Egenti v. Cephus, # 1134 et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UCHENNA EGENTI,
Plaintiff,
v.
JALEN R. CEPHUS, #1134, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 8:25-cv-00948-LKG
Dated: March 4, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	INTRODUCTION
In this civil rights action, the Plaintiff, Uchenna Egenti, brings claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (“Article 24”)
and Maryland common law, against the Defendants, Officer Dominic Buie and Prince George’s
County (the “County”) (collectively, the “County Defendants”), the Town of Forest Heights (the
“Town”), Sergeant Jalen R. Cephus, Officer Taneisha Bigelow-Clark, Officer Jason Willet and
DMV Security Service, LLC (“DMV Security”). ECF No. 1 at 9–19.
The County Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). ECF No. 16 at 1. The Town has also moved to dismiss the claims brought against it,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to bifurcate, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
42(b). ECF No. 24 at 1. The motions are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 16, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28. No
hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that
follow, the Court: (1) GRANTS the Town’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16); (2) GRANTS-in-
PART and DENIES-in-PART the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 24); and (3)
DISMISSES: (a) the Plaintiff’s Monell and Longtin claims against the Town and the County in
Counts I, II, III and XI of the complaint; (b) the Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against
Sergeant Cephus and Officers Bigelow-Clark, Willet and Buie in Counts I, II, III and XI of the
complaint; and (c) the Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against the Town and County in Counts
IV, VI, VII, IX and X of the complaint.
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II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
A. 	Factual Background
In this civil action, the Plaintiff brings Section 1983, Article 24 and Maryland common law
claims against the Defendants Dominic Buie, Prince George’s County, the Town of Forest
Heights, Sergeant Jalen R. Cephus, Officer Taneisha Bigelow-Clark, Officer Jason Willet and
DMV Security Service, LLC, arising from an altercation that occurred on September 3, 2023, at
the BJ’s Wholesale Club (“BJ’s”) located at 1781 Ritchie Station Court, Capitol Heights,
Maryland, Prince George’s County. ECF No. 1 at 9–19. Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts the
following claims in the complaint: (1) Section 1983 (Fourth Amendment/Excessive Force)
against all Defendants (Count 1); (2) Section 1983 (Fourth Amendment/False Arrest and
Malicious Prosecution) against DMV Security, Sergeant Cephus, Forest Heights and the County
Defendants (Count 2); (3) Article 24 against all Defendants (Count 3); (4) assault and battery
against DMV Security, Sergeant Cephus, Officer Buie, Officer Willet and Officer Bigelow-Clark
(Count 4); (5) false imprisonment against all Defendants (Count 6); (6) intentional infliction of
emotional distress against all Defendants (Count 7); (7) negligence against all Defendants (Count
8); (8) malicious prosecution against Sergeant Cephus, the County Defendants and Forest
Heights (Count 9); (9) abuse of process against Officer Cephus, the County Defendants and
Forest Heights (Count 10); (10) Section 1983 (Monell claim for failure to train, supervise, and
implement policies) against Forest Heights (Count 11). Id. As relief, the Plaintiff seeks, among
other things, to recover compensatory damages, punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. Id.
The Parties
The Plaintiff Uchenna Egenti is a resident of Washington, DC. ECF No. 1-1 at 1.
The Defendant Dominic Buie is an Officer of the Prince George’s County Police
Department (“PGPD”). ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.
The Defendant Prince George’s County, Maryland is a local government entity. Id. at ¶ 11.
1 The facts recited in this memorandum opinion are taken from the complaint; the County Defendants’
motion to dismiss and the memorandum in support thereof; the Town’s motion to dismiss and the
memorandum in support thereof; the exhibits attached thereto; and the Plaintiff’s responses in opposition
to the Defendants’ respective motions. ECF Nos. 1, 16, 24, 27 and 28. Unless otherwise stated, the facts
are undisputed.
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The Defendant the Town of Forest Heights is a municipality within Prince George’s
County, Maryland. Id. at ¶ 9.
The Defendant Jalen R. Cephus is a Sergeant of the Forest Heights Police Department
(“FHPD”). Id. at ¶ 5.
The Defendant Taneisha Bigelow-Clark is an Officer of the FHPD. Id. at ¶ 7.
The Defendant Jason Willet is an Officer of the FHPD. Id. at ¶ 8.
The Defendant DMV Security Service, LLC is a security agency. Id. at ¶ 6.
The Plaintiff’s Arrest, Hospitalization And Detention
As background, on September 3, 2023, at approximately 11:00 am, the Plaintiff was
shopping at the BJ’s Wholesale Club located at 1781 Ritchie Station Court, Capitol Heights,
Maryland, when an employee of BJ’s allegedly falsely accused her of disorderly conduct. Id. at
¶ 12. The BJ’s employee called the police after the Plaintiff attempted to use a coupon for
groceries that she had already purchased. Id.
Sergeant Cephus of the FHPD arrived on the scene and the Plaintiff alleges that he was not
responding to an emergency. Id. at ¶¶ 13 and 14. Officer Buie of the PGPD also arrived on the
scene. Id. at ¶ 16.
The Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Cephus and Office Buie physically forced her to the
ground without justification or consent. Id. at ¶¶ 16–17. The Plaintiff also alleges that she did
not resist arrest, and that she was not advised as to why she was being handcuffed and dragged
outside to a police vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 18–20.
The Plaintiff alleges that she was handcuffed and intentionally shoved into an extremely
hot police vehicle by Sergeant Cephus and Officer Buie. Id. at ¶ 21. The Plaintiff also alleges
that she was left in the hot police vehicle without ventilation for more than 30 minutes. Id. at ¶
26. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that she was then driven away from the BJ’s, at a high rate
of speed, without a seatbelt, to the University of Maryland Medical Capital Regional Health
Center located in Largo, Maryland. Id. at ¶¶ 27–31.
The Plaintiff alleges that she was forcibly taken into the medical center by Sergeant
Cephus, Officer Willet and Officer Bigelow-Clark and then handcuffed to a wall. Id. at ¶¶ 31–
32. The Plaintiff also alleges that Sergeant Cephus threatened to take photos of her in a
distressed state and post them online. Id. at ¶ 33. Thereafter, the Plaintiff was transported to the
detention center, and the Plaintiff alleges that she was held in isolation for approximately 16
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hours without food, water or medical care, despite her requests for medical attention. Id. at ¶¶
34–37.
The Plaintiff alleges that she was not informed about the charges brought against her until
September 4, 2023. Id. at ¶ 38. The Plaintiff also alleges that she suffered physical injuries, and
that her disabled minor son was left without a caretaker during her arrest and detention. Id. at ¶¶
39–40 and 42. In this regard, the Plaintiff contends that she was arrested by Sergeant Cephus
and Officer Buie without probable cause and charged with disorderly conduct, failure to obey a
lawful order and resisting arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 43–44. The Plaintiff further contends that the charges
brought against her were initiated by Sergeant Cephus and Officer Buie to conceal the officers’
use of excessive force against her. Id. at ¶ 45.
On November 27, 2023, all charges against the Plaintiff were dismissed by nolle prosequi.
Id. at ¶¶ 46–47. And so, the Plaintiff further contends that the dismissal of the charges brought
against her was favorable and supports her claim for malicious prosecution. Id. at ¶¶ 48–49.
B. 	Procedural History
The Plaintiff commenced this matter on March 23, 2025. Id. On April 21, 2025, Officer
Bigelow-Clark, Sergeant Cephus and Officer Willet answered the complaint. ECF No. 15.
On April 21, 2025, the Town filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, to bifurcate, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), and a memorandum
in support thereof. ECF No. 16.
On April 29, 2025, DMV Security filed an answer. ECF No. 21. On May 5, 2025, the
County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and a
memorandum in support thereof. ECF No. 24.
On May 5, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Town’s motion to
dismiss and a response in opposition to the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 25
and 26.
On May 12, 2025, the Town filed a reply. ECF No. 27. On June 3, 2025, the County
Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 28.
The Defendants’ motions to dismiss having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the
pending motions.
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III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must
allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl.Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible when
“the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When
evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts
factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet, Inc. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009);
Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted). But, the complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of
action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d
at 255. And so, the Court should grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if “it is
clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with
the allegations.” GE Inv. Private Placement Partners II, L.P. v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th
Cir. 2001) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249–50 (1989)). 2
B. 	Section 1983 And Monell Claims
Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 provides a mechanism for individuals who have
had their constitutional rights violated to seek a remedy against individual state actors. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that if any person acting “under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” deprives a United States citizen of any constitutional
right, that person may be liable in a suit for money damages). “[l]iability under § 1983 attaches
only upon a showing of personal participation” against the individual defendants in the case.
Chew v. Platt, No. 20-3075, 2022 WL 294500, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2022) (citing Trulock v.
Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001)).
2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the Court may consider
documents beyond the complaint when considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), if the
documents are “explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference” or are “integral to the complaint
and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d
159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Biospherics, Inc., v. Forbes, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 748, 749 (D. Md. 1997),
aff’d, 151 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1998).
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To establish personal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must affirmatively show that
the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights and the official’s
own individual actions must have violated the Constitution. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d
154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018). Section 1983 also permits a plaintiff to bring a claim directly against a
municipality, if the municipality causes a deprivation of a constitutional right through an official
policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). But, “a
municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the
constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Given this, a municipality may be liable under Section 1983 when a municipality’s “policy
or custom” has caused the violation of an individual’s federal rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–
95. But, a county or municipality “cannot be liable under § 1983 without some predicate
‘constitutional injury at the hands of the individual . . . officer,’ at least in suits for damages.”
Waybright v. Frederick Cnty., 528 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)); English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th 636, 649 (4th Cir. 2024). In this
regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that a Monell plaintiff must adequately plead “the existence of
an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the municipality and that proximately
caused the deprivation of their rights.” Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th
Cir. 1994). 	And so, the municipality’s conduct must demonstrate “deliberate indifference to the
rights of potentially affected citizens” for conduct to be properly thought of as a “policy.” Jones
v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 1997).
C. 	Article 24 Of The Maryland Declaration Of Rights
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that “no man ought to be taken
or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in
any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his
peers, or by the Law of the land.” Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 24. Article 24 protects due
process rights and is the Maryland “analogue to the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Rovin v. State, 321 A.3d 201, 218
(Md. 2024) (citing State v. Dett, 891 A.2d 1113, 1120 n.3 (Md. 2006)).
D. 	Governmental Immunity
“The doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit . . . is firmly embedded in the law of
Maryland.” Katz v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Com’n, 284 Md. 503, 507 (1979). Given this,
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Maryland courts have held that “‘[g]overnmental immunity’. . . is not only applicable to the State
itself, but also applies generally to a county of the State and to the State’s municipal political
subdivisions and local agencies, unless the General Assembly either directly or by necessary
implication has waived the immunity.” Austin v. City of Balt., 405 A.2d 255, 256 (Md. 1979)
(citing Godwin v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 256 Md. 326, 334 (1970)).
Governmental immunity is limited to local governmental entities, such as counties,
municipalities and local agencies. Under Maryland law, a “municipality or county is liable for
its torts if it acts in a private or proprietary capacity, while it is immune if acting in a
governmental capacity.” Nam v. Montgomery Cnty., 732 A.2d 356, 362 (Md. 1999) (quoting
Godwin, 260 A.2d at 299. Relevant here, this Court has recognized that the operation of a police
force is a governmental function under Maryland law. Williams v. Prince George’s County, 157
F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (citing Hector v. Weglein, 558 F. Supp. 194, 206 (1982)). Maryland courts
have also held that “governmental” acts are those “performed . . . for the common good of all,”
rather than “for the special benefit or profit” of the municipality. Tadjer v. Montgomery Cnty.,
479 A.2d 1321, 1325 (Md. 1984). And so, “[a] local governmental entity is liable for its torts, if
the tortious conduct occurs while the entity is acting in a private or proprietary capacity, but,
unless its immunity is legislatively waived, it is immune from liability for tortious conduct
committed while the entity is acting in a governmental capacity.” DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354,
369–70 (1999).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
The Defendants have moved to dismiss certain claims in this matter for several reasons.
First, the Town seeks to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims against it, upon the grounds that: (1) the
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible Monell claim, because she does not identify a municipal policy,
practice or custom attributable to the Town, or identify a specific custom or policy that caused
the alleged violations in this case to support her excessive use of force and failure to train claims;
(2) the Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Officers Cephus, Bigelow-Clark and Willet
must fail as a matter of law for the same reason; (3) for the same reason, the Plaintiff’s Longtin
claim against the Town must also fail; and (4) the Plaintiff’s state common law tort claims are
barred by governmental immunity. See generally ECF No. 16-1. In the alternative, the Town
requests that the claims brought against it be bifurcated for discovery and trial purposes. Id. at
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11. And so, the Town requests that the Court either dismiss the claims brought against it in in
this case, or bifurcate these claims and stay discovery. Id. at 13.
Second, the County Defendants seek to dismiss the claims brought against them, upon the
grounds that: (1) the Plaintiff fails to state a plausible Monell claim, because she does not
identify a municipal policy, practice, or custom attributable to the County, or identify a specific
custom or policy that caused the alleged violations in this case to support her excessive use of
force and failure to train claims; (2) the Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Officer Buie
must fail as a matter of law for the same reason; (3) for the same reason, the Plaintiff’s Longtin
claim against the Town must fail as a matter of law; (4) the Plaintiff’s state common law tort
claims are barred by governmental immunity with regard to the County; (5) Officer Buie is
entitled to public official immunity for the Plaintiff’s state law claims; (6) the complaint fails to
state a claim for malicious prosecution; and (7) the official capacity claim against Officer Buie
should be dismissed, because the claim is treated as a claim against the County. See generally
ECF No. 24-1. And so, the County and Officer Buie requests that the Court dismiss all claims
brought against them in this case. Id. at 10.
In her responses in opposition to the Defendant’s motions, the Plaintiff counters that Court
should not dismiss her Monell and Longtin claims against the Town, because: (1) she has alleged
facts to show that the Town lacks policies on the use of tasers, seatbelt protocols, jurisdictional
limits during secondary employment, extraterritorial arrest and unchecked secondary
employment policies and (2) she has identified eight comparator agencies that have policies on
these topics in the complaint.3 ECF No. 25-1 at 6. The Plaintiff also argues that she states a
plausible Longtin claim against the County, because Officer Buie participated in the alleged
constitutional violations. Id. at 6–7.
In addition, the Plaintiff argues that governmental immunity does not bar her state common
law tort claims against the Defendants, because this doctrine does not apply to claims based upon
rights protected by the Maryland State Constitution. ECF No. 25-1 at 13–16. Lastly, the
Plaintiff argues that she states a plausible malicious prosecution claim against the County
3 The Plaintiff concedes that she fails to state a Monell claim and an official-capacity claim against the
County Defendants in Counts I and II of the complaint. ECF No. 26-1 at 6.
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Defendants. Id. at 10–11. And so, the Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the Defendants’
respective motions to dismiss. Id. at 19.
For the reasons that follow, a careful reading of the complaint shows that the Plaintiff fails
to state plausible Monell and Longtin claims against the Town and County. The complaint also
makes clear that the Plaintiff fails to state plausible official capacity claims against Sergeant
Cephus and Officers Bigelow-Clark, Willet and Buie.
The Defendants also persuasively argue that the Plaintiff’s state common law tort claims
against the Town and County for assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, malicious prosecution and abuse of process are barred by the doctrine of
governmental immunity. But, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff states a plausible claim for
negligence in the complaint, based on her alleged “rough ride.” Lastly, the Defendants have not
shown that Officer Buie is entitled to public official immunity for the Plaintiff’s state law claims.
And so, the Court (1) GRANTS the Town’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16); (2) GRANTS-in-
PART and DENIES-in-PART the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 24); and (3)
DISMISSES: (a) the Plaintiff’s Monell and Longtin claims against the Town and the County in
Counts I, II, III and XI of the complaint; (b) the Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against
Sergeant Cephus and Officers Bigelow-Clark, Willet and Buie in Counts I, II, III and XI of the
complaint; and (c) the Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against the Town and County in Counts
IV, VI, VII, IX and X of the complaint.
A. 	The Court Dismisses The Plaintiff’s Monell And Longtin Claims4
As an initial matter, a careful reading of the complaint shows that the Plaintiff fails to
allege facts to show that her harm was caused by the implementation of an official policy,
practice, or custom, to support her Monell and Longtin claims against the Town. The Plaintiff
may bring a Section 1983 claim directly against a municipality, if the municipality causes a
deprivation of a constitutional right through an official policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). But, “a municipality can be found liable under § 1983
only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Given this, there must be a “policy or
4 Because the Court will dismiss the Plaintiff’s Monell claims against the County and Town, the Court
does not reach the issue of whether to bifurcate this case for the purposes of discovery and trial.
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custom” that caused the violation of an individual’s federal rights, for a municipality to be liable
under Section 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95. And so, to sufficiently plead a Monell claim,
the Plaintiff must allege “the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to
the municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.” Jordan ex rel.
Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994).
Relevant to this dispute, the Fourth Circuit has held that a policy or custom giving rise to a
Section 1983 claim cannot be “inferred merely from municipal inaction in the face of isolated
constitutional deprivations by municipal employees,” Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743
F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1984), unless the municipality’s conduct demonstrates “deliberate
indifference” to the rights of its inhabitants. See Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir.
1997) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389). Only if such deliberate indifference is shown
may the conduct properly be considered a “policy or custom” actionable under Section 1983.
See id. If the Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim, the Court need not conduct an independent
analysis of her Longtin claim. See Palma v. Montgomery County, 598 F. Supp. 3d 288, 297 n.5
(D. Md. 2022) (“Monell and Longtin claims rise or fall together, and the Court need not
undertake an independent analysis of the sufficiency of the latter.”); see Krell v. Queen Anne’s
Cnty., No. 18-637, 2018 WL 6523883, at *15 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2018).
In this case, the complaint makes clear that the Plaintiff fails to identify a policy or custom
attributable to the Town that could give rise to a Section 1983 claim. In the complaint, the
Plaintiff generally alleges that the Town “failed to educate, train and supervise [Sergeant]
Cephus on any policy prohibiting the use of his departmental taser on stun-drive; and or, the
Town of Forest Heights does not have a mandatory policy on the use of tasers by their officers
on stun-drive unlike other Maryland police agencies.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 25. The Plaintiff also
cites such policies for other Maryland municipalities. Id. But the Plaintiff does not identify a
“policy or custom” of the Town that caused the alleged violations of her rights. See id. at ¶ 25.
Given this, the Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the Town is not plausible. See Jordan ex rel.
Jordan, 15 F.3d at 338.
For these same reasons, the Plaintiff’s Longtin claims against the Town and County, and
the Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Sergeant Cephus and Officers Bigelow-Clark,
Willet and Buie, must also be dismissed. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
And so, the Court DISMISSES these claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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B. 	The Court Dismisses The Plaintiffs Tort Claims Against The Town And County
A careful reading of the complaint also shows that the Town and County are entitled to
governmental immunity with regard to the Plaintiff’s non-constitutional common law tort claims
in Counts IV, VI, VII, IX and X of the complaint. Under Maryland law, counties and
municipalities generally enjoy immunity against common law tort liability arising out of acts that
are governmental, as opposed to acts that are private or proprietary. Clark v. Prince George’s
Cnty, 211 Md. App. 548, 557 (2013). In this regard, Maryland courts have held that the Local
Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) does not waive immunity when the government is
sued in its official capacity. Khawaja v. City of Rockville, 89 Md. App. 314, 325 (1991) (“The
LGTCA, by its own terms, contains no specific waiver of governmental immunity when a
governmental entity is sued in its own capacity.”). 	And so, generally, the County and Town
cannot be held liable for state common law tort claims.
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks to bring state common law tort claims against the Town and
County, for among other things, assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. ECF No. 1 at 13–18. The
LGTCA provides no waiver to the Town’s and County’s governmental immunity with respect to
such claims. Martino v Bell, 40 F. Supp. 2d. 719, 723 (D. Md. 1999) (stating that the LGTCA
does not allow a plaintiff to name a county directly in a common law tort suit). And so, the
Court must also DISMISS these state common law tort claims against the County and Town in
Counts IV, VI, VII, IX and X of the complaint.
But the Plaintiff’s negligence claim against the County and Town, regarding her alleged
“rough ride,” is on somewhat firmer footing. In the complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants were negligent, because, among other things, Officers Buie and Sergeant Cephus
gave the Plaintiff a “rough ride” following her arrest. ECF No. 1 at 100. As the Defendants
acknowledge, Maryland law removes governmental immunity for negligent operation of vehicle
claims. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-639.
Given this, the County and Town may not raise governmental immunity as a defense to
the Plaintiff’s claim for damages resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. And
so, the Court declines to dismiss the Plaintiff’s negligence claims against the County and Town,
based upon her alleged “rough ride,” in Count VIII of the complaint.
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C. 	The Court Declines To Dismiss The Remaining Claims Against Officer Buie
Turning to the Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Officer Buie, the County Defendants
argue without persuasion that Officer Buie is entitled to immunity from the Plaintiff’s state tort
claims. See ECF No. 24 at 9. Maryland courts have held that law enforcement officers have
immunity under the law enforcement officer’s privilege for non-malicious, discretionary acts
performed in the course of their official duties. See Davis v. Muse, 51 Md. App. 93, 98 (1982).
But such public official immunity does not extend to intentional torts. Houghton v Forrest, 412
Md. 578, 588–89 (2010). Here, the Court is satisfied that the complaint alleges sufficient factual
allegations that, taken as true, show that Officer Buie acted with malice by participating in
fabricating charges, using excessive force and abusing the process. ECF No 1 at ¶¶ 17–21, 45,
68–69, 78–81, 83–87 and 102–110. 	And so, the Court declines to dismiss the Plaintiff’s state
law tort claims against Officer Buie.
The County Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff fails to state a plausible malicious
prosecution claim against Office Buie is also not persuasive. The complaint contains sufficient
factual allegations to satisfy the elements of this claim. To state a claim for malicious
prosecution, the Plaintiff must allege facts to show that: (1) the Defendants instituted or
continued a criminal proceeding against her; (2) without probable cause; (3) with malice; and (4)
that the criminal proceeding terminated in the Plaintiff’s favor. Okwa v Harper, 360 Md. 161,
183 (2000). A careful reading of the complaint shows that the Plaintiff has alleged facts that,
taken as true, satisfy the elements of this claim.
First, while the Plaintiff states in the complaint that Segreant Cephus filed the criminal
charges brought against her, she also alleges that Officer Buie actively participated in the events
that led to her arrest and prosecution. ECF No 1 at ¶¶ 17–21, 43–45, 68–69 and 103–104.
Second, the complaint alleges facts to show the absence of probable cause for the
Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 12-16, 18, 44, 67, 71 and 104.
Third, the complaint alleges facts to show malice on the part of Officer Buie. Id. at ¶¶ 45,
69, 74 and 104. Notably, the Plaintiff alleges that:
• 	Buie and Cephus, without legal justification or consent then
grabbed Egenti by her arms and about her body, causing great
pains and began physically attacking her in contorting her body,
pulling her in opposite directions and slamming her into her
shopping cart and other hard objects nearby, before forcing her
onto the floor with their pulling, tripping her to take her legs
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from underneath her and applying pressure from their respective
body weight.
• 	Egenti was in severe pain, fearful of the present and impending
physical attack of Defendants and thought she was going to be
slammed onto the ground face first, without an ability to brace
or protect her vital body parts as defendants continued dragging,
punching and pulling her in all directions. 	Nevertheless,
Plaintiff did not physically resist or attempt to resist an arrest,
nor did Plaintiff attempt to flee the painful grips of Defendants
Cephus and Buie.
• 	No defendant advised Egenti why she was being physically
grabbed, dragged and 	beat. Defendants Cephus and Buie,
together, 	handcuffed 	Plaintiff 	and 	dragged 	her 	out 	of 	the
merchandise section of the store, to Cephus Forest Heights
police vehicle (SUV car No. 427) situated outside the store
entrance doors.
• 	Plaintiff was aggressively dragged towards the police vehicle, by
both Cephus and Buie in an intentionally overly aggressive
manner designed to and did prevent Plaintiff from gaining
stability or an ability to walk and keep up with their fast-moving
pace, causing her ankles to twist, further injuring her and causing
more excruciating physical pain.
• 	Buie and Cephus, with Egenti’s hands hand-cuffed behind her
back, then intentionally shoved Egenti into the rear seat of an
extremely hot Forrest Heights police SUV, through the rear
passenger side door, causing her to hit her head and body on the
seats, causing more pain and suffering. At all relevant times, the
temperature outside was 97 degrees Fahrenheit and Egenti found
it very difficult to breath inside the SUV.
• 	On September 3, 2023, Defendants Cephus and Buie arrested
Plaintiff without probable cause at BJ’s Wholesale Club in
Capitol Heights, Maryland.
Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 45 (emphasis added). Lastly, the complaint makes clear that the
criminal proceeding against the Plaintiff was terminated in her favor. Id. at ¶¶ 47, 48, 70–71 and
105. Given this, the Plaintiff states a plausible malicious prosecution claim against Officer Buie.
And so, the Court also declines to dismiss this claim.
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V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Town’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16);
(2) GRANTS-in-PART and DENIES-in-PART the County Defendants’ motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 24); and
(3) DISMISSES:
(a) the Plaintiff’s Monell and Longtin claims against the Town and the County in
Counts I, II, III and XI of the complaint;
(b) the Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Sergeant Cephus and Officers
Bigelow-Clark, Willet and Buie in Counts I, II, III and XI of the complaint;
and
(c) the Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against the Town and County in Counts IV,
VI, VII, IX and X of the complaint.
A separate Order shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge
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