Wilcher v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.

8:25-cv-01649Mdd29.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(Southern Division)
GAVIN WILCHER, beneficiary of
YAWAWAH
Plaintiff,
v.
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.,
Defendant.
Case No. GLS 25-1649
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro Se Plaintiff Gavin Wilcher, “Beneficiary of YAWAWAH (sic)” (“Plaintiff”), initiated
the instant lawsuit by filing a “Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” against Santander
Consumer USA, Inc. (“Defendant”). 	(ECF No. 1). 	In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he
initiated this lawsuit “under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,” and that it “arises under commercial and equitable
law.” (Id.).1
Pending before the Court2 is “Santander Consumer USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint,” and a memorandum in support thereto, filed by the Defendant under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (collectively “the Motion”), (ECF Nos. 12, 12-1). Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,” and a memorandum and declaration in support
1 On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Filing of Supporting Exhibits to Verified Complaint.” (ECF No. 4).
These exhibits were filed without leave of court and appear to be the following: (A) Certificate of Trust; (B) UCC-1
Financing Statement; (C) Declaration of Truth and Status Under God; (D) Reproduced Copy of Notice of Fiduciary
Duty; (E) Security Agreement (Trust as Secured Party); (F) Trust Tender of Application and Instrument; (G) First
Notice to Cure and Opportunity to Perform; (H) Notice of Default in Equity; (I) USPS Certified Mail Receipts and
Proof of Delivery; (J) Initial Denial of Credit Letter from Santander Consumer USA; (K) First Refusal to Perform
Following Notice of Fiduciary Obligation; and (L) 2nd Correspondence Confirming Ongoing Dishonor or Failure to
Cure. (Id.).
2 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for all further proceedings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and with
the consent of the parties. (ECF No. 13).
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 1 of 10
2
thereto, (collectively “the Opposition”), (ECF Nos. 16, 16-1, 16-2). Defendant elected not to file
a Reply. (ECF No. 19). The issues have been fully briefed. The Court finds that no hearing is
necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is
GRANTED.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
Plaintiff is the beneficiary of the YAHAWAH Only Living Trust, “a private trust estate
administered under equity.” (ECF No. 1, “Complaint,” ¶ 3; ECF No. 4-6, pp. 2-4). Defendant is
“a corporate entity operating as a financial services provider.” (Complaint, ¶ 4).
On March 10, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a credit application “in good faith, supported by a
perfected UCC-1 Financing Statement and Certificate of Trust.” (Complaint, ¶ 5; ECF No. 4-3, p.
2). Defendant “received said application and supporting documentation, which placed them [sic]
on lawful notice of Plaintiff’s contractual capacity and the trust’s interest in the transaction.”
(Complaint, ¶ 6). 	Despite Defendant’s “full knowledge of the trust’s standing and security
interest,” it “failed to process the application equitably or perform any of its fiduciary obligations”
to Plaintiff. 	(Id. ¶ 7). 	Defendant “failed to respond to multiple lawful notices, including a
Declaration of Contractual Capacity, Testimony of Status under God, Notice of Fiduciary
Relationship, and a Demand for Specific Performance.” (Complaint, ¶ 8; see ECF No. 4-7, pp.
1-8; ECF No. 4-8, pp. 1-6). 	Defendant “owed Plaintiff a fiduciary duty arising from the trust-
backed financial interaction and the legal notices served.” (Complaint, ¶ 9). Defendant “breached
its duty by failing to process the trust tender, by withholding lawful performance, and by refusing
3 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and are construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiff. This Court assumes the facts to be true. Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388,
390 (4th Cir. 2011); Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 2 of 10
3
to acknowledge the trust’s equitable standing.” 	(Complaint, ¶ 10). 	Plaintiff thus “has suffered
injury, loss of opportunity, and unlawful rejection of trust instruments.” (Id. ¶ 11).
Plaintiff seeks specific performance by Defendant, namely, that it “process the application
as a trust asset [sic].” Plaintiff also seeks what he terms declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory
relief, namely, a declaration that Defendant breached its fiduciary duty under equity; an award of
compensatory damages; injunctive relief; and any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
(Complaint, p. 3).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the facts set forth in a complaint.
King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016); Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d
480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). 	When resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a court accepts as true the well-
pleaded allegations in a complaint. Lokhova v. Halper, 995 F.3d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 2021). When
ruling on such a motion, a court “does not resolve the contests surrounding the facts [or] the merits
of a claim.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379,
387 (4th Cir. 2013)). Rather, at this stage, a court considers the complaint as a whole and construes
the facts advanced as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish each
element of each claim. Goss v. Bank of Am., N.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d
sub nom., Goss v. Bank of Am., N.A., 546 F. App’x 165 (4th Cir. 2013). In addition, a complaint
must satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and contain facts “showing”
entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (complaint must set forth enough facts as to
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 3 of 10
4
suggest a “cognizable cause of action”). 	In other words, a complaint must do more than
formulaically recite “the elements of a cause of action,” or must do more than make “naked
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id.; see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 258 (4th Cir.
2009). A court “must be able to draw the reasonable inference [from the well-pleaded facts] that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Because Plaintiff is pro se, his pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those
filed by attorneys, and the court will liberally construe his claims. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007). However, even under a liberal interpretation, the complaint must meet the standards
for plausibility. A complaint fails to plausibly allege entitlement to relief where, in contravention
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the complaint is confusing, rambling, vague, and ambiguous. See Jianqing
Wu v. TrustPoint Int’l, Civ. No. PWG-15-1924, 2015 WL 13091378, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 2015)
(dismissal appropriate where allegations are “confusing, ambiguous, redundant, vague, and, in
some respects, unintelligible” (quoting Wallach v. City of Pagedale, 359 F.2d 57, 58 (8th Cir.
1966) (per curiam))); Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1977) (dismissing because
the “[complaint is] a confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions concerning
numerous persons, organizations and agencies” and “contain[ed] an untidy assortment of claims
that [were] neither plainly nor concisely stated”).
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 4 of 10
5
B. 	Consideration of Documents Outside of Pleadings
In general, when a motion is filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court generally
limits its review to the allegations in the complaint. 	Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d
159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013)).
A trial court enjoys “complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of
any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and
rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.” Kelly v. Lease,
Civ. No. RDB-16-3294, 2017 WL 2377795, at *1 (D. Md. May 31, 2017) (quoting 5 C Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366 at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2011
Supp.)).
There are two circumstances under which a court may consider additional documents
outside of the pleading and not convert it to a summary judgment motion: (1) if the documents are
explicitly incorporated into a complaint by reference, Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citing Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)); or (2) when a document was “not
attached to or expressly incorporated [by reference] in a complaint,” provided that the document
“was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity.” 	Id.
Under these circumstances, a court does not run afoul of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Goldfarb v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015).
In this case, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Filing of Supporting Exhibits to Verified
Complaint,” which contain 11 exhibits upon which the Complaint relies heavily on their terms and
effect and whose authenticity is not disputed. Thus, the Court may consider the documents without
converting the Motion into a summary judgment motion. See Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (explaining
that a document is integral to the complaint where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 5 of 10
6
effect); see also Magness v. Harford County, Civ. No. ELH-16-2970, 2018 WL 1505792, at *9
(D. Md. Mar. 27, 2018) (“Because these exhibits have been incorporated into the Amended
Complaint, I may consider them without converting the Motion to one for summary judgment.”);
Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that the court “may
also consider documents attached to the complaint, as well as those attached to the motion to
dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic” (citation omitted)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In the Motion, Defendant first avers that the Complaint should be dismissed because it fails
to plausibly allege that a fiduciary relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendant. Relatedly,
then, Defendant contends that the Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Defendant breached a
fiduciary duty. (Motion, ECF No. 12-1, p. 4).4
Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff seems to counter with the following five interrelated
declarative sentences, which are not necessarily arguments. 	First, he maintains that he has
adequately alleged a fiduciary relationship based in equity when he “tendered a secured trust-
backed credit application,” which placed Defendant in a position of fiduciary duty. (ECF No. 16-
1, p. 3). Second, Defendant “entered into constructive dishonor” constituting a breach of fiduciary
duty when it issued a generic letter of denial of his loan application but did not acknowledge the
secured interest. (Id. at 3-4). Third, Plaintiff seemingly has pleaded “concrete injury and standing”
by alleging “[l]oss of the vehicle acquisition due to breach of trust”; “[a]dministrative and
equitable harm to the trust estate”; “[n]on-return of tendered property backed by a secured
interest”; and “[c]osts of mitigation, time, and administrative protest.” (Id. at 4). Fourth, Plaintiff
says that the credit application was a trust-backed tender that established a constructive trust in
4 The Court refers to the page numbers in the memorandum filed in support of the motion.
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 6 of 10
7
which Defendant assumed a fiduciary position. 	(Id. at 4-5). 	Fifth, Plaintiff characterizes the
Complaint as being based in “equity,” where he believes the duty to act in good faith arises through
Plaintiff’s use of a “trust-backed tender.” (Id. at 5).
A. Fiduciary Duty in Maryland
In Maryland, in order to establish a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must adequately
plead the following elements: (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) breach of the duty
owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary; and (3) harm to the beneficiary. Plank v. Cherneski, 231
A.3d 436, 442 (Md. 2020).
In Maryland, a fiduciary relationship between a lender and a customer can be found to exist
only under certain circumstances. As a general matter, the “relationship of a bank to its customer
in a loan transaction is ordinarily a contractual relationship between a debtor and a creditor, and is
not fiduciary in nature.” Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 532 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992);
see Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 714 F.3d 769, 778–79 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that
“[b]anks typically do not have a fiduciary duty to their customers”); Ramirez v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. PWG-14-3819, 2015 WL 5052787, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2015) (“It is well established
under Maryland negligence law that, under most circumstances, a lender does not owe a duty to a
borrower.”). 	Thus, the “special circumstances” under which a fiduciary relationship may exist
between a lender and a borrower are where the lender: “(1) took on any extra services on behalf of
the borrowers other than furnishing money; (2) received a greater economic benefit from the
transaction other than the normal mortgage; (3) exercised extensive control; or (4) was asked by
the borrowers if there were any lien actions pending.” Polek v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 36
A.3d 399, 418 (Md. 2012) (quoting Parker, 604 A.2d at 533) (citation modified).
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 7 of 10
8
In the instant case, even when construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
the Complaint does not plead facts that would trigger any of these special circumstances. Thus,
the Court find that Plaintiff has not pleaded the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Accordingly,
the Court need not address the other Plank factors, namely whether there was a breach of a duty
owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary, nor does the Court need to address whether Plaintiff
sustained harm.
In sum, the Motion will be granted and the Complaint dismissed.
B. Dismissal of Complaint: With or Without Prejudice
Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice. According to the Defendant,
even if the Court were to grant Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2), such amendment would be futile because “every allegation in the Complaint is
based on [Defendant’s] denying Plaintiff’s credit application” and “[t]here are no additional or
remedial facts under which Plaintiff could state a plausible claim that [Defendant] owed Plaintiff
a fiduciary duty.” (Motion, p. 6). In the Opposition, Plaintiff fails to respond to this argument.
(Opposition, ECF No. 16, pp. 1-2; ECF No. 16-1, pp. 1-7; ECF No. 16-2, pp. 1-3).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) governs amendment of pleadings. 	Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1), a
plaintiff has the right to amend his complaint once as a matter of law, provided that he does so
within 21 days after serving it on the opposing party or within 21 days after the opposing party’s
service of a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Here, the summons and
Complaint were served on June 23, 2025, so 21 days thereafter was July 14, 2025. In addition,
Defendant served its Motion on July 16, 2025, so 21 days thereafter was August 6, 2025. Because
that time has passed, the only other mechanism for Plaintiff to be able to amend the Complaint is
with Defendant’s written consent or with leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. 15(a)(2) (a party “may
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 8 of 10
9
amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave,” which
should be freely given “when justice so requires”).
Here, there is no evidence before the Court that Defendant consents to Plaintiff’s amending
of the Complaint. Alternatively, then, Plaintiff could amend the Complaint with the Court’s leave.
A court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to
amend should be denied only when it would be prejudicial, there has been bad faith, or amendment
would be futile. Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2008).
Whether to dismiss a case with or without prejudice lies within the discretion of the Court.
Adbul-Mumit v. Alexandria Hyundai, LLC, 896 F.3d 278, 292 (4th Cir. 2018). When amendment
of the complaint would be futile in light of fundamental deficiencies in the plaintiff’s theory of
liability, dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is appropriate. Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharms.
Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 630 (4th Cir. 2008).
Because there are no additional facts under which Plaintiff could plausibly claim that
Defendant owed him a fiduciary duty, amendment of the Complaint would be futile. See Shah v.
GenVec, Inc., Civil Action No. DKC 12-0341, 2013 WL 5348133, at *15 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2013)
(facts alleged in first amended complaint did not support Plaintiff’s cause of action, so further
amendment was futile).
In light of the fundamental deficiencies in Plaintiff’s theory of liability that amendment
cannot cure, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion, (ECF No. 12), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s
Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A separate Order follows.
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 9 of 10
10
December 29, 2025 	/s/
The Honorable Gina L. Simms
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 8:25-cv-01649-GLS Document 20 Filed 12/29/25 Page 10 of 10

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.