Knight et al v. U.S. Bank National Association

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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DAVOL KNIGHT ET AL.,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
* 	Civil No. 25-4089-BAH
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiffs Davol Knight and Britany Harkins (collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought suit
against Defendant U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City alleging claims arising out of a “mortgage loan process facilitated by U.S. Bank.”
ECF 2 (capitalization altered). 	U.S. Bank removed the action to this Court. 	ECF 1. 	Pending
before the Court is U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss.1 ECF 6. Plaintiffs filed correspondence, ECF
8, which the Court will construe as an opposition to the motion.2 U.S. Bank filed a reply, ECF 9,
1 A Rule 12/56 notice was mailed to Plaintiffs on December 17, 2025. ECF 7.
2 Plaintiffs’ correspondence at ECF 8 argues that “promissory notes are legal tender,” id. at 1–3,
purports to detail a “mortgage fraud scheme,” id. at 4–7, and attempts to define for the Court “what
is and what is not legal tender of the United States,” id. at 8–9 (capitalization altered). Plaintiffs’
correspondence contains little meaningful opposition to the arguments advanced in U.S. Bank’s
motion to dismiss, and the Court agrees with U.S. Bank that to the extent Plaintiffs fail to present
substantive arguments in response to U.S. Bank’s motion, they have conceded Defendants’ points
on those issues. 	Middleton v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, Civ. No. ELH-20-3536, 2022 WL
268765, at *23 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2022) (“A plaintiff who fails to respond to an argument for
dismissal is deemed to have abandoned the claim.”). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs’ filing at
ECF 8 attempts to introduce new allegations into this litigation not contained in the complaint, “it
is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to
dismiss.” 	Mylan Lab’ys, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1068 (D. Md. 1991) (citation
omitted).
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and Plaintiffs filed additional correspondence,3 ECF 12. 	The Court has reviewed all relevant
filings and finds that no hearing is necessary.4 See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). Accordingly, for
the reasons stated below, U.S. Bank’s motion is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that they file their complaint “regarding the deceptive and unconscionable
nature of the mortgage loan process facilitated by U.S. Bank.” ECF 2, at 1. Plaintiffs argue that
U.S. Bank “engaged in a course of conduct that systematically misrepresented the fundamental
nature of the transaction, failed to provide valuable consideration, and unjustly enriched itself” at
Plaintiffs’ expense, which Plaintiffs assert renders their “mortgage contract void.” Id. The crux
of Plaintiffs’ allegation of fraud is that U.S. Bank never intended to “lend its own money,” and
instead “provided a loan approval letter,” which Plaintiffs assert “was merely a promise to lend,
not evidence of existing capital.” 	Id. 	Plaintiffs assert that “U.S. Bank received a line of credit
based on the future revenue stream of [Plaintiffs’] 30-year repayment obligation” and “profited by
receiving this credit . . . while assuming no risk with its own assets.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiffs list four bases for their complaint, including “failure of consideration,” “lack of
good faith and fair dealing,” “unjust enrichment,” and “voidable contract.” 	Id. (capitalization
altered). There is also a section of the complaint titled “fraudulent misrepresentation,” in which
3 Plaintiffs frame their additional correspondence as presenting “the controlling dispute in direct
form.” 	ECF 12, at 1. 	The correspondence lists a variety of “governing” authorities, including
federal statues, purported portions of the Congressional Record, and case law. See id. at 25. The
Court construes this document as a surreply due to its attempt to provide the Court with authority
to rule in Plaintiffs’ favor. 	See generally id. 	“Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, surreply
memoranda are not permitted to be filed.” Loc. R. 105.2(a) (D. Md. 2025); see also Hall v. Prince
George’s Cnty., 189 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D. Md. 2002). 	Plaintiffs did not request leave to file a
surreply. Accordingly, the Court will not consider the surreply at ECF 12.
4 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-
generated page numbers at the top of the page.
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Plaintiffs assert that U.S. Bank “lied,” “breached its fiduciary duties to the borrower and is
therefore guilty of criminal breach of trust,” “concealed” certain facts, and “made material
misrepresentations.” Id. at 3. This section of the complaint further alleges that U.S. Bank “violated
its corporate charter,” and “failed to comply with federal mortgage servicing requirements under
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)” by neglecting “to provide a timely and
complete response to a Qualified Written Request (QWR)” or deliver “the required Life of Loan
Transaction Report.” Id.
“As a direct and proximate result of U.S. Bank’s fraud,” Plaintiffs allege that they have
“suffered significant damages, including but not limited to being bound to an onerous long-term
loan under false pretenses.” 	Id. 	By way of relief, Plaintiffs request that the “transaction be
declared null and void,” the “mortgage be released,” and any funds “paid be returned.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiffs also “seek appropriate damages for the costs and burdens” incurred “as a result of U.S.
Bank’s deceptive practices.” Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to “state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” In considering a motion under this rule, courts discount legal
conclusions stated in the complaint and “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). 	A court then draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and
considers whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. Nemet Chevrolet,
Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). 	“A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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“The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action[.]’” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App’x 745, 747
(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the same time,
a “complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiff’s]
claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.”
Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014).
B. 	Rule 9(b)
If a complaint allegation sounds in fraud, it must also meet the heightened pleading
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in order to survive a motion to dismiss. See
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784, 789 (4th Cir. 1999). Rule 9(b)
requires plaintiffs to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To satisfy this standard, plaintiffs “must, at a minimum, describe the time,
place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the
misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown
& Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2008). “These facts are often ‘referred to as the who,
what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 384 (5th Cir.
2003)). “Failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) is treated as a failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Nat’l Mortg. Warehouse, LLC v. Trikeriotis, 201 F. Supp. 2d
499, 504 (D. Md. 2002) (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783
n.5 (4th Cir. 1999)).
C. 	Liberal Construction
Because Plaintiffs bring this suit pro se, the Court must liberally construe their pleadings,
holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404
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U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 	This leniency has its limits, though. 	“A court may not construct the
plaintiff’s legal arguments for him, nor is a district court required to recognize ‘obscure or
extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.’” Runge v. Barton, Civ.
No. 6:08-0231-GRA, 2009 WL 3245471, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2009) (first citing Small v. Endicott,
998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); and then quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277
(4th Cir. 1985)), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 361 (4th Cir. 2010).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs’ complaint identifies several purported bases for this lawsuit, all of which appear
to relate to the allegation that U.S. Bank engaged in fraud or deception during the mortgage loan
process. 	See generally ECF 2. 	The Court construes the complaint liberally and addresses
Plaintiffs’ allegations in full, including their claims sounding in fraud, in contract, and any claims
purportedly arising under other federal and state laws.
A. 	Claims Sounding in Fraud
Plaintiffs’ complaint centers on an allegation that U.S. Bank engaged in a “profound
deception” in the mortgage loan process. ECF 2, at 1. It is because of this “fraud” that Plaintiffs
assert entitlement to relief. 	Id. at 3. 	However, as U.S. Bank observes, Plaintiffs fail to state a
claim for fraud pursuant to Rule 9(b)’s more stringent particularity requirements. 	See Kellogg
Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d at 379. Plaintiffs have provided no factual allegations to support
their fraud claims, much less to satisfy the “who, what, when, where and how of the alleged fraud”
as required under Rule 9(b). 	Id. (citation omitted). 	Rather, Plaintiffs ambiguously refer to the
misrepresentation allegedly made by U.S. Bank, but they do not actually articulate what facts were
misrepresented or how they have been damaged as a result.
“The purpose of Rule 9(b) is ‘to prevent frivolous suits, [to] stop fraud actions where
everything is learned after discovery (i.e., fishing expeditions), and to protect defendants’
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reputations.’” Bowers v. Legum & Norman Realty, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 3d 294, 304 (D. Md. 2025)
(quoting U.S. ex rel. Nicholson v. MedCom Carolinas, Inc., 42 F.4th 185, 195 (4th Cir. 2022)).
Accordingly, a complaint that complies with the requirements of Rule 9(b) should ordinarily make
the defendant “aware of the particular circumstances for which [it] will have to prepare a defense
at trial,” among other things. Id. (quoting the same). Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to offer any
factual allegations regarding who, on behalf of U.S. Bank, made “misrepresentations” or when
such “misrepresentations” were made in the course of the “mortgage loan process.” See ECF 2, at
1–3. 	Moreover, the general “fraud” Plaintiffs purport to describe appears to track the ordinary
process of obtaining a mortgage loan. See id. at 1 (“The process began with U.S. Bank requiring
us to sign mortgage loan application, which functioned as promissory note. By signing this
document, we were obligated to repay specific sum to U.S. Bank before receiving any funds.”);
ECF 6-1, at 5. U.S. Bank has no notice, on the face of this complaint, of the particular allegations
of fraud in order to prepare a defense. See Bowers, 776 F. Supp. 3d at 304. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
claims sounding in fraud will be dismissed.
B. 	Claims Sounding in Contract
Plaintiffs’ 	complaint 	also 	advances 	several 	allegations 	which 	sound 	in 	contract.
Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that U.S. Bank breached its mortgage contract with Plaintiffs because
there was allegedly no consideration provided by U.S. Bank. See ECF 2, at 2 (“U.S. Bank provided
no valuable consideration of its own at the inception of this transaction.”). Relatedly, Plaintiffs
claim that the mortgage contract is “voidable” because of a “lack of mutual assent . . . from the
beginning.” Id.
“To state a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show that the parties reached a valid
and binding agreement; that the defendant breached the terms of the agreement; and that the
plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach.” McGowens v. Bank of Am., Civ. No. ELH-
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14-1101, 2015 WL 1137749, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 12, 2015) (citing Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A.,
776 A.2d 645, 651 (Md. 2001)). 	“In other words, ‘[i]t is the parties’ agreement that ultimately
determines whether there has been a breach.’” Id. (quoting Mathis v. Hargrove, 888 A.2d 277,
396 (Md. App. 2008)). To survive a motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim asserted under
Maryland law, a complaint must “allege with certainty and definiteness facts showing a contractual
obligation owed by the defendant to the plaintiff and a breach of that obligation by the defendant.”
Robinson v. GEO Licensing Co., L.L.C., 173 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423 (D. Md. 2001) (quoting Yousef
v. Trustbank Sav., F.S.B., 568 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Md. App. 1990)).
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege any contract claim arising from their
mortgage-related transaction with U.S. Bank. Specifically, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any
terms of the mortgage contract that U.S. Bank purportedly breached, the circumstances which gave
rise to their dealings, or any particulars about the damages which resulted. See McGowens, 2015
WL 1137749, at *9 (dismissing breach of contract claim where the plaintiff “failed to identify any
terms in the promissory note, Deed of Trust, or any other contract that defendant purportedly
breached”); Parillon v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, Civ. No. L-09-3352, 2010 WL 1328425, at *4 (D.
Md. Mar. 25, 2010) (dismissing breach of contract claim where the plaintiff did “ not identify a
term set forth in the Loan, the Deed of Trust, or any other contract, that a named defendant
breached”).
Plaintiffs’ attempts to assert contract-related claims for “lack of good faith and fair dealing”
and “unjust enrichment” fare no better. See ECF 2, at 2. First, “Maryland does not recognize a
separate cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Bowers v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 905 F. Supp. 2d 697, 703 (D. Md. 2012) (citing Baker v. Sun Co., Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 609, 610 (D. Md. 1997)). Indeed, attempts at asserting such claims have been previously
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described in this District “as ‘precisely the kind of meritless dispute between lender and defaulting
commercial borrower that the courts . . . have been quick to put to rest.’” CapitalSource Fin. LLC
v. Pittsfield Weaving Co., 571 F. Supp. 2d 668, 673 (D. Md. 2006) (quoting Howard Oaks, Inc. v.
Md. Nat’l Bank, 810 F. Supp. 674, 678 (D. Md. 1993)).
Second, “[a] claim for unjust enrichment . . . requires that a plaintiff show, among other
facts, that the defendant retained a benefit conferred by the plaintiff ‘under such circumstances as
to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.’”
Bowers, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (quoting Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 936 A.2d 343,
351 (Md. 2007)). The only benefit Plaintiffs allege U.S. Bank has retained is the value of “a line
of credit based on the future revenue stream of [Plaintiffs’] 30-year repayment obligation.” ECF
2, at 2. Yet, Plaintiffs have not pled that U.S. Bank improperly retained any payments or other
benefits from Plaintiffs, and they do not adequately explain how the mortgage loan process they
describe produced a benefit that U.S. Bank inequitably retained. Cf. Bowers, 905 F. Supp. 2d at
703 (“The only benefit Bowers has pled that he conferred on BOA is the value of his mortgage
payments and interest, which were conferred in exchange for his home, property he apparently
continues to own. Thus, he has not pled that BOA is retaining any benefit inequitably, and he does
not state a plausible claim for unjust enrichment.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims sounding in
contract will be dismissed.
C. 	Other Claims
The complaint also asserts a few other allegations related to U.S. Bank’s fiduciary duties
and RESPA. 	See ECF 2, at 3. 	The Court addresses those allegations briefly, none of which
succeed in stating a claim.
First, Plaintiffs allege that “U.S. bank breached all of its fiduciary duties” to Plaintiffs and
“is therefore guilty of criminal breach of trust by failing in its good faith requirement.” Id. To the
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extent that Plaintiffs attempt to assert a tort for breach of fiduciary duty, “Maryland courts . . . do
not recognize a separate tort of breach of fiduciary duty.” 	Parillon, 2010 WL 1328425, at *4.
Moreover, it is “well established that ‘the relationship of a bank to its customer in a loan transaction
is ordinarily a contractual relationship between debtor and creditor and is not fiduciary in nature.’”
Kuechler v. Peoples Bank, 602 F. Supp. 2d 625, 633 (D. Md. 2009) (quoting Yousef, 568 A.2d at
1138). And to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to assert violations of criminal law, they cannot do so.
Plaintiffs do not invoke any criminal statutes in the complaint, but regardless, “[a] civil litigant
cannot” typically “assert a cause of action under federal criminal provisions.” Loper v. Howard
Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., Civ. No. ELH-20-3789, 2021 WL 3857857, at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2021)
(collecting cases). 	Neither can Plaintiffs assert any “civil cause of action to force the criminal
prosecution of another.” Noonan v. Allen, Civ. No. ELH-12-3668, 2012 WL 6726711, at *2 (D.
Md. Dec. 21, 2012) (collecting cases).
Second, Plaintiffs briefly invoke RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2605, alleging that U.S. Bank “failed
to comply with federal mortgage servicing requirements” under RESPA by neglecting “to provide
a timely and complete response to a” QWR and by failing to “deliver the required Life of Loan
Transaction Report.” ECF 2, at 3. “To state a claim under RESPA’s QWR provisions, a plaintiff
must allege: ‘(1) a written request that meets RESPA’s definition of a QWR, (2) the servicer failed
to perform its duties, and (3) actual damages.’” Gillis v. Household Fin. Corp. III, Civ. No. GJH-
18-3923, 2019 WL 3412621, at *10 (D. Md. July 29, 2019) (quoting Barr v. Flagstar Bank, FSB,
303 F. Supp. 3d 400, 417 (D. Md. 2018)). 	A QWR is defined under the applicable statute as
written correspondence that “(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name
and account of the borrower; and (ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the
borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the
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servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). The
statute imposes upon a mortgage servicer a duty to respond to a QWR under RESPA “within 5
days (excluding legal public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays)” after receiving a QWR “for
information relating to the servicing of [a federally related mortgage] loan.” Id. § 2605(e)(1)(A).
Here, Plaintiffs do not expressly allege that they submitted a QWR, let alone provide
sufficient detail for the Court to ascertain whether they sent a valid QWR under RESPA. See Elias
v. Am. Fin. Res., Civ. No. BAH-24-489, 2026 WL 479069, at *8 (D. Md. Feb. 20, 2026)
(dismissing a RESPA QWR claim where complaint did “not provide sufficient detail for the Court
to ascertain whether” the borrower “sent a valid QWR under RESPA”). Moreover, Plaintiffs have
not alleged “when any purported QWR was sent in order to plausibly allege a failure to timely
respond” or “any information regarding any actual damages that flowed from” U.S. Bank’s
“alleged failure to respond to any QWR.” 	See id.; see also Ward v. Sec. Atl. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 561, 575 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (“[E]ven assuming the notice
was a valid QWR and that BAC failed to acknowledge receipt of Plaintiffs’ QWR or failed to
respond timely and adequately to Plaintiffs’ questions therein, Plaintiffs nevertheless do not state
a claim under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) as Plaintiffs fail to allege any pecuniary loss attributable to the
RESPA violation.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a RESPA claim.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss is granted. 	All claims in the
complaint are dismissed.
A separate implementing order will issue.
Dated: March 3, 2026 	/s/
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
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