Ramos v. Digital Prosthodontics, LLC et al

8:25-cv-02052Mdd08.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JOSE RAMOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DIGITAL PROSTHODONTICS,
LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 8:25-2052-CDA
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CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING
JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE FLSA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the joint motion to approve the settlement
agreement in this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) action filed by Plaintiff Jose Ramos
against Defendants Digital Prosthodontics, LLC, Amir Juzbasic, and Igor Kachanovskiy
(collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF 17.) The parties also seek a forty-five day stay to permit
completion of obligations created by their agreement. For the reasons explained below,
the Court will GRANT both motions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual and procedural background
This case arises from allegations that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff overtime
pay. See Compl., ECF 1, at ¶¶ 10-16. Plaintiff, a dental laboratory technician, has worked
for Defendants since May 2023. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff maintains that despite his working
between 50 and 54 hours per week, Defendants failed to maintain time records or
compensate his overtime. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16. Plaintiff filed this action on June 27, 2025,
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asserting claims under the FLSA and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, Md. Code Ann.,
Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-413, 3-420. See Compl. at ¶¶ 17-32. Before the deadline for
Defendants’ responsive pleading, the parties filed the pending Joint Motion for
Settlement Approval. ECF 17.
B. The proposed settlement agreement
The parties’ Joint Motion to Approve FLSA Settlement Agreement includes a copy
of the Settlement Agreement and records of Plaintiff’s counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs.
See ECFs 17, 17-1, 17-2. The settlement agreement reflects the parties’ desire to resolve
the lawsuit to avoid “the additional cost and expense” of further litigation. ECF 17-1, at 1.
The agreement is the fruit of two months of negotiations. ECF 17, at 2. In exchange for
Defendants’ payment of $26,500.00, Plaintiff agrees to a full release of “all claims
that were or could have been brought by Ramos” from the “beginning of time to” the
date of the agreement, whether such claims were “asserted or unasserted” against the
Defendant. ECF 17-1, at 1, 3, 4. However, the release excludes (1) “claims that cannot
be released by law” and (2) “any rights or claims that may arise after the execution date of
this Agreement and prior to Ramos’s Resignation Date” (which is set forth elsewhere).
Id. at ¶ 8.c.
The parties agreed to allocate $6,600 of the settlement amount to Ramos’ wages
and liquidated damages, $6,900 to Ramos’ severance pay, and $13,000 to plaintiff’s
counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at ¶ 2.
The Joint Motion includes Plaintiff’s counsel’s time entries, which show that
eight individuals expended 42.8 hours. See ECF 17-2, at 1-7. After some reductions,
counsel billed Plaintiff for 37 hours for a total charge of $15, 618.50. Id. at 7.
Counsel also incurred $899.75 in costs such as filing and service. Id. The total bill
to plaintiff is $16,518.25. Id. Based on the Settlement Agreement’s earmarking
of $13,000 for
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attorneys’ fees and costs, the parties agree to attribute $12,100.75 to fees and $899.75 to
costs. ECF 17 at 9.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The FLSA “protect[s] workers from the poor wages and long hours that can result
from significant inequalities in bargaining power between employers and employees.”
Duprey v. Scotts Co. LLC, 30 F. Supp. 3d 404, 407 (D. Md. 2014). As a result, “except in
two narrow circumstances,” Beam v. Dillon’s Bus Serv., Inc., No. DKC-14-3838, 2015 WL
4065036, at *2 (D. Md. July 1, 2015), “the statute’s provisions are mandatory and
generally not subject to bargaining, waiver, or modification by contract or settlement[,]”
Hackett v. ADF Rests. Invs., 259 F. Supp. 3d 360, 364 (D. Md. 2016). One narrow
circumstance exists when the court “approve[s] a settlement between an employer and an
employee who has brought a private action for unpaid wages pursuant to [29 U.S.C. §
216(b).]” Beam, 2015 WL 4065036, at *2. Courts will approve the settlement as long as
it “reflects a reasonable compromise of disputed issues” and is not “a mere waiver of
statutory rights brought about by an employer’s overreaching.” Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d
at 407 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This standard is met when the
settlement “reflect[s] a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA
provisions[.]” Id. at 408 (quoting Saman v. LBDP, Inc., No. DKC-12-1083, 2013 WL
2949047, at *3 (D. Md. June 13, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Courts in the Fourth Circuit generally employ a three-step process in deciding
whether a settlement reflects a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over
FLSA provisions. First, the court must determine “whether there are FLSA issues actually
in dispute[.]” Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 408. Second, the court must consider “the
fairness and reasonableness of the settlement in light of the relevant factors from [Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 23.]” Id. Third, the court must contemplate “the reasonableness
of the attorneys’ fees, if included in the agreement.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Joint Motion to Approve FLSA
Settlement Agreement. The Court also GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to retain jurisdiction
for the purpose of enforcing the Settlement Agreement.1
A. There is a bona fide dispute regarding FLSA provisions.
“In deciding whether a bona fide dispute exists as to a defendant’s liability under
the FLSA, the court examines the pleadings in the case, as well as [] the representations
and recitals in the proposed settlement agreement.” Hackett, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 365. A
bona fide dispute exists “when an employee makes a claim that he or she is entitled to
overtime payment.” Lomascolo v. Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc., No. 08-1310, 2009 WL
3094955, at *16 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2009); see, e.g., Prudencio v. Triple R. Constr. Corp.,
No. 22-1202-BAH, 2024 WL 1557205, at *3-4 (D. Md. Apr. 10, 2024) (finding a bona fide
dispute where the parties disagreed over whether the employer failed to pay the employee
overtime wages); Mendoza v. Filo Café, LLC, No. 23-2703-AAQ, 2024 WL 964226, at *2
(D. Md. Mar. 5, 2024) (finding a bona fide dispute where the parties disagreed over
whether the employee worked overtime hours and whether the employer failed to pay the
employee overtime wages).
1 Retention of jurisdiction is a common practice in this District in FLSA cases resolved by
settlement agreement. See, e.g., Berman v. Mid-Atlantic Eateries, Inc., No. ABA-23-
2840, 2024 WL 3597191, at *5 (D. Md. July 31, 2024); Flores v. Diverse Masonry Corp.,
No. 23-3215-LKG, 2024 WL 2863575, at *7 (D. Md. June 6, 2024); Santos v. E&R Servs.,
Inc., No. ABA-20-2737, 2024 WL 1416564, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2024); Smith v. David’s
Loft Clinical Programs, Inc., No. 21-3241-LKG, 2022 WL 16553228, at *8 (D. Md. Oct.
31, 2022).
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In this case, the parties disagree regarding whether Plaintiff was an employee
exempt from overtime provisions and whether, like in Mendoza, Plaintiff worked
overtime. ECF 17 at 2, 4-5. These disagreements represent a bona fide dispute.
B. The settlement is fair and reasonable.
Courts evaluate the fairness and reasonableness of a settlement by considering the
following factors:
(1) the extent of discovery that has taken place; (2) the stage of the
proceedings, including the complexity, expense and likely duration of the
litigation; (3) the absence of fraud or collusion in the settlement; (4) the
experience of counsel who have represented the plaintiffs; (5) the opinions
of counsel[;] and (6) the probability of plaintiffs’ success on the merits and
the amount of the settlement in relation to the potential recovery.
Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 409 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Parties
may settle an FLSA case at an early stage provided that a plaintiff has had sufficient
opportunity to evaluate the viability of [their] claims and the potential range of recovery.”
Hackett, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 366.
Litigants may satisfy this standard by, among other things, exchanging records and
engaging in extensive settlement negotiations for the purpose of avoiding the significant
expense of future litigation. See, e.g., Li v. Escape Nails & Spa, LLC, No. DKC-23-1487,
2025 WL 460752, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2025) (finding a settlement fair and reasonable
where the parties “participated in ‘extensive negotiations,’” had a “sufficient opportunity
to obtain additional evidence through informal discovery,” and agreed to settle for the
purpose of avoiding “a lengthy and costly litigation process”); Barnes v. Marriott Int’l,
Inc., No. 20-3205-PX, 2021 WL 3112453, at *2 (D. Md. July 22, 2021) (finding a
settlement fair and reasonable where the parties exchanged pay records and negotiated
for weeks for the purpose of avoiding future litigation costs); Villarroel v. Sri Siva Vishnu
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Temple, No. GJH-I-T-2617, 2014 WL 7460967, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 31, 2014) (finding
settlement fair and reasonable where the parties exchanged pay records and held
“significant negotiations” for the purpose of avoiding the “significant expenses”
associated with “formal discovery, dispositive motions, and possibly trial”). A “sufficient
exchange of relevant information” enables the parties to make knowing and informed
decisions supporting a fair and reasonable settlement. Wade v. CBH Health, LLC, No.
PX-20-3573, 2021 WL 8269082, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2021); see also Mendoza, 2024
WL 964226, at *2 (assessing whether “sufficient information” allowed the parties “to
make informed, intelligent decisions”); Hackett, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 366 (“[T]hough no
formal discovery took place, . . . the informal exchange of information between [the]
parties has allowed them to appropriately ascertain facts and evaluate the strength of their
respective positions[.]”).
Courts scrutinize releases of claims, which are hallmarks of non-FLSA settlement
agreements. “[A] general release of claims beyond those specified in the Complaint . . .
can render the [FLSA settlement] unreasonable.” Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 410.
However, courts are “not required to evaluate the reasonableness of the settlement as it
relates to non-[FLSA] claims if the employee is compensated reasonably for the release
executed.” Villarroel, 2014 WL 7460967, at *3 (citing Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 410). A
settlement amount representing 85% of a plaintiff’s estimated recovery may be “a
reasonable compromise” that accounts for “the risks and costs associated with proceeding
further and [the opposing party’s] potentially viable defenses.” Saman, 2013 WL
2949047, at *5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Corea v. SLDB, LLC,
No. 18-1120-PX, 2018 WL 4829147, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2018) (finding 85% of estimated
recovery to be fair and reasonable); Beam, 2015 WL 4065036, at *4 (63%, 59%, and 74%
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of recoveries were fair and reasonable); Villaroel, 2014 WL 7460967, at *2 (75% of
estimated recovery); Saman, 2013 WL 2949047, at *5 (84.4% of estimated recovery).
Courts look more favorably on releases that do not broadly discharge parties from any
and all liability. See Llamas Lopez v. Amerigal Constr. Co., Inc., No. PJM-15-520, 2015
WL 2127342, at *3 (D. Md. May 4, 2015) (finding a release fair and reasonable where the
provision did not “broadly releas[e the employer] from all liability” but instead pertained
“only to wage-related claims that arose prior to the settlement agreement”).
Considering these principles and the Court’s rulings in similar circumstances, the
Court finds the settlement terms fair and reasonable. As in Li, Barnes, Villarroel, and
Saman, the parties exchanged pay records and participated in negotiations for “several
weeks”—a process that avoiding the significant expense attendant to depositions, formal
written discovery, and further litigation. ECF 17, at 2, 5-6. The parties also represent that
the records have allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to estimate his potential recovery. Id. at 5.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the parties possessed sufficient information to make
informed, intelligent decisions and a sufficient opportunity to evaluate the viability of the
claims, potential defenses, and the potential range of recovery. Furthermore, the
settlement provides Plaintiff 100% of what his counsel estimates he could receive at trial.
Considering that courts have found terms reasonable when a plaintiff receives 85% of
their potential recovery, an agreement that provides the best outcome will be approved.
The Settlement Agreement contains a general release, which draws scrutiny.
However, the settlement amount reflects reasonable compensation for the release of
Plaintiff’s FLSA claim. As a result, the Court need not inquire into the reasonableness of
the Settlement Agreement as it relates to non-FLSA claims. Villarroel, 2014 WL 7460967,
at *3. Even so, the Court notes that the release does not broadly absolve defendants from
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any and all liability; it preserves rights that cannot be released by law or that arose after
the settlement date.
Other factors support the Court’s conclusion on fairness and reasonableness. First,
Plaintiff’s counsel have significant experience litigating FLSA claims. See, e.g., Sutton v.
Capital City Motorsports LLC, No. 24-1665-AAQ, 2025 WL 385773, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 4,
2025); Menendez v. William III, Inc., No. 24-261-AAQ, 2024 WL 5126733, at *4 (D. Md.
Dec. 17, 2024); Hernandez v. Nelson Precast Prods., LLC, No. 21-2814-LKG, 2023 WL
7089919, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 26, 2023). Second, counsel for both parties represent that
the settlement is in the best interests of their clients. See Menendez, 2024 WL 5126733,
at *4 (“Counsel’s opinion that the expense and potential duration of litigation weighs in
favor of early settlement lends credence to a proposed settlement agreement.”). Third,
there is no evidence of fraud or collusion. See Lomascolo, 2009 WL 3094955, at *12
(“There is a presumption that no fraud or collusion occurred between counsel, in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary.”). Finally, the settlement “does not contain
provisions requiring its terms to be kept confidential nor has any request been made to
seal.” Hackett, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 364; see also Escalante v. Tobar Constr., Inc., No. 18-
0980-GLS, 2019 WL 13177822, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 1, 2019) (“A confidentiality clause in
an FLSA settlement agreement is ‘not permitted without compelling reasons.’” (quoting
Salamone v. Balt. Diamond Exch., Inc., No. JKB-14-1507, 2014 WL 2930788, at *1 (D.
Md. June 27, 2014))); Carpenter v. Colonial Mgmt. Grp., LP, No. JKB-12-686, 2012 WL
2992490, at *2 (D. Md. July 19, 2012) (“[A] court should not allow a[n] FLSA settlement
agreement to be filed under seal except in the very limited circumstance where parties
can make a substantial showing that their need to seal the agreement outweighs the strong
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presumption of public access that attaches to such judicial documents.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
C. Based on the consent of the parties and the circumstances of the case, the
attorneys’ fees and costs award is reasonable.
Prevailing parties are entitled to attorneys’ fees under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b). Attorneys’ fees may be determined by a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Flores,
2024 WL 2863575, at *5; Prudencio, 2024 WL 1557205, at *5; Hernandez, 2023 WL
7089919, at *6; Barnes, 2021 WL 3112453, at *3. Importantly, a “prevailing party is
entitled to attorneys’ fees in addition to damages.” Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 411
(emphasis in original). In other words, attorneys’ fees “should be negotiated separately
from” damages, such that “the wronged employee should receive his full wages plus the
liquidated damages penalty without incurring any expense for legal fees or costs.”
Hackett, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 367 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A court must conduct an independent assessment of a separately negotiated
attorneys’ fee to ensure reasonableness. Id. To facilitate this assessment, fee requests
must be accompanied by details including “‘the services performed, by whom they were
performed, the time expended thereon, and the hourly rate charged.’” Matias Guerra v.
Teixeira, No. TDC-16-0618, 2019 WL 3927323, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 20, 2019) (quoting Bel
Air Plaza Ltd. P’ship v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., No. CCB-14-2533, 2016 WL 3440191, at
*1 (D. Md. June 23, 2016)). Courts employ the traditional lodestar method in evaluating
the reasonableness of a fee. Hackett, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 367 (citing Lyle v. Food Lion,
Inc., 954 F.2d 9984, 988 (4th Cir. 1992)). Under this method, courts must determine the
lodestar amount by multiplying the hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly
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rate. Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2008). In determining the
lodestar amount, courts consider twelve factors, including:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services
rendered; (4) the attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant
litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations
at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client
or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the
undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit
arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between
attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.
Id. at 321. Moreover, a fee is reasonable where it comports with the prevailing rates
charged by lawyers of “reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation” for
similar services. Duprey, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 412 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). While the fee tables in the Local Rules do not create any presumptions
regarding what may be reasonable, the Court may consider them when determining what
is reasonable in a given case. See De Paredes v. Zen Nails Studio LLC, 134 F.4th 750, 753-
54 (4th Cir. 2025).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s counsel provides sufficient, detailed records for the
Court to assess the reasonableness of their fees. See ECF 17-2. Counsel provided their
billing rates as follows: Omar Vincent Melehy ($695.00); Suvita Melehy ($645.00);
Andrew Balashov ($465.00); and Paralegals and Law Clerks ($245.00). ECF 17, at 9.
While the Joint Motion does not set forth in detail the attorneys’ experience, the Court
draws on recent decisions noting the following: Mr. Omar Vincent Melehy has 37 years of
experience, Ms. Suvita Melehy has 28 years of experience, and Mr. Andrew Balashov has
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8 years of experience.2 Acker v. Craig Testing Labs. of Md., No. AAQ-24-1945, 2025 WL
254800, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 2025). In total, eight individuals representing Plaintiff
spent 42.8 hours on this case. ECF 17-2, at 7. After a 5.8-hour reduction, counsel billed
Plaintiff for 37 hours for a total of $15,618.50. Adding in $899.75 in costs, the total before
settlement reached $16,518.25. As part of the settlement, counsel agreed to accept
$3,518.25 less than their proposed lodestar figure.
With respect to the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees, the Court observes that
Plaintiff’s counsel frequently appear before this Court in FLSA matters and have
significant experience in this area. See, e.g., Acker, 2025 WL 254800, at *3. In their other
cases, counsel have asserted hourly rates close to those outlined in the Joint Motion.3
Those rates have been approved, at least in part, due to joint motions like the one before
the Court. A FLSA settlement agreement “warrants higher rates due to the consent of the
parties.” Guzman, 2025 WL 756645, at *4. On that basis, the Court has found Plaintiff’s
counsel’s rates reasonable in FLSA cases where the parties agreed to attorneys’ fees by a
2 This recitation of facts from an unrelated opinion should not be interpreted as approval
of or justification for an attorney excluding information about experience in their fee
requests. Nor should it be taken as indicative that such facts would be appropriate for
judicial notice. Instead, the Court notes these facts identified in other opinions from this
District for the sake of efficiency rather than deny a joint motion that will be granted based
on consent regarding fees and reasonableness and fairness on other matters, as explained
herein.
3 In each case, the Court recognized these rates as higher than those in the Local Rules fee
matrix. See Guzman v. KP Stoneymill, Inc., No. 20-2410-PX, 2025 WL 756645, at *3 (D.
Md. Mar. 11, 2025); Camara v. Black Diamond Rest. LLC, No. 23-1782-AAQ, 2024 WL
4644635, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2024); Ramnarine v. Rainbow Child Dev. Ctr., Inc., No.
PWG-17-2261, 2022 WL 16709764, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 4, 2022); Sutton, 2025 WL 385773,
at *4; Acker, 2025 WL 254800, at *4; Zuniga, 2025 WL 241000, at *5; Menendez, 2024
WL 5126733, at *6; Flores, 2024 WL 2863575, at *6; Hernandez, 2023 WL 7089919, at
*7. As noted above, the fee tables do not establish what is presumptively reasonable.
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settlement agreement. See Sutton, 2025 WL 385773, at *4, Acker, 2025 WL 254800, at
*4; Zuniga, 2025 WL 241000, at *5; Menendez, 2024 WL 5126733, at *6; cf. Guzman,
2025 WL 756645, at *4 (examining and reducing rates where defendants—who defaulted
while the case was in discovery—did not respond to plaintiff’s fee motion); Camara, 2024
WL 4644635, at *4 (reducing fee rates where parties reached agreement on wages but not
on attorneys’ fees). Like in Sutton, Acker, Zuniga, and Menendez, Defendants’ consent—
made with the assistance of counsel—favor a finding of reasonableness.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Joint Motion to Approve FLSA
Settlement Agreement and Plaintiff’s Motion for the Court to Retain Jurisdiction. A
separate Order shall issue.
Date: December 8, 2025
/s/
Charles D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge
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