Phillips v. Pratibha et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:24-cv-03532-EA Document 30 _ Filed 02/20/26 Pagelof8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

RONALD PHILLIPS, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * Civil Action No. EA-24-3532
PHUYAL PRATIBHA, et al, *
Defendants. *
MEMORANDUM OPINION

On December 6, 2024, Plaintiff Ronald Phillips initiated this action against Defendants
Phuyal and Koirala Pratibha (the Pratibhas), alleging a single count of premises liability
negligence based on the collapse of a deck that allegedly caused Mr. Phillips to fall and sustain
injuries. ECF No. 1. Mr. Phillips seeks damages in excess of $75,000. Jd. at 93. Pending
before the Court is the Pratibhas’ motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 20. The motion is
fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary.'! ECF No. 27; Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. Dec. 1,
2025). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

1 BACKGROUND

In his Complaint, Mr. Phillips alleged that on June 9, 2023, he was sitting on a rear deck
at 110 Night Heron Court, Cambridge, Maryland (the Premises), when a portion of it collapsed,
causing him to fall to the ground and sustain profound and painful injuries to his back, neck,
shoulders, and body. ECF No. 1 §{] 7-8. Mr. Phillips further alleged that before the occurrence,
the Pratibhas “had knowledge and notice that . . . the deck . .. was in a state of major disrepair
and constituted a hazardous condition” and that “no adequate warnings were posted to alert [Mr.]

Phillips . . . of the dangerous condition of the deck.” Jd. at ¥ 10.

' Defendants Phuyal and Koirala Pratibha elected not to file a reply and the time for
doing so has elapsed. Local Rule 105.2(a) (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2025).

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 1:24-cv-03532-EA Document 30 _ Filed 02/20/26 Page 2of8

The undisputed facts in the summary judgment record establish that on April 4, 2023, Mr.
Phillips and his wife entered into a one-year residential dwelling lease with the Pratibhas to
occupy the Premises beginning on May 1, 2023. ECF No. 27-2 at 1.” Mr. Phillips testified at his
deposition that the Premises was a “brand new home” that had not been previously occupied.
ECF No. 27-1 at 23:14-19. Around the time they signed the lease, Mr. Phillips and his wife met
Dale Hunter, the Pratibhas’ agent, for a walkthrough of the Premises. Jd. at 25:13—17, 26:2-4.
Mr. Phillips testified at his deposition that during the walkthrough, he asked “why there wasn’t a
deck there,” and Mr. Hunter said that “it was in their original contract to build a deck, but... the
grass was too high[,] [s]o they couldn’t... build the deck.” Jd at 25:18—22. After Mr. Phillips
informed Mr. Hunter that he’d “like ... to have. . . someone build the deck,” Mr. Hunter “said
he’ll get right on it.” Jd. at 27:10-12.

In May 2023, Mr. Phillips and his wife moved into the Premises and discovered that
“It]here was no deck there . . . just [a] drop off into the ground.” Jd at 24:12-13. Mr. Phillips
reached out to Mr. Hunter, who in turn “got a hold of a builder [that] came out . . . within the
next couple of days and built the deck.” Jd. at27:19-21. An invoice from Del Mar
Construction, LLC dated May 18, 2023, described the deck as a “4x8 [l]Janding with railings[ ]
and pickets.” ECF No. 27-3. According to Mr. Phillips, Mr. Hunter did not “ever come over to
... thle] property ... before the incident occurred.” ECF No. 27-1 at 27:13-16. In their written
discovery responses, the Pratibhas acknowledged that they had no communication with any
government, county, or municipal entity regarding the maintenance, repair, inspection, or

condition of exterior decks located on the Premises. ECF No. 27-5 § 23.

? Page numbers refer to the pagination of the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case
Files system (CM/ECF) printed at the top of the cited document, except that page numbers of
exhibits that are deposition transcripts refer to the page and line number of the deposition
transcript.

2

Case 1:24-cv-03532-EA Document 30 _ Filed 02/20/26 Page 3of8

Mr. Phillips testified at his deposition that he was sitting on a folding chair, sat back, and
“the deck started falling apart.” ECF No. 27-1 at 33:1, 33:12, 36:2—4; see also ECF No. 27-4

(photographs depicting deck and broken pickets).

Image 1: Deck Image 2: Broken Pickets
(ECF No. 27-4 at 1) (ECF No. 27-4 at 2) (cropped)

Subsequently, Mr. Phillips fell along with, and out of, the chair and onto the deck flooring. ECF
No. 27-1 at 40:14—22. As a result of the fall, Mr. Phillips sustained a vertebrae fracture that
required seven weeks of physical therapy. Jd. at 69:7—9, 70:3-7, 72:12—16. Within half an hour
of being notified of Mr. Phillips’ fall, Mr. Hunter went to the Premises and repaired the broken
railing. ECF No. 27-5 § 5.

Mr. Phillips testified at his deposition that prior to his fall, he used the deck “[m]Jaybe two
or three times,” but never tried to “handle the wood at all” or “check its stability.”, ECF No. 27-1
at 30:16—21, 37:22—38:14. Mr. Phillips further testified that he never observed any issues,
conditions, or problems with the stability of the deck, its boards, or slats prior to the occurrence.
Id. at 31:3-12, 38:19-39:13. Indeed, Mr. Phillips opined that it “[I]ooked like a brand new solid

deck to me.” Jd. at 37:11-16; see also id. at 39:7 (“Looked like a solid deck to me.”’).

Case 1:24-cv-03532-EA Document 30 _ Filed 02/20/26 Page4of8

Il. DISCUSSION

The Pratibhas argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mr.
Phillips has not adduced evidence that defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of any
dangerous condition or defect. ECF No. 20 at 3.

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment motion practice “is properly regarded . . . as an integral part of the
Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the district court “shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very
terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986) (emphasis in original). A material fact is one that “might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Jd. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id.

Thus, to defeat summary judgment, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence
supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’
differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,
288-289 (1968). On the other hand, summary judgment “is justified if, from the totality of the
evidence presented, including pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits,

the court is satisfied that there is no genuine factual issue for trial and the moving party is

4

Case 1:24-cv-03532-EA Document 30 Filed 02/20/26 Page5of8

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty, Md., 48 F.3d 810,
817 (4th Cir. 1995).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that summary
judgment “cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the
action is tried on the merits.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off, of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568-569 (4th
Cir. 2015) (quoting 1OA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2728 (3d ed. 1998)). At this stage, “the judge’s function is not... to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In doing so, the district court “must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences
in [its] favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility.” Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 234-235 (4th Cir. 2001).

B. Negligence

Mr. Phillips alleges that the Pratibhas breached their duty to protect him, an invitee, by
failing to maintain and repair the deck in a manner suitable for reasonable use and failing to warn
him of the dangerous condition of which they knew or should have known existed at the time of
Mr. Phillips’ fall. ECF No. 1 §§ 12-13. In response, the Pratibhas argue that summary judgment
is appropriate because Mr. Phillips has failed to show that they had actual or constructive notice
of a dangerous condition and Mr. Phillips has not alleged negligent construction. ECF No. 20 at
8-10. Stated differently, the Pratibhas assert that they did not negligently create the dangerous
condition, nor did they have any notice of such condition.

In an action brought under a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, the Court is to apply the
substantive law of the state in which it sits. Mathis v. Terra Renewal Serv. Inc., 69 F.4th 236,

242 (4th Cir. 2023); Lewis v. Waletzky, 422 Md. 647, 657 (2011). In Maryland, “‘[t]he elements

5

Case 1:24-cv-03532-EA Document 30 _ Filed 02/20/26 Page6of8

of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legally cognizable duty on the part of the defendant
owing to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant, (3) actual injury or loss suffered
by the plaintiff, and (4) that such injury or loss resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.”
Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 366 Md. 597, 607 (2001).

It is well-settled that “a landlord is not ordinarily liable to a tenant or guest of a tenant for
injuries from a hazardous condition in the leased premises that comes into existence after the
tenant has taken possession.” Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, Inc., 351 Md. 544,
555 (1998); accord Wells v. Pennrose Mgmt. Co., 753 F. Supp. 3d 432, 439 (D. Md. 2024); Heym
v. APG Hous., LLC, Civil Action No. JRR-23-2092, 2024 WL 2302306, at *5 (D. Md. May 21,
2024). Yet, “when a landlord has agreed to make repairs there is a duty resting on him to do so,
and upon his failure the tenant may either sue on his contract or bring an action on the case
founded in tort for neglect of that duty.” Bocchini v. Gorn Mgmt. Co., 69 Md. App. 1, 17 (1986)
(emphasis omitted). A tenant may maintain an action in tort liability for injuries sustained as a
result of an uncorrected defect in rented quarters “[w]here there is evidence of ‘explicit notice of
the defect, recognition by the landlord of its dangers[,] and ample opportunity to remedy it.’”
Wells, 753 F. Supp. 3d at 439 (quoting Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444, 448 (1963)); see also
Joseph v. Bozzuto Mgmt. Co., 173 Md. App. 305, 315 (2007) (stating that in order to sustain a
cause of action in a premises liability action, the plaintiff must prove not only that a dangerous
condition existed but also that the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the
dangerous condition and that the knowledge was acquired with sufficient time to remove it or
warn the invitee).

Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that the Pratibhas negligently created or had
actual knowledge of a dangerous condition on the newly installed deck. It is undisputed that Del

Mar Construction, LLC built the deck and sent an invoice to the Pratibhas on May 18, 2023. Mr.

6

Case 1:24-cv-03532-EA Document 30 _ Filed 02/20/26 Page7of8

Phillips testified at his deposition that prior to his fall, he used the deck two or three times and
perceived it to be a “brand new solid deck.” ECF No. 27-1 at 37:11-16. In addition, Mr. Hunter,
the Pratibhas’ agent, did not see the deck from the time it was completed until after Mr. Phillips’
fall, when he came back to make the necessary repairs. As there is no evidence that the Pratibhas
knew of the alleged dangerous condition before the incident, the only remaining question is
whether they had constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition that allegedly caused Mr.
Phillips’ injuries.

Mr. Phillips bears the burden of establishing the Pratibhas’ constructive knowledge,
which includes a showing of “how long the dangerous condition has existed.” Joseph, 173 Md.
App. at 316. The rationale for this requirement is that when a plaintiff relies on constructive
knowledge, the invitee “must demonstrate that [a] defective condition existed long enough to
permit one under a duty to inspect to discover the defect and remedy it prior to the injury.”
Deering Woods Condo. Ass’n v. Spoon, 377 Md. 250, 267-68 (2003); see also Tennant v.
Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 115 Md. App. 381, 389-390 (1997) (“The mere existence
of a defect or danger is generally insufficient to establish liability, unless it is shown to be of such
a character or of such duration that the jury may reasonably conclude that due care would have
discovered it.”) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ef al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 61, at 426 (Sth ed. 1984)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Phillips and drawing all
inferences in his favor, the Pratibhas are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mr.
Phillips has failed to show that the Pratibhas had constructive knowledge that an unreasonable
risk or dangerous condition existed. To establish constructive notice, Mr. Phillips asserts that the
Pratibhas were notified by the construction company that the deck had been completed, the deck

was located outside the Premises and could have been easily inspected, and the Pratibhas failed

7

Case 1:24-cv-03532-EA Document 30 _ Filed 02/20/26 Page 8of8

to obtain a permit to build the deck pursuant to city code. ECF No. 27 at 7. None of these
contentions carry Mr. Phillips’ burden because they do not establish that Mr. Phillips noticed any
defects or that he notified the Pratibhas of any defects. On the contrary, Mr. Phillips testified in
his deposition that he never observed any issues, conditions, or problems with the stability of the
deck. “[A] negligent failure to inspect does not result in the imposition of liability unless it is
established that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the presence of the defect which
caused the harm.” United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 409 F.2d 961, 963 (4th Cir.
1969). As Mr. Phillips has failed to establish the Pratibhas’ actual or constructive knowledge of a
dangerous condition, the Pratibhas are entitled to summary judgment.
Il. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 20) is

granted. A separate Order follows.

Date: February 20, 2026 /s/
Erin Aslan
United States Magistrate Judge