Wlliams v. Credit One Bank, N.A.

1:25-cv-02315Mdd23.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TERRENCE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-2315-ABA
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Terrence Williams has sued Credit One Bank, N.A. (“Credit One”) for tort and
statutory claims related to alleged consumer reporting errors. On October 8, 2025, the
Clerk entered default and sent Credit One a Notice of Default providing 30 days to file a
motion to vacate the order of default. Within 14 days of that notice, Credit One filed a
Motion to Vacate the Clerk’s Entry of Default. That motion will be granted. But the
briefing on that motion has raised other issues, which are discussed below and as to
which the Court will hold a hearing on February 6, 2026.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Williams filed a complaint on July 16, 2025 against Credit One for claims
based on the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Credit Billing Act, the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and
Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. Part 1026). ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 16–28. Credit One was served with the
complaint on August 20, 2025 and therefore its deadline to file responsive pleadings
was September 10, 2025. ECF No. 6. On September 10, Mr. Williams filed a motion for
Clerk’s Entry of Default. ECF No. 7. Default was entered on October 8, 2025 and a
Notice of Default was sent to Credit One. ECF Nos. 9 & 10. On October 20, Credit One
Case 1:25-cv-02315-ABA Document 19 Filed 12/23/25 Page 1 of 8
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filed an answer to the complaint along with a Motion to Vacate the Clerk’s Entry of
Default. ECF Nos. 11 & 12.
In its motion, Credit One stated that “the delay is attributable to an inadvertent
error in processing the incoming mail from the U.S. Marshall’s [sic] Service.” ECF No.
12-1 at 3. Credit One further points out that it acted with reasonable promptness upon
the receipt of the Notice of Default and that it has meritorious defenses to Plaintiff’s
claims, which the Court should consider on the merits. Id. Finally, it argues that the
approximately one-month delay is not prejudicial to Plaintiff. Id.
In response, Plaintiff principally argues the motion to vacate should be denied
because Credit One had actual notice of this lawsuit prior to the default. He makes this
claim based on a string of emails between him and an attorney, Bryan D. Bolton, that
Mr. Willilams attached as an exhibit to his response brief (ECF No. 14-1). There is no
dispute that Mr. Bolton represents a party, Aetna Health Inc. d/b/a Aetna Better Health
of Maryland, that is unrelated to the parties in this case (the parties here are Mr.
Williams and Credit One), in another case filed by Mr. Williams that is pending in this
Court (Williams v. Aetna Better Health of Md., et al., 1:25-cv-01135-ABA (D. Md.)). But
in opposing the motion to vacate the entry of default with regard to Credit One, Mr.
Williams represented to this Court that Mr. Bolton also represents Credit One. (Mr.
Williams also argues that a 50-day delay was not reasonably prompt, and that he would
be prejudiced if default were vacated. ECF No. 14 at 2–3.) The first email he represented
to this Court as having been sent by Mr. Bolton was this message on September 10, 2025
at 2:51 p.m.: “Mr. Williams: May Credit One Bank have the same time, until Monday
September 29, to respond to the motion for default as well? Same reasons, of course, my
personal travel schedule and nothing to do with Credit One Bank.” ECF No. 14-1 at 3
Case 1:25-cv-02315-ABA Document 19 Filed 12/23/25 Page 2 of 8
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(emphasis added). The second email he represented to this Court as having been sent by
Mr. Bolton was this message on September 10, 2025 at 2:54 p.m.: “Please disregard this
email. I am no longer representing Credit One Bank.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
But Mr. Bolton and his firm do not represent Credit One and have never
represented Credit One in this case. ECF No. 15-1 (Declaration of Bryan D. Bolton) ¶ 7.
And what is more, Mr. Bolton has provided the email chain that he exchanged with Mr.
Williams. It reflects that in both emails that he sent to Mr. Williams that Mr. Williams
purported to submit as evidence in ECF No. 14-1 of Credit One’s knowledge of this case
as of September 10, 2025, the versions that Mr. Williams filed contain fundamental
alterations:
Original email (ECF No. 15-2)1 	Version filed by Plaintiff (ECF No.
14-1)
Sept. 10, 2025, 2:52 p.m.
Message:
“Mr. Williams: May Aetna have the same
time, until Monday September 29, to
respond to the motion for default as well?
Same reasons, of course, my personal
travel schedule and nothing to do with
Aetna.2
Thank you again for considering this
request and I propose to follow the same
process assuming you agree.
Regards, Bryan”
Sept. 10, 2025, 2:51 p.m.
Message:
“Mr. Williams: May Credit One Bank
have the same time, until Monday
September 29, to respond to the motion
for default as well? Same reasons, of
course, my personal travel schedule and
nothing to do with Credit One Bank.
Thank you again for considering this
request and I propose to follow the same
process assuming you agree.
Regards, Bryan”
1 The Court has added the bolding in this chart to highlight the alterations.
2 The reference to “the same time” refers to an email exchange between Mr. Williams
and Mr. Bolton earlier that same afternoon about the Aetna case. In the Aetna case, Mr.
Bolton had filed on September 4, on behalf of his client in that case (Aetna Health Inc.
Case 1:25-cv-02315-ABA Document 19 Filed 12/23/25 Page 3 of 8
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Sept. 10, 2025, 2:55 p.m.
Message:
“Please disregard this email. I am not
representing Credit One Bank. I should
have looked more closely before emailing
you. My apologies.
Regards,
Bryan D. Bolton, Esquire”
Sept. 10, 2025, 2:54 p.m.
Message:
“Please disregard this email. I am no
longer representing Credit One Bank.
I should have looked more closely before
emailing you. My apologies.
Regards,
Bryan D. Bolton, Esquire”
Mr. Williams then filed a motion for leave to file a surreply (which will be
granted), and in the surreply brief claims that Mr. Bolton altered his own emails. ECF
No. 17-1 at 2–6. Credit One filed a brief in opposition to the motion for leave. ECF No.
18.
d/b/a Aetna Better Health of Maryland), a motion to enforce a previously filed
stipulation of dismissal. Williams v. Aetna Better Health, Case No. 25-cv-1135-ABA,
ECF No. 21. Mr. Williams filed a brief in opposition to that motion on September 9. Id.,
ECF No. 25. The next day, Mr. Bolton sent an email, with the subject line “Williams v.
Aetna: Reply Time Extension,” requesting Mr. Williams’s consent to extend until
September 29 Aetna’s deadline to file a reply brief in support of its motion to enforce the
Aetna stipulation. ECF No. 14-1 at 2. At 2:40pm, Mr. Williams responded, agreeing to
that extension. Id. Approximately twelve minutes later, Mr. Bolton sent a separate email
to Mr. Williams with the subject line, “Williams v. Aetna: Motion for Default.” ECF No.
15-2 at 3. No motion for default had been filed in the Aetna case; it appears Mr. Bolton
had become aware that, in the Credit One case (this case), on that same day Mr.
Williams had filed a motion for a Clerk’s entry of default. ECF No. 7. In any event,
apparently believing (erroneously) that Mr. Williams had requested entry of default
against Aetna, and with Mr. Williams having just agreed to extend the deadline to file a
reply brief in the Aetna case on the briefing regarding enforcement of the stipulation of
dismissal, Mr. Bolton requested that Mr. Williams also agree that “Aetna have the same
time, until Monday September 29, to respond to the motion for default as well.” ECF No.
15-2 at 3. Once Mr. Bolton realized that the motion for entry of default was filed in
Credit One, not Aetna, he sent his follow-up email, quoted below, asking Mr. Williams
to disregard his earlier email because “I am not representing Credit One Bank” and
“should have looked more closely before emailing you.” ECF No. 15-2 at 2.
Case 1:25-cv-02315-ABA Document 19 Filed 12/23/25 Page 4 of 8
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II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Good cause exists to vacate the entry of default
A court “may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
Generally, “the Fourth Circuit has a ‘strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on
the merits.’” Xerox Corp. v. SMS Prods., Inc., Case No. 21-cv-1606-ELH, 2022 WL
1912696, at *6 (D. Md. June 3, 2022) (quoting Rangarajan v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 917
F.3d 218, 229 (4th Cir. 2019)). The Fourth Circuit has “repeatedly expressed a strong
preference that, as a general matter, defaults be avoided and that claims and defenses be
disposed of on their merits.” Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal,
Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Tazco, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers
Compensation Program, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 895 F.2d 949, 950 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The
law disfavors default judgments as a general matter.”), and Consolidated Masonry &
Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Const. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (“Generally a default
should be set aside where the moving party acts with reasonable promptness and alleges
a meritorious defense.”)). “When deciding whether to set aside an entry of default, a
district court should consider whether the moving party has a meritorious defense,
whether it acts with reasonable promptness, the personal responsibility of the defaulting
party, the prejudice to the party, whether there is a history of dilatory action, and the
availability of sanctions less drastic.” Id.
The Court finds that Credit One has shown good cause for setting aside the entry
of default. Credit One filed its answer to the complaint contemporaneously with its
motion to vacate the entry of default, which presents eleven affirmative defenses and
denies several allegations made by Plaintiff in his complaint. ECF No. 11. Further, Credit
One retained counsel and filed both the answer and the motion within fourteen days of
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the entry of default, which the Court finds was reasonably prompt. Credit One takes
responsibility for having missed the initial responsive pleadings deadline and explains
that the delay was a result of inadvertent error. ECF No. 12-1 at 3. Finally, the Court
finds that the 40-day delay between Credit One’s initial deadline to file responsive
pleadings and when it filed its answer and motion to vacate does not cause prejudice to
Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is good cause to vacate the entry of
default and allow the case to be considered on the merits.
B. 	Credit One’s request for sanctions based on the altered emails
There remains, however, the issue arising from Mr. Williams’s filing of versions
of Mr. Bolton’s emails that Mr. Williams appears to have altered in material ways,
apparently in an effort to mislead the Court and avoid vacatur of the entry of default. As
noted above, Mr. Bolton is not counsel to Credit One in this case, but rather is counsel to
Aetna Health Inc. d/b/a Aetna Better Health of Maryland in the case Williams v. Aetna
Better Health of Md., et al., 1:25-cv-01135-ABA (D. Md.). Although Credit One has not
filed a motion for sanctions based on this conduct, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (“A motion
for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion”), Credit One has
requested that the Court consider imposing sanctions on Mr. Williams. ECF No. 15 at 3.
Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court herein
orders Mr. Williams to show cause—and will hold a hearing on February 6, 2025 at
10:00 a.m.—why the apparent alteration of Mr. Bolton’s emails does not violate Rule
11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and why any such violation should not give
rise to monetary or other sanctions.
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C. 	Mr. Williams’s allegations regarding the emails
After Credit One and Mr. Bolton brought to this Court’s attention the alterations
in the content of Mr. Bolton’s emails in the exhibits Mr. Williams filed, Mr. Williams
retorted by pointing to slight discrepancies in the timestamp in the emails. Specifically,
he points out that for Mr. Bolton’s email beginning “Mr. Williams: May Aetna have the
same time,” Mr. Bolton’s version of that email shows a timestamp of 2:52 p.m. while
Plaintiff’s version shows a timestamp of 2:51 p.m., and for Mr. Bolton’s “Please
disregard” email, Mr. Bolton’s version shows a timestamp of 2:55 p.m. while Plaintiff’s
version shows a timestamp of 2:54 p.m. See ECF No. 17-1 at 4. These discrepancies
appear to almost certainly be the result of the common slight delay between when an
email is sent from a sender’s server or email provider and received by a recipient’s
server or email provider. But the Court will permit Mr. Williams to argue this point at
the February 6 hearing, and thus the Court will reserve decision on that issue.
III. 	CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. 	The motion to vacate the entry of default (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED;
2. 	The motion for leave to file a sur-reply in opposition to the motion to vacate
the entry of default (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED;
3. 	Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3), within 21 days of this
Order, Mr. William SHALL show cause to why his conduct does not violate
Federal Rule 11(b) and why any such violation should not give rise to
monetary or other sanctions;
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4. 	The Court will hold a sanctions hearing on February 6, 2026 at 10:00
a.m. in Courtroom 7D of the Edward A. Garmatz Courthouse in Baltimore,
Maryland; and
5. 	By January 23, 2026, the parties shall file versions of the contested email
chains containing any relevant metadata for those communications.
Date: December 23, 2025
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge
/s/
Case 1:25-cv-02315-ABA Document 19 Filed 12/23/25 Page 8 of 8

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