Bautista Villanueva v. Bondi et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
LAINET MELISA BAUTISTA
VILLANUEVA,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA JO BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 25-cv-4152-ABA
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Lainet Melisa Bautista Villanueva alleges that in 2023 she “fled to the
United States seeking protection after suffering brutal and targeted violence in Peru.”
ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. She entered the United States, was placed in removal proceedings, sought
protection from removal (asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture), and was released under an order of supervised release. Id.
¶¶ 2–3. On December 14, 2025, after she complied with a direction to check in at the
Baltimore ICE office, ICE took her into custody—not based on any allegation that she
violated her conditions of supervised release, but rather “based upon . . . the pendency
of ongoing removal proceedings.” ECF No. 8-2.
Petitioner has filed this action challenging her detention. She contends that,
because immigration authorities made a determination to release her back in 2023 after
she arrived and because more than two years passed between then and when she was
arrested in December 2025, her detention is not authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. That
statute provides for mandatory detention—without a bond hearing—in certain specified
circumstances. Respondents have responded to the Petition and moved to dismiss (ECF
No. 8), to which Petitioner has replied (ECF No. 9).
Case 1:25-cv-04152-ABA Document 10 Filed 01/14/26 Page 1 of 5

2
The Court agrees with Petitioner that she is not subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225. She was not “arriving” at the time of her detention, and so §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i) does not apply. She has been present in the United States for more than
two years, and so § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) does not apply.1 And for the reasons set forth in
numerous district court decisions in the past few months, § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to
persons like Petitioner who were previously taken into custody and then released (such
as under parole or supervised release). See Afghan v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4105-SAG, 2025
WL 3713732, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2025) (“The primary issue in this case is one that
has been considered in hundreds of federal courts over recent weeks—whether
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) or is entitled to
a hearing before an administrative judge to seek bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The
overwhelming majority of courts to have considered the issue have ruled that Petitioner
(and similarly situated aliens who have been in this country for years) are in the latter
category.”) (citing cases); see also, e.g., Velasquez v. Noem, No. 25-cv-3215-GLR, -- F.
Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3003684, at *4–7 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2025); Maldonado de Leon v.
1 Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner has been present in the United States for
more than two years. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii), a noncitizen must “affirmatively
show[], to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that [she] has been physically
present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the
date of the determination of inadmissibility.” Here, Respondents, by relying on §
1225(b)(2) as the basis for detention, did not permit Petitioner to attempt to make such
a showing, which potentially precludes Respondents from disputing that point. But
regardless, Respondents concede, as they must given the factual record, that more than
two years elapsed. See ECF No. 8 at 3–4 (observing that Petitioner was served with a
notice to appear on April 3, 2023 and a warrant was not issued for her arrest until
December 15, 2025). (If Ms. Bautista Villanueva had been paroled in 2023, then that
would be another reason § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) would not apply, but because she is entitled
to a bond hearing under § 1226 regardless, the Court need not decide whether
supervised release is equivalent to “parole[]” within the meaning of § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).)
Case 1:25-cv-04152-ABA Document 10 Filed 01/14/26 Page 2 of 5

3
Baker, No. 25-cv-3084-TDC, 2025 WL 2968042, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2025); Guerrero
Orellana v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-12664-PBS, -- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2809996, at *5–9
(D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025).
This conclusion is consistent with the decision in Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713987, at *8–12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2025), but this Court reaches its conclusion independently; regardless of Ms. Bautista
Villanueva’s membership in the Maldonado Bautista class, and regardless of the entry
of the declaratory judgment in that case, Ms. Bautista Villanueva has shown that she is
not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225.2 Some courts have disagreed, and
construed § 1225(b)(2) consistent with the BIA’s interpretation in Matter of Jonathan
Javier Yajure Hurtado, Respondent, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Jeffreys, et al., No. 8:25-cv-714, 2025 WL 3754411, at *11–14 (D. Neb. Dec.
29, 2025). Having reviewed the Yajure Hurtado decision, Rodriguez, and other
decisions consistent with them, this Court is more persuaded by the apparent majority
of the courts that have considered the government’s expansive theory under §
1225(b)(2) and rejected it—and that have concluded that “Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), requires courts to exercise independent judgment in
assessing whether agency reasoning is persuasive,” and that likewise Yajure Hurtado is
“is not entitled to Skidmore [v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)] deference.” Afghan,
2025 WL 3713732 at *2.
2 Because Respondents detained Petitioner back in 2023 and then granted her
supervised release, this case does not present the question of whether § 1225 would
apply if December 2025 had been Ms. Bautista Villanueva’s first encounter with
immigration officials.
Case 1:25-cv-04152-ABA Document 10 Filed 01/14/26 Page 3 of 5

4
In short, Respondents may not lawfully detain Ms. Bautista Villanueva under 8
U.S.C. § 1225. That leaves the question of remedy: should the Court order her immediate
release or give Respondents the opportunity to arrange for a bond hearing before an
immigration judge under § 1226? Judge Kaplan of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York recently articulated why the former may be most
appropriate in circumstances like this: “Where respondents have offered no reason for
why M.K’s detention under [§ 1226 ] or any other statute would be lawful, the proper
remedy is immediate release, not ordering a bond hearing. Ordering a bond hearing
would fail to remedy the statutory violation that has occurred here.” M.K. v. Arteta, No.
25-CV-9918 (LAK), 2025 WL 3720779, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2025). The present
record, however, does not indicate that the immigration judge to whom Ms. Bautista
Villanueva’s case is to be referred will fail to apply the correct legal standards for bond
hearings under § 1226. Accordingly, the Court is persuaded that the appropriate remedy
for Respondents’ statutory violation is an order that Petitioner receive a bond hearing
within 7 days of this order.
For these reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART;
2. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225;
3. 	Respondents shall provide Petitioner a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 on
or before 5:00 p.m. ET on Wednesday, January 21, 2026;
4. 	If a bond hearing is not held by January 21, 2026, Respondents shall
RELEASE Petitioner from custody by 12:00 p.m. ET on January 22,
Case 1:25-cv-04152-ABA Document 10 Filed 01/14/26 Page 4 of 5

5
2026, and such release shall be subject to the same conditions that applied
before Petitioner’s December 14, 2025 arrest; and
5. 	The parties shall file a joint status report within 10 days of this Order.
Date: January 14, 2026
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge
/s/
Case 1:25-cv-04152-ABA Document 10 Filed 01/14/26 Page 5 of 5