Mitchell v. Physioc et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cv-01010-LKG Document13_ Filed 02/20/26 Page 1 of 7

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Vel
WSDG- GREENBELT

)
EDGAR MITCHELL, ) 25 FEB 20 pH2:41
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-1010-LKG '
v. )
) Dated: February 20, 2026
BRANDON PHYSIOC, )
SGT. JOHN ZERKLE, )
LT. ERIC MOATS, )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM ,

*

Plaintiff Edgar Mitchell, who at all relevant times! was incarcerated at the Washington
County Detention Center (“WCDC”), filed this civil rights complaint alleging that Defendants
subjected him to excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. Defendants
Brandon Physioc, Sgt. John Zerkle, and Lt. Eric Moats have filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment in response to the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 11.
Although Mitchell was advised of his right to file an Opposition Response and of the
consequences of failing to do so, he has not opposed the motion. ECF No. 12. No hearing is
necessary. D. Md. Local R. 105.6 (2025). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion,
construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, shall be GRANTED.

J. | BACKGROUND

Mitchell alleges that on November 5, 2024, there was an incident with correctional staff
resulting in him being handcuffed, shackled, brutally attacked, and maced by Defendants. ECF
No. I-1 at 1. He explains that he supposed to be taken to a bail review hearing but in the process
of the escort he was antagonized by racial slurs coming from the officers “for no reason.” Id.
Mitchell states that he feared for his life and safety. Id. He states he was “beaten up bad and

thrown in a cell as if 1 was an animal” and adds that he was “choked and maced directly in my

1 As of April 25, 2025, Mitchell is no longer incarcerated at WCDC. See ECF No. 11-1 at 4.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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face” which caused him respiratory distress. Jd. According to Mitchell, he had a pre-existing
respiratory condition of bronchitis. Id.

Despite Mitchell telling the officers “numerous times” that he was not resisting and that
he could not breathe, he claims they continued to choke and beat him until he was slipping in and
out of consciousness. Jd, at 2. Mitchell claims the officers threw him into a “wet dirty cell
without any clothes on” prior to beating him. Jd. He states that he constantly asked for medical
attention because he could not breathe but the officers simply walked away without responding
to his request. Jd. As relief, he seeks an award of 500 million dollars. Jd.

Mitchell attaches to his complaint a document entitled Initial Report of Detainee Rules
Violation dated November 7, 2024, which varies significantly from the allegations he raises in
the body of his complaint. ECF No. 1-2. The report was written by Sgt. Zerkle who was
assigned to “Escort” and, in that capacity, he accompanied Sgt, Mills and “M/Dep. Physioc” to
D-Pod to get Mitchell for Bond Review. Jd. at 1. When they arrived at Mitchell’s cell, they
discovered he had flooded his cell: “water was coming out the door.” Id. When asked if he
wanted to go to Bond Review, Mitchell stated that he wanted to attend and submitted to being
handcuffed before exiting his cell. Jd. When Mitchell reached the hallway, he became
argumentative and made statements that he was “on lock” for no reason, and indicated he was
not going back to “that cell.” Jd. All of the officers present attempted to explain to him that he
would be going back to the cell he was in and that he was on lock for refusing to lock in while he
was in the booking area. Jd. According to the report, Mitchell became irate and started backing
away from the escorting officers, who were then joined by two additional officers. Jd.

Because Mitchell was being disorderly, the officers decided to put him back into his cell
which he had flooded before the escort had arrived to take him to Bond Review. Jd. Mitchell
protested and said he wasn’t going back into that cell because it was dirty. Jd, When it was
pointed out to Mitchell that it was he who had flooded the cell and that prior to that the cell was
clean, he continued to state he was not going into the cell. Jd. Sgt. Mills then placed his hand on
Mitchell’s shoulder to begin escorting him back to D-Pod, Mitchell pulled away and Sgt. Zerkle
grabbed the handcuffs. Jd. Mitchell pulled away from Sgt. Zerkle and fell to the floor, resisting
staff. Id. Zerkle and others began dragging Mitchell along the floor because he refused to walk.
Id.

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When the group reached D-Pod, with Mitchell being dragged still refusing to walk,
Mitchell grabbed onto the sally port door which prevented them from getting through the door
and into D-Pod., ECF No. 1-2 at 2. At this point, staff had to pick Mitchell up and carry him
because he was still resisting efforts to put him back in his cell. Jd. Sgt. Zerkle explains that he
was behind Mitchell at that time and “placed his left arm over his left shoulder, then [his] right
arm over his right arm into a ‘seatbelt’ hold.” Jd. After placing him in that hold, Sgt. Zerkle “sat
down backwards onto the floor with him to gain better control.” Jd. Mitchell’s leg irons were
removed, and he was placed back on his feet. Id.

As they began walking Mitchell toward his cell, he continued to resist the effort by
pushing back with his feet and once they reached the door of the cell, put his fect against the
door jam to keep the officers from putting him into the cell. Jd. Sgt. Zerkle began to pull on
Mitchell’s right leg and Barton pulled on his left; once Mitchell’s feet were off the door frame, he
began kicking at staff, striking Sgt. Zerkle in the face and hitting other staff in the face and legs.
Id.

Once the officers had Mitchell under control, Barton and Physioc were able to get him
into the cell. /d. “A tether was placed on the hand cuffs [sic] and Barton exited the cell and
Physioc had control of the tether.” Jd. After the door was closed, Mitchell continued to resist by
pulling on the tether. Jd. Defendants have provided the same report, clarifying that the final
page of exhibits attached to Mitchell’s complaint is also part of the same incident report. ECF
No. 1-2 at 4; ECF No. 11-7 at 1-3. The report concludes that Zerkle advised Mitchell that if he
did not place his hands in the drop box and stop pulling back on the tether he would be pepper
sprayed. Id. at 2. Mitchell remained non-compliant and Zerkle discharged pepper spray into the
cell through the drop box towards Mitchell’s face; Mitchell then complied. /d. The report
concludes that Mitchell refused medical treatment. Jd.

Another incident on November 7, 2024 involved Officers Bakner, Sgt. Ramsey, and Lt.
Moats. ECF No. 1-2 at 3. On this occasion Mitchell was being housed in a booking cell and was
banging on the cell door, yelling that he wanted to make a phone call. Jd. Although staff
attempted to counsel him that this was not the way to go about getting what he wanted, his
compliance would only last for a few minutes before his disruptive behavior would return. Jd.

The report indicates that Mitchell’s behavior continued throughout his-stay in booking. /d. None

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of these correctional officers are named as Defendants in this civil action and this incident
appears to be completely unrelated to the claims asserted here.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the complaint in light of a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
12(b)(6) the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the
facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir,
1997). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-
Fleming Int’l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading
standard” of Rule 8(a)). .

The Supreme Court of the United States explained a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“srounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need
“detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. /d. at 555. Instead, “once a claim
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.” Jd. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss; “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S, at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jgbai, 556 U.S.
at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the pleader
is entitled to relief.’” Jd. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a}(2)).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Court should “view the evidence in the

light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor

Case 1:25-cv-01010-LKG Document13 _ Filed 02/20/26 Page5of7

without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia
Colleton Med. Ctr, Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). Importantly, “the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).

While self-represented pleadings are liberally construed, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007), this Court maintains an “affirmative obligation . . . to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens
Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). “A party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,’ but
rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jd. (quoting
Fed, R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A dispute of material fact is only “genuine” if sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477
USS. at 249-50.

il. ANALYSIS

Defendants assert that Mitchell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and his
complaint is therefore barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and that he has
otherwise failed to state a claim against them. ECF No. 11.

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. If Mitchell’s claims
have not been properly presented through the administrative remedy procedure they must be
dismissed pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C, § 1997e. The
PLRA provides in pertinent part that:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.

~ 42 ULS.C. § 1997e(a).
For purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or
detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent

for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

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diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). The phrase “prison conditions” encompasses “all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve gencral circumstances or particular episodes,
and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002); see Chase v, Peay, 286 F.Supp.2d 523, 528 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 98 Fed. Appx. 253
(4th Cir. 2004).

Notably, administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement
and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner. Rather, the failure to .
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by )
defendants. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-216 (2007); Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361
(4th Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, a claim that has not been exhausted may not be considered by this
Court. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 220. In other words, exhaustion is mandatory. Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 632, 639 (2016). Therefore, a court ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. Ross,
578 U.S. at 639 (citing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (explaining “[t]he mandatory
‘shall’. . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion”)).

Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedural steps in order to exhaust his
administrative remedies, Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d at 725, 729; see Langford v. Couch, 50
F.Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he . .. PLRA amendment made clear that exhaustion is
now mandatory.”). Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review process in
accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion of administrative
remedies, which ‘means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that
the agency addresses the issues on the merits)."” Woodford 548 U.S. at 93 (quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). But the court is
“obligated to ensure that any defects in [administrative] exhaustion were not procured from the
action or inaction of prison officials.” Aguilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2007); see Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006).

Defendants have provided the Court with verified business records describing the
grievance procedure in place at WCDC. ECF No. 11-4. The procedure states in pertinent part
that:

An inmate may invoke the Inmate Grievance Procedure by first obtaining form
an “Inmate Request Form”. This form is available to inmates upon request. The
inmate will use the form to file a written request to receive one or more copies

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of an “Inmate Grievance Form”. The “Inmate Request” will be completed in

line the Inmate Handbook; marked to the attention of the Classification

Counselor designated to process “Inmate Grievance Forms”; and returned to a

deputy. A deputy receiving an “Inmate Grievance Form” will forward it to the

designated Classification Counselor.
ECF No. 11-4 at 1 § 1.1.1. The designated Classification Counselor is charged with the
responsibility of forwarding Inmate Grievance forms to any inmate who requests one, and if
multiple forms are requested, multiple forms must be sent. Jd. at § 1.1.2. WCDC Warden Craig
Rowe has provided a declaration stating that there is no record that Mitchell filed any grievance
regarding either incident that occurred on November 7, 2024, and further states that there is no
record of WCDC personnel ever assaulting Mitchell during his incarceration. ECF No. 11-6 at 2,
44. As noted, Mitchell has not disputed these allegations, therefore his complaint must be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
IV. CONCLUSION

By separate Order which follows, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for

Summary Judgment shall be GRANTED and the complaint DISMISSED without prejudice for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

202026 we Her

Date KAY GRIGGSBY 7/7
United States RIGS Judge