit that remains pending in this district. In 2025,
Siguel—apparently frustrated with adverse rulings in the 2022 case—filed another lawsuit against
the homeowners’ association, asserting similar allegations regarding the balustrade requirement.
After this Court dismissed Siguel’s second-filed suit as duplicative of his first-filed suit, Siguel
asked the Court to vacate its dismissal order and reinstate the case. Siguel’s request is denied.
I. 	Background
A. Siguel’s 2022 Case
To understand why the Court dismissed Siguel’s second lawsuit as duplicative of his first,
a fulsome explanation of the allegations and procedural history of the first-filed suit is necessary.
1. 	Siguel’s allegations
On March 21, 2022, Siguel filed suit against the homeowners’ association, King Farm
Citizens Assembly, Inc. (“King Farm” or “KFCA”); trustees Susan Beckerman, Tracy L. Jackson,
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Christopher Leschack, Richard Ricciardi, and Matthew Roh; president and/or trustee Donald B.
Jackson; past trustee Nancy Paul; Bennett Frank McCarthy Architects, Inc. (“BFMA”), architect
Laurence Frank; architectural design trust member Karen Sicard; and King Farm’s general
manager Brandi Ruff. ECF 1, ¶¶ 10–13.1 On October 13, 2022, Siguel filed an amended complaint.
ECF 22. He added Martin Green, who had been president of King Farm, and King Farm’s attorney
Ursula Burgess as defendants. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
In a nutshell, Siguel alleged that his physical disability prevents him from complying with
King Farm’s onerous restrictions on the appearance of the exterior of his home and with the
association’s home maintenance requirements. Siguel further alleged that King Farm has denied
his request for relief from the requirements and a reasonable accommodation for his disability.
More specifically, Siguel alleged the following in his amended complaint.
Siguel has a disability that “causes physical pain, muscular weakness, bladder blood,
(which increases with movement), mental disruptions” and “involves key organs, including
kidney, bladder, prostate and Gastrointestinal tract.” Id. ¶ 39. He alleged the disability makes him
fatigue easily and interferes with “sleep, physical tasks, and supervis[ing] contractors,” and
treatment occupies “several hours” of each day. Id. ¶¶ 39–40; see id. ¶ 138. Siguel added that his
children’s special needs and disabilities, which require “highly complex health care and behavior
modifications,” also occupy his time. Id. ¶ 45.
Siguel explained that he chose to purchase his home in the King Farm community and to
make “substantial modifications [to his home], which cost over $200,000,” because there were
“explicit words [in the] [King Farm] Charter . . . to protect Owner from onerous maintenance.” Id.
1 In this discussion of the 2022 case, the ECF numbers are from Siguel v. King Farm Citizens
Assembly, Inc., et al., No. GLS-22-672 (D. Md.).
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¶ 36. As Siguel read the Charter, King Farm “assured [him] that they would comply with disability
anti-discrimination of public housing laws and would agree to reasonable modifications and
accommodations” and that “if he needed help with house maintenance, KFCA would help him
because that was the purpose of KFCA, explicitly stated in KFCA Charter.” Id.; see id. ¶¶ 125–
27.
Siguel claimed King Farm did not comply with his understanding of the King Farm
Charter. He alleged that King Farm “create[s] rules restricting the appearance, use and enjoyment
of [his] house,” and “mandates [he] spend time and labor to change his home appearance
(aesthetics) to benefit KFCA, or else be punished,” even though the “frequent, burdensome
maintenance, physical and mental labor, climb on roof, move up and down around four sides of 9
columns, frequently check caulk for water leaks . . . causes him harm, e.g., pain, bleeding,
muscular spasms” and “reduces use and enjoyment of his home.” Id. ¶¶ 1–2. Siguel asserted that
King Farm’s maintenance requirements are more onerous for him due to his and his children’s
disabilities and the location and size of his house. Id. ¶¶ 46, 50, 53, 104.
Siguel explained that King Farm “prohibits changes to the exterior of [his] house without
KFCA approval.” Id. ¶ 34. Siguel claimed he asked King Farm for a reasonable accommodation
for his disability or a modification to the Charter requirements, but King Farm “refuses [his]
requests for Reasonable Accommodations . . . or Modifications . . . or both.” Id. ¶ 2. Siguel
provided several examples: one concerning the balustrade, one concerning a brick patio, one
concerning a plant trellis, one concerning the placement of a shed on his porch, and one concerning
the placement of a shed behind his home.
Starting with the balustrade, Siguel stated that his front porch originally had a flat roof with
“architectural barriers, decorative columns and railings (‘fake balcony’, a.k.a. balustrade),” but the
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columns “caused water leaks [and] damaged the roof,” so he replaced the roof “but did not reinstall
[the balustrade] due to the damage it would cause again.” Id. ¶¶ 37, 103–07. King Farm insisted
he reinstall the balustrade. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. Siguel did not want to “have a fake balcony/balustrade . . .
on his roof” or, if he had to have a balustrade, he wanted to have King Farm “install and maintain
it.” Id. ¶ 2. As Siguel saw it, he was within his “rights [as] a disabled Owner to modify his house
exterior for full use and/or enjoyment [as] authorized by [the] Fair Housing Act.” Id. ¶ 1.
Turning to the other requested accommodations, Siguel alleged King Farm refused to allow
him to install a storage shed behind his house, “mov[e] a small horizontal shed onto his [front]
porch, build[] a small patio of brick over soil, necessary to walk over mud, have a plant Trellis,
and other modifications.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 34; see id. ¶¶ 239–48. Siguel explained that he wanted to make
these changes so that he could access his lawn and gardening tools more easily and with less pain
and so that he could walk across his yard safely, without slipping and falling. Id. ¶¶ 243, 246–49.
Siguel alleged King Farm inspected and photographed his property and charged him with
violations of the homeowners’ association Charter in 2018 and 2019. Id. ¶¶ 55–56. In 2019, Siguel
began asking King Farm to waive the exterior home requirements. Id. Siguel asserted that “[e]very
day KFCA may decide [he] violates KFCA appearance ‘standards’, send demand notices, schedule
hearings, start litigation for the same demands made in 2019, unless [he] provides substantial
physical and mental resources (e.g., time, labor, money) to satisfy KFCA arbitrary aesthetics.” Id.
¶ 178 (emphasis in pleading removed).
Siguel claimed that King Farm’s demands that he reinstall the columns on his porch room
were “inconsistent and not in accordance with” the community charter and bylaws. Id. ¶¶ 76, 94–
95. He insisted that King Farm’s “Founding Documents, either authorize or require that KFCA do
repairs or maintenance due to KFCA demands (e.g., install columns),” and failure to do so violates
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the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., “has adverse discriminatory effect, and
violates KFCA fiduciary duty” and the U.S. Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 77, 99. Siguel asked the Court to
order the defendants to comply with the FHA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. Id. ¶ 3. He sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief under
these statutes, federal regulations, “and other applicable federal and state laws.” Id. ¶ 18. His
amended complaint included four claims for violations of the FHA based on conduct relating to
the balustrade (Counts I–IV), additional claims for FHA violations based on conduct relating to
Siguel’s shed, patio, and trellis, and the defendants’ handling of the administrative process (Counts
V–VI), a claim that King Farm’s “rights to enforce exterior appearances are void” (Count VII), a
claim for discrimination (Count VIII), a claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodations
(Count IX), and a claim for “Violation of Forced Labor Laws” (Count X). Id. at 79–84.
2. 	Procedural history
On February 28, 2023, the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge for all
proceedings, and the 2022 case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Simms. ECF 68, 69. In
response to Siguel’s amended complaint, the defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the parties
briefed extensively. ECF 33, 34, 39, 43, 49, 50, 51, 63, 64, 67. On October 12, 2023, Judge Simms
granted the motions in part, dismissing all claims against Beckerman, Tracy Jackson, Leschack,
Ricciardi, Roh, Donald Jackson, Paul, Ruff, Green, and Burgess and almost all claims against King
Farm, BFMA, and Frank. ECF 85. Judge Simms dismissed the FHA claims related to the
balustrade because Siguel did not sufficiently plead that the accommodations he sought were
necessary, as the FHA requires, because they would not “‘directly ameliorate’ the effects of
[Siguel’s] disability.” ECF 84, at 24–25. The only count that survived the motions to dismiss was
Siguel’s claim in Count VI related to his request to install storage sheds on his front porch and in
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the back of his house. Id. BFMA, Frank, and Siguel moved for reconsideration. ECF 93, 94. On
July 3, 2024, Judge Simms denied the motions for reconsideration, ECF 119–22, and issued a
scheduling order. ECF 124.
On July 9, 2024, Siguel requested permission from the Court to file a motion for leave to
file a 65-page second amended complaint. ECF 126. Siguel insisted that he “ha[d] adequate facts
to amend [the] complaint to meet all elements of each claim.” Id. at 1. The defendants opposed his
request. ECF 128, 129, 130. Siguel filed a reply, styled as a motion for leave to amend. ECF 133.
Judge Simms directed Siguel to file a proposed second amended complaint not to exceed 40 pages.
ECF 134. On August 21, Siguel filed a 40-page proposed second amended complaint that did not
restate the allegations in the amended complaint but rather “incorporate[d]” the first amended
complaint, corrected some details, and augmented the factual allegations. ECF 137-1; see ECF
137, at 2 (cover ltr.). Siguel’s proposed second amended complaint removed the ADA claim and
the claim for involuntary labor, and it bolstered the facts in support of the other claims, including
the claim concerning the balustrade. Id. Among other allegations, Siguel stated that “Defendants
continue 	to 	threaten 	[him] 	with 	penalties 	and 	administrative 	procedures 	unless 	he
installs/maintains” a balustrade. ECF 137-1, ¶ 493; see id. ¶ 507 (“KFCA never withdrew its
demands and continues to retain an alleged right to enforce them at any time, which do not allow
[Siguel] to use and enjoy [his] house like [a] healthy owner.”); id. ¶ 527 (“Demands by KFCA,
adverse actions against [Siguel] about [the balustrade], are continuing, denials every day, with
periodic denials during meetings with manager, Trustees, President.”). The defendants opposed
the motion for leave to amend. ECF 140, 143, 150. Judge Simms held an on-the-record telephonic
hearing on September 26, 2024 and denied the motion for leave to amend. See ECF 155.
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On August 6, 2025, after the parties had engaged in discovery for several months, Siguel
asked Judge Simms to reconsider the October 12, 2023 dismissal of his claims relating to the
balustrade in light of a recent FHA ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC v. Gibson Island Corp., No. 23-2295 (4th Cir. July 15, 2025).
ECF 191. On November 25, Judge Simms notified the parties she would not rule on the motion
for reconsideration until after the parties participate in a settlement conference, which is scheduled
for March 9, 2026. ECF 209, 219.
On December 16, 2025, Siguel sought leave to file a motion to stay King Farm’s ongoing
demands that he install the balustrade. ECF 213. On December 19, King Farm filed its response.
ECF 216. On December 23, Judge Simms granted Siguel leave to file the motion, ECF 217, which
he did on January 8, 2026, ECF 218. In his motion, Siguel asserted that King Farm is asking the
State of Maryland to order him to comply with King Farm’s demand that he install the balustrade.
ECF 218, at 1. He reiterated his factual allegations regarding the balustrade and added that, in
October 2025, King Farm filed a “demand for enforcement” with the Montgomery County
Commission on Common Ownership Communities (“CCOC”), asking that Siguel be charged $500
each day that he does not reinstall the balustrade. ECF 218-1, at 6–7, 19.
Additionally, 	an 	exhibit 	attached 	to 	Siguel’s 	motion 	describes 	August 	2025
communications between Siguel and King Farm’s attorney, Burgess, in which Siguel asked King
Farm not to demand installation of a balustrade while his federal case was pending, and King Farm
refused. ECF 218-2, at 1–2. He asks Judge Simms to reinstate his claims regarding the balustrade
and to order King Farm to allow him to maintain his porch roof without a balustrade or, at the very
least, to enjoin King Farm from enforcing any CCOC order and from demanding that he install the
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balustrade while his federal case is pending. ECF 218, at 1–3; ECF 218-1, at 19. King Farm’s
response is due January 30. ECF 217.
B. Siguel’s 2025 Case
Meanwhile, on September 23, 2025—while his August 6, 2025 motion for reconsideration
of the order dismissing his claims regarding the balustrade was pending before Judge Simms—
Siguel filed this lawsuit against King Farm asserting similar allegations about the installation and
maintenance of a balustrade. In this suit, Siguel sued King Farm, its President Paul Scott (who has
replaced Green), and its Chairperson Susan Beckerman. ECF 1.2 In his cover letter, Siguel
admitted that his 2022 case still was pending in the District of Maryland, but he took the position
that the 2022 case “does not involve President Scott” and that the new complaint involved
“different events in 2024/2025 (long after the 2022 complaint was filed).” ECF 1-2, at 1–2. Siguel
noted that, in the 2022 case, Judge Simms had denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint
to reallege the claims regarding the balustrade that had been dismissed. Id. at 2.
Siguel set the same stage in his 2025 complaint as in his 2022 complaint: He has
disabilities—the same disabilities described in his 2022 complaint—that make activities painful
for him, cause him to bleed when he moves, and cause him to fatigue easily. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. He
purchased his home in King Farm in reliance on explicit language in the King Farm charter
“protecting Owner from onerous maintenance” and King Farm’s assurances that “if he needed help
with house maintenance, KFCA would help because that was the purpose of KFCA.” Id. ¶¶ 32–
33. He alleged that “KFCA rules and assurances were essential” and “a substantial factor in [his]
decision to pay for substantial house options (e.g., stronger floors, insulation, etc.)” because he
“had disabilities at [the] time of purchase that made it difficult or impractical to maintain exterior
2 ECF numbers now refer to the docket in DLB-25-3145 unless otherwise noted.
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appearances of his house.” Id. He claimed that, despite these assurances, King Farm is demanding
home maintenance that he is unable to perform. Id. ¶¶ 5, 105–09. These allegations are
substantively identical to the allegations in the 2022 case.
To be sure, Siguel’s 2025 case is narrower than the 2022 case. In this case, Siguel
complained only about King Farm’s demands for reinstallation and maintenance of the balustrade;
he did not complain about requirements related to the trellis, sheds, or patio. Siguel alleged that
when he “purchased his house, there was no document that required a balustrade. The builder told
him that he could remove it anytime.” Id. ¶ 135 n.13. He stated that he removed the balustrade in
2019 because it was damaging the roof to his porch and because it was difficult to maintain. Id.
¶¶ 77, 114. Again, Siguel described his porch and the balustrade and explained why he removed
the balustrade and why he has not replaced it. Id. ¶¶ 74–77, 127–28. He alleged, as he did in his
amended complaint in the 2022 case, that King Farm denied his request not to have a balustrade.
Id. ¶¶ 69–70. He also alleged that King Farm “demands that [he] now install, maintain forever, a
decorative balcony/balustrade on his roof porch,” and the “balustrade harms [his] use and
enjoyment of the house.” ECF 1, ¶ 5. Once again, Siguel insisted that King Farm “founding
documents describe and limit KFCA remedies, authority, to allow KFCA to correct alleged
aesthetic violations, but do not give the right to compel Owner to do it.” Id. ¶ 16. He asked the
Court to compel the defendants to comply with the FHA by either allowing him not to have a
balustrade or by installing and maintaining one for him. Id. ¶ 42.
In the 2025 case, Siguel alleged, for the first time, events from 2024 and 2025 related to
the balustrade. He stated that “[i]n 2024, KFCA demanded [he] install[] a decorative balustrade”
that is 40 feet long and heavy “or face penalties,” and King Farm rejected his request not to install
a balustrade. Id. ¶ 76. Siguel specifically alleged that, in September 2024, he “was coerced,
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required (by KFCA administrators/lawyer), to submit . . . a [design review application] with
alternative designs for a new balustrade.” Id. ¶ 92. He stated that King Farm relied on a Maryland
administrative agency decision to insist that Siguel file a new application. Id. ¶ 100. When he
submitted his application, Siguel “included a request not to have a balustrade,” which, in his view,
complied with the requirement that he include “any feasible method of reinstallation.” Id. ¶¶ 93,
100. His request was denied on the basis that the FHA did not apply. Id. ¶ 94. “Manager Ruff, her
supervisor President Scott, Architect Frank, ADT, [and the Trustees] . . . [i]nstead . . . approved
installation of a balustrade with burdensome technical modifications.” Id. ¶ 96. Siguel sought
reconsideration, and his request was “denied or ignored.” Id. ¶ 97. Siguel appealed to the Trustees,
and “[o]n July 30, 2025, the ‘Trustees’ denied [his] request” and King Farm “demanded
installation by Sept 15, 2025.” Id. ¶¶ 98–99. Siguel stated that, in 2025, King Farm “administrators
continued . . . to allege FHA does not apply.” Id. ¶ 103. On August 17, 2025, Siguel notified the
defendants that he believed their insistence that he install a balustrade was unlawful and contrary
to the King Farm charter, and he asked them to “stay adverse actions pending a decision in federal
court. Id. ¶¶ 120–21. On August 25, King Farm responded that his “deadline(s) for compliance
remain in place.” Id. ¶ 121. On September 16, Siguel asked King Farm to state what the penalties
would be for noncompliance, but King Farm did not answer the question. Id. ¶ 124.
Siguel alleged that the defendants’ “unlawful rejections of [his] FHA requests were a series
of separate acts, repeated frequently, occurred separately every day.” Id. ¶¶ 182–85. He claimed
that the defendants violated the FHA and the King Farm charter and forced him to provide
“involuntary labor to KFCA.” Id. ¶¶ 143–44, 166. He claimed the defendants refused the
reasonable modification he proposed (not to install a balustrade) in violation of the FHA (Counts
I & II), intentionally discriminated against him by rejecting his request not to install a balustrade
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in violation of the FHA (Count III), and caused him to experience adverse discriminatory effects
in violation of the FHA (Count IV). Id. ¶¶ 198–208. Siguel asked the Court to declare that “KFCA
has no valid, legitimate community architect”; that “KFCA rights to enforce exterior appearances
are void” because “they vested elsewhere when KFCA was forfeited and did not revive
automatically”; and that “KFCA is not lawfully revived” (Counts V–VII). Id. ¶¶ 209–19. He also
claimed breach of contract. Id. ¶¶ 221–22.
When Siguel filed his complaint, he also filed a motion for an injunction. ECF 4. He asked
the Court to permanently enjoin King Farm from ordering him to install and maintain the
balustrade or at least enter a preliminary injunction to “stay adverse actions of KFCA against
Plaintiff pending resolution of this case.” Id. at 4.
On November 5, 2025, this Court dismissed, sua sponte, Siguel’s complaint without
prejudice. ECF 7. The Court found that, although the 2025 complaint included new causes of action
such as breach of contract, the factual allegations and the alleged wrongs by King Farm and its
representatives were the same as in the 2022 complaint. ECF 7, at 2. Citing general principles
about the need to avoid duplicative litigation and the imperative to present “claims arising out of
a single wrong . . . in one action,” the Court dismissed this lawsuit as duplicative of the pending
lawsuit. Id. at 2 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976); and then quoting Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d
621, 626 (D. Md. 2006) (quoting Myers v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1224
(D. Kan. 2000)), aff’d, 273 F. App’x 256 (4th Cir. 2008)). Dismissal of the case mooted the request
for injunctive relief.
Undeterred, Siguel filed a motion to vacate the dismissal order and to reinstate his
complaint. ECF 8; see ECF 9 (correction of error). The defendants opposed the motion, ECF 10,
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and Siguel filed a reply, ECF 11. Siguel then filed an interlocutory appeal of the dismissal order
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. ECF 12. The Fourth Circuit notified this Court
that it will not consider the appeal until this Court addresses the motion to vacate. ECF 14, 20.
II. 	Motion for Reconsideration
Siguel’s motion, styled as a motion to vacate, is construed as a motion for reconsideration
of the order of dismissal. When, as here, a party files a motion for reconsideration of an order
within 28 days of the order, the Court considers the motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Katyle v. Penn. Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470 n.4 (4th Cir. 2011).
“Reconsideration is an ‘extraordinary remedy,’ to be used ‘sparingly,’ available on only three
grounds: 1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) previously unavailable evidence; or 3) to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” JTH Tax, Inc. v. Aime, 984 F.3d 284,
290 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pac. Ins. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998)).
Siguel does not seek reconsideration of the dismissal order because there has been an
intervening change in the law or because previously unavailable evidence is now available.
Instead, Siguel insists the Court should reconsider its dismissal order because the order is “based
on errors of facts and law” and “is unjust.” ECF 8-1, at 3, 10. As Siguel sees it, this case should
not have been dismissed because the 2022 and 2025 “cases are only partially overlapping” and
because “the 2025 Complaint involves events and claims that did not exist in 2022 and thus could
not have been brought” when the 2022 case was filed. Id. at 2. Siguel insists that “the Court could
coordinate both complaints, simplify discovery, [and] ensure a quick resolution of all claims on
the merits.” Id. At the same time, Siguel believes “[t]he 2022 and 2025 complaints can and should
be resolved independently.” Id. at 2–3. Siguel states that if the Court “decid[es] soon on the
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injunction” and decides in his favor, “Defendants should be willing to settle and drop other
claims.” Id. at 2.
Siguel has not established the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.
As Siguel concedes, and as the exposition of his 2022 and 2025 complaints shows, these
cases concern the same alleged wrongs. Siguel’s grievances in both cases center on the deed
restrictions imposed and enforced by King Farm, Siguel’s difficulties complying with the
restrictions due to his disability, Siguel’s belief that King Farm would accommodate his disability
and either help him comply with or modify the restrictions, and the ensuing conflicts between the
parties. Compare ECF 22, ¶¶ 1–3, 36–40, 55–56, 76–77, 94–95, 103–07, 125–27, 138, in GLS-
22-672, with ECF 1, ¶¶ 5, 32–33, 35–36, 74–77, 105–09, 114, 127–28, in DLB-25-3145. In the
2022 case, Siguel discussed several disagreements he has had with King Farm and its trustees,
president, 	and 	architect 	regarding 	what 	requirements 	King 	Farm 	can 	enforce 	and 	what
modifications he should be allowed. ECF 22, ¶¶ 1–3, 34, 55–56, 239–49, in GLS-22-672. The
conflicts included whether he may have a brick patio on the soil in his backyard, a plant trellis, a
shed on his porch, and a shed behind his house, and whether he must reinstall and maintain a
balustrade on the roof of his porch. Id. ¶¶ 1–3, 34, 37, 103–07, 239–48. The allegations and claims
in the 2025 case only concern the balustrade. E.g., ECF 1, ¶¶ 5, 69–70, 74–77, 114, 127–28, 135
n.13, 198–208, in DLB-25-3145.
It is true, as Siguel points out, that his allegations in the amended complaint in the 2022
case end in October 2022, when Siguel filed the pleading, whereas the allegations in the 2025
complaint concern events that occurred in 2024 and 2025, when King Farm made new demands
that Siguel install and maintain a balustrade and Siguel refused to comply. E.g., id. ¶¶ 76, 92–100,
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103, 120–24. In his motion to vacate the dismissal order, Siguel explains the timeline. In 2021,
after King Farm “filed a complaint with . . . CCOC,” CCOC “ordered Plaintiff to submit a new
Design Review Application (DRA) to install a different balustrade (a decorative, aesthetic, fake
balcony composed of columns/ posts and railings) to prevent leaks,” Siguel “appealed the CCOC
decision in the Maryland state courts,” and while the appeal was pending, King Farm stayed
enforcement of the CCOC order. ECF 8-1, at 6–7, ¶¶ 3–4. While that appeal was pending, Siguel
filed his 2022 case, “alleging FHA discrimination, including the failure to accommodate his
request not to reinstall the [balustrade] as it was.” Id. at 7, ¶ 5. In 2024, the state court affirmed the
CCOC order, and in November 2024, King Farm “directed Plaintiff to submit a new DRA to install
a new balustrade and prevent leaks.” Id. ¶ 6. Siguel proposed that either, pursuant to the FHA, he
be allowed “not to install any balustrade” or that he be allowed to use “a different balustrade design
that would reduce leaks.” Id. King Farm denied his request not to install a balustrade. Id. And so,
Siguel explains, his 2025 case is based on King Farm’s 2025 denial of his request not to install a
balustrade. Id. ¶ 8.
Whatever modest differences there may be between the balustrade-related allegations in
Siguel’s two lawsuits, it is abundantly clear that Siguel challenges the legality of the same conduct
in both cases: King Farm’s insistence that he install and maintain a balustrade. This dispute
between homeowner and homeowners’ association over the installation of a balustrade began in
2019 and continues to this day. See ECF 22, ¶¶ 55–56, 178 in GLS-22-672 (King Farm charged
Siguel with alleged violations in 2018 and 2019 and “[e]very day KFCA may decide [he] violates
KFCA appearance ‘standards’, send demand notices, schedule hearings, start litigation for the
same demands made in 2019” (emphasis removed)); ECF 1, ¶¶ 69–70, 76, 92–100, 103, 120–24
in DLB-25-3145 (King Farm demanded a balustrade beginning in 2019 and then, in 2024 and
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2025, threatened “penalties” if Siguel did not propose and install a balustrade). The allegations in
this case are a continuation of the allegations in the 2022 case. Because the balustrade-related
claims in both lawsuits “aris[e] out of a single wrong,” they must “be presented in one action.”
Sensormatic, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (quoting Myers, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1224). And that action is
the ongoing 2022 case.3
If Siguel wants to pursue claims against King Farm, its trustees, its officers, and its counsel
related to the more recent developments in this ongoing conflict about the balustrade, he must seek
leave to do so in the 2022 case. Siguel has, to some extent, begun this process by filing a motion
for reconsideration of the October 2023 order dismissing his balustrade-related claims in the 2022
case. He also may seek reconsideration of the September 2024 order denying him leave to amend
in the 2022 case or file a new motion for leave to supplement to introduce the more recent
allegations and to add the current president as a defendant. See ECF 8-1, at 14 (Siguel recognizing
he could “[t]ry[] to amend the 2022 complaint”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (standard for supplementing
the pleadings); Hodges v. Meletis, 109 F.4th 252, 263 (4th Cir. 2024) (discussing leave to
supplement under Rule 15(d)). To be clear: This Court is not opining on whether such motions
3 Siguel argues the cases the Court cited in its dismissal order support his position that his 2025
complaint was properly filed because he could not have asserted the allegations from 2024 and
2025 when he filed the 2022 case. ECF 8, at 2; ECF 8-1, at 3–4. Siguel misreads the law. The
Fourth Circuit and the District of Maryland’s Sensormatic opinions undercut, rather than support,
Siguel’s position. See Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 273 F. App’x 256, 264–
65 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of claim filed as second lawsuit because plaintiff filed
second lawsuit after court denied leave to amend first lawsuit to add the same claim and “[i]n a
claim splitting case, the second suit will be barred if the claim involves the same parties and ‘arises
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the first claim’” (quoting Trustmark Insur.
Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1269–70 (11th Cir. 2002))); Sensormatic, 452 F. Supp. 2d at
626–27 (dismissing lawsuit under the doctrine of claim splitting because, “[l]ike res judicata, claim
splitting ‘prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal, and requires that all claims
arising out of a single wrong be presented in one action’” (quoting Myers, 102 F. Supp. 2d at
1224)).
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would be meritorious. If Siguel’s motions are denied, he may appeal the adverse rulings to the
Fourth Circuit. But Siguel may not attempt to circumvent adverse rulings in his first-filed suit or
to obtain a faster resolution of his claims by filing another suit and claiming the second suit is
based on different allegations that could not have been alleged in the first suit.
The Court did not commit a clear of error of law when it dismissed Siguel’s complaint
without prejudice. Nor did its order cause manifest injustice due to a misunderstanding of the facts.
The motion to vacate the dismissal order is denied.
III. 	Motion for Leave to Amend
Alternatively, Siguel seeks leave to amend his complaint. He wants “to incorporate new
facts about KFCA requests to county agency, and prohibition against local government
interference with FHA, 42 USC §3615.” ECF 8, at 3. He predicts that the CCOC will file for
enforcement in state court, after which he will remove the case to federal court “for FHA
violations.” ECF 8-1, at 9. He predicts that the removal “would leave the federal court with 2
separate complaints and multiple proceedings to decide where to attach the 2025 Complaint,
procedures that could take years and require multiple paths due to uncertainty of appeals, etc.” Id.
Siguel suggests that if he is granted leave “to amend his 2025 complaint and incorporate 2025
decisions of KFCA and CCOC,” that “may prevent the need to remove (because CCOC should
not review FHA claims pending in federal court, §3615).” Id.
“[A] district court may not grant a post-judgment motion to amend the complaint unless
the court first vacates its judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b).” Katyle, 637 F.3d at
470 (citing Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). When, as here, a party
seeks both to vacate a judgment under Rule 59(e) and to amend its pleading, “the broad standard
for allowing a court to grant the motion allows the court simply to turn to the standard applicable
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to the motion to amend.” Daulatzai v. Maryland, 97 F.4th 166, 178–79 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing
Laber, 438 F.3d at 427–28). Under Rule 15(a), a court should grant a motion to amend if there is
no prejudice, bad faith, or futility. Id. at 177; Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Siguel does not meet the Rule 15(a) standard. If he were granted leave to amend along the
lines that he proposes in his motion to vacate, the amendment would be futile because his proposed
allegations concern King Farm’s insistence that he install and maintain a balustrade and those
allegations must be raised in the ongoing 2022 case against King Farm. Any amended complaint
in this case would be subject to dismissal on the same grounds the original complaint was
dismissed. Siguel’s request for leave to amend is denied as futile.
IV. 	Conclusion
Siguel’s motion to vacate the dismissal order, ECF 8, is denied. Siguel’s motion for leave
to amend, ECF 8, is denied. A separate order shall follow.
_______________________ 	____________________________
Date 	Deborah L. Boardman
United States District Judge
January 21, 2026
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