McGinnis v. Plamondon Enterprises, Inc.

ALASTAR MCGINNIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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* 	Civil No. 25-2138-BAH
PLAMONDON ENTERPRISES, INC.
d/b/a ROY ROGERS,
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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Plaintiff Alastar McGinnis 	("Plaintiff') brought suit 1 against his 	former 	employer,
_Plamondon Enterprises, Inc. ("Defendant") alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq., and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act ("MFEPA"), Md. Code Ann.,
State Government Article ("SG") § 20-601 et seq. ECF 5 (amended complaint). Pending before
the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss (the "Motion"). ECF 8. Plaintiff filed an opposition.
ECF 10. The Court has reviewed all relevant filing"s and finds that no hearing is necessary. See
Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
1 Plaintiff filed an original complaint on July 2, 2024. 	ECF 1. 	An amended complaint, ECF 5,
-was timely filed after Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs initial complaint. See ECF
4. 	"[A]n amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect"
Young v. City ofMt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567,572 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Crysen/Montenay Energy
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 226 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2000)). 	Accordingly, Defendant's motion to
dismiss the original complaint was denied as moot. See ECF 11.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
. 	.
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs amended complaint, which the Court will
accept as true and construe in the light most .favorable to the plaintiff. See Wikimedia Found. v.
Nat'! Sec. Agency, 857 FJd 193,208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (US.)
Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiff alleges that he was hired by Defendant to work
at Roy Rogers in Frederick, Maryland, starting "in or about August 2022." 	ECF 5, at 5 1 20.
Plaintiff was a minor during his employment with Defendant. 	Id. at 2 1 5. 	Plaintiff is also
diagnosed with "[a]utism and a [s]peech [i]mpairment," id. at 3 19, and alleges that "Defendant
was aware of [his] disability at the time of hire and throughout his employment," id. at 6134.
Plaintiff alleges that "[bJeginning in or about February 2023," his "female General
Manager" 	began "repeatedly enter[ing] 	the 	men's restroom while 	Plaintiff was 	using 	it,
unannounced and without knocking." Id. at 7 1 41. The General Manager also allegedly "stared
at Plaintiff from behind while he was urinating, looking him up and down in a manner that Plaintiff
experienced as sexually assaultive, humiliating, and wholly inappropriate." 	Id. 1 42. 	Plaintiff
alleges that the General Manager "did not follow female employees into the restroom or stare at
them while they used the bathroom." 	Id. at 8 1 4 7. 	Based on the General Manager's conduct,
Plaintiffs father "filed a formal complaint of sexual harassment ... on or about March 10, 2023;
on Plaintiffs behalf." 	Id. at 8 1 50. 	On that same day, Plaintiffs father advised the District
Manager and Human Resources Manager that "since [Plaintiff] is autistic, for him to respond to
any criticism or counseling, management would have to speak to him in a calm, clear, professional-
and polite manner." Id. at 9 1 65. 	Defendant then "immediately suspended Plaintiff from work
pending investigation." Id. at 10 1 68.
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Plaintiff was then "involuntarily transferred ... to a different Roy Rogers location" "[o]n
.or about March 20, 2023." 	Id. 1 70. 	After the transfer, Plaintiff was allegedly subjected to
"disability-based derogatory conunents and disparate treatment," including a manager screaming,
"That was stupid!" after Plaintiff made a "minor customer service mistake," id 1173-74. In May
_of 2023, Plaintiffs father "reiterated to [the Human Resources Manager] ... that for [Plaintiff] to
respond to any criticism or counseling, management would have to speak to him in a calm, clear,
professional, and polite manner." Id. at 11 1 81.
Plaintiff alleges that the circumstances at work began to deteriorate, including that he was
targeted with inconsistent enforcement of workplace rules and "was frequently written up for
minor or trivial mistakes, unlike his non-disabled ·coworkers." 	Id. at 12 11 90-91. 	During a
meeting with Human Resources on June 9, 2023, Plaintiff raised "that management had failed to
address his complaints of retaliation and that the [General Manager at the previous location] had
not been disciplined for her repeated restroom intrusions, which made Plaintiff feel sexually
assaulted." Id. at 1411106-107. On June 12, 2023, Plaintiff was terminated. Id. at 151109.
Plaintiff brings the following claims: sex discrimination and sexual harassment in violation
of Title VII and MFEPA (Counts I and II); gender-based retaliation in violation of Title VII and
MFEPA (Counts III and IV); disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and MFEPA
(Counts V and VI);.disability-based retaliation in violation of the ADA and MFEPA (Counts VII
and VIII); and hostile work environment harassment.in violation of the ADA and MFEPA (Counts
IX and X).
U. 	LEGALSTANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to "state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." In considering a motion under this rule, courts discount legal.
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conclusions stated in the compla_int and "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal; 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). 	A court then draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the _plaintiff and
considers whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. Nemet Chevrolet,
Ltd. v. 	Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). 	"A claim has facial	. 	.
plausibility when the phrintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
"The complaint must offer 'more than labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of
the elements ofa cause of action[.]"' Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. ofEduc., 698 F. App'x 745, 747
(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the same time,
a "complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiffs]
claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits."
Owens v. Bait. City State's Att'ys Off, 767 F.3d 3'.:9, 396 (4th Cir. 2014).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6). 	See
ECF 8, at 1. Plaintiff argues that the Rule 12(b)(6) standard "establishes a relatively low threshold·
that strongly favors the non-moving party." 	ECF 10, at 3. 	While accurate that the Court must
view the amended complaint as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff must
nonetheless state a plausible claim for relief.
Below, the Court first provides a summary of MFEPA's relationship to federal anti-
discrimination statutes followed 	by analysis 	of Plaintiffs discrimination, 	harassment, 	and
retaliation claims in turn.
4
II
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A. 	MFEP A is Analogous to Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes
MFEPA prohibits discriminatory employment practices based on an individual's protected
characteristics, including one's sex or disability. See SG § 20-606. Under MFEPA, an employer
may not "fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to the individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because
of, relevant here, the individual's sex or disability, SG § 20-606(a)(I); "fail or refuse to make a
reasonable accommodation for the known disability of an otherwise qualified employee," id.
(a)(4); or "engage in harassment of an employee," id. (a)(5). Similarly, MFEPA prohibits an
employer from discriminating or retaliating "against any of its employees" because that individual
has either "opposed any practice prohibited by [MFEPA]" or "made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [MFEPA]." Id. (f).
The Supreme Court of Maryland has recognized that MFEPA is "modeled on federal anti-
discrimination legislation." Doe v. Catholic ReliefServs., 300 A.3d I 16, 126 (Md. 2023) (quoting
Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 609,614 (Md. I 996)). Maryland has a well-established "history
of consulting federal precedent in the equal employment area." Taylor v. Giant of Md., LLC, 33
A.3d 445,459 (Md. 2011) (citing Haas v: Lockheed Martin Corp., 914 A.2d 735, 742 (Md. 2007)).
For instance, Maryland follows the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applicable to
'federal 	anti-discrimination 	laws 	when 	resolving 	a 	claim 	of retaliation 	and 	employment
discrimination. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Balderrama, 134 A.3d 398,414 (Md. App. 2016);
Barreto v. SGT, Inc., 826 F. App'x 267, 271 (4th Cir. 2020) ("Under Title VII and the MFEPA,
·courts apply the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to claims of retaliation that
they apply to discrimination claims."). 	As such, the Court's analysis under MFEPA and the
respective federal discrimination statutes invoked here-Title VII and the ADA-is parallel,
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unless otherwise indicated. 	See Watrous v. AIRtec, Inc., Civ. No. TJS-24-2076, 2025 WL
2494324, at* 10 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2025) (noting that "[b]ecause the MFEPA is 'modeled on federal
anti-discrimination legislation,' Maryland courts largely apply federal precedent to employment
discrimination claims brought under the MFEPA" except "where the MFEPA materially departs
from the language of Title VII" (quoting Catholic ReliefServs., 300 A.3d at 126-27)).
B. 	Discrimination
1. 	Title VII and MFEPA (Counts I and II)
Plaintiff alleges 	that 	the 	General· Manager's 	bathroom 	intrusions 	constitute 	sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII. ECF 5, at 17 1 128. Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment
because the General Manager "did not engage in similar conduct towards female employees." Id.·
at 7146.
Under Title VII an employer may not, in relevant part, "discriminate against any individual
with respect to [the] ... terms, conditions, or privileges of [his] employment, because of' an·
individual's protected characteristics, including sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); see Strothers v.
City of Laurel, Md., 895 F.3d 317, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2018). 	A plaintiff may prove a claim under
Title VII through either "(l) direct or circumstantial evidence that discrimination motivated the.
employer's adverse employment decision; or (2) the McDonnell Douglas 'pretext framework' that
requires a plaintiff to show that 'the employer's proffered permissible reason for taking an adverse
employment action is actually a pretext for [discrimination]."' Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,284 (4th Cir. 2004) (en bane) (quoting Tex. Dep 't ofCmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)), abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013)); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)
(establishing a three-step test where; first, a plaintiff must establish a "prima facie case" of
'
discrimination; second, "[t]he burden then[] shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
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nondiscriminatory reason" for the alleged adverse· action; and third, the plaintiff may present
evidence to show that the employer's reasoning was mere pretext for discrimination).
However, as the Supreme Court clarified in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting framework is an "evidentfary standard, not a pleading standard." 	534
U.S. 506, 510 (2002). However, McDonnell Douglas remains useful as a framework for assessing
whether a complaint accords with the standards articulated in Twombly and Iqbal. 	See Woods v.
City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 646-48 (4th Cir. 2017). In other words, though a plaintiff need
not establish a prima facie case as required by McDonnell Douglas at the motion to dismiss stage,
"reference to the elements of a claim is helpful to assess whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible
claim." Allgaier v. Microbiologies, Inc., Civ. No. ELH-22-01900, 2023 WL 2837336, at *8 (D.
Md. Apr. 7, 2023).
In instances where, as here, a plaintiff does not offer direct evidence of discrimination, the
elements of a prima facie case of discrimination alleging disparate treatment "under Title VII are:
(I) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment
·action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class."
Coleman v. Maryland Ct. ofAppeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing White v. BF/ Waste
Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288,295 (4th Cir. 2004)), aff'd sub nom. Coleman v. Ct. ofAppeals of Md,
'566 U.S. 30 (2012). 	Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead the second and fourth
elements. ECF 8, at 4.
With respect to the second element, Plaintiff alleges that he had been doing his job in a
·satisfactory manner when the General Manager started following him into the bathroom in
February of 2023. See ECF 5, at 6136 ("From the time the Plaintiff began working for Defendant
until about March 9, 2023, the Plaintiff was doing his job in a satisfactory manner."). 	Plaintiff
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rests his assertion of satisfactory job performance on the al)egation that "Defendant has no written
record of any contemporaneous event demonstrating [Plaintiff had] any performance issue," id.,
and "no record of any discipline, counseling or warning of any kind issued to the Plaintiff," id. at
71 40. Perhaps in an attempt to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the General
Manager's actions pursuant to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas test, Defendant contends
that "the General Manager was only looking for the Plaintiff in the restroom because Plaintiff was
known to hide in the restroom, instead of remaining at his workstation," which Defendant provides
is the "sole reason" the General Manager entered the bathroom. ECF 8, at 3-4. It bears repeating
that at the pleading stage, the Court must accept Plaintiffs allegations in the amended complaint
as true, and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test does not apply. As such, the Court does·
not consider Defendant's justification for the General Manager's bathroom intrusions at this stage.
Courts evaluate \ill employee's alleged satisfactory job performance from the perspective
of the employer, rather than the employee. 	Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1980)."
"This requires a plaintiff to provide 'detailed factual information regarding performance."' Burns
v. WSSC Water, Civ. No. GLS-21-2509, 2022 WL 3043412, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2022) (quoting
Bynum v. Martin, Civ. No. GJH-16-2067, 2016 WL 7468050, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 27, 2016)).
However, "[e]mployees are not required to show that they are 'perfect or model' employees."
Quiroz v. Empirian Vil/. of Maryland, LLC, Civ. No. AAQ-21-02638, 2022 WL 1321594, at *2
(D. Md. May 3, 2022) (quoting Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir ..
2019)). While a conclusory allegation of satisfactory job performance is generally insufficient to
meet this burden, this Court has concluded that a plaintiff sufficiently pleads satisfactory job
performance where he alleges he was never informed "that his job was in jeopardy prior to" an_
adverse employment action. 	Id. 	Here, Plaintiff pleads that he had "no record of discipline,
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counseling or warning of any kind" prior to the Gerieral Manager's bathroom intrusions. ECF 5,
at 7 iJ 40. Had his job performance been less than satisfactory in the six-month period prior to the
bathroom intrusions, it is reasonable to infer that his employer would have given him some kind
of warning or discipline. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor, he has adequately
plead that his job performance was satisfactory at this stage. See Parker v. Children's Nat'/ Med.
Ctr., Inc., Civ. No. ELH-20-3523, 2021 WL 5840949, at *10 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2021) (satisfactory
job performance sufficiently alleged where the plaintiff was "abruptly fired" without identification
of "particular deficiencies" in job performance); see also Tafazolli v. 	Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Civ. No. PWG-19-321 & PWG-19-1638, 2020 WL 7027456, at *12 (D. Md. Nov.
30, 2020) (finding that Plaintiff had sufficiently pied satisfactory performance where facts alleged
were brief).
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to plead the fourth element because he does not
"demonstrate that the [proposed] comparator is similarly situated in all relevant respects." ECF 8,
at 3 (quoting Williams-Johnson v. Paris Foods Corp., Civ. No. RDB-24-1197, 2025 WL 775513,
·at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2025)). 	Defendant rests its assertion on its proffered legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the bathroom intrusions, arguing that Plaintiff provides no facts "to
suggest that female employees were hiding in a restroom to avoid their work duties or that
management needed to chase female employees back to their workstations." 	Id. at 4. 	But the
Court may not consider Defendant's counterargument at this stage, and Defendant offers no other
argument in support of its assertion that the Court should do so.
In general, where '"a plaintiff attempts to rely on comparator evidence to establish
circumstances 	giving 	rise to 	an 	inference 	of unlawful 	discrimination,' 	the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the comparator is similarly situated in all relevant respects." Williams-Johnson,
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2025 WL 775513, at *5 (quoting Swaso, 698 Fed. App'x at 748). This il).cludes alleging "that the
employees 'dealt with the same supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards and ... engaged
in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would
distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it."' Haywood v. Locke, 387 F.
App'x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.
1992)). 	"Although a full analysis of whether comparators are similarly situated does not
necessarily occur at the, motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff must still plead sufficient facts to
justify an inference that the employer treated the plaintiff differently from the way it treated others
under 'arguably similar circumstances."' Tittle v. Petro, Civ. No. TDC-24-3061, 2025 WL
1920936, at *6 (D. Md. July 11, 2025) (quoting Woods, 855 F.3d at 651). 	However, "no single
comparator" must "perfectly align[] with every incident of [a plaintiff's] conduct" as "the analysis
does not require a perfect one on one fit." Johnson v. Baltimore City, Maryland, No. 25-1124, ---
F.4th ----, 2026 WL 31776, at *6 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026) (alterations added) (citing Haynes, 922'
F.3d at 223). "Instead, the analysis focuses on the 'similarity between [the] comparators' and their
conduct such that a jury could reach an inference of discrimination, so long as the comparison is
'meaningful."' Id. (alteration in Johnson) (quoting Lightner v. City of Wilmington, N.C., 545 FJd·
260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff asserts that the General Manager "did not follow female employees into the
restroom or stare at them while they used the bathroom." ECF 5, at 171121. Whether the female·
employees were similarly situated in all relevant respects, including whether they had "comparable
job duties,job performance, [or] qualifications," Tittle, 2025 WL 1920936, at *7, has little bearing
on the discrimination that Plaintiff alleges he experienced-an interference with his ability to use.
the bathroom privately while at work. 	See ECF 10, at 12, n.2 (alleging that the bathroom
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"intrusions affect[ ed] a term of [Plaintiffs] employment: the ability to use the bathroom
undisturbed from privacy invasions"). 	"Overall, the inquiry simply asks whether there are
sufficient commonalities on the key variables between the plaintiff and the would-be comparator
to allow the type of comparison that, taken together with the other prima facie evidence, would
allow a jury to reach an inference of discrimination.". Swaso, 698 F. App'x at 748 (quoting Eaton
v. Ind. Dep 't of Corr., 657 F.3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 2011)). 	Presumably all employees were
permitted to use the bathroom in Plaintiffs workplace, thus, the comparator inquiry depends
primarily on the variable that Plaintiff has alleged-that female employees were not intruded on
·in the bathroom and thus treated differently under "arguably similar circumstances." Woods, 855
F.3d at 651. 	As such, the nature of the alleged act, combined with Plaintiffs assertion that the
General Manager did not intrude on female employees in the bathroom is sufficient to support a
·reasonable inference of sex discrimination at this stage and the Court will not dismiss these counts.
2. 	ADA and MFEPA (Counts V and VI)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied him reasonable accommodations in violation of the
-ADA. ECF 5, at 21 at ,r 159. The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against otherwise
"qualified indi_vidual[s] on the basis of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b). Under the ADA, a
"disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
'
.major life activities," "a record of such an impairment," or "being regarded as having such an
impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Manufacturers
& Traders Tr. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3d 89, 102 (D. Md. 2019). Major life activities "include, but are.
_not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working," as well as "the operation of a major bodily function." 	Id. §
12102(2). A "qualified individual" is one who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can
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perform the essential functions of the employment position that [the] individual holds or desires."
·Id § 12111 (8). Among the forms of discrimination prohibited by the statute are (1) imposing an
adverse action upon an employee due to their disability; (2) retaliating against an employee for
engaging in protected activities related to disability discrimination; and (3) creating a hostile work
environment. 	See Israelitt v. Enter. Servs. LLC, 78 F.4th 647, 653 (4th Cir. 2023) (recognizing
each type of claim under the ADA).
"One form of discrimination prohibited by the ADA is a failure to make a reasonable
accommodation." Crabill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 423 F. App'x 314, 322 (4th Cir.
2011). 	"A reasonable accommodation is one that (1) 'enables [a qualified] individual with a
disability ... to perform the essential functions of[a] position,' ... or (2) 'enable[s] [an] employee
with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and JJrivileges of employment as are enjoyed by ... other
similarly situated employees without disabilities."'. Hamel v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cnty., Civ.
No. JKB-16-2876, 2018 WL 1453335, at *10 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2018) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(o)(l)(ii)-(iii)). 	The elements of a failure to accommodate claim are: "(1) the employee
was an individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the employer had notice of
the disability; (3) with .reasonable accommodation, the employee could perform the essential'
functions 	of the position; and (4) the employer refused to make such accommodations."
Manufacturers & Traders Tr. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (citing Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373,
387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff "has failed to establish that he qualifies as an individual
with a disability under the ADA." ECF 8, at 9, 15. • The Court disagrees. "The ADA's definition
is intended to be broad,'' Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off.of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562,572 (4th Cir. 2015),·
and "[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered
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entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether
the individual meets the definition of disability," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.l(c)(4). 	"[T]he question of
whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive
analysis." 	Chisholm v. Mountaire Farms of N 	Carolina Corp., 629 F. Supp. 3d 368, 375
(M.D.N.C. 2022) (citing ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122
Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008)). Further, the regulations set forth that autism substantially limits a major
life activity. 	See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (listing autism as an impairment that presumptively
substantially limits a major life activity). 	Plaintiff is diagnosed with autism and a speech
·impediment, ECF 5, at 20 1 153-154, and alleges that he required reasonable accommodations
from his employer for those conditions, id. at 5 i 4. 	The Court concludes that Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged a disability under the ADA.
Defendant does not contest that it had notice of Plaintiffs disability. See ECF 5, at 5 11
23-24 (describing how Plaintiffs father explained to the District Manager that Plaintiff has autism
before he was hired). However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege both "how or when
·he personally requested accommodations" and "that the alleged accommodation requested by
Plaintiff would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of his job."2 ECF 8, at 10.
Defendant cites Bell v. Medline, Civ. No. GLR-24-3368, 2025 WL 934275 (D. Md. Mar .
.27, 2025) 	in support of its assertion that Plaintiff was required to "personally request[]
2 Defendant also argues that the accommodations requested by Plaintiff were not reasonable. ECF
8, at 10-11. 	The Court declines to address this argument because the reasonableness of an
·accommodation is a question of fact and not to be addressed at the pleading stage. Sager v. Hous.
Comm 'n of Anne Arundel Cnty., 855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 566 (D. Md. 2012) ("Whether an
accommodation is reasonable is ultimately a question of fact." (quoting Pandazides v. Virginia Bd
of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 833 (4th Cir. 1994))). 	To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is only
required to plausibly allege that with reasonable accommodation, he could perform the essential
functions of the position as discussed herein.
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accommodations." 	Id. ("Here, as in Bell, Plaintiff fails to allege how or when he personally
requested accommodation from Roy Rogers·for his alleged disability."). 	However, in Bell, this
Court did not conclude that a plaintiff is required to personally request accommodations in order
to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim. 	Rather, the Court determined that the plaintiff in
that case failed to "explain how he requested· an accommodation for his alleged disability at all."
Bell, 2025 WL 934275, at *5 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, regardless of whether Plaintiff was
required to "personally request" accommodations, his claim fails because he fails to plead that he
could perform the essential functions of his job even with reasonable accommodation.
"An employer's obligations under the ADA are triggered for those accommodations
necessary for the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of [his] job." Simmons v. UM Cap.
'
Region Health, Inc., Civ. No. PX-21-2074, 20.21 WL 4806336, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2021) (citing
Fierce v. Burwell, 101 F. Supp. 3d 543, 550 (D. Md. 2015)). 	"Essential functions" are "the
fundamental job duties of the employmt;nt position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Plaintiffs duties
included "working the cash register, preparing the food bags for customer orders, [and] delivering
the orders to the cars in the parking lot." 	ECF 5, at 6 1 30. 	Plaintiff asserts that reasonable
accommodations for his autism would have included "modifications to work schedules, breaks, or·
conduct expectations," ECF 5, at 4 1 17, and receiving criticism through "management ...
speak[ing] to him in a calm, clear, professional, and polite manner," id at 9 1 16. He specifically
alleges that his father requested the second set of accommodations on his behalf. 	Id 	But "an·
employer's failure to provide an accommodation is only actionable if the accommodation would
'alleviate disability-induced 	limitations 	that 	impact 	an 	employee's job-related 	activities."'
Simmons, 2021 WL 4806336, at *4 (quoting Hamel, 2018 WL 1453335, at *12). 	'"A causal·
relationship' between the disability and the accommodation, therefore, is essential to the success
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of the claim," id. (quoting Fierce, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 550), "or, in other words, [that] 'the requested
accommodation was necessary in order for [him] to perform the essential functions of [his] job,"'
Shivers v. Saul, Civ. No. JKB-19-2434, 2020 WL 7055503, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 2, 2020) (quoting
Fierce, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 550) (emphasis in Fierce).
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege the requisite causal connection because he fails to plead
'how "management ... speak[ing] to [Plaintiff] in a calm, clear, professional, and polite manner"
would alleviate limitations caused by his disabili_ty and allow him to perform the essential
functions of his job. In fact, the amended complaint alleges that he requested the accommodation
to assist Plaintiff with "respond[ing] to any criticism" and not necessarily related to any essential
functions of his position. ECF 5, at 11181; cf Simmons, 2021 WL 4806336, at *4 (dismissing a
reasonable accommodation claim where plaintiffs request was made to "ensure that sudden
-deadlines and unrealistic expectations would stop occurring" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The 	amended 	complaint 	is 	also 	devoid 	of facts . connecting 	Plaintiffs 	disability 	to 	the
accommodation request, except for the conclusory statement that the accommodation was needed
."since [Plaintiff is] autistic." ECF 5, at 9165. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that the requested
accommodation was necessary for Plaintiff to perform any essential functions of his job.
Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed.
C. 	Harassment
I. 	Title VII and MFEPA (Counts I and II)
Plaintiff alleges harassment in violation of Title VII based on the General Manager entering
the men's bathroom, "star[ing] at [him] from behind while he was urinating," and "looking at him
up and down." ECF 5, at 161120. He asserts that the General Manager's conduct was "pervasive,
occurred on multiple occasions, and created a hostile, intimidating, and distressing work
environment for Plaintiff." Id. at 8 1 49.
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Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination necessarily proscribes harassment on the basis
of sex. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Without question, when
a supervisor sexually h<!fasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor.
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex"). 	Under Title VII, "[t]here are two categories of sexual
harassment that are generally recognized: (1) quid pro quo harassment, where sexual consideration
is demanded in exchange for job benefits; and (2) harassment that creates an offensive or hostile
work environment." 	Brannam v. Fid. Direct Mortg., LLC, Civ. No. DKC-~8-3306, 2019 WL
2642832, at *5 (D. Md. June 27, 2019) (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,254 (4th Cir. 1983)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges the second type-hostile work environment harassment on the basis of sex.
See ECF 10, at 12 n.2 (explaining that Plaintiff's "gender[-Jbased claims for a hostile work
environment ... pertain to the bathroom intrusions"). 	A hostile work environment exists when
the workplace is "permeated with discriminatory 	intimidation, ridicule, 	and insult that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment." 	Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 272 (4th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). The elements of a hostile
work environment clairμ are (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiffs protected
class; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs conditions of employment
and to create an abusive work environment; (4) which is imputable to the employer. See Boyer-
Liberto, 786 FJd at 277.
The Fourth Cir\:uit has set "a high bar in order to satisfy the severe or pervasive test."
EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306,315 (4th Cir. 2008). "[T]o plead that the environment
is sufficiently severe or pervasive, a plaintiff must allege an objectively hostile workplace·
environment as well as that it was subjectively perceived by the plaintiff as hostile." 	Milo v.
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CyberCore Techs., LLC, Civ. No. RDB-18-3145, 20)9 WL4447400, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 17, 2019)
(citing Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 178 (4th Cir. 2001)). 	The determination of
'whether an environment is objectively hostile requires consideration of the "the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive 	utterance; 	and 	whether 	it 	unreasonably 	interferes 	with 	an 	employee's 	work
·performance." 	Id. 	"Although the severity or pervasiveness of harassment can be a question of
fact, a district court may dismiss a complaint that does not allege facts suggesting that the
defendant's conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of plaintiffs
·employment." Sunkins v. Hampton Roads Connector Partners, 701 F. Supp. 3d 342, 352 (E.D.
Va. 2023) (collecting cases).
Defendant asserts Plaintiffs claim must fail because "requiring Plaintiff to perform his
.work duties is neither severe nor pervasive" and that Plaintiff has failed to allege that the bathroom
intrusions were "physically threatening," "humiliating," or that they "interfered with his work
performance." ECF 8, at 5.
Plaintiff plainly alleges the first and second elements of a Title VII hostile work
environment claim-that the conduct of the General Manager was unwelcome; ECF 5, at 16 , 119,
and that "gender was a motivating factor" in the conduct, id. , 121. Defendant counters that the
intrusions were justified because the General Manager was "checking to see if Plaintiff was using
his cell phone." ECF 8, at 6. As noted, this is a burden-shifting argument that the Court need not
consider at this time. 	The nature of the General Manager's alleged conduct. combined with the
allegation that she "did not follow female employees into the restroom or stare at them while they
used the bathroom," ECF 5, at 8, 47, both create a plausible inference that the bathroom intrusions
were based on Plaintiffs sex. Cf Westmorelandv. Prince George's Cnty., Md., Civ. No. AW-09-
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2453, 2011 WL 3880422, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 31, 2011) (detennining that at the pleading stage,
plaintiff plausibly alleged that her gender was a but-for cause of harassment where plaintiff alleged
that out of thirty-nine mostly male students, she was the only individual implicated in a cheating,
scandal).
Plaintiff alleges that the General Manager's actions were subjectively hostile. ECF 5, at 7
,r 42 (explaining that Plaintiff experienced the conduct as "sexually assaultive, humiliating, and
wholly inappropriate"). But whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the conduct was severe and
pervasive so as to create an objectively hostile work environment is a more difficult question. See
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 (explaining that this standard is a "middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible
. psychological injury"). As noted, whether a work environment is objectively hostile depends on
"the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance." Milo, 2019 WL 4447400, at *6. Isolated incidents are generally
not sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim. E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., 750 F. Supp.
2d 564, 572 (D. Md. 2010). 	However, Plaintiff alleges that the General Manager entered the
restroom "repeatedly," ECF 5, at 17 ,r 125, and "on multiple occasions," id. at 8 ,r 49, and that the
conduct continued even after his father made a complaint of harassment, id. at 18 ,r 132. Plaintiff
also alleges that the actions. "interfered with [his] ability to perfonn his job duties." 	Id. ,r 134.
Additionally, that a supervisor perpetrated th_e alleged harassment supports the inference that the
conduct was objectively severe or pervasive, because "a supervisor's power and authority invests
his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. •
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998). As such, Plaintiff plausibly alleges an objectively hostile work
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environment. Finally, that the alleged harasser was Plaintiffs General Manager satisfies the fourth
and final element-that the harassment is imputable to the employer. 	See Hunt v. Constantine
·com. Constr., Civ. No. TDC-20-1846, 2023 WL 2744491 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2023) ("If the harasser
is a supervisor, the employer is either strictly or vicariously liable for the supervisor's actions."
(citing Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317,333 (4th Cir. 2018))). 	Accordingly, Plaintiffs
Title VII and MFEPA sex-based hostile work environment claims survive.
2. 	Hostile Work Environment - ADA and MFEPA (Counts IX and X)
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his disability,
-ECF 5, at 24-26, grounding his claim on Defendant allegedly calling him "stupid," writing him
up for minor or trivial mistakes, sending him home early without justification, and subjecting him
to inconsistent and targeted enforcement of workplace rules, id at 25 1 190. He also alleges that
.on one occasion, a coworker "physically assaulted" him by "aggressively forc[ing] a food box out
of Plaintiff's hands." Id. at 141102.
The requirements for a hostile work environment claim under the ADA mirror those of
Title VIL Plaintiff must allege that "(l) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was
subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his disability; (4) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and (5) some factual basis exists to impute liability for the harassment to the
employer." Fox, 247 F.3d at 177.
Plaintiffs claim falters at the fourth step. 	As noted, Plaintiff must allege a subjectively
and objectively hostile work environment. Milo, 2019 WL 4447400, at *6. While Plaintiff pleads
his subjective perception, the conduct alleged here is far from what may be considered objectively
hosti_le. 	First, "corrective action to address an employee's professional shortcomings, even if
misplaced, does not objectively create a hostile or abusive environment." 	Wedderburn v. Bd. of
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Educ. of Baltimore Cnty., Civ. No. PX-19-215, 2022 WL 504511, at *13 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2022).
That Plaintiff was written up for what he perceives as minor mistakes or that he was subjected to
targeted enforcement of rules does not qualify. Next, although Plaintiff takes issue with allegedly.
being told something he did was "stupid," name-calling, on its own, rarely gives rise to objectively
"severe or pervas~ve" harassment. 	See Peralta v. Roros 940, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 385, 395
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (findi\lg that "name-calling," combined with "undue reprimands, perceived.
animosity, and unwelcome work assignments" did "not exhibit the severity or pervasiveness of an
actionable hostile work environment"); Murphy v. BeavEx, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 139, 150-151
(D. Conn. 2008) (finding that name calling and teasing based on disability were not sufficient to
show "severe or pervasive" harassment); Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 653,
664 (D. P.R. 1997) (same). As to the alleged·physical assault that involved aggressively forcing a
food box out of Plaintiff's hands, this is not so severe as to constitute a hostile work environment,
as only "extremely serious" isolated incidents may amount to discriminatory changes in the "terms
and conditions of employment" that form the basis of a hostile work environment claim. 	See
Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d at 315 (explaining that "conduct that amounts to 'simple teasing,
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)"' do not rise to the level of
objectively severe or pervasive (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998))). Finally, that Plaintiff was sent home early similarly fails to qualify. See Faulkenberry
v. U.S. Dep't of Def, Civ. No. JMC-22-1150, 2023 WL 3074639, at *12 (D. Md. Apr. 25, 2023)
(holding plaintiffs allegations that she was es_corted off work premises by security in view of other
employees was not severe enough to establish a hostile work environment claim, noting "far worse
is 	required"). 	Accordingly, 	Plaintiff has 	failed 	to 	establish an objectively 	hostile 	work
environment under the ADA, and his disability-based MFEPA claim fails for the same reasons.
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D. 	Retaliation -Title VII, ADA, and MFEPA (Counts III, IV, VII, and VIII)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against him in violation of Title VII, the ADA,
and MFEPA, for his participation in protected activities including reporting alleged sexual
harassment, requesting accommodations, and reporting disability-based harassment. ECF 5, at 19
,r 141, at 23 ,r 173. Plaintiff claims he was subjected to a number of"adverse employment actions,"
including but not limited to "immediate suspension, involuntary transfer ... , and ultimately
termination." Id. at 23 ,r 174.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff's retaliation claims must fail because Plaintiffs father
engaged in protected activities pursuant to Title VII and the ADA, and "not the Plaintiff himself."
ECF 8, at 7; see also id. 	at 13-14. 	Plaintiff counters that "his father was acting as his
representative," ECF 10, at 10, and "the Supreme Court [has] rejected the argument [that] excludes
·third-party complaints on behalf of employees" for purposes of a retaliation claim, id. at 9 (citing
Thompson v. N Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (20_11)). Plaintiff also alleges that he engaged in
at least one protected activity with respect to his Title VII claim by raising with management that
'they "dici not take his complaints about sexual harassment seriously." 	ECF 5, at 19 ,r 141.
However, Defendant asserts that this also fails to qualify as a protected activity because Plaintiff
"does not detail when, how, and to whom Plaintiff allegedly reported any alleged complaint." ECF
·8, at 7-8.
Title VII, the ADA, and MFEPA prohibit employers from retaliating against employees
who oppose discriminatory conduct. 	"A prima facie case of retaliation requires [] that: (1) the
.plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)
there was a causal connection between the protected.activity and the adverse action." Ray v. Int'/
Paper Co., 909 F.3d 661,669 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Foster, 787 F.3d at 250).
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"The Fourth Circuit has explained that, in the context of a retaliation claim, a protected.
activity may fall into two categories, opposition and participation." 	P.arker v. Children's Nat'/
Med. Ctr., Inc., Civ. No. ELH-20-3523, 2021 'WL 5840949, at *19 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397,406 (4th Cir.
2005)). In other words, '.'[a]n employer may not retaliate against an employee for participating in
an ongoing investigatioI\ or proceeding D, nor may the employer take adverse employment action
against an employee for ,opposing discriminatory practices in the workplace." Laughlin v. Metro.
Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253,259 (4th Cir. 1998). "[A]n adverse action for purposes
of a Title VII [] claim ~s merely one that causes 'some harm respecting an identifiable term or
condition of employment.'" Barnhill v. Bondi, 138 F.4th 123, 129 n.6 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346, 354-55 (2024)). 	"An employee need not
show that the harm was,significant, serious, substantial, 'or any similar adjective suggesting that
the disadvantage to the (lmployee must exceed a heightened bar."' Id. (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S.
at 355).
A plaintiff may,attempt to plead causation in a retaliation claim in two ways: 	(1) "[a]
plaintiff may establish the existence of facts that 'suggest[ ] that the adverse action occurred
because of the protected activity,"'; or (2) "a plaintiff may demonstrate that 'the adverse act bears
sufficient temporal proximity to the protected activity[.]"' Gaines v. Baltimore P.olice Dep 't, 657
F. Supp. 3d 708, 745 (I;>. Md. 2023) (alterations in Gaines) (first quoting Roberts v. Glenn Indus.
Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2021); and then quoting Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54·
F.4th 201,218 (4th Cir. 2022)). "The existence of relevant facts alone, or together with temporal
proximity, may be used to establish a causal connection between the protected activity and the.
adverse action." Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Roberts, 998 F.3d at 123).
22.
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1. 	Plaintiffs 	father's 	actions 	constitute 	protected 	activity 	for 	purposes 	of
Plaintiff's retaliation claims
Plaintiff asserts that Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011),
stands for the proposition that that "the. Supreme Court [has] rejected the argument [that] excludes
third-party complaints on behalf of employees" for purposes ofa retaliation claim. ECF 10, at 9.
In Thompson, an engaged couple, Thompson and Regalado, were employed by the same company.
562 U.S. at 172. 	When Regalado filed an EEOC discrimination charge on her own behalf, the
company fired Thompson, which Thompson claimed was retaliation for Regalado's undertaking
of a protected activity. Id 	Applying a zone-of-interest test, the Court held that a retaliation suit
may lie "by any plaintiff with an interest 'arguably [sought] to be protected by the statute."' Id. at
178. "In light of Thompson, [a] plaintiff may rely on the protected activity of another person to
establish a Title VII retaliation claim." 	Mackall v. Colvin, Civ. No. ELH-12-1153, 2015 WL
412922, at *24 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2015) (citing Thompson, 562 U.S. at 867). 	Here, Plaintiff falls
into the zone of interest of Title VII and ADA, as he has an interest in being protected from
retaliation by his employer.
The Fourth Circuit has also allowed a student to sue for retaliation under the ADA based
on actions taken by her mother, who was acting on the student's behalf in dealings with school
officials. See Baird ex. rel. Bairdv. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999). In that case, the Fourth
·Circuit expressly rejected the argument that a plaintiff could not maintain her claim simply because
she did not engage in protected activity on her own behalf. Id at 471 n.10 (rejecting the argument
that "Baird failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect
to her retaliation claim" because "the forecasted evidence tended to demonstrate that the retaliation
against Baird was a result of protected conduct engaged in by her mother, not Baird herself,"
because· "[i]t [wa]s clear that Baird's mother was acting on Baird's behalf in complaining of what
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she perceived to be conduct by school officials violating the ADA"); see also E.E. 0. C. v. Ohio
Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541,547 (6th Cir. 1993) (a protected activity may include circumstances where
"an employee, or his representative, has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment·
practice" (emphasis in original)). 	That Plaintiff was a minor during his employment is also
relevant here, as parents "typically have standing to assert the claims of their minor children," Doe
#1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. PJM-21-0356, 2021 WL 6072813, at *6 (D. Md ..
Dec. 23, 2021), and so it is reasonable that a parent might raise workplace conduct issues on their
minor child's behalf, just as the plaintiffs mother did with the school in Baird. Under the specific
circumstances here, including Plaintiffs minor status during his employment, his affirmation that.
his father was acting as his representative, and that he falls into the "zone of interest" of a retaliation
claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff may' rely on his father's protected activity undertaken on
his behalf to assert the first element of his retaliation claim.
2. 	Plaintiff has sufficiently pied his retaliation claims
Plaintiff has sufficiently pied his Title· VII and ADA retaliation claims. It bears noting that
Defendant does not address, and therefore does not appear to dispute, that Plaintiff suffered adverse
employment action. Defendant also does not address causation in its Motion. Rather, Defendant
rests its dismissal arguments on its assertion that Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity.
ECF 8, at 7-8, 13-14. This argument fails.
Plaintiff asserts that the protected activities relevant to his retaliation claims include: (1)
his father's complaint of sexual harassment op. March 10, 2023 regarding the bathroom intrusions,
ECF 5, at 19 ,r 141; (2) Plaintiffs own complaint on June 12, 2023 "that management did not take
his complaints about harassment seriously," id.; (3) Plaintiffs father's March 10, 2023 request for
accommodations for Plaintiff, id. at 23 ,r 173;_ and (4) Plaintiffs father's May 10, 2023 reiteration
of his request for accommodations for Plaintiff, id. 	To the extent that Defendant argues that
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Plaintiff must plead more specific details about his June 12 complaint, Defendant does not provide
any case law in support of that purported requirement.
It is well established, .and Defendant does not dispute, that complaints about sexual
harassment and requests for accommodations are protected activities under Title VII and the ADA,
respectively. US. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm 'n v. Golden Ent., Inc., Civ. No. LKG-20-2811,
2023 WL 4134696, at *5 (D. Md. June 22, 2023) ("Complaining about sexual harassment is a
protected activity."); Hamilton v. Prince George's Cnty. Police Dep 't, Civ. No. DKC-17-2300,
2018 WL 1365847, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 	16, 2018) ("A request for accommodation is [a]
.paradigmatic protected activit[y] for ADA purposes."). 	Termination is also unquestionably an
adverse employment action. 	Lamb v. Spencer, Civ. No. PX-16-2705, 2018 WL 6434512, at *7
(D. Md. Dec. 7, 2018) ("It is undisputed that termination constitutes adverse employment action.").
_Further, "courts have recognized that a 'transfer' ... may constitute an adverse employment
action." Thomson v. Belton, Civ. No. ELH-18-3116, 2018 WL 6173443 (D. Md. Nov. 26, 2018).
Thus, the outstanding issue in Plaintiffs retaliation claim is causation.
As noted, one avenue to establish causation is to "demonstrate that 'the adverse act bears
sufficient temporal proximity to the protected activity."' Gaines, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 745. 	Here,
Plaintiff alleges that his suspension occurred "immediately" after the March I 0, 2023 complaint
of sexual haras'sment and request for accommodations, and his involuntary transfer occurred ten
days later. 	ECF 5, at 10 1 68 ("Following the complaint of sexual harassment, Defendant
immediately suspended Plaintiff from work pending investigation[.]"), at 1 70 ("On or about
March 	20, 	2023, 	Defendant 	involuntary 	transferred 	Plaintiff to 	a 	different 	Roy 	Rogers
location[.]"). 	Plaintiff was then terminated on June 12, 2023, only three days after his second
complaint of sexual harassment and one month after the second request for accommodations. Id
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at 11 ,i 81 (in a phone call on May 10, 2023, Plaintiffs father "reiterated" his request for
accommodations for Plaintiff), at 14 ,i,i 106-107 ("On June 9, 2023, Plaintiff was called into a
meeting" where "Plaintiff explained that management had failed to address his complaints of
retaliation and that [the General Manager] had not been disciplined for her repeated restroom
intrusions, which made Plaintiff feel sexually assaulted."). 	The temporal proximity between the
protected acts and adverse actions support an inference of causation here.
"[T]he Fourth Circuit has expressly 	declined to determine 	'how close a temporal
connection must [be] for ... a causal nexus [to exist],' while noting that its 'precedent establishes
that several months is sufficiently proximate to satisfy the requirement."' Beto/v. Suburban Hosp.,.
Inc., Civ. No. DKC-11-1452, 2012 WL 2564781, at *11 (D. Md. June 29, 2012) (quoting
Brockman v. Snow, 217 F. App'x 201, 207 (4th Cir.2007)). 	However, "[o]ne month is a
sufficiently short time to establish a causal link. by temporal proximity alone." 	Lowman v.
MarylandAviationAdmin., Civ. No. JKB-18-1146, 2019 WL 133267, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 8, 2019).
Here, the adverse employment actions were all taken within one month or less of each protected
activity claimed here, satisfying the requisite causation standard. Plaintiffs retaliation claims thus
survive.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss, ECF 8, is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. The motion is granted as to Plaintiffs disability discrimination (Counts V
and VI) and hostile work environment harassment (Counts IX and X) claims under the ADA and
MFEPA, which are DISMISSED. Plaintiffs sex discrimination and sexual harassment in violation
of Title VII and MFEPA (Counts I and II); gender-based retaliation in violation of Title VII and
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MFEPA (Counts III and IV); and di'sability-based retaliation in violation of the ADA and MFEPA
(Counts VII and VIII) survive.
A separate implementing order will issue.
Dated: January 28, 2026 	/s/
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
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