Abdulaziz v. Musa et al

1:24-cv-03009Mdd15.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ABDULAZIZ 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Case No: 1:24-cv-03009-JMC
MUSA, et al., 	*
Defendants. 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Jamil Abdulaziz, initiated the present lawsuit on October 16, 2024, against
Defendants Erten Musa and Pro Level Business Brokerage & Consulting LLC. (ECF No. 1). The
matter arises from a brokerage contract through which Defendants assisted the sale of Plaintiff’s
businesses. 	Id. 	Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment to pierce the corporate veil and brought
claims for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and a
violation of the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Md. Code Mon. Law, § 15-201,
et. seq. Id. Presently pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 26) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count II (ECF No. 27).
The motions are fully briefed (ECF Nos. 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33) and no hearing is necessary. See
Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion summary judgment
(ECF No. 26) will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 27) will be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
1 To begin, the parties make numerous arguments based on their interpretations of the record. The following facts are
undisputed, unless specifically noted, or otherwise characterized as being the position of one of the parties.
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a. 	Plaintiff-Defendant Pro Level Contract
The present dispute arises from the sale of Plaintiff’s towing service business, GTS Towing
LLC, for which Defendants acted as Plaintiff’s broker. See (ECF Nos. 1-3; 26-5). Plaintiff engaged
with Defendant Pro Level Business Brokerage & Consulting, LLC (“Pro Level”) through its sole
member, Defendant Musa. (ECF No. 26-5). The parties first engaged by way of a listing agreement
(the “Listing Agreement”) between Pro Level and Plaintiff. Id. The parties executed the Listing
Agreement on December 27 and December 28, 2023. 	Id. at 6.2 Under the Listing Agreement,
Plaintiff agreed to “engage [Pro Level] exclusively to sell all or substantially all” of his businesses
for a total sale price of $3,900,000.00. Id. at 1. “In consideration for [Pro Level’s efforts to sell
the Assets of the business, [Plaintiff] agrees to pay [Pro Level], at the time of settlement, 12%.”
Id.
b. 	Plaintiff-Nasim Contract Obligations
Thereafter, Defendant secured a buyer named Usman Nasim, (“Nasim”) who is not a party
to this action. See, (ECF Nos. 26-6 at 4-5; 26-8). On January 4, 2024, Nasim sent a letter of intent
(the “LOI”) to Defendant Musa indicating his desire to purchase Plaintiff’s business for
$3,700,000.00. (ECF No. 1-2). According to the LOI, Nasim would pay a $1,900,000.00 down
payment and the rest of the remaining balance ($1,800,000) “12 months seller financing
$75,000.00 monthly ARP and after 12 months pay off the loan $900,000.00.” Id. There would also
be a $100,000.00 earnest deposit within twenty-four hours of signing a purchase agreement. Id.
On February 6, and February 8, 2024, Plaintiff and Nasim executed a Business Asset
Purchase Agreement (“BAPA”), which detailed the sale of Plaintiff’s business to Nasim. (ECF
2 When the Court cites to a specific page number or range of page numbers, the Court is referring to the page numbers
provided in the electronic filing stamps located at the top of every electronically filed document. Where a document
is not electronically stamped, the citation is instead to the number at the bottom of the page.
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No. 26-8). Under BAPA, Nasim agreed to pay Plaintiff a purchase price of $3,550,000.00. Id. at
2. As indicated in the LOI, BAPA required a $1,900,000.00 down payment before closing. 	Id.
Plaintiff also agreed to provide financing to help effectuate the remaining payments after closing.
See id.
Later, on June 9, 2024, Plaintiff and Nasim executed an amendment to BAPA (the
“Amendment”), which reduced the final purchase price from $3,550,000.00 to $3,000,000.00.
(ECF No. 26-9). The Amendment did not impact the down payment. Id. On June 10, 2024, Nasim
and Plaintiff executed a promissory note in the amount of $1,100,000.00, payable by twelve
monthly installments. (ECF No. 1-7). Indeed, after the Amendment, which reduced the purchase
price by $550,000.00, the remaining balance for which Plaintiff agreed to provide Nasim financing
was $1,100,000.00 rather than $1,650,000.00. See id. 	Accordingly, each check would be for
$50,000.00, due on the first of each month. Id.
c. 	Payments Between Plaintiff, Defendants, and Nasim
After Nasim and Plaintiff executed the Amendment and promissory note, Nasim was still
required to make the $1,900,000.00 down payment. See id. With respect to the down payment,
Nasim made two deposits via checks to Pro Level, which Defendants contend “were held in escrow
for Closing.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 3). Nasim testified he wrote one check for $630,000.00 and one
for $350,000.00, which totaled to $980,000.00. (ECF No. 26-6 at 10). Each check was “deposited
into…Pro Level’s escrow.” Id. Nasim also delivered $400,000.00 by way of cashier’s checks to
Plaintiff as part of the down payment. Id. In total, before closing, Nasim paid $1,380,000 in cash,
of which $400,000.00 was paid directly to Plaintiff and $980,000.00 was paid to Pro Level, to be
held in escrow for Plaintiff. See id.
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However, Nasim had trouble sourcing the remaining cash. 	(ECF No 26-6 at 4).
Accordingly, as the payments were due prior to closing, Nasim’s cash sourcing challenges delayed
the parties’ ability to close on the sale. 	Id. Consequently, Nasim offered to pay the remaining
balance by transferring the title of a 2018 Mercedes GTR (“GTR”) valued at $120,000.00. Id. at
5-6. “As a part of escrow,” Nasim delivered the GTR to Defendant Musa rather than to Plaintiff.3
Id. at 6. At closing, Nasim paid an additional $160,000.00 directly to Plaintiff and issued a separate
check in the amount of $150,000.00 directly to Plaintiff.4 (ECF No. 26-6 at 11).
d. 	Remaining Obligations between Defendant and Plaintiff
As for payment obligations between Plaintiff and Defendants, there exists rigorous dispute
as to what was paid to whom and when. After execution of the Amendment, the 12% commission
to which BABA entitled Defendant Pro Level was $360,000.00.5 There arose a dispute as to
whether the parties agreed upon a greater commission, set forth in more detail below. According
to Defendant Musa, Pro Level disbursed to Plaintiff $660,000.00 by way of its escrow account.
(ECF Nos. 26-1 at 4, 26-3 at 6). In support of this assertion, Defendants include a redacted bank
record showing a withdrawal in the amount of $660,000.00 from the Pro Level escrow account on
June 10, 2024. 	(ECF No. 26-10). 	According to Defendants, “[t]his amount paid to Plaintiff
included a Thirty Thousand Dollar ($30,000.00) additional payment from Pro Level’s commission
3 The record presents some dispute as to how whether the GTR title was transferred to Plaintiff or to Defendant Musa
as part of escrow. Defendant Musa (in his capacity as Defendant Pro Level’s corporate designee) testified that Nasim
transferred the GTR title to Musa, on behalf of Pro Level. (ECF No. 26-3 at 5). Plaintiff does not contend he ever
received title to the GTR. It does not appear that the parties contemplated title transfer to Plaintiff. Further, Defendant
Musa testified Defendant Pro Level disbursed the GTR after transfer as part of his commission. Id.
4 In total, Nasim paid $710,000.00 directly to Plaintiff before and upon closing. Nasim conferred a value of
$1,100,000.00 (by way of checks and the GTR) to Pro Level to be held in Escrow. To note, these amounts equal a
total of $1,810,000.00 and not $1,900,000.00. The parties do not dispute whether Nasim paid the amounts he owed
under the contract, nor is Nasim a party to the present litigation. At an unknown time, a separate legal dispute arose
between Nasim and Plaintiff. (ECF No. 26-12).
5 (3,000,000 x .12 = 360,000).
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in order to keep the total purchase price at Closing at $3 Million.” (ECF No. 26-3 at 101). To that
end, Plaintiff characterizes the record differently:
Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendants falsely represented the amounts held in
escrow ($1.1 Million vs. $980,000) as well as the source of $30,000. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Musa misrepresented to Plaintiff that $30,000 of the $630,000
distributed to Plaintiff was paid by Musa, who took possession of the GTR valued
at $120,000. According to Defendants, they were entitled to receive $450,000 (15%
commission). Using Defendants’ numbers of $1.1 Million in escrow funds -
$450,000 15% Commission= $650,000, not $660,000 reflected in the bank
statement. 	[Defendant’s 	Bank 	Record] 	on 	its 	face 	supports 	the 	Plaintiff’s
allegations that Musa gave Plaintiff $630,000 funds held in escrow and an
additional $30,000 of Musa’s personal funds.
(ECF No. 31 at 15).
With respect to the transfer of the GTR title, Defendant Musa (on behalf of Pro Level)
testified,
Q: How is it that you, Mr. Musa, came into possession of the title of the GTR?
A: So in the beginning, he6 offered me for additional $90,000 for a truck. And I
said okay. I can take the truck. I don’t mind. He said, I want more cash. I said, okay.
No problem. But on May 15, 2024, Nasim called me, and I picked up the GTR. I
told [Plaintiff], what about this? He said, Brother, this is too much. I said, no, no,
no. Tell me how much you want over. He said 120 minus 90. He said, $30,000. In
addition, $30,000 and take the GTR. And we did it. I took—that’s why I didn’t pay
him 620. I paid him 660,000 cashier’s checks….
(ECF No. 26-3 at 6).
It is presumably this conversation that has led to many of the arguments analyzed below.
Though unclear from the summary judgment memoranda, from what the Court can discern, it
appears that the parties dispute whether Pro Level, and by extension, Defendant Musa, had the
authority under BAPA to arrange for this transfer of the GTR to Defendant Musa rather than to
Plaintiff. The Court can find no facts indicating the parties contemplated transferring the GTR to
Plaintiff.
6 Presumably, Defendant Musa refers to Plaintiff here.
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Defendant Musa testified that he was entitled to the GTR title because commission was
actually 15%, contrary to the 12% commission under the Listing Agreement due to additional
consulting services he provided, which he claims were not contemplated under the Listing
Agreement. (ECF No. 31-2 at 3). He believes the transfer of the GTR would satisfy the additional
3% commission obligation. 	(ECF No. 31-2 at 12). Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that
$120,000.00 would satisfy the additional 3% commission, were it to be valid, a point Plaintiff
rigorously opposes. See (ECF No. 31). To that end, Defendant Musa testified “When I’m doing a
brokerage, I’m just bringing the buyer and seller together. So that’s the 12 percent. But if you want
me to be consulting you, that’s another 3% which it costs. That’s what it is.” (ECF No. 31-2 at
2). Defendant Musa “educated both the buyer and seller during the transactions because they
didn’t—they didn’t even hire an attorney. And I told them a hundred times to hire an attorney.”
Id. at 2-3. Defendant Musa indicated that the Listing Agreement provides only for brokerage
services and “[t]here is an agreement for 12 percent, and there is a shake agreement—handshake
agreement for 3 percent.” Id. at 12. Accordingly, the Listing Agreement is the only written
agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants, and there exists no additional written consulting
agreement. See id. Plaintiff now alleges Defendant Musa defrauded Plaintiff during the course of
the sale in order to take the GTR. See (ECF Nos. 27, 31, 33).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to “grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute as to a material fact “is genuine if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v.
S.R.P. Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 115 F. Supp. 3d 593, 600 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 	A nonmoving party “opposing a properly supported
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motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his]
pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)).
The Court is “required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to” the nonmoving party. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). 	However, the Court must also “abide by the ‘affirmative
obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding
to trial.’” Heckman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799–800 (D. Md. 2013)
(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)). Consequently, a party cannot
create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.
See Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1998). “[I]n the face of conflicting
evidence, such as competing affidavits, summary judgment ordinarily is not appropriate, because
it is the function of the fact-finder to resolve factual disputes, including matters of witness
credibility.” Angelini v. Balt. Police Dep't, 464 F. Supp. 3d 756, 776 (D. Md. 2020).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Count I Because No Fact
Finder Could Find Clear and Convincing Evidence of Fraud or Evidence that
Defendant Musa Used Defendant Pro Level as a Cloak to Perpetuate Fraud.
Defendants urge the Court to find there “is no legal basis for a declaratory judgment to
pierce the corporate veil,” and thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to
Count I. (ECF No. 26-1 at 6). Plaintiff retorts, “[t]he core dispute in Count 1 is the alleged oral
agreement to pay the Defendants 3% more than the 12% commission agreed upon in the fully
executed and integrated Listing Agreement…Plaintiff seeks to hold Musa personally responsible
for damages caused by Musa’s actions on behalf of Pro Level.” (ECF No. 31 at 2).
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Defendants correctly point out that Maryland courts are reluctant to disregard a corporate
entity’s personal liability shield “in the absence of a finding of fraud. Serio v. Baystate Properties,
LLC., 209 Md.App. 545, 559 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 20136). Indeed, piercing the corporate veil is an
extraordinary equitable remedy. 	See Hildreth v. Tidewater, 378 Md. 724, 735 (2006). Thus, in
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., the Supreme Cort of Maryland recognized
[T]he most frequently enunciated rule in Maryland is that although the courts will,
in a proper case, disregard the corporate entity and deal with substance rather than
form, as though a corporation did not exist, shareholders7 generally are not held
individually liable for debts or obligations of a corporation except where it is
necessary to prevent fraud or enforce a paramount equity.
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennsi, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 301 (1975).
In Bart Arconti & Son’s, Inc.’s wake, this rule “has been so narrowly construed that neither
[the Appellate Court of Maryland] nor the [Supreme Court of Maryland] has ultimately ‘found an
equitable interest more important than the state’s interest in limited shareholder liability.’” Serio,
209 Md.App. at 559-560. (quoting Residential Warranty v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley,
Inc., 126 Md.App. 294, 307 n. 13 (1999)). “Despite the proclamation that a court may pierce the
corporate veil to enforce a paramount equity, arguments that have urged a piercing of the veil for
reasons other than fraud have failed in Maryland courts.” Residential Warranty, 126 Md.App. at
307 (internal quotations omitted); see also United Elec. Supply Co. v. Greencastle Gardens Section
III Ltd. P’ship, 36 Md.App. 70, 80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (“Corporate veils were not intended
to provide false fronts as conveyances for pecuniary gain made from conduct that is statutorily
proscribed.”); Maryland Trust Co. v. Tulip Realty Co. of Md., 220 Md. 339, 414 (1959) (finding it
“unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil in this instance” despite clear evidence that certain
7 Even in cases considering whether to pierce a limited liability company’s corporate veil, courts look to the rules that
apply to corporations. See Serio, 209 Md.App. at 259 (indicating “we look to case law discussing piercing a corporate
vel for instruction” when considering whether to pierce a limited liability company’s corporate veil).
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stockholders acted fraudulently); Fuller v. Horvath, 42 Md.App. 671, 686 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1979) (discussing the requirements of requisite evidence to support a finding of fraud). Indeed,
Maryland courts have identified three scenarios in which disregarding the corporate personal
liability shield is proper:
First. Where the corporation is used as a mere shield for the perpetration of a
fraud, the courts will disregard the fiction of separate corporate entity.
Second. The courts may consider a corporation as unencumbered by the fiction of
corporate entity and deal with substance rather than form as though the corporation
did not exist, in order to prevent evasion of legal obligations.
Third. Where the stockholders themselves, or a parent corporation owning the stock
of a subsidiary corporation, fail to observe the corporate entity, operating the
business or dealing with the corporation's property as if it were their own, the courts
will also disregard the corporate entity for the protection of third persons.
Hildreth, 378 Md. at 734.
Plaintiff insists there exists a genuine issue of material fact with respect to a finding of fraud or an
alter ego. (ECF No. 31 at 2). Alternatively, Plaintiff avers piercing the corporate veil is necessary
under a theory of paramount equity.8 See id.
1. 	Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment with Respect to Fraud.
“Maryland courts require parties seeking to pierce the corporate veil by alleging fraud to
meet a higher standard and make a more vigorous factual showing than do other jurisdictions.”
Baltimore Line Handling Co. v. Brophy, 771 F.Supp.2d 531, 553 (D. Md. 2011) (applying
Maryland state law). Evidence of fraud must be clear and convincing. Residential Warranty Corp.,
8 “Even Maryland decisions that recognize alternate grounds for piercing the corporate veil have not done so absent a
finding of fraud.” Serio, 209 Md.App. at 561. Accordingly, “few decision have explicated or applied the concept of
enforcing a ‘paramount equity’ even though the often-repeated rhetoric suggest it as a basis to disregard the entity
distinct from fraud.” Id. (citing Travel Committee, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 91 Md.App. 123 (1992), cert.
denied, 327 Md. 525, 610 A.2d 797 (1992)); see also Ramlall v. MobilePro Corp., 202 Md.App. 20, 31 (2011) (“With
no precedent approving this extraordinary remedy, we decline to pierce the corporate veil…based on the paramount
equity justification.”). The facts here are not so extraordinary such that a jury could find for Plaintiff under a theory
of paramount equity absent a finding of fraud. Therefore, the primary inquiry is whether there exists a genuine issue
of material fact of (1) fraud or (2) an alter ego.
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126 Md.App. at 308; see also Starfish Condominium Ass’n v. Yorkridge Service Corp., Inc., 295
Md. 693, 714 (1983) (requiring “the one charging fraud to establish by clear, specific facts, acts
that in law constitute fraud”). To support a finding of fraud, Maryland courts look for a “deliberate
intention and purpose of cheating and defrauding…the other party to the contract.” Colandrea v.
Colandrea, 42 Md.App. 421, 432 (1979).
In Colandrea, a Maryland court pierced the corporate veil on a finding of fraud when a
husband and former shareholder of a corporation brought suit against the corporation, his ex-wife,
who was the remaining shareholder, and several of her newly formed corporations. 	Id. at 422.
There, the plaintiff sought payments under certain promissory notes made to him in the name of
the marital corporation. Id. at 425. Piercing the corporate veil was proper because there was clear
and convincing evidence of the defendant ex-wife’s fraudulent intent. Id. Specifically, the record
showed the ex-wife fraudulently transferred assets from the marital corporation so she could profit
from its established business without affording profits to her ex-husband. Id. 	The court noted
“[t]he effect of all these corporate machinations is obvious. By it [the defendant ex-wife] was able
to continue the profitable business of [the marital corporation] without its attendant obligations to
[the plaintiff ex-husband]. Id.
In contrast, the Bart Arconti9 court made clear Maryland courts are reluctant to pierce the
corporate veil even when there does exist evidence of some deception. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc.,
275 Md. at 311-12. In Bart Arconti, the court refused to pierce the corporate veil even though the
evidence showed the stockholders’ conduct was designed to cause the corporation to evade a legal
9 Bart Arconti involved a different procedural posture than the instant case. Bart Arconti, 275 Md. at 305-06. There,
the trial court pierced the corporate veil and assessed liability against the defendant corporation and officers. See id.
On appeal, the Bart Arconti court reversed, holding the ruling was clearly erroneous. See id. To note, the facts had
already been found upon appeal. Id. However, “the trial judge…made no reference to fraud…presumably because he
was of the view that no evidence to support such a finding had been produced. Nor does appellee rely upon that ground
in this Court.” 	Id. at 310-11. Therefore, though not exactly on point, Bart Arconti illustrates the demanding
evidentiary threshold necessary to pierce the corporate veil in Maryland. See id. at 312.
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obligation. Id. at 312. The record there showed that the corporation’s defendant officers sought
to avoid certain contractual obligations by using two of their other entities “to keep the…business
of [the third entity] but without leaving any real asset [of the third entity] in that corporation.” Id.
at 309. 	Despite some showing of deception in an effort to avoid contract obligations, the court
could find no precedent to “allow[] the corporate entity to be disregarded merely because it wished
to prevent an evasion of legal obligations absent evidence of fraud.” Id. at 312 (internal quotations
omitted). There, even the evidence of an intent to evade the contractual obligations was not enough
to support a finding of fraud. See id.
Moreover, summary judgment is proper when a fraudulent claim is predicated only on
speculative evidence. 	See, e.g., Residential Warranty, 126 Md.App. at 310-11. In Residential
Warranty, the president and sole shareholder received an unexplained transfer of funds into his
personal account, a portion of which came out of construction loans deposited into the
corporation’s account. Id. at 302. Following this transfer, the corporation was nearly insolvent. Id.
Plaintiff argued this evidence showed that the sole shareholder “intentionally and secretly
impoverished [the corporation] while covering up multiple major structural flaws.” 	Id. at 308.
According to the plaintiffs, the evidence supported an inference that the sole shareholder “siphoned
[the corporation’s] funds to prevent [the corporation] both from making proper repairs required”
under the contract at issue “and from indemnifying the [plaintiffs] for the expenses it incurred”
due to its failure to perform properly. Id. The defendants argued that there was not clear and
convincing evidence of fraud. Id. Siding with the defendants, the court reasoned an inference of
fraud was “mere speculation” that lacked “factual evidence to link the distributions to fraudulent
actions.” Id. at 311.
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Here, there is insufficient evidence upon which a fact finder could conclude by clear and
convincing evidence that Defendant Musa used Defendant Pro Level to defraud Plaintiff such that
the corporate veil could be pierced. Id. Even if a jury could find that Defendant Musa acted with
the intent to avoid some of Defendant Pro Level’s contract obligations to Plaintiff, such evidence
was not enough to justify piercing the corporate veil in Bart Acronti. See Bart Acronti, 275 Md.
at 311-12. The evidence of a title transfer in dispute under certain contract rights is much unlike
that in Colandrea, in which the evidence showed a clear intent to cheat the shareholder’s former
husband out of financial rights to a martial corporation’s stock. Compare Colandrea, 42 Md.App.
at 428-29. Moreover, like the evidence in Residential Warranty, there exists no factual support
from the record—and nor does Plaintiff cite to any—that links the title GTR title transfer to a
fraudulent action or clear intent to defraud Plaintiff. Residential Warranty, 126 Md.App. at 311.
The facts here are even less severe than those in Residential Warranty, as there is no evidence, nor
even an argument, that Defendant Musa was motivated by a threat of insolvency. (ECF No. 31).
Plaintiff relies only upon speculative interpretations of Defendant Musa’s testimony in advance of
its contention that “Musa used his control of Pro Level to unilaterally pay himself personally or
unlawfully increase Pro Level’s commission in direct contravention of Plaintiff’s rights under the
Listing Agreement.” (ECF No. 31 at 4). Confusingly, Plaintiff emphasizes without evidentiary
support that Defendant Musa titled the GTR in his name after Nasim attempted to renegotiate the
sale. 	Id. at 3. 	Even if a jury finds this fact to be true, Bart Acronti and Residential Warranty
foreclose recovery by way of piercing the corporate veil. See Bart Acronti, 275 Md. at 311-12;
Residential Warranty, 126 Md.App. at 311. Moreover, the Court cannot find any factual support
for this claim. There does exist factual support for the contention that Defendant Musa had title of
the GTR. There is also evidence by way of Plaintiff’s own testimony that he “never felt pressured”
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by Defendant Musa during the sale process. (ECF No. 26-4 at 6). To be sure, a jury could very
well find that Pro Level breached its contract obligations to Plaintiff. But there exists no factual
support that entitles Plaintiff to such an extraordinary inference necessary to pierce the corporate
veil. Thus, under Maryland’s high bar no reasonable jury could find clear and convincing evidence
of fraud. See Bart Acronti, 275 Md. at 311-12; Residential Warranty, 126 Md.App. at 311.
2. 	Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment under the Alter Ego
Doctrine.
In contrast, the alter-ego doctrine applies when there exists evidence of (1) “complete
domination, not only of the finances, but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will
or existence of its own,” (2) “that such control [was] used by the defendant to commit fraud or
wrong, to perpetrate the violation of the statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and
unjust act in contravention of the plaintiff's legal rights,” and (3) “that such control and breach of
duty proximately caused the injury or unjust loss.” Hildreth, 378 Md. at 735. (cleaned up).
“Although there appears to be no universal rule as to the specific criteria that courts will consider
in determining whether to apply [the alter ego] doctrine,” there exist certain factors that are
commonly considered “when dealing with a single corporation.” Id. They include
(1) whether the corporation is inadequately capitalized, fails to observe corporate
formalities, fails to issue stock or pay dividends, or operates without a profit, (2)
whether there is commingling of corporate and personal assets, (3) whether there
are non-functioning officers or directors, (4) whether the corporation is insolvent at
the time of the transaction, and (5) the absence of corporate records.
Id.
In Hildreth, a Maryland plaintiff sought to pierce a New Jersey entity’s corporate veil after
its sole shareholder failed to fully disclose the corporation’s identity, despite the existence of a
Maryland corporation with the same name. See id. at 725-27. 	At the time the plaintiff and
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defendant first contracted, the defendant’s corporation was not registered in Maryland. Id. After
a contract dispute arose, the plaintiff eventually raised an argument to pierce the corporate veil. Id.
at 730-31. Analyzing whether there was sufficient evidence to impose personal liability upon the
shareholder under the alter ego doctrine, the court reasoned there was no evidence that the sole
shareholder “exercised such complete domination over [the corporation] to warrant a conclusion
that it had no separate mind, will or existence of its own.” Id. at 736. (internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, there was no evidence that the corporation was undercapitalized, that corporate
formalities were not observed, that the corporation operated without a profit, that there were non-
functioning officers or directors, that the company was involved when it entered into its
arrangement with the Plaintiff, or any evidence of inadequate corporate records. See id. Though
the plaintiff believed the defendant “was acting as an agent for an undisclosed or partially disclosed
principal,” any evidence there that tended to support a lack of disclosure was not enough to justify
the extraordinary measure of piercing the corporate veil. 	See id.; see also Roley v. Nat’l Pro.
Exch., Inc., 474 F. Supp. 3d 708, 726-27 (D. Md. 2020) (declining to pierce the corporate veil
when there was no evidence of any of the Hildreth factors).
Here, the undisputed facts construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff do not represent
the extraordinary circumstances Maryland courts require to pierce the corporate veil. While
Plaintiff is clearly unhappy with the GTR title transfer to Defendant Musa, there exists no evidence
on the record to satisfy the Hildreth factors. 	Specifically, there is no evidence—nor even an
argument—that Pro Level is undercapitalized, insolvent, or lacks records. (ECF No. 31). Plaintiff
reiterates many of the unavailing fraud arguments in support of its alter ego argument. Id. at 3-4.
There appears to be some argument that Pro Level comingled funds with personal assets, and to
that end, the record is unclear. See id. at 4. Even taking all inferences in the light most favorable
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15
to Plaintiff, this ambiguity alone does not support an inference that Defendant Pro Level lacked a
separate mind or existence from Defendant Musa such that the corporate veil can be pierced absent
a finding of fraud. Hildreth, 378 Md. at 735-36; see also Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc., 275 Md. at
340. Moreover, Plaintiff points only to several instances in Defendant Musa’s deposition in support
of the contention that Defendant Musa had complete domination over Pro Level. However, these
instances are also unavailing. Mere references to Defendant Musa’s choices on behalf of Pro Level
stated in the first person do not create a genuine issue of material fact such that a jury could
conclude Pro Level was his alter ego. 	(ECF No. 32 at 2). Plaintiff points to no other factual
evidence in the record to support its contention that Defendant Pro Level was a mere alter ego of
Defendant Musa designed to perpetuate fraud. See (ECF No. 31). Without greater factual support
for this contention, there does not exist a genuine issue of material fact such that a fact finder could
find for Plaintiff in a jurisdiction as reluctant to pierce the corporate veil as Maryland. Therefore,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Count I is GRANTED.
B. 	There Exist Genuine Issues of Material Fact with Respect to the Breach of
Contract Claim Against Defendant Pro Level.
Although Plaintiff and Defendants repeatedly assert that no material facts are in dispute
and they are each entitled to judgment as a matter of law, it is clear to the Court that many facts
material 	to 	determining 	each 	of 	their 	rights 	under 	the Listing 	Agreement 	are disputed.
Interpretation of a contract is “ordinarily a question of law for the court.” Transamerica Premier
Life Ins. Co. v. Selman & Co., LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 576, 592 (D. Md. 2019). In interpreting a
contract, “Maryland courts apply the objective theory of contract interpretation, which specifies
that ‘clear and unambiguous language’ in an agreement ‘will not give way to what the parties
thought the agreement meant or was intended to mean.’” Id. at 592 (citation omitted). The matter
becomes more complicated, however, when contractual terms are not clear and unambiguous. The
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Fourth Circuit has explained that as to summary judgment motions regarding contractual
interpretation:
A court faces a conceptually difficult task in deciding whether to grant summary
judgment on a matter of contract interpretation. Only an unambiguous writing
justifies summary judgment without resort to extrinsic evidence, and no writing is
unambiguous if susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. The first step for a
court asked to grant summary judgment based on a contract's interpretation is,
therefore, to determine whether, as a matter of law, the contract is ambiguous or
unambiguous on its face. If a court properly determines that the contract is
unambiguous on the dispositive issue, it may then properly interpret the contract as
a matter of law and grant summary judgment because no interpretive facts are in
genuine issue. Even where a court, however, determines as a matter of law that the
contract is ambiguous, it may yet examine evidence extrinsic to the contract that is
included in the summary judgment materials, and, if the evidence is, as a matter of
law, dispositive of the interpretative issue, grant summary judgment on that
basis. If, however, resort to extrinsic evidence in the summary judgment materials
leaves genuine issues of fact respecting the contract's proper interpretation,
summary judgment must of course be refused and interpretation left to the trier of
fact. Goodman 	v. 	Resolution 	Trust 	Corp., 7 	F.3d 	1123, 	1126 	(4th 	Cir.
1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Rock Spring Plaza II, Inc. v. Invs. Warranty of Am., 618 F. Supp. 3d 262, 267 (D. Md. 2022)
(quoting Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Potomac Inv. Props., Inc., 476 F. 3d 231, 234-35 (4th
Cir. 2007)).10 Ultimately, if “there is a bona fide ambiguity in the contract’s language or legitimate
doubt as to its application under the circumstances … the contract [is] submitted to the trier of fact
for interpretation.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cnty. v. Plymouth Rubber Co., 569 A.2d
1288, 1296 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)).
Plaintiff correctly points out that binding agreements must involve consideration. Chernick
v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 479 (Md. 1992) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (Am.
Law Inst. 1981)). “A written agreement ... may be modified by a subsequent oral agreement, but
10 The Rock Spring court applied substantive Maryland law in this diversity breach of contract case. Rock Spring, 618
F. Supp. 3d at 268.
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the oral modification must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Chesapeake
Supply & Equip. Co. v. Manitowoc Eng'g Corp., 232 Md. 555, 566 (1963). “[T]he determination
of whether the conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of a written contract constitutes
a modification is ordinarily a question left to the fact-finder.” Berringer v. Steele, 133 Md.App.
442, 504 (2000) (citing University Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 279 Md. 512, 523 (1977)); see also
Hoffman v. Glock, 20 Md.App. 284, 289 (1974).
1. 	There Exists a Genuine Issue of Material Fact with Respect to Plaintiff’s
Contract Claim against Defendant Pro Level.
Here, there exist several issues of material fact with respect to a breach of contract claim.
From what the Court can discern, the entire dispute stems from uncertain entitlements under the
Listing Agreement. 	First, whether there existed a handshake agreement for an additional 3%
commission is an issue for the fact finder. With respect to Plaintiff’s consideration argument, the
Listing Agreement provides, in pertinent part, “In consideration for the Broker’s efforts to sell the
Assets of the business, the Seller agrees to pay the Broker, at the time of settlement, 12%;…” (ECF
No. 26-5 at 1). According to Defendants, these “efforts” did not include consulting services. (ECF
No. 31-2 at 2-3). Thus, providing consulting services constituted additional consideration
necessary to effectuate a modification. (ECF No. 30 at 3). According to Plaintiff, the efforts did
include consulting. (ECF No. 27-1 at 6-7). However incredulous Plaintiff may find it that his
contract with “Pro Level Business Brokerage & Consulting LLC” does not include consulting
services, that does not mean the legal issue must be removed from trial. (ECF No. 27-1 at 6-7).
Therefore, whether the Listing Agreement provided for consulting services and whether there
existed an additional handshake agreement that modified the contract remain genuine issues of
material fact a jury must decide. 	Rock Spring Plaza II, Inc, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 267; see also.
Plymouth Rubber Co., 569 A.2d at 1296; Berringer, 133 Md.App. at 504.
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18
Second, with respect to whether Defendant Pro Level breached the Listing Agreement,
there exist many inconsistences within the record regarding what amount, if any, Defendant Pro
Level held in escrow and later disbursed to Plaintiff. 	The record contains very few financial
records, and the parties rigorously argue their interpretations of the facts. Where Plaintiff insists
Defendant Pro Level breached the contract by failing to disburse certain payments to him,
Defendant Pro Level insists it “received less than it was entitled to receive in commission.” (ECF
No. 30 at 4). Where Pro Level argues it “issued a check to Plaintiff for $660,000.00, $30,000.00
of which amount was from Pro Level’s commission,” Plaintiff retorts, “[The Pro Level Escrow
Bank Record Entry] does not provide copies of the canceled checks or proof that a cashier’s check
in the amount of $660,000 was paid to the Plaintiff from this escrow account.” See (ECF Nos. 26-
1 at 8-9, 31 at 14). It is true that the bank record is heavily redacted, showing only that a withdrawal
in the amount of $660,000.00, and no other financial records (including Plaintiff’s bank activity)
are available for review. 	(ECF No. 26-10). 	While a fact finder could very well find this bank
record persuasive for Defendant Pro Level, the mere existence of this record does not remove the
issue of breach of contract from trial either. At the same time, it is possible a reasonable fact finder
could reject Defendant Musa’s testimony and conclude that the payments to which Plaintiff was
entitled were not properly made. 	Therefore, Defendant Pro Level’s Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Count II and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant
Pro Level are DENIED.
2. 	Defendant Musa is Entitled to Summary Judgment Because He is Not a
Party to the Contract.
Defendant Musa argues he is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count II
because he was not a party to the contract between Defendant Pro Level and Plaintiff. (ECF No.
26-1 at 8). In response, Plaintiff insists he is entitled to summary judgment against Defendant Pro
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19
Level. Presumably, Plaintiff disputes Defendant Musa’s entitlement to summary judgment, though
he does not seek summary judgment on this claim against Defendant Musa. See (ECF No. 31).
To begin, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to personal liability by way
of piercing the corporate veil for the reasons stated above. See supra Section III.A. Moreover,
Defendants correctly point to Mowbray v. Zumot, which makes clear that individual members
“cannot be personally liable for breach of contract because [they are] not a party” to the contract.
See Mowbray v. Zumot, 533 F.Supp.2d 554, 564 (D. Md. 2008). Indeed, Maryland LLC members
are not personally liable for “the obligations of the company, whether in contract, tort, or
otherwise, solely by reason of being a member of the limited liability company.” Md. Code. Ann.,
Corporations & Assn’s, § 4A-301. 	Additionally, Plaintiff cites to no evidence that shows
Defendant Musa incurred an obligation on the Listing Agreement in an individual capacity.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Musa is entitled to summary judgment with respect
to Count II. Thus, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II is GRANTED with
respect to Defendant Musa.
C. 	There Exist Genuine Issues of Material Fact on the Issue of Whether
Defendant Pro Level Failed to Disclose Material Facts Regarding the GTR
Title Transfer Despite a Duty to Do So.
Defendants next seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
(ECF No. 26-1 at 10). There exist certain nuances in Maryland’s fraudulent misrepresentation
standards that cannot be accounted for in a corporate veil analysis. See, e.g., Willis v. Bank of Am.
Corp., Civil Action No. ELH-14-02615, 2014 WL 3829520, at *18, *39-*40 (D. Md. Aug. 1,
2014) (applying a broader fraud standard on a misrepresentation claim than in its corporate veil
analysis when granting a motion to dismiss with respect to both claims). In Maryland, “‘[f]raud
encompasses, 	among 	other 	things, 	theories 	of fraudulent misrepresentation, 	fraudulent
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concealment, 	and 	fraudulent 	inducement.’” Sass 	v. 	Andrew, 	152 	Md. 	App. 	406, 	432
(2003) (citation omitted). To prevail on an intentional misrepresentation claim grounded in fraud,
Plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff, (2) that its
falsity was either known to the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless
indifference as to its truth, (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding
the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely on it, and
(5) that the plaintiff suffered compensable injury resulting from the misrepresentation. Nails v. S
& R, Inc., 334 Md. 398, 415 (1994). To be actionable, a false representation “must be of a material
fact.” Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 258 (1993). The “misrepresentation must be made with
the deliberate intent to deceive,” Sass, 152 Md. App. at 430 (citing VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation
Corp., 350 Md. 693, 704 (1998)). Moreover, the defendant must “know[] that his representation
is false” or be “recklessly indifferent in the sense that he knows that he lacks knowledge as to its
truth or falsity.” Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 232, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995). In
Maryland, the “mere failure to disclose a material fact does not constitute fraud, in the absence of
a legal duty to disclose that inheres in certain types of transactions. Willis, 2014 WL 3829520, at
*18 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2014).
Review of the Complaint shows Plaintiff primarily alleges fraud but also raises a theory of
failure to disclose. (ECF No. 1 at 16). When a plaintiff predicates an intentional misrepresentation
claim on a duty to disclose and failure to do so, Maryland has recognized “a duty to disclosure
arises where the defendant makes an active misstatement of fact, or only a partial or fragmentary
statement of fact, which misleads the plaintiff to its injury.” 	Odyssey Travel Ctr., Inc. v. RO
Cruises, Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d 618, 628 (D. Md. 2003) (citing Lubore v. RPM Associates, Inc., 109
Md.App. 312, 330-31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
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In Odyssey Travel Center, Inc., a plaintiff travel center company brought a claim of
intentional misrepresentation by concealment when a defendant cruise ship company failed to
disclose in its itinerary that the vessel lacked two required federal certificates. Id. According to
the plaintiff there, these omissions constituted “affirmative representations about the vessel’s plan
for the [cruise] [that were] materially misleading.” Id. Evidence of the brochure confirmed that
the defendant did not disclose its knowledge that the vessel lacked the necessary certificates. Id.
Reasoning that the plaintiff did “no more than surmise that [the defendant] deliberately withheld
information—concerning the lack of certificates and [the defendant’s] deteriorating financial
conditions—with the intent to defraud,” the Court granted summary judgment on the issue of
intentional misrepresentation based on fraud. 	Id. 	Nevertheless, concluding that the defendants
failed 	to 	disclose 	and 	had 	a 	duty 	to 	do 	so, 	the 	Court 	nevertheless 	let 	the 	intentional
misrepresentation claim survive. Odyssey Travel Center, Inc., 262 F.Sup.2d at 629-30.
Thus, Odyssey Travel Center makes clear that fact disputes regarding the existence of an
omission are not enough to bar summary judgment in an intentional misrepresentation case. See
id. To that end, Defendants argue:
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are liable for intentional misrepresentation because
they mispresented an escrow amount of $1,100,000.00 rather than $980,000.00,
then distributed to Plaintiff $600,000.00 rather than $630,000.00, causing monetary
damages to Plaintiff, making false representations for the purposes of defrauding
Plaintiff. Compl. at ¶¶ 115-126. Plaintiff has presented no material evidence in
support of his claim that the check made to him was for $630,000.00 rather than
$660,000.00, other than a mischaracterization of a cashier’s check paid at the order
of Nasim and filed with this Court as Complaint Exhibit 4.
(ECF No. 26-1 at 10).
Plaintiff counters,
The Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendants falsely represented the amounts held
in escrow ($1.1 Million vs. $980,000) as well as the source of $30,000. Specifically,
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22
Plaintiff alleges that Musa misrepresented to Plaintiff that $30,000 of the $630,000
distributed to Plaintiff was paid by Musa, who took possession of the GTR valued
at $120,000. According to Defendants, they were entitled to receive $450,000 (15%
commission). Using Defendants’ numbers of $1.1 Million in escrow funds -
$450,000 15% Commission= $650,000, not $660,000 reflected in the bank
statement. Exhibit 8 on its face supports the Plaintiff’s allegations that Musa gave
Plaintiff $630,000 funds held in escrow and an additional $30,000 of Musa’s
personal funds.
…
The distribution of $660,000 clearly supports Plaintiff’s allegations that Musa
pretended to give him an additional $30,000 to keep the GTR when, in reality, the
$30,000 came from Nasim’s down payment held by Pro Level. Moreover, the
Defendants have failed to produce a single canceled check or affidavit showing that
the $660,000 was paid to the Plaintiff. Indeed, Musa repeatedly references cashier
checks, not checks, which also supports Plaintiff’s allegations of misrepresentation.
In fact, the bank statement reflecting the withdrawal of $660,000 redacts all
relevant sections that show the number and the amount of the checks drawn.
…
If Pro Level was truly owed 15% or $450,000, there was no need for Pro Level to
pay Plaintiff an additional $30,000. It is undisputed that Pro Level held $980,000
in cash from Nasim in its escrow account. Therefore, the distribution to the Plaintiff
should have been $650,000. Pro Level alleged that it already possessed the GTR at
$120,000, which left a balance of $330,000 of its $450,000 commission ($120,000
GTR + $330,000= $450,000). The only scenario where the Plaintiff should receive
$660,000 is if Musa misrepresented that he would personally pay $30,000 to keep
the GTR since there was no need for Pro Level to pay $30,000 of its commission
back to Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 31 at 15-17).
Defendants reply, “In a bizarre statement of speculation, Plaintiff appears to concede that “if Pro
Level were truly owed 15% commission . . . the distribution to the Plaintiff should have been
$650,000.” Defendants do not dispute this assertion. However, it has no place in the Opposition.”
(ECF No. 32 at 3).
Though the record underlying a number of these arguments is unclear, careful review of
the facts available and arguments raised suggests that there exist several disputes including: (1)
whether Defendants were entitled to a 15% commission in the first place; (2) whether Defendants
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23
disbursed $660,000.00 to Plaintiff; (3) whether Defendants paid an excess of $30,000.00; (4)
whether there existed any promise regarding the title transfer of the GTR; and (5) whether
Defendants’ disclosure of the source of the $30,000.00 was proper under BAPA and the Listing
Agreement. The Court can find only limited factual evidence regarding several of these arguments.
It is unclear how any of the facts, if interpreted in Plaintiff’s favor, could support an inference of
an intent to deceive or defraud Plaintiff. Moreover, to find any evidence of intent to deceive is of
considerable difficulty, as Plaintiff has not cited to the record beyond offering speculative
interpretations of Defendant Musa’s testimony. See (ECF No. 31). The evidence does, however,
show a bank record depicting a withdrawal from Defendant Pro Level’s escrow account in the
amount of $660,000.00 (ECF No. 26-10). While Plaintiff challenges the extent of the inferences
that the bank record support, Plaintiff points to no facts that support an inference connecting a
withdrawal in the amount of $660,000.00 to an intent to defraud. 	While the record may well
support a strong case for a breach of contract, the Court can find no evidence that shows Plaintiff
objected to the title transfer in the first place, that Defendant lied about the source of the
$30,000.00, or that Defendant Musa did so with the intent to defraud Plaintiff. See Odyssey Travel
Ctr., 262 F.Supp.2d at 628-29. There exists much evidence to the contrary in Defendant Musa’s
deposition. 	See generally (ECF No. 26-4). 	To that extent, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment.
Following Odyssey Travel Center, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claim is predicated on a
duty to disclose and failure to do so, the Court finds that these factual conflicts create a genuine
issue of material fact. Indeed, the parties agree Defendant Pro Level had a fiduciary relationship
with Plaintiff. Therefore, based on the reasoning in supra Section III.B.2., Defendant Musa is
entitled to Summary Judgment as he was not a party to the contracts at issue, Defendant Pro Level
Case 1:24-cv-03009-JMC Document 34 Filed 12/15/25 Page 23 of 30
24
is entitled to Summary Judgment on the issue of an intent to deceive, and the Motion for Summary
Judgment on Count III is otherwise DENIED to the extent that there remain genuine issues of
material fact on the issue of failure to disclose in the existence of a duty to do so.
D. 	There Exist Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding Whether Defendant
Pro Level Breached a Fiduciary Duty to Plaintiff.
Defendants next move for summary judgment on Count IV, which alleges a breach of
fiduciary duty. To prevail on a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty, Plaintiff must show (1) the
existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) breach of the duty owed by the fiduciary to the
beneficiary; and (3) harm to the beneficiary. Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 559 (2020). “If a
plaintiff describes a fiduciary relationship, identifies a breach, and requests a remedy recognized
by statute, contract, or common law applicable to the specific type of fiduciary relationship and
specific breach alleged, a court should permit the count to proceed.” Id.
To begin, it is undisputed that Defendant Pro Level owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by
way of the Listing Agreement. (ECF No. 26-1 at 12-13). Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff
seeks a remedy recognized by contract that is applicable to the alleged breach. See id.; (ECF No.
31). Defendant Pro Level urges there is no genuine issue of material fact to substantiate a breach.
(ECF No. 26-1 at 12-13). However, based on the analysis of the existing factual disputes regarding
Defendant Pro Level’s disclosures and distributions set forth above, the Court applies the same
reasoning here. Therefore, Defendant Pro Level is not entitled to summary judgment with respect
to a breach of its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.
With respect to Defendant Musa, the arguments require additional consideration beyond
that set forth in supra Section III.B.2. Plaintiff argues Defendant Musa owed Plaintiff a fiduciary
duty because he is the sole member of Defendant Pro Level. (ECF No. 31 at 17-18). Plaintiff relies
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on the doctrine of respondeat superior11 and agency principles in support of its argument. See id.
Such arguments rely on a misapplication of the agency rules.12 To be sure, a member of an LLC
owes to the LLC—not third parties—fiduciary duties. See Plank, 469 Md. at 578 (“After
discussing at length the duties owed by an agent to a principal, including the duty of loyalty and
duty to disclose information material to the agency, we pointed out that under our existing case
law, damages were available for the breach in the form of lost profits.”) (emphasis added).
Here, there Listing Agreement does not make a single reference to Defendant Musa as an
individual. See (ECF No. 26-5). Rather, Defendant Pro Level is defined as the “Broker” that
incurred all obligations under the contract. See id. After careful review of the record, the Court can
find no evidence that supports a duty Defendant Musa owed Plaintiff in his individual capacity.
Of course, insofar as Defendant Musa acted in his capacity as an agent of Pro Level, his conduct
will be under scrutiny with respect to Plaintiff’s fiduciary claim against Defendant Pro Level.
Indeed, Plaintiff’s fiduciary arguments may well result in a fact finder’s decision in his favor
against Defendant Pro Level. 	However, consistent with the reasoning above, there exists
insufficient factual support to conclude Defendant Musa and Defendant Pro Level were one and
the same. There is simply no evidence to conclude Defendant Musa acted in his individual
capacity. Therefore, Defendant Musa is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count IV.
Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV is GRANTED with respect
to Defendant Musa and DENIED with respect to Defendant Pro Level.
11 To be clear, the doctrine of respondeat superior provides a basis upon which to “impute[] liability for a cause of
action to a principal.” Stewart v. Bierman, 859 F.Supp.2d 754, 768 n.8 (D. Md. 2012). Accordingly, Maryland does
not recognize the theory of respondeat superior as a cognizable cause of action. Williams v. Coppin State Univ., Civil
No.: 1:23-cv-02590-JRR, 2024 WL 3904676, at *17 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2024).
12 Plaintiff further argues Defendant Musa breached the fiduciary duty of loyalty because he engaged in a “self-
dealing” transaction. (ECF No. 31 at 17-18). However, Plaintiff, as a third-party contractor with Defendant Pro Level,
does not have standing to bring such claims. See Plank, 469 Md. at 578.
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E. 	There Exist Certain Genuine Issues of Material Fact under Maryland’s
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on Count V, which Plaintiff brings under
the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 15-201 et seq.
(“MUFCA”). 	As Defendants point out, “MUFCA is made up of several statutes, the statutes
specifically recited in the Complaint being described here.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 14). At issue here
are the following provisions:
Md. Com. Law Code § 15-205 states “Every conveyance made without fair
consideration when the person who makes it is engaged or is about to engage in a
business or transaction for which the property remaining in his hands after the
conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and other
persons who become creditors during the continuance of the business or transaction
without regard to his actual intent.”
…
Md. Com. Law Code § 15-207 states “Every conveyance made and every obligation
incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder,
delay, or defraud present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and
future creditors.”
…
Md. Com. Law Code § 15-209 states that “If a conveyance or obligation is
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim has matured, the creditor, as against any
person except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at
the time of the purchase or one who has derived title immediately or immediately
from such a purchaser, may (1) have the conveyance set aside or obligation
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy the claim; or (2) levy on or garnish the
property conveyed as if the conveyance were not made.”
(ECF No. 26-1 at 14-16).
Defendants insist there exists no genuine issues of material fact under MUFCA for various reasons.
See id. Plaintiff retorts, emphasizing the consideration argument set forth under the breach of
contract argument. (ECF No. 31 at 19).
First taking Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 15-205, Defendants aver Residential Warranty
requires summary judgment because “the ‘creditor-debtor relationship must exist for maintenance
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27
of a suit under the fraudulent conveyance statute[.]’” (ECF No. 26-1 at 15) (quoting Residential
Warranty, 126 Md.App. at 313). In Residential Warranty, the court declined to analyze whether
transfers from a defendant corporation to the sole shareholder were fraudulent when the plaintiff
asserted MUFCA claims against the shareholder. Residential Warranty, 126 Md.App. at 313.
Reasoning that there may be a claim against the corporation, plaintiff did not have a claim within
the meaning of MUFCA against the shareholder because he “could never have anticipated that
appellant would be a future creditor of [him] personally” and the “creditor-debtor relationship must
exist for maintenance of a suit under the fraudulent conveyance statute.” 	Id. (citing Dixon v.
Bennett, 72 Md.App. 620 (1987)). Moreover, the court noted that because there was no genuine
issue of material fact with respect to proving that the shareholder had an intent to defraud plaintiff,
the plaintiff was also unable to prove “the conveyance of which they complain was made with the
intention and design to defraud.” Id. at 314 (citing Neeb v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Realty Co.,
176 Md. 297, 306 (1939)).
Consistent with the analysis in supra Section III.A., the Court again finds the Residential
Warranty reasoning persuasive. See Residential Warranty, 126 Md.App. at 313-14. Having found
no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Defendant Musa’s personal liability on the Listing
Agreement, Residential Warranty requires this Court to dismiss the MUFCA claims against
Defendant Musa. Id. Indeed, there exists no evidence showing Defendant Musa could have
anticipated Plaintiff would become his personal creditor. 	Id. at 313. Plaintiff insists, “The
Defendants' reliance on caselaw shielding a distribution to its members is misplaced since the
existence and adequacy of consideration for the initial conveyance of the GTR to Pro Level are
disputed facts that can only be determined at trial.” (ECF No. 31 at 20). However, this argument
is unavailing. To be sure, assuming that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
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28
the existence and adequacy of consideration for the initial conveyance of the GTR to Pro Level,
this factual conflict does not create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether
Defendant Musa would anticipate Plaintiff as a creditor of him in a personal capacity. Thus,
Defendant Musa is entitled to summary judgment under MUFCA. Based on the Court’s finding
that there exist several fact disputes with regard to consideration, Defendant Pro Level is not
entitled to summary judgment under Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 15-205.
Regarding Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 15-207, Defendants argue there is no evidence to
support a finding that Defendants acted with an intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.”
(ECF No. 26-1 at 15). 	To be sure, § 15-207 “permits a transfer to be avoided” if there existed
either an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or constructive fraud, which is not at issue
here. See In re Rood, 459 B.R. 581, 602 (D. Md. 2011). When assessing such claims,
Maryland courts rely on badges of fraud as indicia for exposing fraudulent intent
and establishing the knowledge necessary for a fraudulent conveyance, such as
insolvency or indebtedness of the transferor, lack of consideration for the
conveyance; a relationship between the transferor and the transferee; the pendency
or threat of litigation; secrecy/concealment; departure from the usual method of
business; transfer of the debtor’s entire estate; reservation of benefit to the
transferor; and the retention by the debtor of actual possession of the property.
Id.
To that end, Plaintiff argues,
The subsequent [GTR title] conveyance to Musa, who was not a party to the Listing
Agreement, occurred on July 7, 2024, well after Musa became aware that Nasim
was 	dissatisfied 	with 	the 	sale. 	Consequently, 	whether 	Pro 	Level’s 	alleged
distribution to Musa of the GTR was an act intended to obstruct, hinder, and delay
Plaintiff’s ability to repossess the GTR is also a disputed fact that must be
determined at trial.
(ECF No. 31 at 21).
Case 1:24-cv-03009-JMC Document 34 Filed 12/15/25 Page 28 of 30
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Again, the Court can find no evidence on the record—nor does Plaintiff point to any—that
supports this assertion. First, there exists no evidence that Defendant Musa only received title to
the GTR after he knew Nasim was dissatisfied with the sale or any evidence showing a connection
between such knowledge and an intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s rights to repossess the GTR.
The Court can find no factual evidence showing Plaintiff even contemplated taking title to the
GTR, nor that Defendant Musa knew of any desire to have it based on their contractual
relationship. Plaintiff again relies upon previously stated speculative interpretations of Defendant
Musa’s testimony. Though there is some fact dispute regarding the sufficiency of consideration
and the rights under the Listing Agreement, none of the In re Rood factors have sufficient factual
support such that a fact finder could hold Defendants liable under § 15-207. In re Rood, 459 B.R.
at 602. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment under § 15-207.
Finally, turning to Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 15-209, MUFCA provides “that once a
conveyance is proven to be fraudulent, a creditor has the option of either having the conveyance
set aside or disregarding the conveyance and attaching or levying execution upon the property
conveyed.” See Molovinsky v. Fair Empl. Council of Greater Wash., Inc., 154 Md.App. 262, 284
(2003). Having concluded that there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding sufficiency
of consideration based on the contract dispute under Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 15-205,
summary judgment is necessarily barred under § 15-209. Molovinsky, 154 Md.App. at 284.
Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V is GRANTED with
respect to Defendant Musa and DENIED as to Defendant Pro Level under Md. Code Ann., Com.
Law §§ 15-205, 15-209.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is this 15th day of December 2025 ORDERED:
Case 1:24-cv-03009-JMC Document 34 Filed 12/15/25 Page 29 of 30
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(1) Defendant Pro Level’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to
Count I;
(2) Defendant Pro Level’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part with respect to Count III and V;
(3) Defendant Pro Level’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to
Counts II and IV;
(4) Defendant Musa’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;
(5) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) is DENIED; and
(6) The parties are hereby directed to confer and jointly inform the Court within fourteen
(14) days from the date of this Memorandum Order and Opinion whether there is
mutual desire to participate in another settlement conference with Judge Austin before
proceeding to schedule a trial and related dates.
Date: December 15, 2025 	/s/
J. Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:24-cv-03009-JMC Document 34 Filed 12/15/25 Page 30 of 30

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