Simpson v. Aflac Insurance Company

8:25-cv-01437Mdd11.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MARICA SIMPSON
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 25-1437
:
AFLAC INSURANCE COMPANY
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this breach of
contract 	case 	is 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	complaint 	and 	strike
the 	jury 	demand 	filed 	by 	Defendant 	Aflac 	Insurance 	Company1
(“Defendant” 	or 	“Aflac”). 	(ECF 	No. 	7). 	The 	issues 	have 	been
briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed
necessary. 	Local 	Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the
motion 	to 	dismiss 	will 	be 	denied, 	although 	the 	complaint 	will 	be
dismissed without prejudice, and the court will grant plaintiff a
chance to amend her complaint in light of this opinion. Defendant’s
motion to strike the jury demand will be denied as moot.
I. 	Background
Pro 	se 	Plaintiff 	Marica 	Simpson 	(“Plaintiff” 	or 	“Simpson”)
alleges 	that 	she 	was 	due 	a 	reimbursement 	of 	a 	“$30,000 	loss”
1 	Aflac 	Insurance 	Company 	is 	not 	a 	valid 	legal 	entity. 	As
discussed further below, Defendant states that the correct entity
is Continental American Insurance Company, which is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Aflac Incorporated. 	(ECF No. 2, at 1).
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suffered on or about June 1, 2024. 	(ECF No. 4, at 1). 	According
to Defendant, Simpson appears to be seeking “the refund of premiums
paid 	under 	a 	group 	whole 	life 	insurance 	policy 	. 	. 	. 	issued 	by
Continental 	American 	Insurance 	Company 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	employer,
Alamance Health Care Center dba Vita Healthcare Group.” 	(ECF No.
7-1, at 1). 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendant promised to provide
her money on or before December 15, 2024, but she has not received
a reimbursement. 	(ECF No. 4, at 1). 	As further information, she
provides the following:
My 	employee 	contacted, 	the 	insurance
company 	and 	was 	promised 	that 	a 	check 	would
mail 	out 	but 	to 	no 	avail 	the 	insurance
requested 	for 	a 	signature 	which 	they 	claim
that 	sign 	the 	document 	but 	there 	was 	no
signature 	or 	consent 	that 	was 	made 	by 	me.
[E]ven 	so 	the 	insurance 	refused 	to 	reimburse
me 	the 	money 	that 	was 	deducted 	from 	my
paycheck.
(Id.).2 	She filed a complaint against Aflac Insurance Company in
the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on February 21, 2025.
(Id.). 	Defendant 	removed 	the 	case 	to 	this 	court 	on 	May 	5, 	2025,
asserting 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction 	under 	the 	Employee
Retirement 	Income 	Security 	Act 	of 	1974 	(“ERISA”), 	29 	U.S.C. 	§§
1100-1461. 	(ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	1, 	2). 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	motion 	to
2 The complaint states “my employee contacted[] the insurance
company,” (ECF No. 4, at 1), which appears to be a typo. 	From the
context 	of 	the 	rest 	of 	the 	complaint 	and 	the 	materials 	filed 	by
the 	Defendant, 	it 	seems 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	employer, 	not 	employee,
contacted the insurance company.
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dismiss 	the 	complaint 	and 	to 	strike 	the 	jury 	demand 	on 	May 	12,
2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	7). 	On 	May 	20, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed
correspondence 	with 	the 	court 	requesting 	a 	“deferred 	ruling 	of
dismissal 	of 	the 	pending 	settlement 	case.” 	(ECF 	No. 	12). 	The
court 	construed 	the 	correspondence 	as 	a 	motion 	for 	extension 	of
time and granted the Plaintiff an extension until July 7, 2025, to
file 	a 	response 	to 	Defendant’s 	motion. 	(ECF 	No. 	13, 	at 	2).
Plaintiff 	did 	not 	file 	a 	response 	and 	has 	not 	filed 	anything
additional in this court.
II. 	Analysis
Defendant 	has 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	complaint 	under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(5) 	for 	insufficient 	service 	of 	process, 	and
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief 	can 	be 	granted. 	(ECF 	No. 	7, 	at 	1). 	Defendant 	also 	moves
to strike plaintiff’s request for a jury trial under Fed.R.Civ.P.
39(a). 	(Id.).
A. 	Service of Process
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(5) 	governs 	motions 	to 	dismiss 	for
insufficient service. 	In a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5),
the 	plaintiff 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	establishing 	the 	validity 	of
service 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	4. 	O'Meara 	v. 	Waters, 	464 	F.Supp.2d
474, 476 (D.Md. 2006). 	“Generally, when service of process gives
the defendant actual notice of the pending action, the courts may
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construe 	Rule 	4 	liberally 	to 	effectuate 	service 	and 	uphold 	the
jurisdiction of the court.” 	Id.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h) governs service of process on a corporation
such 	as 	Defendant. 	As 	relevant 	here, 	corporations 	can 	be 	served
by 	“delivering 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	summons 	and 	of 	the 	complaint 	to 	an
officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized
by 	appointment 	or 	by 	law 	to 	receive 	service 	of 	process.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h)(1)(B). 	According to the sheriff’s return filed
in the state court proceeding, the complaint was served on “Bertha
Hughley” 	of 	“Aflac 	Ins. 	Co.” 	(ECF 	No. 	1-3, 	at 	3). 	Defendant
argues 	“[s]ervice 	was 	improper 	and 	insufficient 	because 	‘Bertha
Hughley’ is not an officer or agent authorized, by appointment or
law, 	to 	receive 	service 	of 	process 	on 	behalf 	of 	‘Aflac 	Insurance
Company.’” 	(ECF No. 7-1, at 9). 	Plaintiff does not counter with
any additional information.
Although the failure to ensure proper service is uncontested,
this is not a fatal flaw. 	“[Defendant] has not been prejudiced by
the insufficient service” and “the case is in its infancy.” 	Harris
v. 	Johns 	Hopkins 	Health 	Sys. 	Corp., 	No. 	23-cv-701-ELH, 	2023 	WL
3624733, 	at 	*3 	(D.Md. 	May 	23, 	2023). 	When 	service 	is 	improper,
the appropriate consequence is to quash service and not to dismiss
the complaint on that basis. 	The motion to dismiss for failure to
serve 	will 	be 	denied. 	The 	Plaintiff 	is 	reminded 	that 	she 	must
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follow 	the 	requirements 	of 	Rule 	4(h) 	when 	serving 	any 	amended
complaint on Defendant.
B. 	12(b)(6): Proper Entity
Defendant also argues the case should be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) because “Aflac Insurance Company” is “not the insurer and
not 	a 	corporate 	entity 	capable 	of 	being 	sued.” 	(ECF 	No. 	7-1, 	at
5). 	It 	is 	undisputed 	that 	the 	policy 	“identifies 	Continental
American 	Insurance 	Company 	as 	the 	insurance 	company 	that 	issued
the 	Policy 	to 	Alamance 	Health 	Care 	Center 	dba 	Vita 	Healthcare
Group,” 	and 	the 	policy 	is 	a 	“legal 	contract 	between 	Continental
American 	and 	the 	Policyholder.” 	(Id.). 	The 	confusion 	may 	come
from the fact that “Aflac” is a “registered service mark licensed
for 	use 	by 	insurance 	company 	subsidiaries 	of 	Aflac 	Incorporated,
including 	Continental 	American 	Insurance 	Company[,]” 	(Id. 	at 	2),
and the top of the policy document says “Aflac,” (ECF No. 7-2, at
1).
Trade names are “not jural persons and cannot sue or be sued.”
Riverkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 10-cv-01834-AW, 2011
WL 	13078022, 	at 	*1 	(D.Md. 	Jan. 	18, 	2011) 	(quoting 	Frison 	v. 	Ryan
Homes, 	No. 	04-cv-350-AW, 	2004 	WL 	3327904, 	at 	*3 	(D.Md. 	Oct. 	29,
2004)). 	Defendant 	has 	maintained 	since 	the 	beginning 	that 	the
proper defendant is Continental American Insurance Company. 	(See
ECF Nos. 2, at 1 n.1 (“The proper defendant should be Continental
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American Insurance Company.”); 7, at 1 n.1 (same)). 	Plaintiff has
not 	sought 	leave 	to 	amend 	nor 	substituted 	the 	proper 	Defendant
despite 	this 	notice. 	The 	court 	need 	not 	dismiss 	the 	complaint,
however, 	because 	of 	this 	mistake. 	See 	Riverkeeper, 	2011 	WL
13078022, at *1 (“[T]he Court finds it senseless to dismiss without
prejudice 	and 	further 	delay 	resolution 	of 	issues 	that 	must 	be
addressed 	eventually.”). 	Given 	the 	latitude 	granted 	to 	pro 	se
plaintiffs, 	and 	the 	proper 	defendant’s 	participation 	in 	this
litigation, 	the 	court 	declines 	to 	dismiss 	the 	complaint 	based
solely 	on 	this 	mistake. 	The 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	is 	denied 	on 	this
ground.
C. 	Preemption and ERISA claims
A 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(6) 	tests 	the
sufficiency of the complaint. 	Presley v. City of Charlottesville,
464 	F.3d 	480, 	483 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2006). 	The 	court 	“must 	accept 	the
complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe the facts in
the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff.” 	Barnett 	v. 	Inova
Health 	Care 	Servs., 	125 	F.4th 	465, 	469 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(citing
Barbour 	v. 	Garland, 	105 	F.4th 	579, 	589 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2024)). 	A
complaint must only satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a “short
and 	plain 	statement 	of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is
entitled 	to 	relief.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	8(a)(2). 	“[W]here 	the 	well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
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possibility 	of 	misconduct, 	the 	complaint 	has 	alleged—but 	it 	has
not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” 	Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
A 	Rule 	8(a)(2) 	“showing” 	requires 	“stat[ing] 	a 	claim 	to 	relief
that 	is 	plausible 	on 	its 	face.” 	Bell 	Atl. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550
U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007). 	“A 	claim 	has 	facial 	plausibility 	when 	the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable 	inference 	that 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the 	misconduct
alleged.” 	Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 299–300 (4 th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Plaintiff 	in 	this 	case 	is 	pro 	se. 	Courts 	hold 	pro 	se
pleadings 	to 	“less 	stringent 	standards 	than 	formal 	pleadings
drafted 	by 	lawyers.” 	Erickson 	v. 	Pardus, 	551 	U.S. 	89, 	94 	(2007)
(quoting 	Estelle 	v. 	Gamble, 	429 	U.S. 	97, 	106 	(1976)). 	The 	court
has 	an 	obligation 	to 	construe 	pleadings 	of 	self-represented
litigants 	liberally. 	Id. 	It 	is 	not 	necessary, 	however, 	to
“conjure 	up 	questions 	never 	squarely 	presented,” 	or 	to 	recognize
“obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts
to 	unravel 	them.” 	Beaudett 	v. 	City 	of 	Hampton, 	775 	F.2d 	1274,
1277-78 (4 th Cir. 1985).
The 	court 	first 	notes 	that 	Defendant 	has 	attached 	an
“Endorsement to Policy and Certificate of Insurance” to its motion
to dismiss, (ECF No. 7-2).
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Although, 	as 	a 	general 	rule, 	evidence
extrinsic 	to 	the 	Complaint 	should 	not 	be
considered 	at 	the 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	stage, 	the
[United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the]
Fourth Circuit has held that when a defendant
attaches a document to its motion to dismiss,
“a 	court 	may 	consider 	it 	in 	determining
whether 	to 	dismiss 	the 	complaint 	[if] 	it 	was
integral 	to 	and 	explicitly 	relied 	on 	in 	the
complaint 	and 	[if] 	the 	plaintiffs 	do 	not
challenge its authenticity.”
Gordon v. CIGNA Corp., No. 17-cv-2835-GJH, 2018 WL 3375099, at *2
(D.Md. 	July 	11, 	2018) 	(quoting 	Phillips 	v. 	LCI 	Int'l 	Inc., 	190
F.3d 	609, 	618 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1999)). 	Plaintiff 	has 	not challenged 	the
authenticity 	of 	the 	document, 	and 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	contractual
relationship underpins Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. 	(ECF
No. 	4). 	The 	court 	will 	consider 	the 	policy 	document. 	See
Darcangelo 	v. 	Verizon 	Commc'ns, 	Inc., 	292 	F.3d 	181, 	195 	n.5 	(4 th
Cir. 	2002) 	(“Because 	[plaintiff] 	relies 	on 	the 	agreement 	in 	her
complaint, it was proper for the district court to consider it in
ruling on the motion to dismiss.”).
1. 	12(b)(6): ERISA Preemption
Defendant 	makes 	a 	substantive 	argument 	for 	dismissal 	under
Rule 	12(b)(6), 	saying 	that 	ERISA 	preempts 	Plaintiff’s 	state 	law
breach 	of 	contract 	claim. 	(ECF 	No. 	7-1, 	at 	6-8). 	Defendant
misunderstands 	the 	impact 	of 	preemption 	under 	ERISA’s 	civil
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enforcement mechanism. 	ERISA § 502, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132,3
transforms 	a 	state 	law 	claim 	into 	a 	federal 	claim 	and 	provides 	a
basis 	for 	removal 	but 	does 	not 	automatically 	lead 	to 	dismissal.4
Rather, 	Plaintiff 	will 	be 	given 	an 	opportunity 	to 	amend 	her
complaint if she wishes to proceed with an ERISA claim.
The 	first 	issue 	is 	whether 	the 	relationship 	at 	issue 	falls
within 	ERISA’s 	scope. 	The 	term 	“employee 	benefit 	plan”
encompasses, among other things:
[A]ny 	plan, 	fund, 	or 	program 	which 	was
heretofore 	or 	is 	hereafter 	established 	or
maintained by an employer . . . for the purpose
of 	providing 	for 	its 	participants 	or 	their
beneficiaries, 	through 	the 	purchase 	of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical,
or 	hospital 	care 	or 	benefits, 	or 	benefits 	in
3 The court will follow the practice in this circuit and refer
to 	the 	“statutory 	provisions 	by 	their 	ERISA 	designation, 	not 	by
their 	place 	in 	the 	U.S. 	Code.” 	Rose 	v. 	PSA 	Airlines, 	Inc., 	80
F.4th 488, 494 n.2 (4 th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 	144 S. Ct. 1346
(2024).
4 A different provision, ERISA § 514 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
1144), 	“precludes 	prosecution 	of 	the 	preempted 	state-law 	claim.”
Risdorfer 	v. 	Ascentage 	Pharma 	Grp. 	Inc., 	No. 	23-cv-987-ELH, 	2023
WL 4664036, at *11 (D.Md. July 19, 2023) (quoting Marks v. Watters,
322 	F.3d 	316, 	323 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2003)). 	“[I]f 	a 	state-law 	claim
preempted 	by 	§ 	514 	is 	not 	included 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	§ 	502(a),
the claim is susceptible to a § 514 defense, whether it is brought
in State or federal court. 	But if a state-law claim falls within
the scope of § 502(a), it is ‘completely preempted’ and therefore
treated 	as 	a 	federal 	cause 	of 	action.” 	Marks, 	322 	F.3d 	at 	322-
23. 	Defendant 	only 	argues 	that 	ERISA 	§ 	502 	preempts 	Plaintiff’s
claim.
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the 	event 	of 	sickness, 	accident, 	disability,
death or unemployment[.]
ERISA § 3(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (3). 	While Plaintiff does
not 	refer 	specifically 	to 	an 	“employee 	benefit 	plan” 	in 	her
complaint, that is not dispositive. 	Risdorfer v. Ascentage Pharma
Grp. Inc., No. 23-cv-987-ELH, 2023 WL 4664036, at *14 (D.Md. July
19, 	2023) 	(finding 	that 	a 	complaint 	which 	“makes 	no 	reference 	to
an 	‘employee 	benefit 	plan’” 	has 	nevertheless 	“alleged 	facts
supporting 	a 	plausible 	inference 	that 	the 	[agreements] 	are
regulated 	or 	governed 	by 	ERISA”). 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	seeks
reimbursement 	from 	her 	insurance 	company 	of 	money 	deducted 	from
her paycheck, and notes that her employer contacted the insurance
company on her behalf. 	(ECF No. 4, at 1). 	From the facts alleged
in 	the 	complaint, 	there 	is 	enough 	information 	to 	assume 	that 	the
agreement is an employee benefit plan within the ambit of ERISA.
“The 	purpose 	of 	ERISA 	is 	to 	provide 	a 	uniform 	regulatory
regime over employee benefit plans.” 	Aetna Health v. Davila, 542
U.S. 	200, 	208 	(2004). 	ERISA 	includes 	a 	civil 	enforcement 	remedy
which allows a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action
“to 	recover 	benefits 	due 	to 	him 	under 	the 	terms 	of 	his 	plan, 	to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights 	to 	future 	benefits 	under 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	plan.” 	ERISA 	§
502(a)(1)(B). 	This 	enforcement 	remedy 	is 	comprehensive; 	“any
state-law 	cause 	of 	action 	that 	duplicates, 	supplements, 	or
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supplants 	the 	ERISA 	civil 	enforcement 	remedy 	conflicts 	with 	the
clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and
is therefore pre-empted.” 	Davila, 542 U.S. at 209. 	This does not
mean that a case bringing a state law claim preempted by the ERISA
civil enforcement remedy must be dismissed. 	Rather, “it ‘converts
an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal
claim 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	well-pleaded 	complaint 	rule.’” 	Id.
(quoting 	Metro. 	Life 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Taylor, 	481 	U.S. 	58, 	65-66
(1987)).
The Fourth Circuit follows a three-prong test to determine if
a 	particular 	state 	law 	claim 	is 	completely 	preempted 	by 	ERISA 	§
502:
(1) 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	have 	standing 	under 	§
502(a) to pursue its claim; (2) its claim must
“fall[] within the scope of an ERISA provision
that 	[it] 	can 	enforce 	via 	§ 	502(a)”; 	and 	(3)
the 	claim 	must 	not 	be 	capable 	of 	resolution
“without 	an 	interpretation 	of 	the 	contract
governed 	by 	federal 	law,” 	i.e., 	an 	ERISA-
governed employee benefit plan.
Prince 	v. 	Sears 	Holding 	Corp., 	848 	F.3d 	173, 	177 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2017)
(quoting 	Sonoco 	Prods. 	Co. 	v. 	Physicians 	Health 	Plan, 	Inc., 	338
F.3d 366, 372 (4 th Cir. 2003)). 	As to the first prong, “the only
parties 	entitled 	to 	pursue 	an 	ERISA 	claim 	under 	§ 	502(a)(3) 	are
‘participants,’ ‘beneficiaries,’ and ‘fiduciaries.’” 	Sonoco, 338
at 372. 	While Plaintiff’s complaint does not include much detail,
Plaintiff states she is seeking a reimbursement of “the money that
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was deducted from [her] paycheck.” 	(ECF No. 4, at 1). 	In relevant
part, 	ERISA 	defines 	a 	participant 	as 	“any 	employee 	or 	former
employee 	of 	an 	employer 	. 	. 	. 	who 	is 	or 	may 	become 	eligible 	to
receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which
covers employees of such employer.” 	ERISA § 3(7). 	From the face
of 	the 	complaint, 	it 	appears 	that 	Plaintiff 	is 	a 	participant 	in
her employer’s plan, granting her standing to pursue a claim under
ERISA 	§ 	502. 	The 	second 	and 	third 	prongs 	are 	both 	met 	by
Plaintiff’s breach of contract action.
Because 	the 	contract 	in 	question 	is 	an 	ERISA
plan, this claim is clearly preempted. 	ERISA
§ 	502 	permits 	plan 	participants 	to 	bring 	an
action to “enforce [the participant’s] rights
under 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	plan.” 	29 	U.S.C. 	§
1132(a)(1)(B). 	Accordingly, 	an 	action 	to
enforce 	the 	terms 	of 	a 	contract, 	when 	that
contract is an ERISA plan, is of necessity an
alternative enforcement mechanism for ERISA §
502[.]
Darcangelo, 	292 	F.3d 	at 	194-195. 	Plaintiff 	brought 	a 	state 	law
claim 	– 	breach 	of 	contract 	– 	regarding 	her 	benefits 	under 	an
employee benefit plan. 	This claim is clearly preempted by ERISA’s
civil enforcement remedy.
While 	the 	claim 	is 	preempted, 	Defendant’s 	argument 	that
preemption 	pursuant 	to 	§ 	502 	automatically 	leads 	to 	dismissal 	is
incorrect. 	The 	Fourth 	Circuit 	confronted 	a 	similar 	situation 	in
Darcangelo:
Case 8:25-cv-01437-DKC Document 14 Filed 12/11/25 Page 12 of 15
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Nevertheless, when a claim under state law is
completely preempted and is removed to federal
court 	because 	it 	falls 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	§
502, the federal court should not dismiss the
claim 	as 	preempted, 	but 	should 	treat 	it 	as 	a
federal 	claim 	under 	§ 	502. 	What 	was 	a 	state
claim for breach of contract becomes a federal
claim 	for 	the 	enforcement 	of 	contractual
rights under § 502(a)(1)(B).
Id. at 195. 	Defendant only moved to dismiss based on preemption;
it 	did 	not 	make 	any 	additional 	substantive 	arguments 	under 	Rule
12(b)(6). 	Plaintiff did not respond to the motion. 	Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.
2. 	Analysis of the ERISA Claim
Regardless, the court will consider whether Plaintiff stated
a claim under ERISA § 502, even though Defendant did not make the
argument. 	The court confronted an analogous procedural situation
in 	Verbal 	v. 	Giant 	of 	Md., 	LLC, 	204 	F.Supp.3d 	837 	(D.Md. 	2016).
In Verbal, the plaintiff brought a state law claim that the court
found 	to 	be 	preempted 	by 	the 	Labor 	Management 	Relations 	Act
(“LMRA”). 	Id. at 844. 	After finding preemption, the court asked
“whether Plaintiff has stated a § 301 claim under the LMRA,” even
though 	“Defendant 	did 	not 	move 	to 	dismiss 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a
§ 301 claim.” Id. at 845. After determining that the plaintiff had
failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	under 	the 	LMRA, 	the 	court 	laid 	out 	the
proper way forward:
Plaintiff 	therefore 	has 	not 	stated 	a 	§ 	301
claim upon which relief can be granted, but it
Case 8:25-cv-01437-DKC Document 14 Filed 12/11/25 Page 13 of 15
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is 	not 	clear 	that 	she 	cannot 	do 	so.
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	wrongful 	discharge
claim 	is 	construed 	as 	a 	§ 	301 	claim 	and 	will
be dismissed without prejudice. 	If Plaintiff
wishes 	to 	proceed 	on 	a 	§ 	301 	claim, 	she 	must
file 	an 	amended 	complaint 	setting 	forth
appropriate 	allegations 	within 	twenty-one
(21) days.
Id. 	at 	845-46; 	see 	also 	Van 	Lier 	v. 	Unisys 	Corp., 	142 	F.Supp.3d
477, 	487 	(E.D. 	Va. 	2015) 	(“Because 	there 	is 	complete 	preemption—
not 	just 	conflict 	preemption—plaintiff[’]s 	complaint 	is 	properly
dismissed 	without 	prejudice 	so 	that 	plaintiff 	can 	amend 	her
complaint 	to 	assert 	a 	claim 	under 	ERISA's 	civil 	enforcement
provisions.”). 	There is not enough information on the face of the
complaint 	to 	move 	forward 	with 	an 	ERISA 	claim. 	While 	the 	court
construes a pro se litigant’s pleadings leniently, Plaintiff makes
legal 	conclusions 	and 	only 	provides 	scarce 	facts 	that 	“do 	not
permit 	the 	court 	to 	infer 	more 	than 	the 	mere 	possibility 	of
misconduct.” 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	at 	679. 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that
Defendant 	owes 	her 	$30,000 	and 	that 	“the 	insurance 	refused 	to
reimburse [her] the money that was deducted from [her] paycheck.”
(ECF 	No. 	4, 	at 	1). 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	provided 	any 	information
about why the money would be owed to Plaintiff, how she arrived at
the $30,000 figure, or why the money was deducted from her paycheck
in 	the 	first 	place. 	Plaintiff 	simply 	has 	not 	provided 	enough
information 	to 	state 	a 	claim. 	That 	being 	said, 	“it 	is 	not 	clear
that 	she 	cannot 	do 	so.” 	Verbal, 	204 	F.Supp.3d 	at 	845.
Case 8:25-cv-01437-DKC Document 14 Filed 12/11/25 Page 14 of 15
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Accordingly, 	the 	court 	will 	dismiss 	the 	complaint 	without
prejudice and allow Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
To address the procedural problems with the case opening and
the 	viability 	of 	an 	ERISA 	claim, 	Plaintiff 	has 	twenty-one 	(21)
days 	from 	the 	date 	of 	this 	opinion 	to 	amend 	her 	complaint 	if 	she
wishes to proceed with an ERISA claim. 	Plaintiff is reminded that
any 	amended 	complaint 	must 	properly 	name 	the 	defendant 	-
Continental 	American 	Insurance 	Company 	– 	and 	follow 	the
requirements 	for 	service 	provided 	in 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	4(h). 	Because
Plaintiff’s 	current 	complaint 	is 	being 	dismissed, 	Defendant’s
motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a) to strike Plaintiff’s request for
a jury trial is denied as moot.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will
be denied, and its motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for a jury
trial 	will 	be 	denied 	as 	moot. 	The 	complaint 	will 	be 	dismissed
without 	prejudice, 	and 	Plaintiff 	will 	be 	given 	an 	opportunity 	to
file an amended complaint. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
Case 8:25-cv-01437-DKC Document 14 Filed 12/11/25 Page 15 of 15

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