1:25-cv-03434•Hernandez-Lugo v. Bondi et al
Gesamter Gesetzestext
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND WINSTONS HERNANDEZ-LUGO, Petitioner, v. PAMELA BONDI, et al., Respondents. * * * * * Civil Action No. GLR-25-3434 *** MEMORANDUM OPINION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Winstons Hernandez- Hernandez-Lugo Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and Nikita Scott 2). The Motion is fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2025). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in part and deny it in par . I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Petitioner Winstons Hernandez-Lugo is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet. Writ ¶ 1, ECF No. 1).1 Immigration officers paroled him into the United States in July 2022. (Id. ¶ 2). He is married to a U.S. citizen, and his spouse is a U.S. Army 1 Unless otherwise noted, citations to the page numbers refer to the pagination Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 1 of 17
2 Veteran. (Id. ¶ 21 ). In the two years since he was permitted to enter the United States, he has complied with the conditions of his parole. (Pet. ¶ 22). He has multiple affirmative applications pending with and an application for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. (Id. ¶¶ 20 21). Respondents do not allege that Petitioner has any criminal history or convictions. On October 15, 2025, ICE officials detained Hernandez-Lugo when he reported to ICE for a check-in. (Id. ¶ 23). ICE officials then took him into custody at the Baltimore ICE Holding Cells and served him with a Form I- Form I-862 Notice to Appear ( NTA ) in the Hyattsville Immigration Court. (Id. ¶¶ 23 24; Warrant at 4, ECF No. 1-2; NTA at 15 17, ECF No. 1-2). The NTA states that Hernandez- United States who has not been admitted or paroled Immigration 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for not being in possession of valid entry or travel documents. (NTA at 15, 17). The next day, on October 16, 2025, Respondents transferred Hernandez-Lugo to an ICE facility in California City, California. ( 5, ECF No. 12-1). B. Procedural History On October 17, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court. (ECF No. 1). On November 4, 2025, Petitioner had a bond Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 2 of 17
3 hearing in the Adelanto, California Immigration Court, where the IJ denied him bond because the Immigration Court does not have jurisdiction to set bond -1). On November 5, 2025, Respondents submitted a consolidated Answer to the Petition and Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 12). On November 13, 2025, Petitioner submitted his Opposition. (ECF No. 13). II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if a petitioner is in federal custody in violation of the United States Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). If a district court entertains a habeas petition, then it must either award the writ or order the respondent to show cause as to why the writ should not be granted, unless it is apparent from the application that the petitioner is not entitled to the requested relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see also Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *2 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (explaining relevant standard of review in habeas cases). B. Analysis 1. Jurisdiction The Court will first address jurisdiction. Respondents argue that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. (Answer at 5 7). Contrary to Petitioner is not simply bringing an Administrative Procedure Act claim. (Id. at 7). Petitioner, instead, is challenging his ongoing detention under an authority that he alleges to be unlawful, (see Pet. ¶¶ 26 34), which this Court has Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 3 of 17
4 the authority to review, see Maldonado de Leon v. Baker, No. TDC-25-3084, 2025 WL 2968042, at *4 (D.Md. Oct. 21, 2025) (finding Court has jurisdiction to review habeas petition challenging detention during pendency of immigration proceedings). The Government further argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars judicial review. (Answer at 10 11). Section 1252(b)(9), however, bars judicial review of removal proceedings and orders rather than custody determinations. See Leal- Hernandez v. Noem, No. JRR-25-02428, 2025 WL 2430025, at *6 (D.Md. Aug. 24, 2025). Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected an overinclusive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) that encompasses custody determinations. Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *3 (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 293 95 (2018)). Because this case concerns a custody determination, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to review Hernandez-Lugo and agrees with other district courts that have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Leal-Hernandez, 2025 WL 2430025, at *5 argument that § 1252(b)(9) functions as judicial bar and noting that [n]one of the cases on which the Government relies bears remote relevant relation to this habeas action not the Accordingly, for all these reasons, the Court finds it has jurisdiction to review this Petition. 2. Administrative Exhaustion The Court next turns to administrative exhaustion. No applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion in these circumstances; therefore, Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 351 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503. U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 4 of 17
5 balance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *4 (quoting McCarthy [I]nstances in which an easonable or Id. at *4 (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146 48). Here, there is no reason to require prudential exhaustion or exhaustion of As both parties have recognized, the decision, Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that divests IJs of jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for noncitizens who were not lawfully admitted because the BIA determined that all such noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Id. at 228. Hernandez-Lugo already requested and was granted a bond hearing in front of an IJ, and the IJ denied This request was exactly what this Court recently recognized would be an exercise in futility, as the result of such administrative proceedings [had] already been predetermined. See Pineda Velasquez v. Noem, GLR-25-3215, 2025 WL 3003684, at *2 (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148). Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 5 of 17
6 Furthermore, a where administrative processes may result in undue delay, a court may properly consider that as a factor militating against requiring exhaustion. Leal-Hernandez, 2025 WL 2430025, at *12 (citing McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146 47). This Court could require Hernandez-Lugo to exhaust administrative remedies, including BIA review, until further judicial review by a U.S. Court of Appeals; because with the passage of time, the allegedly improper detention would continue to occur Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *4 (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147). § 1225(b)(2) will result in him being detained until the end of his removal proceedings or an appeal to a court of appeals, a process that could take months or even years and would result in a miscarriage of justice if the proper detention authority were § 1226(a). If Hernandez-Lugo is correct that he should be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), then he is entitled to a meaningful bond hearing and may be released from custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(a). This issue, therefore, is ultimately a matter of statutory interpretation: to decide whether he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) or discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Answer at 7). Matters of statutory interpretation are within the sound province of the judiciary. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). This Court thus finds waiver of the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies appropriate. This Court will not compel Hernandez-Lugo to pursue further administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief and now turns to the merits of his claims. Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 6 of 17
7 3. Applicability of Section 1226(a) The Government cites a variety of provisions to support Hernandez- detention and rejects that § 1226(a) is the lawful authority, without specifying which provision it contends is the controlling authority. (See Answer at 12 14) (referencing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) (2) and 1231(a)). The Court will therefore review the relevant provisions to determine which statute is the lawful authority here. a. Inapplicability of § 1225(b)(1) For the reasons set forth below, the Court first finds that § 1225(b)(1) does not Under § 1225(b)(1), two groups of people are subject to mandatory detention and expedited removal: If an immigration officer determines that an alien . . . who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title, the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). An individual described in clause (iii) and subject to this provision is: [a]n alien . . . who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2- year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). All individuals subject to this provision who do not manifest a fear of persecution or intention to apply for asylum are summarily removed via 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). The Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 7 of 17
8 shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed. U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Inspection of aliens arriving in the United States As stated, for mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) to apply, a noncitizen must either ( arriving in the § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), or (2) have not been admitted or paroled into the U.S. and not have sufficiently shown at least two years of continuous presence in the United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). Here, the NTA issued to Hernandez- 15), so the Court does not find that Hernandez-Lugo is subject to § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). He similarly does not fall under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) because the Court finds that the parole documentation that he submitted sufficiently demonstrates that he on July 29, 2022 and therefore has been physically present in the United States for at least three years. (See Parole Auth., ECF No. 13-2) The Court has no reason to doubt the authenticity of this document. As a result, because Hernandez-Lugo is not arriving in the United States, was paroled into the U.S., and has been physically present for over two years, the Court finds that he cannot be subject to expedited removal or mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). b. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) Although the Government does not explicitly state that it relies on § 1231(a) in justifying Hernandez- , it cites almost exclusively to cases that Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 8 of 17
9 involve § 1231(a) detention. (Answer at 12 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Rodriguez-Guardado v. Smith, 271 F.Supp.3d 331 (D.Mass. 2017); Julce v. Smith, No 18- 10163-FDS, 2018 WL 1083734 (D.Mass. Feb. 27, 2018); , 12 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2021))). For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that § 1231(a) applies to noncitizens that have final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Zadvydas, a case upon which the Government relies (Answer at 12), stands for the proposition that an individual with a final order of removal cannot be indefinitely detained. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. For the six-month presumption of reasonable detention under Zadvydas to apply, an individual must have been through removal proceedings, an IJ must See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Without these conditions being fulfilled, however, there is no presumptively reasonable period of detention, as detention under an unlawful authority is inherently unreasonable. Here, because Hernandez-Lugo has not been ordered removed, there is no presumptively reasonable period of detention barring habeas review, and he cannot be detained under the authority of § 1231. See Maldonado, 2025 WL 2968042, at *10 Where [Petitioner] is not subject to a removal order, and his detention is not governed by § 1231, the presumptively reasonable six-month period of Zadvydas is inapplicable to Petition. For all of these reasons, the Court will grant the Petition. Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 9 of 17
10 c. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2) The Court next considers whether a review of the relevant statutes supports detention under § 1226(a) or § 1225(b)(2). If Hernandez-Lugo is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), his detention is mandatory. If he is not, his detention falls under the 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detention framework, and he is entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that a plain reading of the statute makes clear that Hernandez-Lugo 1225(b)(2)(A) and instead falls under the discretionary detention category under § 1226(a) as a noncitizen proceedings under § 1229a. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Government argues that Hernandez-Lugo is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Answer at 8 9). In relevant part, that provision provides that in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title. U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1225 officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing, and contains subsections related to stowaways, crewmen, and noncitizens arriving from contiguous territories. 8 U.S.C. § 1225. It also contains provisions authorizing officers to , aircraft, railway car, or other conveyance in which they at airports of arrival. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(d). Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 10 of 17
11 Hernandez-Lugo argues instead that his detention is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (Pet. ¶¶ 26 34). This section is Apprehension and detention of aliens, and contains subsection § 1226(a), , by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States § 1226(a). The ICE determines pursuant to § 1226(a) that a noncitizen will be detained, that individual may seek review of the detention decision by requesting a bond Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *5 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d), 1003.19, 1236.1(d)). When engaging in statutory of the statute. Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 784 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Total Realty Mgmt., LLC, 706 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2013)) To determine a statute s plain meaning, courts not only look to the language itself, but also the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Id. (quoting In re Total Realty Mgmt., LLC, 706 F.3d at 251). Considering the plain language of §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a), the Court finds that § 1226(a) plainly applies to Hernandez-Lugo. He was and placed into removal proceedings - , (Answer at 2 4), the framework described in § 1226(a). No such warrant or arrest provisions exist in § 1225(b)(2), further bolstering this finding. Further, the I-200 warrant explicitly states that it pursuant to sections 236 [8 U.S.C. § 1226] and 287 [8 U.S.C. § 1357] of the Immigration and Nationality Act to arrest and take into custody Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 11 of 17
12 (Warrant at 1 (emphasis added)); see also Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *6 (quoting the I-200 warrant); Pineda Velasquez, 2025 WL 3003684, at *4 (same). 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and that authority is explicitly referenced in [I- clear that § 1226 is the applicable statute governing such detention. Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *6; see also Pineda Velasquez, 2025 WL 3003684, at *10. In looking at the interplay between the various subsections of § 1225, the Court has found that § 1225(b)(1) is inapplicable to Hernandez-Lugo, as it solely addresses those time. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § An arriving alien who is a stowaway is not eligible to apply for admission or to be admitted and shall be ordered removed upon inspection by an immigration officer. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1225. This focus throughout § 1225 on the actual place and manner of arrival of noncitizens to the United States similarly bolsters Hernandez-Lugo § 1226, and not § 1225, is the correct statutory authority here, where Hernandez-Lugo has been present in the United States for at least three years, (Parole Authorization at 1). Additionally, the recent legislative history of the INA further supports that § 1226 applies here. Earlier this year, Congress amended § 1226 via the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119- § 1225(b)(2) superfluous. This amendment, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), mandates Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 12 of 17
13 detention for noncitizens who are inadmissible under certain inadmissibility grounds who have been charged with or convicted of certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(E)(i) (ii). Other district courts have relied on this recent amendment in finding § 1226(a) to be the proper detention authority for noncitizens in Hernandez- position. See, e.g., Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 ( redundant if § 1225(b)(2) authorized their detention as well As has been previously recognized in Maryland, although § 1225(b)(2) applies to an applicant for admission, that is not the only operative language in [the statute]. Rather, the statute conditions mandatory detention on a determination by an immigration officer that an alien seeking admission is not clearly entitled to be admitted. Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). The requirement that the alien at issue be seeking admission necessarily limits the applicability of this provision to one who, at the time of the detention, was seeking or attempting to gain lawful entry . . . into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)). As found in Maldonado de Leon, here, espondents citation to cases that discuss admission or seeking admission in different contexts do[es] not alter the Court s reading of the plain language of this statutory provision. Id. Yajure Hurtado is not persuasive nor binding on this Court. See, e.g., id. at *8; Pineda Velasquez, 2025 WL 3003684, at *6. Under Loper Bright exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions . . . defer to an Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 13 of 17
14 agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous. 413. Further where Respondents new interpretation of these detention provisions so as to require mandatory detention of all inadmissible noncitizens runs counter to nearly 30 years of government immigration practice, the BIA s recent about-face in Matter of Yajure- Hurtado carries very little weight. Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *8. Accordingly, the Court finds that Hernandez-Lugo er the framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) § 1225(b)(2). d. Prior Practice and Usage of § 1226(a) This finding that Hernandez-Lugo therefore subject to discretionary detention and entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a), is consistent with the decades-long history of the application of § 1226(a). The Supreme Court has recognized § who were inadmissible at the time of entry and Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. Similarly, in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021), the Supreme Court outlined th if the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) discovers that an alien is living in the United States without authorization, it may initiate removal proceedings DHS may arrest and detain the alien pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States who are arrested and detained may generally apply for release on bond or conditional parole Id. at 527 28 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Under existing Supreme Court precedent, Section 1226 applies to aliens already present Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 14 of 17
15 (emphasis added). Hernandez-Lugo 1225(b)(2), (Answer at 8 12), is inconsistent with decades-long precedent on this topic. Further, the Government reliance on the Jennings Court statement that § catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) 3 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287)), is misplaced. In the first part of the Jennings opinion, the Court broadly described the differences between individuals subject to § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) and noted that the latter, § 1225(b)(2), is for noncitizens seeking admission at the borders and ports of entry, while § for noncitizens Jennings, 583 U.S. at 286 88. The Court recognized that § 1226(a) authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings Id. at 288 89. Based on this precedent, the Court here finds that Hernandez-Lugo is subject to the discretionary detention and bond provisions under § 1226(a) and that detention under § 1225 is improper. 4. Fifth Amendment Claim Because the Court finds that Hernandez-Lugo is detained and entitled to a bond hearing under the statutory authority of § 1226(a), the Court declines to decide the merits of his Fifth Amendment claim. Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 15 of 17
16 C. After a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is filed, the proper response by the Respondent is the filing of an Answer, to be followed by a Reply filed by the Petitioner. See Rules 2, 5, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts see also these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule 1(a). ). There is no corresponding action or motion to dismiss under the Habeas Rules. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied to a habeas petition, see Habeas Rule 12, the Court ordinarily does not apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, which governs the filing of a motion to dismiss, to a habeas petition because such a motion is effectively duplicative of an Answer to a Petition, in which all relevant arguments that could be made on such a motion can and should be made. Here, where the Motion to Dismiss was simultaneously Respondents Answer through a single brief addressing both the Motion and the Answer, (see ECF No. 12), the Court finds that (1) there was no need for a Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the Court s resolution of the Petition necessarily resolves the Motion to Dismiss. Because the Court has denied Respondents jurisdictional and procedural arguments and granted the Petition, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied. See Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *11. Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 16 of 17
17 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Hernandez-Lugo (ECF No. 1) in part and DENY it in part. The Petition will be granted to the extent explained in this Opinion and accompanying Order and denied as to all other respects. The Court will DENY (ECF No. 12). A separate Order follows. Entered this 25th day of November, 2025. /s/ George L. Russell, III Chief United States District Judge Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 17 of 17
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