J.O.P., et al v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
J.O.P., et al., 	*
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Plaintiffs, 	*
*
v. 	* 	Civil No. SAG-19-01944
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 	*
HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., 	*
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Defendants. 	*
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2019, a class of individuals who arrived in this country as “unaccompanied alien
children” (“UACs”) filed this lawsuit to challenge a revision to policies governing adjudication of
their subsequent asylum applications. ECF 1. On November 25, 2024, this Court held a fairness
hearing and granted the parties’ joint motion for final approval of a settlement agreement in this
case (the “Settlement Agreement”). ECF 205. The settlement did not conclude the case, however,
as there have been a multitude of issues stemming from alleged violations of Defendants’
obligations under the Settlement Agreement. Three such motions are currently ripe for disposition:
(1) Class Counsel’s Motion for Order Directing Defendants to Provide Prompt Notice of Class
Member’s Return to the United States, ECF 320; (2) Class Counsel’s Motion to Find Probable
Cause to Hold Defendants in Contempt, ECF 375; and (3) Defendants’ Motion to Vacate, ECF
386.1 This Court has reviewed the three motions along with the related briefing. ECF 376, 382,
1 Class Counsel recently filed a new motion relating to Defendants’ alleged noncompliance with
the Settlement Agreement, ECF 428. That motion is not yet ripe for disposition and will be
adjudicated separately.
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392, 393, 395, 406, 407, 421. No hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For
the reasons that follow, all three motions will be denied.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A class of asylum seekers filed this lawsuit against Defendants from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging the procedures for determining which agency would
have initial jurisdiction over their asylum applications. The parties settled the case through a
Settlement Agreement approved by this Court on November 25, 2024. ECF 205. In relevant part,
the Settlement Agreement defines class members as individuals “for whom USCIS has not
adjudicated the individual’s asylum application on the merits.” ECF 199-2 at Section II.E. Section
III.I of the Settlement Agreement provides “[w]ith respect to any Class Member with a final
removal order, ICE will refrain from executing the Class Member’s final removal order until
USCIS issues a Final Determination on one properly filed asylum application under the terms of
this agreement.” Id.
On March 15, 2025, President Trump issued a Proclamation entitled, Invocation of the
Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua, ECF 227-2 Ex.
3. On that same day, Defendants began removing Venezuelan nationals to El Salvador, alleging
without any formal process that each removed individual was a member of Tren de Aragua.
Despite a temporary restraining order issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
Defendants removed several hundred Venezuelans to El Salvador, where they were detained at
CECOT, a supermax prison.2
2 The basis for the Venezuelan nationals’ indefinite detention in El Salvador went unexplained.
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One of the Venezuelans removed to CECOT was Cristian,3 who was 20 years old and had
a pending asylum application with USCIS. On March 13, 2025, Cristian’s immigration counsel
alerted ICE officials that Cristian was a member of the settlement class in this case, also providing
them a link to the Settlement Agreement on USCIS’s website. ECF 376-2 at 2-3. Nevertheless,
Cristian was among the Venezuelan nationals removed by Defendants to El Salvador two days
later, on March 15, 2025.
On April 23, 2025, in response to Class Counsel’s emergency motion to enforce the
Settlement Agreement, this Court ordered Defendants to “facilitate Class Member Cristian’s return
to the United States to await the adjudication of his asylum application on the merits by USCIS
under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Facilitation includes, but is not limited to, a good
faith request by Defendants to the government of El Salvador to release Cristian to U.S. custody
for transport back to the United States.” ECF 254 ¶ 2 (the “April 23 Order”).
Defendants first attempted to vacate the “facilitation” paragraph of this Court’s Order and
then filed an appeal along with a motion to stay. ECF 261. This Court granted a stay of the
paragraph pending the filing of the appeal, ECF 270, but the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit declined to stay the paragraph pending adjudication of the appeal, with the
majority of the panel explicitly stating that this Court’s requirement that Defendants make a “good
faith request” as part of “facilitation” was proper. J.O.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-
1519, 2025 WL 1431263, at *6 (4th Cir. May 19, 2025) (Benjamin, J., concurring).
Once the stay was lifted, on May 20, 2025, this Court ordered Defendants to provide a
status report by 5:00 PM on May 27, 2025 regarding “(1) Cristian’s current physical location and
3 “Cristian” is the pseudonym approved by this Court for use in this litigation to protect the class
member’s safety. ECF 254.
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custodial status; (2) what steps, if any, Defendants have taken to facilitate Cristian’s return to the
United States; and (3) what additional steps Defendants will take, and when, to facilitate Cristian’s
return.” ECF 280 (the “May 20 Order”). Defendants filed their report one hour late, stating only,
“It is DHS’s understanding that Cristian is in the custody of El Salvador. DHS has informed the
Department of State (DOS) of the Court’s order and requested DOS assistance in complying with
the Court’s order. DOS has acknowledged DHS’s request.” ECF 285-1 ¶ 10.
Recognizing the substantive and procedural deficiencies with that response, this Court
issued an Order on May 28, 2025 to remind Defendants that “strict adherence to this Court’s
deadlines is expected and required” and to require additional information on the three topics
identified in the May 20 Order. ECF 287 (the “May 28 Order”). This Court also invited Class
Counsel to propose “a process to create an appropriate record on Defendants’ lack of compliance
with this Court’s orders.” Id. at 2.
Defendants provided a more responsive status report on June 2, 2025, stating, “Secretary
Rubio has a personal relationship with President Bukele,” that “he is personally 	handling the
discussions with the government of El Salvador regarding persons subject to the Court’s order,”
and that “he is committed to making prompt and diligent efforts on behalf of the United States to
comply with that order.” ECF 290-1 ¶ 6.
Class Counsel proposed a process for creating a factual record, ECF 289, and on June 5,
2025, this Court ordered that Defendants, on each ensuing Friday, “file a weekly status report on
or before noon ET in the form of a declaration by an individual with personal knowledge”
concerning the same three topics enumerated in the May 20 Order. ECF 293 (the “June 5 Order”).
During the six-week period between June 6 and July 18, 2025, Defendants filed eight such Status
Reports. ECF 294, 295, 300, 303, 307, 314, 330, 352. Several of those were filed after the noon
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deadline (but always before 5 PM). Although some of the reports provided some information about
Cristian’s whereabouts and health, none of them detailed steps being taken for his return or
provided evidence that either Defendants or the State Department had made a good faith request
to El Salvador for Cristian’s release. Id.
The June 5 Order also prescribed a process for the parties to engage in expedited discovery
about the government’s actions. ECF 293 ¶¶ 2, 4–6. The parties commenced the discovery process.
The discovery responses received by Class Counsel do not reflect that any good faith request was
made to El Salvador to release Cristian to the United States, although there are communications
regarding a request for information on his custodial and health status.
As Defendants continued to assure (in a non-specific fashion) that the Department of State
was “making prompt and diligent efforts on behalf of the United States to comply” with this
Court’s orders, on July 8, 2025, the New York Times reported that Secretary Rubio was
“overseeing a deal to free several Americans and dozens of political prisoners held in Venezuela
in exchange for sending home about 250 Venezuelan migrants the United States had deported to
El Salvador.” 4 On the morning of Friday, July 18, 2025, some news reports speculated that the
prisoner swap would occur that day. Once again, on that date, Defendants failed to file their court-
ordered weekly status report by the noon deadline. When Class Counsel reached out that afternoon
for information, Defendants’ counsel responded that they were “waiting for information from the
Department of State.” ECF 376-11 at 2. When Class Counsel contacted this Court about the news
coverage, this Court ordered an additional status report on whether Cristian “is being transported
4 Frances Robles et al., U.S. Botched a Deal to Swap Venezuelans Held in El Salvador for
Americans, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2025),
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/08/world/americas/trump-venezuelan-migrants-us-prisoner-
swap.html.
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to Venezuela.” ECF 351 (the “July 18 Order”). At 4:25 PM ET, Defendants filed their belated
status report, ECF 352, and at 5:04 PM ET filed an additional status report in response to the July
18 Order, stating that Cristian “is either currently in Venezuela or will arrive there shortly.” ECF
353 at 1. They represented that “the United States obtained assurances from the Maduro regime
that (1) if and when U.S. legal proceedings reach a stage where the appearance of one of the 252
Venezuelan nationals formerly housed at CECOT may be called for in legal proceedings or
required by a court; (2) if the U.S. government is prepared to facilitate the person’s travel to the
United States for that purpose; and (3) if the individual is willing to travel to the United States for
that purpose, the Maduro regime will not impose obstacles to the individual’s travel.” ECF 352
Ex. A ¶ 9; ECF 353 at 1. Further, Defendants represented, “The Department of State has also
pledged to assist Department of Homeland Security in facilitating the return of Cristian should he
wish to return.” ECF 352 at 1; ECF 353 at 1.
This Court held a hearing on July 22, 2025 on Class Counsel’s pending Motion to Compel
Discovery. In light of the intervening events, this Court denied Class Counsel’s Motion to Compel,
without prejudice, and ordered the parties to file joint weekly status reports regarding their ongoing
discussions about Cristian’s return to the United States. ECF 358. Eleven such status reports were
filed. ECF 363, 366, 368, 379, 380, 384, 388, 390, 396, 404, 408. The first such reports indicated
that Class Counsel was in contact with Cristian and that Class Counsel were attempting to obtain
information from the government regarding the terms of his return to the United States. But
beginning in late August, 2025, Class Counsel has been unable to reach Cristian to provide updates
on his desire to return to the United States. His whereabouts are presently unknown. This Court
has since stayed the weekly reporting requirement in light of the lack of new information and the
government shutdown. ECF 415, 417. Each of the currently pending motions is addressed below.
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II. 	MOTION FOR PROMPT NOTICE
In July, 2025, while Cristian was held in El Salvador’s CECOT prison, Class Counsel filed
a “Motion for an Order Directing Defendants to Provide Prompt Notice of Class Member’s Return
to the United States.” ECF 320. The motion noted Defendants’ representation, in ECF 318, that
they would give Class Counsel notice within 48 hours of Cristian’s return to this Country, and
expressed concern that, within that 48-hour timeframe, Defendants could adjudicate the merits of
Cristian’s asylum petition without ever notifying his counsel that the proceedings were underway.
No opposition to the motion was filed but intervening events have rendered the motion
moot. Cristian is now, to the best the parties are aware, in Venezuela and is no longer in any
government’s custody. Should he resume contact with his counsel, any return to the United States
will occur through negotiations with the United States government (or potentially through Court
order) and will not happen by surprise. Accordingly, this Court will deny ECF 320 as moot,
without prejudice.
III. 	MOTION TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE FOR CONTEMPT
A. Legal Standards
Class Counsel ask this Court to make a finding that probable cause exists that Defendants
have engaged in conduct constituting criminal contempt by willfully failing to comply with this
Court’s orders.5 ECF 376. A criminal contempt charge “initiate[s] ‘a separate and independent
proceeding at law [. . .] to vindicate the authority of the court’ [that is] ‘not a part of the original
5 Class Counsel do not seek civil contempt, which generally applies when a court uses contempt
proceedings to coerce a party’s compliance with an existing court order. Although there are some
nuances, a contempt sanction is generally considered civil if it “is remedial, and for the benefit of
the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the
authority of the court.” Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). Plaintiffs’
instant motion focuses solely on punishment by this Court for the allegedly noncompliant conduct
that already occurred.
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[case].’” Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 75 (1975) (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 445, 451).
“Criminal contempt proceedings are thus initiated at the sole discretion of the court and are ‘not
dependent on the [success] or even the continuation of the’ underlying suit.” Brandt v. Gooding,
636 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bray, 423 U.S. at 76) (alteration in Brandt).
18 U.S.C. § 401(3) permits a federal court “to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at
its discretion, . . . [d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.” Imposition of criminal contempt sanctions in the context of violation of a court order
requires that three elements be proved: “(1) a reasonably specific order; (2) violation of the order;
and (3) the willful intent to violate the order.” In re Gates, 600 F.3d 333, 338-39 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Allen, 587 F.3d 246, 255 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see also United
States v. Linney, 134 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1998) (“To support a conviction of criminal contempt
for violation of a court order, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant willfully violated a decree that was clear and left no uncertainty in the minds of those
that heard it.”) (citing Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123,
129 (4th Cir.1977)). If probable cause exists to believe that such criminal contempt has occurred,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) provides certain procedural safeguards to govern the
proceedings, to include notice of the contempt charges, the appointment of an independent
prosecutor, and a jury trial.
B. Analysis
Class Counsel allege that probable cause exists to find Defendants’ willful violations of
two sets of clear court orders: (1) this Court’s April 23 Order (ECF 254) to facilitate Cristian’s
return to the United States, and (2) its May 20 Order (ECF 280) and June 5 Order (ECF 293) to
provide status reports at particular times containing particular information.
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First, looking at the April 23 Order, Class Counsel allege that Defendants failed to comply
with the language ordering “facilitation” of Cristian’s return and defining facilitation as including,
“but . . . not limited to, a good faith request by Defendants to the government of El Salvador to
release Cristian to U.S. Custody for transport back to the United States.” ECF 254 at 3. In support
of their contention that no such good faith request occurred, Class Counsel cite the return of Kilmar
Abrego Garcia, another individual who had been removed from the United States to CECOT, on
June 6, 2025. See ECF 376 at 22 (citing Defendants’ Notice of Compliance with Preliminary
Injunction, Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951 (D. Md. June 6, 2025), ECF 181). They
suggest that the return of Mr. Abrego Garcia to comply with a court order entered in his litigation
indicates that a “good faith request” to return Cristian would have been equally successful. They
further note the absence of any representation from Defendants, over the many months this
litigation has been pending, that any government official made the court-ordered good faith request
for Cristian’s return.
While this Court shares Class Counsel’s frustration with what appears to be lack of good
faith government efforts at compliance with this Court’s order, it cannot find, on the particular
facts of this case, the factors needed to find probable cause for criminal contempt. There is an
important distinction between this case and Abrego Garcia. This lawsuit preexisted the current
administration and was filed (and settled) under President Biden’s administration, with the goal of
changing a particular facet of the immigration system’s asylum process. Abrego Garcia was filed
after Mr. Abrego Garcia’s March, 2025 removal from the United States to CECOT, seeking to
effect his return. Both cases eventually sought the return of an individual from CECOT. But
because the cases arose in very different procedural postures, the named defendants in the two
cases are different. The Defendants in this case are limited to DHS, USCIS, ICE, and their directors
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and acting directors who had authority over the asylum processes challenged by the Class
Members. The defendants in Abrego Garcia include Secretary Rubio, the official charged with
communicating, on behalf of the United States, with other heads of state and governments.
That distinction is meaningful in terms of the ability of the respective defendants to comply
with a court order to facilitate return. Defendants reasonably suggest that they did not willfully
violate this Court’s order—because of the different roles the relevant agencies play, Defendants’
personal ability to make the “good faith request” required by the April 23 Order was limited to
conveying the Order’s dictates to the State Department and requesting it be followed. Defendants
asserted repeatedly, in their status reports, that they took those steps. See, e.g., ECF 285. At no
point did this Court order the State Department or Secretary Rubio to take any specific action—
they were not named in this lawsuit and this Court’s post-settlement role was limited to enforcing
the Settlement Agreement between Class Members and the Defendants. Of course, in other times,
one might assume that a federal agency not specifically named in a case would still use its best
efforts to effectuate its sister agencies’ compliance with a valid order from a federal court. This
Court certainly hoped, in entering the April 23 Order, that events would unfold in that manner and
that the federal government as a whole would undertake compliance efforts. Its hopes were dashed.
That frustration, though, does not mean criminal contempt is warranted. With international
diplomatic communication falling within the purview of the State Department, a non-party to this
case, the April 23 Order did not, and indeed, could not, delineate the respective responsibilities of
both the named Defendants and the State Department with the clarity and certainty required to
satisfy the stringent standard for criminal contempt. This Court cannot see a circumstance where
it could impose criminal contempt upon a government agency or official with no authority to
convey specific communications directly to El Salvador.
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Class Counsel attempts to argue that DOS and Secretary Rubio were acting as Defendants’
“agents” in their efforts to comply with this Court’s order.6 ECF 421 at 8. Once again, under the
willfulness standard governing criminal contempt, an “agent” that is a separate government
agency/official with its own duties and agenda could not pass muster. Even if one assumes, as is
reasonable, that the State Department focused its efforts on using Cristian as one of many pawns
in its prisoner swap instead of endeavoring to comply with this Court’s order to facilitate his return,
criminal contempt is unavailable because this Court’s order did not (and could not) clearly direct
the State Department or Secretary Rubio to take action.
To be clear, this Court agrees with the general proposition that it has seen no evidence that
the United States government ever made a good faith request to the government of El Salvador for
Cristian’s return. However, in the unique circumstances presented, it cannot find probable cause
that the Defendants named in the lawsuit willfully violated this Court’s order to request his return
in good faith.
In their second argument that criminal contempt is warranted, Plaintiffs assert that
Defendants violated this Court’s orders requiring status reports, in two ways: by generally
providing deficient (and often tardy) reports and, on July 18, 2025, as Cristian was en route to
Venezuela, by delaying the filing of the report by four hours to prevent interference with the
prisoner swap.
Without question, Class Counsel can establish that this Court’s orders for status reports
were not followed to the letter. As this Court itself expressed on several occasions, Defendants’
6 Class Counsel’s sole citation that agency theory applies in a contempt context relates to civil
contempt, not criminal. See ECF 421 at 8 n.2 (citing In re Sterling, 933 F.3d 828, 833-34 (7th Cir.
2019)). There are different considerations at play when deciding whether an official or entity
should be subjected to a full-blown criminal contempt trial.
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responses were often woefully deficient. On several occasions, they were also filed late. And, for
the July 18, 2025 report, Class Counsel can establish that the violation of the filing deadline was
willful. Defendants concede that they knew the report was due at noon and opted, upon the request
of the State Department, to refrain from filing it until later in the day to “mitigate the risk” the
ongoing prisoner swap operation would “fall apart from public scrutiny.” ECF 352; ECF 395-3 ¶
9.
This Court has grave concerns about the government’s apparent willingness to disregard
this Court’s orders, even after previous admonition, and its determination that protection of the
prisoner swap (apparently from prospective judicial intervention) is a valid reason to ignore (or at
least delay compliance with) a valid Court order to provide a status report. But even with those
troubling background circumstances, this Court declines to impose the drastic sanction of ordering
litigants into separate criminal proceedings, culminating in a jury trial, for criminal contempt on
the offense alleged here: the filing of incomplete or untimely status reports.7 That immense power
must be exercised judiciously, and this Court does not find it to be a warranted exercise of its
discretion here, where the violations of this Court’s orders consisted of modest filing delays and
caginess about the content of the reports.
IV. 	MOTION TO VACATE
Finally, Defendants have filed a motion asking this Court to vacate Paragraph 2 of its April
23 Order, which directs Defendants “to facilitate Class Member Cristian’s return to the United
States to await adjudication of his asylum application on the merits by USCIS under the terms of
7 A more fulsome investigation of the conduct alleged here (the alleged lack of candor to the court
by counsel and/or the acts potentially subjecting some agencies or officials to civil liability for
their handling of the Venezuelan detainees) might be appropriate in other venues. But the conduct
does not amount to criminal contempt as it arises in this proceeding, as status report violations.
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the Settlement Agreement.” ECF 254 at 2. Defendants submit that the issue is now “moot” because
of “Cristian’s unwillingness to return to the United States.” ECF 386 at 1.
On July 18, 2025, with a pending court order requiring facilitation of his return to the
United States, Cristian was transported, entirely against his will, to the very country from which
he had sought asylum in the United States, Venezuela. The United States represented that the
Maduro regime would permit travel to the United States for an individual whose return was “called
for in legal proceedings or required by a court” and the individual was “willing to travel to the
United States for that purpose.” ECF 386-1 at 7-8. As Cristian attempted to glean information,
through his attorneys, about the possible terms of his return to the United States, Class Counsel
lost touch with Cristian. His current whereabouts are unknown.
While Defendants argue that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief
from judgment where prospective application of the judgment “is no longer equitable,”8 ECF 386-
1 at 10 (quoting Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 454 (2009)), the equities do not weigh in
Defendants’ favor here. As this Court has already found, Cristian never should have been removed
from this country without the bargained-for protections afforded him under the Settlement
Agreement. It is possible, at this point, that Cristian has decided to forego a return to the United
States and has voluntarily absented himself from contact with his counsel. It is equally possible
8 While Defendants base their Rule 60(b)(5) argument almost entirely on their assertion that
Paragraph 2 of the April 23 Order has become moot, they also recite the circumstances which the
Rule itself lists as justifying its application, including where “applying [a judgment] prospectively
is no longer equitable.” ECF 386-1 at 10, 12. In addition, Defendants presented their argument in
support of vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6) under the heading that the April 23 Order “Is No Longer
Equitable Because Further Compliance is Impossible Without Cristian’s Cooperation,” id. at 15,
though they later, in their Reply, appear to disclaim that language. ECF 407 at 9 (“Class Counsel
mischaracterizes Defendants’ argument under Rule 60(b)(6) as an argument that the Court’s order
‘is no longer equitable.’”). Notwithstanding this apparent confusion (as noted by Class Counsel in
their opposition, ECF 392 at 11), this Court affirmatively notes, infra, that this ground for vacatur
is not applicable here.
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that Cristian has been the victim of the anticipated violence that caused him to seek asylum in the
United States in the first instance.9 This Court therefore rejects the premise of Defendant’s motion,
that “Cristian does not wish to return to the United States,” that compliance with Paragraph 2 of
the April 23 Order is not feasible, and that said Paragraph is therefore moot. See ECF 386-1 at 11.
While this Court cannot reach any definitive conclusion about Cristian’s present whereabouts,
Defendants offer no evidence that they are suffering any ongoing burden or obligation from the
continued existence of Paragraph 2 of this Court’s April 23 Order, because all reporting
requirements are currently stayed. And, should Cristian resurface and express a desire to the United
States, Defendants should retain their existing obligation to restore him to his status quo before
their breach of the Settlement Agreement.
To ensure that there is no continuing burden or obligation impacting government
functioning in any way, this Court will permanently lift the already-stayed requirement for regular
status reports regarding government efforts to facilitate Cristian’s return. No such requirement will
be imposed until or unless Class Counsel re-establish contact with Cristian and advise this Court
that he wishes to return to the United States. However, Defendants’ Motion to Vacate, ECF 386,
will be denied.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, all three ripe motions, ECF 320, 375, 386, will be denied.
A separate order follows. This memorandum opinion will be filed UNDER SEAL, and the parties
will be afforded one week to confer and notify this Court of proposed redactions to be made to a
9 Whether the United States directly negotiated the prisoner swap resulting in Cristian’s transport
to Venezuela in exchange for the release of American prisoners or simply “served as intermediary
in light of the acrimonious relationship between El Salvador and the Maduro regime,” ECF 386-1
at 7, it is clear that it knowingly played a role in Cristian’s landing in the country from which he
had sought asylum.
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publicly filed version. Should this Court not receive proposed redactions within one week, it will
file this opinion publicly in full.
Dated: November 14, 2025 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
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