Siguel v. King Farm Citizens Assembly, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(SOUTHERN DIVISION)
)
EDWARD SIGUEL, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	)
) 	Civil Case No. GLS-22-672
KING FARM CITIZENS 	)
ASSEMBLY, INC., et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On March 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the following Defendants: King
Farm Citizens Assembly, Inc.; its current and former trustees Tracy L. Jackson, Nancy Paul, Susan
Beckerman, Christopher Leschack, Richard Ricciardi, Matthew Roh, Donald B. Jackson (also
president), Karen Sicard (architectural design trust member), and Brandi Ruff (KFCA general
manager) (“King Farm Individual Defendants”); and Laurence Frank and Bennett Frank McCarthy
Architects, Inc. (“Defendant Frank” and “Defendant BFMA,” respectively or collectively “BFMA
Defendants”). (ECF No. 1). Subsequently, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended
complaint. (ECF No. 15). In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added two individuals, Martin
P. Green, former president of KFCA and KFCA’s attorney, Ursula Burgess, Esq. (ECF No. 22).
Pending now is a “Motion Requesting Stay to Avoid Decorative Balcony and Other
Matters” filed by pro se Plaintiff, Edward Siguel (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Siguel”). (ECF No. 218,
“Motion”). Attached to the motion are a memorandum and several exhibits. (ECF No. 218-1,
“Memorandum;” ECF Nos. 218-2 through 218-13). Defendant King Farm Citizens Assembly, Inc.
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(“KFCA”) filed an Opposition and exhibits in support thereto. (ECF Nos. 220, 220-1). Plaintiff
has filed a reply. (ECF No. 221).
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court denies the motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Instant Case
The relevant procedural history in this case is set forth in Section I.A.2. As articulated later,
all defendants filed motions to dismiss. For purposes of resolving Plaintiff’s pending motion,
recitation of the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint is required.
1. 	Factual Allegations - First Amended Complaint: 2019-20221
Plaintiff, Edward Siguel, is a disabled individual that has experienced physical disability
for over forty years. (ECF No. 22, “Amended Complaint,” ¶ 41). Plaintiff suffers from a variety
of conditions, that cause numerous adverse symptoms such as physical pain, fatigue, muscular
weakness, the accumulation of bladder blood with movement, and “mental disruptions.” (Id., ¶¶
39-40). Due to these symptoms, Plaintiff is “substantially restricted” to his home. (Id., ¶ 42). He
needs access to a readily available bathroom. (Id.). Plaintiff often uses his home for studying,
thinking, caring for his children, and walking through his garden. (Id., ¶¶ 42-43).
In 2001, Plaintiff purchased his single-family-home. (Id., ¶ 126). Plaintiff's home is part of
the King Farm Citizens Assembly (“KFCA”) community, which includes single-family homes and
townhouses. (Id., ¶ 22).
1 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was, regrettably, confusing and frequently incomprehensible. This clearly violates
the standard set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Regardless of this fact, the Court did its best to
carefully review the Amended Complaint, and exercised best efforts to discern and identify the factual allegations and
causes of action that Plaintiff was attempting to advance. In this regard, the Court generously and liberally construed
Plaintiff’s pleading. However, the Court did not “act as an advocate” or “fashion claims” for Plaintiff. Lewis-Davis v.
Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty., Civ. No. ELH-20-0423, 2021 WL 4772918, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 13, 2021) (internal
citations omitted). Indeed, it would have been improper to do so and would have put an impermissible “strain [on]
judicial resources.” Id.
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Defendant KFCA is a homeowners’ association (“HOA”) and, as is relevant here, has a
President, Board of Trustees, a Board of Code Compliance, one or more managers, an
Architectural Design Trust and an architect. (Id.). The Architectural Design Trust and architect
require “design review applications” in order to “approved change to the exterior of houses.” (Id.).
As is relevant here, the following King Farm Individual Defendants served as Trustees: Donald B.
Jackson, Tracy L. Jackson, Nancy Paul, Susan Beckerman, Christopher Leschack, Richard
Ricciardi, and Matthew Roh. (Id., ¶ 23). Mr. Jackson also served as HOA President at one point
in time, as did King Farm Individual Defendant Mr. Green. (Id., ¶¶ 23, 27). King Farm Individual
Defendant Karen Sicard was part of the Architectural Design Trust, and Defendant Laurence Frank
worked for BFMA as an architect. (Id., ¶ 23). King Farm Individual Defendant Brandi Ruff was a
KFCA General Manager, who “decided [Plaintiff’s] structural, landscape requests, mandated
maintenance, and rejected modifications.” (Id., ¶ 25). King Farm Individual Defendant Burgess
was an attorney for Defendant KFCA. (Id., ¶ 28).
The HOA requires titleholders within the HOA to uphold obligations set forth in the HOA
or KFCA Charter (“the Charter”). (Id., ¶ 117). Pursuant to the Charter, a homeowner generally
cannot make changes to the visual appearances to the exterior of structures. (Id., ¶ 114; see also
ECF No. 33-4, the Charter, § 3-1022). Specifically, the Charter states the following:
Changes in the visual appearance of the exteriors of structures and
the Lots on which they are situated may not be made until approval
has been secured in writing from the King Farm Architectural
Design Trust. Changes in landscape elements that involve additions,
removal, or material changes in the appearance of trees, shrubs,
fences, or hard surfaces and materials shall also require written
approval of the King Farm Architectural Design Trust. To expedite
processing of approvals for the convenience of Titleholders, the
King Farm Architectural Design Trust may, in lieu of individual
notices of approval in writing, issue notice of the acceptability of a
2 For the Court’s analysis as to why it considered the Charter when resolving the motions to dismiss, see ECF No. 84,
p. 11.
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kind of proposed change that does not require formal application to
the King Farm Architectural Design Trust. Such notices shall be
based upon the Design Standards and Guidelines.
(ECF No. 33-4, the Charter, § 3-102).
However, such changes may be made upon approval by the King Farm Architectural
Design Trust, which is a HOA regulatory body that “aids the community in maintaining the visual
integrity of the [c]ommunity.” (ECF No. 33-4, the Charter, § 4-101). In addition, when a structure
is damaged, the Charter requires that a homeowner make the repairs necessary to restore the prior
appearance within ninety days. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 104; see also ECF No. 33-4, the Charter,
§ 3-104). Here, the Charter provides the following:
In the event of damage to a Living Unit or other structure which is
clearly visible from the exterior, the Titleholder of such Living Unit
or other structure shall be obliged to repair or reconstruct the Living
Unit or other structure in accordance with its appearance prior to
such damage unless the King Farm Architectural Design Trust has
agreed to the contrary. Such repair or reconstruction shall be
accomplished within ninety days of the damage unless the King
Farm Architectural Design Trust grants a waiver based upon a
finding of hardship. Should a Titleholder not conform to the
provisions of this § 3-104, the Board of Trustees is entitled to
accomplish necessary repairs or reconstruction according to its best
judgment, and levy an assessment upon the Titleholder for the costs
involved.
(ECF No. 33-4, the Charter, § 3-104).
The home was originally built to Plaintiff’s specifications and in accordance with HOA
requirements. (Id., ¶¶ 127-30, 135-36). The original design included an “open front porch,” with
columns that supported a flat roof. (Id., ¶ 103). The flat roof was made of wood and a “rubber like
thin soft material.” (Id.). On the flat roof extending over the porch, there were columns that
supported “long (over 30 ft) heavy” railings. (Id., ¶ 104). The columns were “nailed/screwed” into
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the flat roof. (Id.). The Plaintiff refers to this structure—the flat roof with columns and railings
sitting on top—as a “fake balcony.” (Id., ¶ 37).
Due to weather conditions, the columns on the roof were susceptible to damage and
difficult to maintain. (Id., ¶ 104). Snow and ice accumulated against the columns which would
result in water leaks. (Id., ¶ 104). To prevent water leaks, Plaintiff would need to remove the
accumulated water and snow quickly, which resulted in physical pain and organ damage. (Id. ¶¶
104-05). Also, strong winds often blow toward Plaintiff’s home, which results in damage to the
columns on the roof. (Id., ¶ 106). As a result, the water would enter the “infrastructure under the
roof” and cause structural damage. (Id.). Because of the repeated damage, Plaintiff repaired the
“fake balcony” on many occasions, at the request of the HOA. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 31, 225).
In or about 2019, Plaintiff removed the columns on the roof in order to repair the damaged
roof. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 107). Plaintiff did not replace the columns on the roof because
Plaintiff did not want to damage the roof by “put[ting] nails/screws [into the roof] to hold
columns.” (Id., ¶ 107). HOA representatives reviewed the roof damage and authorized Plaintiff to
replace the flat roof. (Id., ¶ 109). However, the HOA required that Plaintiff reinstall the columns
on the flat roof after the repairs were complete. (Id., ¶¶ 109-10). In response, Plaintiff submitted
requests to the HOA, seeking permission to not reinstall the columns. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 80).
Plaintiff submitted various alternatives to requiring him to reinstall the columns such as: (1)
preserving the flat roof without replacing the columns; (2) the HOA could reinstall the columns;
(3) the HOA could provide three contractors to do the work; (4) tall plants could be grown to
obstruct the flat roof; and (5) a planter could be placed on the roof. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 85-
90). The HOA denied these requests and instructed Plaintiff to repair the “fake balcony.” (Id., ¶¶
91-93).
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Plaintiff also made other requests to the HOA, all of which were denied. These requests
include: (1) the ability to build a brick patio on top of soil in Plaintiff’s backyard; (2) the
construction of a shed in Plaintiff’s backyard; (3) the installation of a “horizontal shed” on
Plaintiff’s front porch; (4) the installation of a plant trellis. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 9, 79, 158, 239-40, 246).
In addition to denying all of Plaintiff’s above-detailed requests, the HOA also issued
violation notices, and either did impose--or threatened to impose--fines related to modifications
that Plaintiff made to his home, e.g., the removal of the columns and placing horizontal shed on
front porch. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 6, 54, 261, 317, 375).
BFMA Defendant Frank, as an agent of KFCA, “made decisions on [Plaintiff’s] request
for changes to his property.” Moreover, the Architectural Design Trust and Mr. Frank “had
authority to recommend or allow [the] modifications requested by Plaintiff,” which were rejected.
(Id., ¶ 23). Each time that Mr. Frank “made a recommendation to KFCA” none of his
recommendations nor those of the Architectural Design Trust were “rejected.” (Id., ¶ 24).
According to the Plaintiff, Defendant Burgess “filed a complaint” on behalf of Defendant
KFCA against Plaintiff with the Commission on Common Ownership Communities(CCOC),
“demanding that [Plaintiff] repair/replace columns and railings on the 1 st floor porch.” (Id., ¶ 28).
In addition, “later during a hearing [Ms. Burgess] amended to reinstall fake balcony on 2 nd floor
porch roof(sic),” and Burgess “provided recommendations regarding communications between
[Plaintiff] and KFCA and other Defendants.” (Id., ¶ 28)
As of the date that the First Amended Complaint was filed, the HOA continued to make
the demands regarding Plaintiff’s maintenance of his home exterior. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 371).
In sum, the First Amended Complaint alleges wrongdoing by the Defendants only between
in or about 2019 until in or about October 2022, and requested accommodations related to an area
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on top of his open front porch that had a flat roof extending over it, which, at one time, had columns
and railings sitting on top of it. Regarding this issue, Plaintiff initially used the phrase “fake
balcony” and later uses the words “balustrade/railing” when describing the issues.
2. 	Procedural History: 2022-2025
The extensive procedural history in this case is set forth in great detail in two prior
memorandum opinions authored by the Court. (ECF Nos. 84, 119). For the purposes of resolving
the pending motion, recitation of some of that history is required here.
On October 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff appeared to
advance the following claims against all Defendants, except as otherwise noted: Count I, failure
to allow reasonable modifications, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 et seq., the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”)3; Count II, failure to allow reasonable accommodations, in violation of the FHA and 42
U.S.C. 12101 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); Count III, disparate impact,
in violation of the FHA; Count IV, disparate impact, in violation of the FHA; Count V, retaliation
in violation of the FHA; Count VI, failure to allow for reasonable for reasonable modifications, in
violation of the FHA; Count VII declaratory relief, under “42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §
3602(i), and 42 U.S.C. § 3613,” related to the King Farm Defendants’ ability to enforce their
governing documents; Count VIII, intentional discrimination, in violation of the FHA; Count IX,
failure to allow for reasonable accommodations and/or modifications, in violation of the FHA and
the ADA; and Count X, which appears to be involve allegations of trafficking, involuntary
servitude, and forced labor, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 15904. (ECF No. 22, see, e.g., ¶¶
342-377).
3 Plaintiff did not pursue this claim against King Farm Individual Defendants Green and Paul. (ECF No. 22, ¶ 344).
4 The Plaintiff also referred to 15 U.S.C. § 1581, which does not exist.
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All Defendants filed motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which Plaintiff
opposed. (ECF Nos. 33, 34, 39, 43, 49, 50, 51, 63, 64, 67). By memorandum opinion and order
dated October 12, 2023, the Court granted in part, denied in part the motions to dismiss. Dismissed
from the instant action were all of the King Farm Individual Defendants and Defendant Burgess,
and virtually all claims against Defendants Frank, KFCA, and BFMA. (ECF Nos. 84, 85). What
remained in the action was Count VI against Defendant KFCA and the BFMA Defendants,
specifically pertaining to the accommodation/modification requests related to the storage sheds on
Plaintiff’s front porch and in the back of Plaintiff’s house. (Id.).
Subsequently, in or about October 2023 - December 2023, Plaintiff and Defendants Frank
and BFMA moved for reconsideration of the Court’s orders. (ECF Nos. 93-95, 99, 102, 109, 110,
113-117). The Court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying all motions for
reconsideration on July 3, 2024. (ECF Nos. 119-122).
On July 9, 2024, Plaintiff sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which
Plaintiff briefed and the Defendants opposed via various filings in August 2024 - September 2024.
(ECF Nos. 126, 137, 138, 140, 143, 150). In the motion, Plaintiff sought to reallege the claims
regarding the balustrade that had already been dismissed. (ECF No. 126). During a hearing on
September 27, 2024, the Court issued its ruling, denying Plaintiff’s request to file a Second
Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 155, 166).
Thereafter, the Court entered a Scheduling Order, which set December 16, 2024 as the
deadline for the close of discovery. (ECF No. 124). The operative scheduling order was amended
two more times, first in October 2024 and then in May 2025, upon request of the parties. (ECF
Nos. 158, 159, 162, 168, 174, 175). The Second Amended Scheduling Order, which was the final
order, made clear that discovery was to close on August 22, 2025. (ECF No. 175). Between in or
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about October 2024 - August 2025, the parties engaged in discovery, and the Court resolved
several discovery disputes. (ECF No. 174).
On August 6, 2025, approximately 16 days before discovery was to end, Plaintiff asked the
Court to reconsider its October 12, 2023 dismissal of his claims related to the balcony’s columns
and railings (hereinafter referred to as “balustrade”). (ECF No. 191). In support of that request,
Plaintiff cited to Grp. Home on Gibson Island, LLC v. Gibson Island Corp., a 2025 Fourth Circuit
opinion. (Id.). In his request, Plaintiff contended that there had been a change in the FHA law on
what constitutes a “necessary” accommodation. (Id.). The Court ordered responses from the
Defendants, which they timely filed. (ECF Nos. 194, 198, 199).
Per the operative Scheduling Order, discovery closed in this case on August 22, 2025. (ECF
No. 175).5
Thereafter, the Court scheduled a case management conference, which was cancelled per
the request of one of the parties. (ECF Nos. 201-203). When the conference finally occurred, the
Court deferred ruling on the pending reconsideration motion so that the parties could attend
mediation. (ECF No. 209). Mediation is currently scheduled for March 9, 2026. (ECF No. 219).
On December 16, 2025, Plaintiff sought leave to file a motion to stay enforcement of
KFCA’s requirement that he re-install the railings and columns, to which KFCA responded. (ECF
Nos. 213, 214, 216). On December 23, 2025, the Court set a schedule for briefing by the parties.
(ECF No. 217).
5 A discovery dispute remains pending this Court’s consideration, which the Court deferred ruling on until after the
parties attend a mediation session on March 6, 2026. See ECF Nos. 197, 206.
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3. 	Procedural History 2026
On January 8, 2026, Plaintiff timely filed “Motion Requesting Stay to Avoid Decorative
Balcony and Other Matters” and a “Memorandum in Support of an Injunction to Stay/Stop KFCA
Demands.” (ECF Nos. 218, “Motion;” 218-1, “Memorandum”).
In the Motion and Memorandum, Plaintiff advances several requests for relief. First,
relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 3613, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter a “permanent or temporary
injunction, temporary restraining order or other order to enforce the FHA.” Second, Plaintiff cites
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, arguing that the Court has the power to enter a temporary restraining order
against CCOC “if the CCOC continues its actions, or find CCOC acts in concert with or assists
KFCA to evade federal law or Court Orders.” Third, Plaintiff cites to the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and asks the Court to “clarify existing legal rights, duties or
relationships between the parties.” Fourth, relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 3615, Plaintiff asks the Court
to declare that by trying to force him to reinstall the balustrade, KFCA’s actions violate the FHA.
(Motion, p. 2; Memorandum, pp. 3, 19-21).6
To support his arguments, Plaintiff relies upon Grp. Home on Gibson Island, LLC v.
Gibson Island Corp., 144 F.4th 522 (4th Cir. 2025) (“Gibson Island Corp.”). According to
Plaintiff, the Gibson Island Corp. opinion redefines what constitutes a “reasonable and necessary”
accommodation under the FHA, and his request to not re-install the balustrade fits squarely under
what Gibson Island Corp. prescribes. Thus, he contends that he has met his burden to satisfy the
legal requirements necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction. (Motion, pp. 1-23).
Defendant timely filed its Opposition. (ECF No. 220). Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No.
221).
6 All page numbers cited to are the CM/ECF numbers at the top of the pages.
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4. 	Factual Allegations Advanced in 2026 Filings
a. 	Exhibits
Plaintiff attached exhibits to the Memorandum. Plaintiff’s exhibits are described as
follows: (1) “Exhibit PO18,” which appears to be a September 2, 2025 document that he authored
related to the balustrade. Plaintiff characterizes this exhibit as an “FHA Request [that] All KFCA
actions must be consistent with and comply with public laws”; (2) “Exhibit PO19,” which appears
to be a September 17, 2025 document that he authored related to the balustrade. Plaintiff describes
this document as “[stating] issues and my justifications/explanations” and describes threats and
attempts at coercion by KFCA; (3) “Exhibit PO22A,” dated October 30, 2024, which is Defendant
KFCA’s objections and responses to Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories in this case, specifically
answers to Interrogatories Nos. 10-13; (4) “Exhibit PO22B,” no date provided, which is Defendant
KFCA’s objections and responses to Plaintiff’s first request for production of documents (RFPDs),
specifically RFPD Nos. 6-9; (5) “Exhibit PO23A,” dated April 14, 2025, which is Defendant
BFMA’s answers and objections to Plaintiff’s “owner set of interrogatories,” specifically answers
to Interrogatories Nos. 1-7, 12-13; (6) “Exhibit PO23B,” no date provided, which is Defendant
BFMA’s responses and objections to Plaintiff’s RFPDs Nos. 5-6; (7) “Exhibit PO27,” dated
January 27, 2023, which Plaintiff calls “Affidavit Owner January 2023 KFCA elections;” (8)
“Exhibit PO29,” no date provided, which is Defendant Frank’s answers and objections to
Plaintiff’s “owner set of interrogatories” in this case, specifically answers to Interrogatories Nos.
1-2, 5-7; (9) “Exhibit PO30,” no date provided, which is Defendant Frank’s answers to Plaintiff’s
RPFD Nos. 5-8; (10) “Exh. S1,” a document called “Commission on Common Ownership
Communities Complaint Form,” signed by Ursula K. Burgess, dated, December 11, 2020; (11)
“Exh. S2,” consists of two different documents: (a) a September 25, 2025 “Request for
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Enforcement” form, letterhead says “Montgomery County, Maryland Department of Housing and
Community Affairs (DHCA), Commission on Common Ownership Communities,” signed by
Ursula K. Burgess, Esq.; (b) Order from the Supreme Court of Maryland, dated September 25,
2024, in In the Matter of Edward Siguel, Petition No. 169, September Term, 2024 (No. 238, Sept.
Term, 2022, Appellate Court of Maryland), (Cir. Ct. No. 486895V), affirming the denial by the
Appellate Court of Maryland of Mr. Siguel’s petition for writ of certiorari; and (12) “Exh. S3,”
“Uniform Civil Citation,” dated December 4, 2025, issued by DHCA to Mr. Siguel, that refers to
an “attached affidavit” (no such document is attached by Plaintiff) and says that Mr. Siguel is
charged with “failure to comply with Decision and Order (10B-13-J),” and instructs him that he
“may pay a $500.00 fine by December 24, 2025, or elect to stand trial by sending a written request
to the Office of the County Attorney.” (ECF Nos. 218-2 through 218-13).
Defendant KFCA’s exhibits are described as follows: (1) a “Decision and Order” issued
by the Commission on Common Ownership Communities (“CCOC”) for Montgomery County,
Md., Case No. 2021-042, dated July 9, 2021. (ECF No. 220-1, pp. 1-15); (2) an “Order Affirming
Agency Decision,” issued by Hon. Christopher C. Fogleman, Associate Judge, Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Md., on March 22, 2022, in Edward Siguel v. King Farm Citizens Assembly,
Inc.,, Case No. 486895V, which refers to the July 9, 2021 CCOC decision and order (ECF No.
220-1, p. 16); and (3) a copy of the September 25, 2024 Order issued by the Supreme Court of
Maryland in In the Matter of Edward Siguel, affirming the Appellate Court of Maryland’s denial
of Mr. Siguel’s petition for writ of certiorari. (ECF No. 220-1, p. 17).
b. 	Undisputed Facts
Neither side has objected to the other side’s version of certain facts related to CCOC.
Indeed, reviewing their filings, the parties seem to agree on some basic facts, which are essential
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to the Court’s ultimate decision related to the balustrade. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 22, 218, 218-1, 218-
11 through 218-13, 220, 220-1).
As best as the Court can understand it,7 on December 11, 2020, Ursula Burgess, Esq., on
behalf of KFCA, filed a complaint against Mr. Siguel with the CCOC. The complaint was filed
because there was an area on top of his open front porch that had a flat roof extending over it,
which had columns and railings sitting on top of it that Mr. Siguel removed without KFCA’s
authorization or approval. (ECF No. 220-1, p. 17; see also First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 28, 37).
In the December 11, 2020 Complaint Form, KFCA stated “we would like Mr. Siguel to apply for
and subsequently replace the porch railings on his home which comply with the Assembly’s
requirements.” (ECF No. 218-11, p. 3). Although referenced in the Complaint Form, there is no
document called “Summary of Complaint” attached. (Id.).
There were hearings before a CCOC panel that occurred after the Complaint Form was
filed and before the CCOC issued its decision on July 9, 2021. In brief, Mr. Siguel was ordered by
CCOC to reinstall the columns and railings in the way in which they were originally there, having
found that he needed to submit a new design application to KFCA. (ECF No. 220-1, p. 14; see also
First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 27-28).
Thereafter, Mr. Siguel filed a petition for judicial review of CCOC’s decision and order in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, challenging the CCOC’s findings of facts and
conclusions of law. (ECF No. 220-1, p. 16). The parties were allowed to brief the issues, and the
7 For the orders from the Supreme Court of Maryland and the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, the Court took
judicial notice of them. See generally Hughes v. Freightliner, LLC, No. 7:04CV00309, 2006 WL 1842997, at *1
(W.D. Va. June 29, 2006) (citing Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991)(“[A] court may take
judicial notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but
rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.’”)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
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court entertained oral argument. (Id.). In March 2022, the Honorable Christopher Fogelman issued
an order affirming CCOC’s decision and order. (Id.).
Later, Mr. Siguel appealed Judge Fogelman’s decision to the Appellate Court of Maryland,
which must have denied his appeal, and then Mr. Siguel filed a petition for certiorari with the
Appellate Court, which was denied. (Id.). Subsequently, Mr. Siguel sought relief from that order
in the Supreme Court of Maryland. (ECF No. 218-12). The Supreme Court of Maryland denied
relief on September 25, 2024. (Id.).
c. 	Additional Factual Allegations Advanced by Mr. Siguel
The Court infers that, by submitting exhibits, Mr. Siguel is asking the Court to construe
them as containing facts relevant to resolving the pending motion.
In January 2023, KFCA held elections, seemingly for the Board. (ECF No. 218-8). Mr.
Siguel communicated with “KFCA management, KFCA lawyer, and other KFCA residents,” and
believes that the election records inadequately reflect “how many citizens/residents were able to
vote,” thereby rendering invalid the KFCA election for President. (Id.).
Apparently, on August 25, 2025, Ms. Burgess, on behalf of KFCA, responded to Mr.
Siguel’s request that KFCA stay any proceedings against him related to the balustrade. KFCA
denied his request. (ECF No. 218-2). On September 2, 2025, Mr. Siguel emailed Ursula Burgess,
Esq. and “Brandi,” “president@kingfarm.org” and “trustees@kingfarm.org” about letters that he
sent to them on August 17, 2025 and August 21, 2025. (Id.). Those letters reportedly explained to
KFCA why their actions related to the balustrade “are inconsistent with the FHA and recent 4 th
Cir. decision in Gibson case.” (Id.). Also in the September 2 email, Mr. Siguel makes a series of
demands of KFCA, including: that the entity preserve records and that it explain the “adverse
consequences(to me), and actions KFCA may or will take, now that it does not stay its actions.
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(Id.). In the email, Mr. Siguel also demands that “each KFCA administrator, each Trustee, and
Lawyer Burgess [compensate him] with $100,000 (plus damages) if their actions violate public
laws or KFCA governing documents.” (Id.). Furthermore, he calls for the dissolution of KFCA.
(Id.).
On 	September 	17, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	emailed 	Ursula 	Burgess, 	Esq. 	and
“president@kingfarm.org” and “trustees@kingfarm.org,” stating “this letter is not legal advice, it
only states issues and my justifications/explanations. I am not a licensed attorney.” (ECF No. 218-
3). Mr. Siguel again refers to the August 25, 2025 email from Ms. Burgess, complaining that it
“does not explain, state, its justifications(sic), who voted, when, how, to deny the request for a
stay.” (Id.). He then includes other sections: “the denial of my request for a stay in alleged housing
violations and actions violates the FHA;” “actions by KFCA administrators violate KFCA
founding documents;” “please do not interfere with my housing civil rights;” and “the following
actions appear to be coercion or intimidation or interference with my civil rights. Please explain
why not, for each one.” (Id.). He concludes with asking for the current mailing address for KFCA
President Scott, and says that he “look[s] forward to your clarifying response on the above issues.”
(Id.).
Finally, the Court is unclear on the relevance of the following exhibits, all of which appear
to be generated while discovery was pending in the case now before the Court: (1) Defendant
KFCA’s objections and responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Nos. 10-13; (2) Defendant KFCA’s
objections and responses to Plaintiff’s RFPD Nos. 6-9; (3) Defendant BFMA’s answers and
objections to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Nos. 1-7, 12-13; (4) Defendant BFMA’s responses and
objections to Plaintiff’s RFPDs Nos. 5-6; (5) Defendant Frank’s answers and objections to
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Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Nos. 1-2, 5-7; (6) Defendant Frank’s answers to Plaintiff’s RPFD Nos.
5-8.
B. Other Proceedings Related to the Balcony
Mr. Siguel has also sought relief from KFCA’s actions related to the so-called fake balcony
or balustrade in other litigation.
1. 	Federal Court
While his motion for reconsideration related to the Gibson Island Corp. case was pending
before the Court, on September 23, 2025, Mr. Siguel filed another lawsuit in U.S. District Court-
Maryland related to the fake balcony or balustrade.8 In that action, he sued King Farm Citizens
Assembly, Inc., its current president (Paul Scott) and its “Chair of Trustees” (Susan Beckman).
(ECF No. 1).9 That other lawsuit raised similar allegations about his disabilities and alleged that
KFCA and the individual defendants violated the law in several ways. (Id.). As is relevant for
resolution of the pending motion, Mr. Siguel alleged that KFCA and the individual defendants
engaged in unlawful housing practices, including violating the FHA by refusing to grant his request
for a reasonable and necessary accommodation related to the balustrade. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 71-72,
161-165, 170, 180-208). In that new complaint, Mr. Siguel alleges for the first time in any filing
in federal court in Maryland that KFCA and the named defendants engaged in additional
wrongdoing related to the balustrade in or about 2024-2025. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 69-135, 140, 186-
208).10
The remaining procedural history of this case is set forth in a January 21, 2026
memorandum opinion issued by the district judge in Civ. No. DLB-25-3145. (ECF No. 21).
8 See Siguel v. King Farm Citizens Assembly, Inc., et al.¸ Civ. No. DLB-25-3145. (D. Md.).
9 In this Section only, the CM/ECF numbers refer to the docket entries in Civ. No. DLB-25-3145.
10 As set forth above in Section I.A.1., the dates alleged in the case now before this Court range from in or about 2019
to in or about October 2022.
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2. 	Administrative and State Court Litigation
As set forth above in Section I.A.4.b., KFCA filed a complaint against Mr. Siguel in front
of the CCOC. In addition, Mr. Siguel appealed the CCOC’s decision and order to the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, Md., then to the Appellate Court of Maryland, and finally to the Supreme
Court of Maryland. (ECF Nos. 218-12; 220-1, pp. 16-17).
II. 	DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is pro se, and has accorded his
motion, memorandum and attachments thereto as liberal a construction as feasible, given the state
of his filings. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, that does not mean that
Plaintiff’s filings do not have to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the law.
A. Plaintiff’s Arguments
As the Court understands it, in the Motion and Memorandum, Plaintiff advances seven
requests for relief.
Plaintiff first asks the Court to order KFCA to permit him, at his expense, to maintain his
porch’s 	roof 	without 	adding 	back 	the 	columns/railings. 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	this
accommodation/modification request is “authorized by the FHA,” as it is necessary in order for
him to “safely and fully use and enjoy” his home, “notwithstanding his disability.” (Motion, p. 1).
In connection with this argument, Plaintiff requests “that the claim for no balcony should be
reinstated due to errors of fact and law.” (Id., p. 3). In support of this argument, Plaintiff relies
upon the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Gibson Island Corp. (Memorandum, pp. 7-23).
Second, and alternatively, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order than enjoins KFCA
from “demanding or requiring that he install a balcony pending resolution of the federal claims.”
(Id.). Third, as another alternative, Plaintf asks the Court to order KFCA “and those acting in
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concert, to halt enforcement of the order (which requires that he re-install the fake balcony) that
[was issued by the CCOC].” while this action is pending in federal court. (Motion, pp.1, 3)
Fourth, he asks the Court to order KFCA to “withdraw” its complaint,”11 and to “enjoin
KFCA from further participation in, or from filing, new retaliatory complaints or administrative
actions based on the balcony facts.” (Motion, pp. 1, 4). Fifth, that “pending resolution (sic),”
Plaintiff asks the Court to order that “there be no inspections or compliance actions requiring
physical movement onto the roof or balcony-related labor.” (Motion, p. 4). Plaintiff does not
clearly articulate whether he seeks a ruling precluding CCOC from engaging in inspections or
performing “compliance actions,” or whether he seeks to preclude KFCA from so behaving.
Sixth, Plaintiff asks the Court to “grant appropriate declaratory or summary relief
confirming that KFCA’s balcony demand violates the FHA, and that KFCA’s remedy, if any, must
proceed in federal court rather than through local coercion.” (Motion, p. 4). Finally, Plaintiff asks
the Court to “provide an opinion addressing the controlling facts and law, certify appropriate
issues, and allow interlocutory appeal.” (Motion, pp. 1-4).
B. Defendant KFCA’s Arguments
In opposing Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant KFCA advances five arguments. First, that
Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits because this Court has already dismissed the balcony
claims, which “is dispositive of the ‘likelihood of success factor.’” Second, because Plaintiff has
already “litigated and lost” claims related to the re-installment of the balcony in state court, the
doctrine of res judicata prevents Plaintiff from reasserting those claims now. (Opposition, pp. 4-
6). Third, Plaintiff improperly seeks relief related to CCOC, which is not a party to this action.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s request to bind CCOC to any ruling issued by this Court runs afoul of Fed.
11 Although not explicitly stated, the Court infers that this request is for the Court to order KFCA to withdraw its
complaint before CCOC.
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R. Civ. P. 65(d). (Opposition, pp. 6-7). Fourth, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of establishing
irreparable harm, and granting the preliminary injunction is not in Plaintiff’s interest. Finally,
Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 3615 is not warranted because the statute
“targets conflicting governmental enactments and does not convert neutral, privately adopted
community covenants into per se violations, nor does it strike down rules that neither require nor
permit discrimination as the FHA defines it.” (Opposition, pp. 8-9).
C. The Law
1. 	Preliminary Injunction
As a preliminary matter, neither party has asked for a hearing. In addition, this Court finds
that even though a preliminary injunction motion has been filed, no hearing is necessary given the
procedural posture of this case. See Fundamental Admin. Servs., LLC v. Anderson, Civ. No. JKB-
13-1708, 2015 WL 2340831, at *1 (D. Md. May 13, 2015) (declining to hold hearing where “the
parties’ written submissions do not raise a question of fact that must be resolved before the Court
may rule on Plaintiff’s motion”); see also 11A Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949 (3d ed. 2019) (“[P]reliminary injunctions are
denied without a hearing, despite a request for one by the movant, when the written evidence shows
the lack of a right to relief so clearly that receiving further evidence would be manifestly
pointless”).
Next, the Court is not entirely sure that the law allows Plaintiff to use a preliminary
injunction as the vehicle to reopen claims that the Court has already adjudicated. Instead, as set
forth below, the Court believes that the appropriate vehicle is a motion for reconsideration.
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a. 	Winter Standard
The Fourth Circuit has held that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that [a] plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Perry v.
Judd, 471 F. App’x 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2012)(citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 22m 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249(2008)). Put another way, a plaintiff does not automatically
have a right to entry of a preliminary injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, 125 S. Ct. 365. Indeed, a
trial court enjoys broad discretion is deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. Id.
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff Siguel must establish the following
factors: (1) that [he] is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that [he] is likely to suffer irreparable
harm if preliminary relief is not granted; (3) that the balance of equities between the parties tips in
favor of Plaintiff; and (4) that entry of an injunction is in the public interest. Frazer v. Prince
George’s County, 86 F.4th 537, 543 (4th Cir. 2023)(citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). Plaintiff bears
the burden of satisfying all four factors in order to obtain a preliminary injunction. Real Truth
About Obama, Inc. v FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S.
1089, 130 S. Ct. 2371, 176 L.Ed.2d. 764 (2010), reinstated in relevant part, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir.
2010). Plaintiff must make a “clear showing” that he is entitled to relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
Thus, if Mr. Siguel fails to establish any of the aforementioned factors, his preliminary injunction
must be denied. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 346.
b. 	42 U.S.C. § 3613
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A), a person may initiate an action in federal court or
state court “not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged
discriminatory housing practice. . . to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory
housing practice.” In addition, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1): “in a civil action [initiated under
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subsection (a)], if the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. . .the court
may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages. . .and may grant as relief, as the court
deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction. . . .”
The Court agrees that this statute permits Plaintiff to file a lawsuit in federal court to
challenge a discriminating housing practice. Indeed, Plaintiff has cited to this statute in his First
Amended Complaint. The Court also finds, however, that the statute provides that only after a
factual finding is made that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred can a court enter a
permanent or temporary injunction. Thus, as set forth herein, the Court proceeds with its analysis
of the exhibits before it and of the Winter factors.
2. 	Declaratory Judgment Requests
Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, where an “actual controversy within its
jurisdiction” exists, “any court of the United States. . .may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). A court can
exercise jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action if the following circumstances exist:
(1) the complaint alleges and actual controversy between the parties
of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment;
(2) the court possess an independent basis for jurisdiction over the
parties; and
(3) the court does not abuse its discretion in its exercise of
jurisdiction.
Volvo Const. Equip. N. America, Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., Inc., 386 F.3d 581, 592 (4th Cir. 2004).
In the Memorandum, Plaintiff also cites to 42 U.S.C. § 3615. As is relevant here, the statute
provides that “nothing in [the FHA] shall be construed as to invalidate or limit any law of a State
or political subdivision of a State. . .that grants, guarantees, or protects the same rights as are
granted by [the FHA]; but any law of a State. . .that purports to require or permit any action that
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would be a discriminatory housing practice under [the FHA] shall to that extent be invalid.” 42
U.S.C. § 3615.
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff cites to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) and 42 U.S.C. §
3615. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 19, 215-220, 225, 354-355). In the Memorandum, Plaintiff first
asks the Court to find that “Gibson 4 th Cir. supports to reinstate the balcony and all associated
claims.” (Memorandum, p. 7). Plaintiff relies upon these statutes when asking the Court to declare
that Defendant KFCA has violated the FHA by failing to grant his accommodation request.
As set forth herein, to resolve the pending motion, the Court must analyze Winter.
D. Rulings Related to the Pleading and Submissions
1. 	Plaintiff’s Pleading and Preliminary Injunction Motion
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the only complaint before it is the First
Amended Complaint, which only pertains to alleged KFCA conduct that occurred between 2019 -
October 2022. Put another way, there is no pleading before the Court that sets forth KFCA’s
alleged misconduct related to the balustrade that occurred in or about 2023 - 2025. Relatedly, to
the extent that Plaintiff asks the Court order CCOC to act or not act, there is no pleading before
the Court that names CCOC as a party. Instead, Plaintiff, relying upon his assertions in the Motion,
appears to be asking the Court to proceed as if it had an amended complaint in which CCOC is a
named party and the allegations pertaining to KFCA were clearly pleaded. Because that is not true,
the Court cannot so proceed. If Plaintiff seeks to amend his First Amended Complaint by the words
that he uses in the preliminary injunction motion, this is improper. In general, a party may not
amend his complaint thru its briefing. Hurst v. District of Columbia, 681 F. App’x 186, 194 (4th
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Cir. 2017). Thus, the Court finds that to extent that Plaintiff believes that his arguments can take
the place of a properly-pleaded complaint, the Court declines to so find.12
Next, when filing the Motion and Memorandum, Plaintiff does not attach an affidavit or a
declaration of facts that relates to KFCA’s conduct that allegedly occurred in or about 2023 - 2025.
Instead, Plaintiff repeatedly makes allegations in the Memorandum as if they are facts that support
his requested relief. Factual assertions by Plaintiff in the Motion are not evidence. Plaintiff is
entitled to a preliminary injunction if he can put forth evidence that he is likely to succeed on the
merits of a claim that is actually set forth in a pleading. Winter requires a “clear showing,” which
means that evidence must be submitted. Such evidence usually consists of affidavits, verified
complaints or declarations, to support the “extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Winter, 555 U.S. at
22.
Moreover, in the absence of facts and the legal framework (claims asserted against CCOC
in a complaint), the Court does not necessarily have the power to grant the relief that Plaintiff seeks
related to CCOC’s actions. Relatedly, it is certainly true that Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C) provides
that a court can enter an order that binds not only the parties but “other persons who are in active
concert or participation with [parties].” However, reviewing Plaintiff’s submission, Plaintiff has
failed to put forth evidence that CCOC is acting in concert with (in effect, colluding with) KFCA,
which is required to establish the showing required under the statute. Thus, the Court declines to
ask CCOC “to halt enforcement of the order (which requires [Plaintiff to] re-install the fake
balcony),” or to cease engaging “in compliance actions.” (Motion, p. 4).
12 It is worth noting that after the Court denied Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, and before
discovery closed on August 22, 2025, Plaintiff did not seek leave to file a Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) motion to supplement
the First Amended Complaint to contain additional facts related to KFCA, nor did he seek leave to amend, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) and 16(b)(4), to add CCOC as a party.
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In light of the above, the Court could have exercised its discretion and denied Plaintiff’s
requests outright. Instead, the Court focused on whether Plaintiff, even with his deficient pleading
and submission, ultimately meets his burden under Winter.
2. 	Defendant KFCA’s Submission
In the Opposition, Defendant KFCA contends that Plaintiff cannot “reasser[t] these
balcony claims that already have been dismissed in a prior lawsuit” because: (a) the factual and
legal issues related to the same “were decided fully and finally in the Association’s favor;” and (b)
Plaintiff’s claims raise issues that he could have brought in the litigation before CCOC and in the
state court. (Opposition, p. 5).
Res judicata is a doctrine that “bars a party from suing on a claim that has already been
litigated to a final judgment by that party or such party’s privies and precludes the assertion by
such parties of any legal theory, cause of action, or defense which could have been asserted in the
action.” Reid v. New Century Mortg. Corp., Civ No. AW-12-2083, 2012 WL 6562887, at *3 (D.
Md. Dec. 13, 2012)(quoting Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 210
(4th Cir. 2019))(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A defendant can succeed in its assertion if it establishes: “(1) a judgment on the merits in
a prior suit resolving (2) claims by the same parties and their privies, and (3) a subsequent suit
based on the same cause of action.” Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal, supra, 556 F.3d at 210 (quoting Aliff
v. Joy Mfg. Co., 914 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1990)).
In connection with its Opposition, Defendant KFCA has put the following exhibits before
the Court: (1) a “Decision and Order” issued by the Commission on Common Ownership
Communities (CCOC) for Montgomery County, Md., Case No. 2021-042, dated July 9, 2021.
(ECF No. 220-1, pp. 1-15); (2) an “Order Affirming Agency Decision,” issued by Hon.
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Christopher C. Fogleman, Associate Judge, Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Md., on March
22, 2022, in Edward Siguel v. King Farm Citizens Assembly, Inc.,, Case No. 486895V, which
refers to the July 9, 2021 CCOC decision and order (ECF No. 220-1, p. 16); and (3) a copy of the
September 25, 2024 Order issued by the Supreme Court of Maryland in In the Matter of Edward
Siguel, affirming the Appellate Court of Maryland’s denial of Mr. Siguel’s petition for writ of
certiorari. (ECF No. 220-1, p. 17).
The Court can clearly take judicial notice of the second and third exhibits, as they establish
the fact of prior litigation and related filings. See Hughes, supra, 2006 WL 1842997, at *1 (citing
Kramer, 937 F.2d at 774). However, those exhibits do not provide any facts about the issues before
the Circuit Court, the Appellate Court of Maryland, and the Supreme Court of Maryland. Thus,
the Court is unable to find that there has been a judgment on the merits in a prior suit resolving all
claims that Plaintiff has raised in the instant action.
Regarding the first exhibit, while the existence of it and the fact that there were hearings
before the CCOC that Mr. Siguel attended do not appear to be in dispute, on the record before me,
it is unclear whether there are disputed issues of fact about what transpired before the CCOC
panel.13 When evaluating the defense of res judicata, “a court may take judicial notice of facts
from a prior judicial proceeding when the res judicata defendant raises no disputed issues of fact.”
Kalos v. Centennial Sur. Assocs., Civ. No. CCB-12-1532, 2012 WL 6210117, at *2 (D. Md. Dec.
12, 2012)(quoting Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000)(citation and quotation
marks omitted)).
13 Had Defendant KFCA put more evidence in front of the Court, perhaps its ruling would have been different.
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Thus, on this record, the Court declines to find that res judicata operates to preclude
Plaintiff from reasserts claims related to the balustrade that have already been dismissed by the
Circuit Court.
3. 	Connection between Preliminary Injunction Factors and Gibson Island Corp.
There is one more predicate step taken by the Court before it engaged in the Winter
analysis. As the Court sees it, by filing the Motion and Memorandum, Plaintiff is, in effect, seeking
a reconsideration of the Court’s earlier decision dismissing the balcony-related claims from this
case. The Court so finds because Plaintiff relies so heavily upon Gibson Island Corp., believing
that it establishes new precedent and supports his belief that the Court erred in dismissing his
claims related to the so-called fake balcony. Accordingly, the Court also construes the Motion and
Memorandum as a motion for reconsideration based on a change in applicable law.14
Evaluating Gibson Island Corp. appears to be interconnected to the Court’s ability engage
in a success-on-the-merits analysis in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. Thus, in
the next section, the Court sets forth its understanding of Gibson Island Corp. and the FHA law.
As the Court ultimately determines that its decision dismissing the balustrade-related
claims was not erroneous, it ceases its Winter analysis after that point.
14 Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court’s prior order resolving the Defendants’ motions to dismiss is
considered an interlocutory order. Rule 54(b) also governs a motion asking the Court to reconsider its interlocutory
order granting in part, denying in part Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Deitemyer v. Ryback, Civ. No. ELH-18-2002,
2019 WL 4393073, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 12, 2019). The Court understands the law to be that a court can revise an
interlocutory order “in the same circumstances in which [a court] may depart from the law of the case, [namely]: (1)
a subsequent trial proceeding producing substantially different evidence; (2) a change in applicable law; or (3) clear
error causing manifest injustice.” Carlson. v. Bos. Sci. Corp, 856 F.3d 320, 325 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). Thus, as is relevant here, reconsideration may be proper when “the law has been
changed by a body with greater authority on the issue [presented, such as] a court higher in hierarchy of a single court
system, a state court developing law that controls [a] decision by a federal court, an administrative agency that is
peculiarly responsible for elaborating a statutory scheme, or the same court sitting en banc.” Charles Allen Wright &
Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 (3d ed. June 2024 update)(footnotes omitted).
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E. FHA LAW AND GIBSON ISLAND CORP. DECISION
1. 	The FHA and Reasonable Accommodations
In its memorandum opinion issued in October 2023, the Court analyzed the Fair Housing
Act’s reasonable accommodation provisions. (ECF No. 84, pp. 21-27). That analysis, upon with
the Court continues to rely, is set forth immediately below.
In addition, in light of the Motion, the Court has found it necessary to add some additional
language regarding the definition of “necessary” from Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty,
Md., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Fair Housing Act’s reasonable accommodation and modification provisions are
codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)(A) and (f)(3)(B), respectively, and provide the following:
(3) For purposes of this subsection, discrimination includes--
(A) a refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person,
reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be
occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to
afford such person full enjoyment of the premises except that, in the
case of a rental, the landlord may where it is reasonable to do so
condition permission for a modification on the renter agreeing to
restore the interior of the premises to the condition that existed
before the modification, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
(B) a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary
to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling[.]
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A),(B). For “accommodation” and “modification” claims, the inquiry
principally relates to whether the proposed accommodation or modification is “reasonable” and
“necessary.” Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty, Md., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997); see
also Gavin v. Spring Ridge Conservancy, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D. Md. 1995).
An accommodation or modification is “reasonable” when it is “both efficacious and
proportional to the costs to implement it.” Acosta v. A&G Mgmt. Co., Inc., Civ. No. WMN-14-
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515, 2014 WL 1236918, at *2 (D. Md. 2014) (citing Matarese v. Archstone Pentagon City, 761 F.
Supp. 2d 346, 364 (E.D.Va. 2011)). Analyzing this issue often involves determining whether the
accommodation or modification will cause “undue financial and administrative burdens,” or
substantial “changes, adjustments, or modifications to existing programs….” Bryant Woods, 124
F. 3d at 604.
Moreover, in Bryant Woods, the Fourth Circuit opined that:
In 	enacting 	the 	FHA, 	Congress 	clearly 	did 	not 	contemplate
abandoning the deference that courts have traditionally shown to [ a
county’s] local zoning code. 	And the FHA does not provide a
‘blanket waiver of all facially neutral zoning policies and rules,
regardless of the facts’. . .which would give the disabled ‘carte
blanche to determine where and how they would live regardless of
zoning ordinances to the contrary. . . .’ Seeking to recognize local
authorities’ ability to regulate land use and without unnecessarily
undermining the benign purposes of such neutral regulations,
Congress required only that local governments make ‘reasonable
accommodation’ 	to 	afford 	persons 	with 	handicaps 	‘equal
opportunity to use and enjoy’ housing in those communities.
The FHA requires an accommodation for person with handicaps if
the accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford
handicapped persons equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.
Bryant Woods, 124 F.3d at 603(internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court does not read Bryant
Woods to interpret the FHA to provide a blanket waiver of all facially neutral policies and rules,
regardless of the facts.
In defining the “necessary” element, the Bryant Woods court held:
[T]he FHA provision mandating reasonable accommodations which
are 	necessary 	to 	afford 	equal 	opportunity. 	. 	.requires 	the
demonstration 	of 	a 	direct 	linkage 	between 	the 	proposed
accommodation and the ‘equal opportunity’ to be provided to the
handicapped person. This requirement has attributes of a causation
requirement. And if the proposed accommodation provides no direct
amelioration of a disability’s affect, it cannot be said to be necessary.
Bryant Woods, 124 F.3d at 604 (citing Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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Per Bryant Woods, then, an accommodation or modification is “necessary” when it
provides a “direct amelioration of a disability's effect.” Id. Conversely, if “the proposed
accommodation [or modification] provides no direct amelioration of a disability's effect, it cannot
be said to be ‘necessary.’” Acosta, 2014 WL 1236918, at *2 (internal citation omitted).
The law is also clear that “not every practice that creates a general inconvenience or burden
on the person with a handicap needs to be modified;” instead, “necessary” accommodations and
modifications under the FHA are those that are needed to allow a disabled individual to “use and
enjoy” his home. See Evans v. UDR, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 675, 680 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (citing Bryant
Woods, 124 F.3d 603); see also Gavin, 934 F. Supp. at 687.
The Court will now turn to its interpretation of Gibson Island Corp.
2. 	Gibson Island Corp.
On July 15, 2025, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in Grp. Home on Gibson Island,
LLC v. Gibson Island Corp.
a. 	Background
The case involves a dispute between a man named Craig Lussi, a homeowner on Gibson
Island, Md., and an entity called Gibson Island Corporation, which is a homeowner’s association
and governing body for Gibson Island. Beginning in or about 2016, the plaintiff made it known to
Gibson Island Corp. that he intended to build an assisted living group home for elderly people with
disabilities. The Gibson Island Corp. opposed the project, communicating the same to Mr. Lussi.
In 2019, Mr. Lussi tried to purchase property from Gibson Island Corp. to build the facility, but it
rejected his offer; Gibson Island Corp. claimed that it could not accept his bid because he had
previously threatened to sue it for violating federal and state laws designed to prevent housing
discrimination against the disabled. Then, in 2020, Mr. Luisi purchased a home on Gibson Island,
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planning to renovate it to be used as an assisted living facility. Gibson Island Corp. vigorously
opposed the project. 144 F.4th at 528-30.
Their disagreements first eventuated in a complaint being filed in federal court by Gibson
Island Group against Mr. Lussi and his company Group Home on Gibson Island, in which it sought
a declaratory judgment that Mr. Lussi could not renovate the home without its approval because
the proposed facility violated Gibson Island’s business-purpose covenant against commercial use
properties. The district court granted declaratory relief to Gibson Island Corp. finding that Lussi
and his company had to formally request an exemption to the covenant’s provisions before moving
forward with renovations. Thereafter, Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC and another company
(“plaintiffs”) sued Gibson Island Corp. in federal court, alleging that it had violated the FHA’s and
Maryland’s 	fair 	housing 	laws. 	Specifically, 	plaintiffs 	accused 	Gibson 	Island 	Corp. 	of
discriminating against the prospective residents of the assisted living residence because they were
disabled, and of retaliating against the plaintiffs, when it denied their request to exempt the facility
from the business-purpose covenant so that the group home could open on Gibson Island.
Discovery ensued, during which evidence was developed about other conditions that Gibson Island
Corp. required the plaintiffs to comply with before the entity would agree to approve of the assisted
living facility. 144 F.4th at 530. At the close of discovery, the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment. Id.
b. 	The Fourth Circuit’s Opinion
As a procedural matter, the case was before the Fourth Circuit on an appeal of the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Gibson Island Corporation. The Fourth Circuit’s
review of the district court’s decision was de novo, where it evaluated anew the facts and inferences
in favor of the party that did not move for summary judgment. Understandably, then, the Fourth
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Circuit began its opinion with an extensive recitation of the factual history in the case. 144 F.4th
at 528-31. The Fourth Circuit found there had been years of discovery that “produced an extensive
record dating back years, with the parties hotly disputing material facts and the inferences to be
drawn from them.” 144 F.4th at 528. The Fourth Circuit opined that “if a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-movant, then a genuine factual dispute exists, and summary judgment
is improper.” 144 F.4th at 531.
The Fourth Circuit continued its analysis of the plaintiffs’ failure to accommodate claims,
opining that the burden was on the plaintiffs to establish that their proposed accommodation was
“reasonable” and “necessary” to afford the prospective assisted living home residents an equal
opportunity to have housing on the Island. 144 F.4th at 532. The Fourth Circuit, citing to Bryant
Woods, then held that “[a]n accommodation is ‘necessary’ if there is a ‘direct linkage’ between the
proposed accommodation and the provision of equal opportunities.” Gibson Island Corp, 144 F.4th
at 532 (quoting Bryant Woods, 124 F.3d at 604). In the very next sentence of the opinion, the
Fourth Circuit opines about what makes an accommodation reasonable. 144 F.4th at 532-33. This
Court does not read the opinion to reflect that, when defining “necessary,” the Fourth Circuit
squarely struck down or overruled that part of the Bryant Woods opinion that contains very next
phrase: “This [necessity] requirement has attributes of a causation requirement. And if the
proposed accommodation provides no direct amelioration of a disability’s affect, it cannot be said
to be necessary.” 144 F.4th at 533.
Next, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rationale underpinning its decision
granting summary judgment in favor of Group Island Corp. on the plaintiffs’ reasonable
accommodation claims. In performing appellate review, the Fourth Circuit highlighted how the
district court had reasoned that the evidentiary record established that removal of the disputed
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conditions in order to approve of the assisted living facility “was not ‘necessary’ to allow for use
of the proposed group home by future residents with disabilities.” The Fourth Circuit held that the
district court had so ruled because “Lussi could not show the required ‘direct linkage’ between his
proposed group home and the provision of an equal housing opportunity for people with
disabilities.” Id. By way of example, the district court held that were plaintiffs to comply with one
of the conditions sought by Gibson Island Corp it would not “compromise the enjoyment of [the]
property by a disabled resident, making removal of the condition ‘unnecessary’ as a matter of law.”
Id.
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by “asking the wrong question,” and
that what mattered is “whether a proposed accommodation is necessary to provide equal housing
opportunities,” 	not 	whether 	removing 	Gibson 	Island 	Corp.’s 	proposed 	conditions 	were
“necessary.” Id. Next, the Fourth Circuit framed the question as “whether the accommodation
actually requested by Lussi-an exception to the business-purpose covenant for his proposed group
home was ‘necessary’ to provide prospective residents an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their
housing of choice.” Id. When so doing the Fourth Circuit again cites to Bryant Woods: “analyzing
whether requested accommodation to expand group home was ‘necessary’ in light of other
opportunities for disabled persons to live in the same area.” Id.
Finally, having “ask[ed] the right question,” the Fourth Circuit then analyzed the evidence
in the record, finding that “on the sprawling record before us, there are two sides to this story, not
one, making summary judgment inappropriate.” 144 F.4th at 539.
In sum, Gibson Island Corp. is a case in different procedural posture than this case; the
error occurred there because the district court ultimately evaluated the facts and resolved the
disputes of material fact itself, rather than letting them go before a jury. Next, this Court does not
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believe that the Fourth Circuit squarely addressed the amelioration issue in Gibson Island Corp.
Thus, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s interpretation that the Gibson Island Corp. decision
changed the applicable law on the causation requirement that proposed accommodation must
provide a direct amelioration of a disability’s effect . Instead, the Court finds that the amelioration/
causation requirement in Bryant Woods remains good law.
3. 	Analysis of the Instant Case
Having so concluded that the Gibson Island Corp. decision does not change the law, and
having now reconsidered its earlier ruling in light of Gibson Island Corp., the Court again finds
that Plaintiff’s claims in the First Amended Complaint related to the balustrade, as pleaded, do not
allow the Court to infer that they are “necessary” as defined by the FHA. (ECF No. 84, pp. 24-27).
If the question is whether the accommodation that Plaintiff requests--not to have to re-install the
balustrade--is “necessary” to provide him with an equal opportunity to use the house of his choice,
then, Bryant Woods still requires the Court to consider whether the proposed accommodation
provides “direct amelioration of” the effects of his disability. The focus is not on the arguments
made by Plaintiff in the Motion or the Memorandum, which are not evidence nor the appropriate
way to amend the First Amended Complaint (i.e., they are not procedurally ripe). Instead, the
Court, when reconsidering its earlier ruling, must focus on what Plaintiff pleaded in the First
Amended Complaint. See, e.g., ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 85-89. While Plaintiff may not like KFCA’s
Charter and regulations, “not every practice that creates a general inconvenience or burden on the
person with a handicap needs to be modified;” instead, “necessary” accommodations and
modifications under the FHA are those that are needed to allow a disabled individual to “use and
enjoy” his home. See Evans, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 680; see also Gavin, 934 F. Supp. at 687.
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Consequently, Plaintiff cannot establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits--the first
prerequisite to establishing the need for the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction.
None of the exhibits that Plaintiff puts in front of the Court constitute sufficient evidence
to demonstrate a likely violation of the civil rights of Plaintiff, who could live in and enjoy his
home if it were not for KFCA’s Charter and other documents. None of the documents clearly relate
to how Plaintiff’s proposed accommodation provides direct amelioration of the affects of his
disability; they do not help him to establish that his accommodation is necessary. When evaluating
the exhibits that Plaintiff attached to the Memorandum, the Court finds several of them to be
irrelevant. See ECF Nos. 218-4 through 218-10. In addition, two of the exhibits are not declarations
or affidavits, but documents authored by Plaintiff (which contain hearsay and appear to contain
excerpts from other documents), and frequently contain his characterization of FHA law. See ECF
Nos. 218-2, 218-3. Moreover, as held above, the remaining three documents, at best, only help to
establish facts that are undisputed; namely, that Defendant KFCA sought and obtained a ruling
from CCOC requiring him to reinstall the balustrade, which he appealed in state court and failed
to prevail. See ECF Nos. 218-11 through 218-13. Thus, none of Plaintiff’s exhibits aid him in
meeting his burden of putting sufficient evidence before the Court such that it can find that he has
satisfied the likelihood of success element required by Winter, entitling him to the relief that he
seeks.
Because Plaintiff has failed to establish the first Winter factor, the Court is required to deny
Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 346.15
15 In the Motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue its opinion “addressing the controlling facts and law,” and to “certify
appropriate issues, and allow interlocutory appeal.” (Motion, p. 4). It is unclear to the Court whether Plaintiff is
actually saying that, if this Court denies the preliminary injunction motion, he will file an appeal with the Fourth
Circuit. It is equally possible that Plaintiff could be a asking the Court to certify under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), that the
Court believes that, when issuing this order, there is “a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the termination
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to stay/motion for preliminary injunction is
DENIED.
A separate Order will follow.
Dated: February 26, 2026 	/s/
The Honorable Gina L. Simms
United States Magistrate Judge
of litigation.” See also Does v. Musk, Civ. No. TDC-25-462, 2026 WL 242062, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2026). The
Court declines to interpret Plaintiff’s bareboned request as sufficiently making a request under the statute or the law.
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