Doe v. Roe

8:23-cv-01617Mdd11.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD ROE,
Defendant.
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Civil No. PX-23-1617
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This Report and Recommendation addresses
ECF No. 55. On December 8, 2025, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and pursuant to Local
Rule 301.6, Judge Xinis referred this case to me for a report and recommendation on
Motion. ECF No. 58. 	I find that
a hearing is unnecessary. 	See 	Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully
recommend that 	Motion be denied.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Richard Roe and Smith High School on June 15, 2023,
ECF No. 1, and an Amended Complaint against the same defendants on October 19, 2023, ECF
No. 26. In both complaints, Plaintiff claimed that Richard Roe was liable to her for damages arising
ECF No. 26
¶ 1. 	see 	ECF
Nos. 50 & 51, leaving Richard Roe as the sole defendant. Richard Roe was personally served with
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the Complaint on August 22, 2023, but he did not answer or otherwise respond to it.1 	ECF No. 24.
On February 6, 2025, the Clerk entered an Order of Default against Richard Roe for his failure to
plead or otherwise defend against the Complaint. ECF No. 52. Notice of default was sent to
Richard Roe on the same day. ECF No. 54.
On March 5, 2025, Richard Roe filed the Motion to Vacate. ECF No. 55. Plaintiff filed an
opposition in response to the Motion, ECF No. 56, but Richard Roe did not file a reply and the
time for doing so has passed. 	See 	Loc. R. 105.2. The Motion is ripe for decision.
II. 	LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. 	Standard for Vacating Entry of Default
Under Rule
has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the
clerk must enter the party 	See also G&G Closed Cir. Events, LLC v. Elevation Cigars
& Lounge LLC, No. DKC-23-2477, 2025 WL 3187089, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2025). A
defendant 	s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to entry of a default judgment;
rather, that decision is left to the discretion of the court. 	See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th
Dow v. Jones, 232 F.Supp.2d 491, 494 (D. Md. 2002) (citing
United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993)), but default judgment may
1 	It does not appear that Richard Roe was initially served with the Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 26). But because Richard Roe failed to appear to defend against the Complaint, and
because the Amended Complaint did not assert new claims for relief against him, Plaintiff was not
required to serve him with the Amended Complaint. 	See 	No service is
required on a party who is in default for failing to appear. But a pleading that asserts a new claim
for relief against such a party must be served on that party under Rule 4. 	And in any event, on
December 4, 2023, the Court granted Richard Roe leave to respond to the Amended Complaint,
see 	ECF No. 31 at 1 n.1, but he failed to do so.
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be appropriate where a party is unresponsive, 	see 	S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F.Supp.2d 418, 421 (D.
Md. 2005) (citing 	Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
Pursuant to Rule
meritorious defense, whether it acts with reasonable promptness, the personal responsibility of the
defaulting party, the prejudice to the party, whether there is a history of dilatory action, and the
Payne ex rel. Est. of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 204-
05 (4th Cir. 2006); 	see also Timilon Corp. v. Empowerment Just. Ctr. Corp., 738 F. Supp. 3d 669,
Id. 	(quoting 	Tolson v.
Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969)). The Court will discuss each of the 	Payne 	factors below.
1. 	Meritorious Defense
Richard
He also notes that
Id. 	He says nothing more
showing that would permit a finding for the defaulting party. 	Timilon, 738 F. Supp. 3d at 680 	81
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing 	Acosta v. Vera 	s White Sands Beach
Club, LLC, No. PX-16-782, 2019 WL 1767147, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2019); 	Augusta Fiberglass
Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp.
defense requires a proffer of evidence which would permit a finding for the defaulting party or
) 	s burden for proffering a meritorious
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Acosta, 2019 WL 1767147, at *2 (quoting 	Russell, 2013 WL 66620, at *2);
see also United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982).
Richard Roe has not met this minimal burden. He has alleged no facts that would constitute
a defense if they were accepted as true. He only hints at the possibility of discovering such facts
meritorious defense must be more than a conclusory
statement of fact 	Kihn v. Vavala, No. PX-18-2619, 2019 WL 2492350, at *2 (D. Md. June 14,
2019); 	see also 	Consol. Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Const. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 252
fell far short of
providing the court with a satisfactory explanation of the merits of the defense 	Further, Richard
his
-1 at 4. Because
Richard Roe failed to make an evidentiary proffer or otherwise provide the Court with an
explanation of the merits of his defense, the first 	Payne 	factor weighs against vacating entry of
default.
2. 	Reasonable Promptness
Motion to Vacate was filed on March 5, 2025, which is 27 days
after default was entered. The Motion was filed before the 30-day deadline set forth in the Notice
of Default sent to Richard Roe. ECF No. 54.
, No. ELH-15-2572,
2016 WL 5144493, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 21, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because
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Richard Roe filed the Motion within 30 days of the entry of default, as directed by the Notice of
Default (ECF No. 54), I find that he acted with reasonable promptness. The second 	Payne 	factor
weighs in favor of vacating entry of default.
3. 	Personal Responsibility of Defaulting Party and History of Dilatory
Action
Richard Roe states that he was served with process on August 22, 2023, and acknowledges
that his response would have been due by September 12, 2023. ECF No. 55 at 1. He explains that
arty
(and without divulging specific privileged information), he was under a misimpression that the
School co- 	Id. 	at 2. Although Richard Roe admits that
he was aware of this litigation, he does not specify with whom he consulted about his defense, nor
does he explain why he believed that Defendant Smith High School would provide a defense for
him.
The Court will address the third and fifth 	Payne
to whether the defaulting party was personally responsible for the default and the fifth factor
Timilon, 738 F. Supp. at 682 (quoting 	Nat'l
Liab. & Fire, 2016 WL 5144493, at *7).
the Fourth Circuit have found that default judgment is reserved only for cases where the party 	s
noncompliance represents bad faith or complete disregard for the mandates of procedure and the
Timilon, 738 F. Supp. at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
by the errors or neglect of his attorney which cause a final, 	involuntary termination of
Moradi, 673 F.2d at 728.
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Richard Roe was aware that he was required to answer or otherwise respond to the
Complaint, but he failed to do so. He was solely responsible for this failure. His statement that he
-specific. Whatever this third party told him, the
Court has no basis to find that Richard Roe was not personally responsible for failing to participate
in this litigation before he filed the Motion to Vacate. The litigation went on for over 18 months
before Richard Roe made an appearance in the case. And notably, the Court specifically granted
Richard Roe leave to respond to the Amended Complaint, noting that he had previously failed to
respond to the original Complaint. ECF No. 31 at 1 n.1. Still, Richard Roe failed to respond.
he
had actual notice that he had not responded to the Complaint or Amended Complaint. He is
personally responsible for his extensive delay in appearing in this case. The third and fifth 	Payne
factors weigh against vacating default.
4. 	Prejudice
In the context of a motion to set aside an entry of default, as in other contexts, delay in
Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc.
v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 418 (4th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff does not explain how she
would be prejudiced if the Court vacates the entry of default. No discovery has been conducted in
this case. And although the original Complaint was filed over two years ago, much of the delay in
the case is due to Plain 	See 	ECF Nos. 33 & 44.
The fourth 	Payne 	factor weighs in favor of vacating default.
5. 	Availability of Sanctions Less Drastic
Sanctions less drastic than default are available in this case, as they are in all cases. Hall v.
Halsted Fin. Servs./Fortiva, No. 6:25-CV-68, 2025 WL 3298315, at *3 (W.D. Va. Nov. 26, 2025)
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impose other sanctions against the offending [party], such as awarding the non-movant's costs and
Because less drastic sanctions are available,
this factor weighs in favor of vacating the default.
6. 	Vacating Entry of Default Is Not Warranted
Three factors weigh in favor of vacating default. Richard Roe took prompt steps to seek
vacatur of the entry of default, the prejudice to Plaintiff that would result from vacating default is
es is available to the Court. But the
most important factors weigh against vacatur. Richard Roe has not proffered a meritorious defense.
abuse of a minor makes him liable to Plaintiff in this case. And Richard Roe is personally
responsible for the default. He was personally served with process, he was aware of this litigation
Amended Complaint, even though he failed to respond to the original Complaint. Still, Richard
Roe declined to participate in this litigation. Nothing suggests that his default was caused by
anything other than his personal choice. Even considering the strong preference for disputes
brought before this Court to be resolved on their merits, the 	Payne 	factors weigh against vacating
the default. Accordingly, I find that Richard Roe has not shown good cause to vacate the entry of
default.
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I find that Richard Roe has not shown that he is entitled to
vacatur of the entry of default. I recommend that the Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 55) be denied.
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Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed within 14 days,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) and Local Rule 301.5(b).
December 11, 2025 	/s/
Date 	Timothy J. Sullivan
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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