Schrider v. Devlin Contracting and Maintenance, Inc et al

IN THE UNITED STATES·DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
DEBORAH SCHRIDER,
*
Plaintiff,
*
v.
* 	Civil No. 24-2978-BAH
DEVLIN CONTRACTING AND
MAINTENANCE, INC, ET AL.,
Defendants.
* 	* 	* 	* 	*
*
*
* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
* 	* 	* 	*
Deborah 	Schrider ("Plaintiff') 	brought 	suit 	against 	her former 	employers, 	Devlin
Contracting and Maintenance, Inc. ("Devlin Contracting"), Devlin Solar, Inc. ("Devlin Solar"),
Matthew Devlin, Brian Devlin, and Cindy Ingemi (collectively "Defendants"), to colle_ct unpaid
wages, liquidated treble damages, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs for violations of the
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article
("LE") §§ 3-501 et seq. (hereinafter "M\'.'PCL"). See ECF 1 (complaint). On November 15, 2024,
Plaintiff moved for entry of default as to all Defendants, which the Clerk entered that same day.
ECF 10 (motion for Clerk's entry of default); ECF 11 (Clerk's entry of default); ECFs 12-16
(notices of default for each Defendant). On November 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for default
judgment. 	ECF 17. 	On September 30, 2025, the Court provisionally granted Plaintiffs motion
for default judgment against Matthew Devlin, Devlin Contracting, and Devlin Solar, but denied
default judgment as to Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi. See ECF 18 (memorandum opinion); ECF
19 (implementing order). Additionally, the Court de_nied Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees and
costs because Plaintiff did not provide proof of attorney's fees and costs with sufficient specificity
Case 1:24-cv-02978-BAH Document 23 Filed 01/14/26 Page 1 of 15

for the Court to perform the required analysis to determine whether the request was reasonable.
See ECF 18, at 25-27. 	The Court ordered Plaintiff to submit a status report regarding how she
planned to proceed with her claims against Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi, and afforded Plaintiff.
an opportunity to supplement the record on attorney's fees. Id at 27. •
Before the Court are Plaintiffs submissions of supplemental documentation in support of
a final order of default judgment against Matthew Devlin, Devlin Contracting, and Devlin Solar,
and an award of attorney's fees and costs. 	See ECF 20; ECF 22. 	The Court has reviewed all
relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. 	See Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025).
Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the Court AMENDS the default judgment order, ECF
19, and enters final default judgment against Matthew Devlin, Devlin Contracting, and Devlin
Solar, dismisses all claims against Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi, and awards Plaintiff damages,
attorney's fees, and costs.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the complaint on October 11, 2024. 1 ECF 1. After Defendants failed to file
a responsive pleading, the Clerk entered default as to all Defendants on November 15, 2024. See
ECF 11. Plaintiff then filed the motion for default judgment. ECF 17. On September 30, 2025,
the Court provisionally granted the motion for default judgment as to Matthew Devlin, Devlin
Solar, and Devlin Contracting and determined damages as to those three defendants. See ECF 18,
at 15-25. 	The Court, however, vacated the entry of default and denied the motion for default
judgment as to Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi, finding that they were not properly served. 	See
id. at 11-12. Because the Court chose not to enter default against a subset of defendants when all
1 The Court incorporates the relevant factual allegations as set forth in the Court's previous
memorandum opinion, ECF 18.
11 2
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defendants were alleged to be jointly and severally-liable, Plaintiff was asked to submit a status
report addressing how she planned to proceed against Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi before final
default judgment could be entered. Id at 14-15. The Court also found that Plaintiffs request for
attorney's fees was unsupported and afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to supplement the record
regarding her request for attorney's fees. Id. at 25-27.
Plaintiff submitted a status report and "supplemental submission in support of attorney's
fees" on October 14, 2025. See ECF 20. In her status report; Plaintiff indicated that she "does not
intend to pursue her claims against Defendants Brian Devlin or Cindy Ingemi," and requested that
·the Court"[d]eem the claims against Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi withdrawn" and"[ e]nter final
judgment" against Matthew Devlin, Devlin Contracting, and Devlin Solar, "consistent with the
findings and damages awarded in-the Court's September 30, 2025 memorandum opinion." ECF
-20, at 1-2. Plaintiff also submitted argument in support ofreasonable attorney's fees, see id af2-
5, and supplied documentation in support of her request, see ECF 20-1. Upon review, ilie Court
noted a discrepancy between the fees requested and the documentation provided, and asked
.Plaintiff to clarify the discrepancy. See ECF 21 (noting that while Plaintiff requested $36,501.66
in attorney's fees and costs, the invoic~s reflected that she only incurred $18,139.39 in "legal
services, paralegal services, and costs). 	On October 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed the requested
.documentation. See ECF 22-1, at I. Plaintiff requests $36,556.66 in total fees and costs. Id
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
As noted in ECF 18, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), "[w]hen a party
_against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend,
and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." The
Court may conduct hearings or make referrals when necessary to determine ilie damages, establish
3
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the truth of any allegation by evidence, or investigate any other matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
Thereafter, the court may enter default judgment at the plaintiff's request and with notice to the
defaultirig party. Id.
If the complaint avers sufficient facts from which the court may find liability, the court
turns to damages. See Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 FJd 778, 780-81 (4th Cir. 2001).
The court must make ~ independent determination regarding damages and cannot accept as true
factual allegations of damages. See S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 35~ F. Supp. 2d 418,422 (D. Md. 2005).
While the court may conduct an evidentiary qearing to determine damages, it is not required to do
so; it may rely instead on affidavits or documentary evidence· in the record to determine the
appropriate sum. 	See Monge v. Portofino Ristorante, 751 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (D. Md. 2010)
(collecting cases).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Default Judgment and Damages
Plaintiff "does not intend to pursue her claims against Defendants Brian Devlin or Cindy
Ingemi." ECF 20, at I. Accordingly, she requests that the Court "[d]eem the claims against Brian
Devlin and Cindy Ingemi withdrawn" and enter final default judgment against Matthew Devlin;
Devlin Solar, and Devlin Contracting consistent with the Court's previous memorandum opinion
at ECF 18. Id. at 1-2. As noted in the Court's previous letter order, ECF 21, the Court observes
that dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi permits adjudication of
the matter with respect to all defendants and will not cause logically inconsistent or contradictory
results. ECF 21; see also Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552,554 (1872); Choice Hotels Int'/, Inc.
' 	'
v. Mander, Civ. No. GJH-14-3159, 2015 WL 1880277, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2015).
4
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims against Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi are DISMISSED.
• The default judgment order, ECF 19, is AMENDED to enter final default judgment against
'Matthew Devlin, Devlin Solar, and Devlin Contracting. 	As noted in the Court's previous
memorandum opinion, the Court awards damages in the amount of $532,840,2 for which Matthew
Devlin, Devlin Solar, and Devlin Contracting are jointly and severally liable. See ECF 18, at 21-
·25; ECF 19, at I.
B. 	Attorney's Fees
A court may also award "reasonable counsel fees and other costs" to a prevailing party
.under the MWPCL, LE§ 3-507.2(b), which Plaintiff has requested in the amount of$36,556.66,
ECF 22, at I. 	The court determines the reasonableness of an attorney's fee by starting with the
"number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate."
.Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 	This is commonly known as the "lodestar"
method. 	Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313,320 (4th Cir. 2008).
In making an inquiry into the reasonableness of hourly rates, the Fourth Circuit follows the• 	' 	.
."locality rule," whereby "[t]he community in which the court sits is the first place to look to in
evaluating the prevailing market rate." Montcalm Pub. Corp. v. Virginia, 199 F.3d 168, 173 (4th
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation niarks omitted). 	"Evidence of the prevailing
market rate usually takes the form of affidavits from other counsel attesting to their rates or the
prevailing market rate. However, in the absence of sufficient documentation, the court may rely
on its own knowledge of the market." CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 780,
788 (D. Md. 2000).
2 This number is the total amount the Court awarded to Plaintiff for her unpaid commissions and
overrides-$266,420-c-doubled pursuant to the damage enhancement provision of the MWPCL.
See ECF 18, at 21-25; ECF 19, at I.
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/
As to reasonable hours, "the plaint/ff 'must show that the number of hours for which [she]
seeks reimbursement is reasonable and does not include hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary."' McFadden v. L&J Waste Recycling, LLC, Civ. No. ELH-16-2744, 2017_
WL 3007070, at *7 (D. Md. July 14, 2017) (quoting Travis v. Prime Lending, No. 3:07cv00065,
2008 WL 2397330, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 12, 2008)). 	As such, "the party seeking fees 'has the
burden of proving hours to the district court by submitting contemporaneous time records that
I
reveal all hours for which compensation is requested and how those hours were allotted to specific
tasks."' 	Gonzalez v. Caron, Civ. No. 10-2188-CBD, 2011 WL 3886979, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 2,
2011) (quoting CoStar Grp., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 788).
The Court is also guided by twelve factors in determining whether a fee request is
reasonable. See Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216,226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978) (adopting twelve
factors set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)).
These factors (referred to hereinafter as the "Johnson factors") include:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2). the novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the
attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset ofthe_litigation; (7) the
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in
controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of
the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which
the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between
• attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.
Barber, 577 F.2d.at 226 n.28; see also Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243-
44 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court is not required_ to analyze each factor individually or even examine
every factor but may instead consider the factors as a whole. Martin v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 151
F. App'x 275,283 (4th Cir. 2005).
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While "[a]n attorney may ... recover for compensable work generally performed by
paralegals at the paralegal rate," "clerical, ministerial, or administrative work should not be
•Compensated as an award for attorney's fees, no matter who performs it." Kubas v. 331B, LLC,
Civ. No. EA-20-2456, 2024 WL 3487890, at *4 (D. Md. July 19, 2024) (cleaned up) (collecting
cases). "In this District, clerical tasks include: (1) collating and filing documents with the court;
.(2) issuing summonses; (3) scanning, and mailing documents; (4) reviewing files for information;
(5) printing pleadings arid preparing sets of orders; (6) document organization; (7) creating
notebooks or files and updating attorneys' 	calendars; (8) assembling binders; (9) emailing
documents; and (10) logistical telephone calls with the clerk's office or the judge's chambers."
Jermaine G. v. Kijakazi, Civ.No. GLS-21-2445, 2023 WL 5346140, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2023).
Plaintiff asserts that the fees requested are reasonable and provides an affidavit from
Counsel and invoices in support thereof. 	See ECF 17-2 (Counsel's affidavit); ECF 20-1 (partial
invoices); ECF 22-1 (complete'set of invoices). The Court has reviewed the updated set of invoices
and calculates·67.5 hours billed by Counsel at $500 per hour ($33,750 in total), 7.8 paralegal hours
billed at $125 per hour ($975 in total), and costs in the amount of$1,526.66, totaling $36,251.66. 3
See ECF 22-1. The invoi~es also reflect 4.7 hours of attorney work that Plaintiff does not request
reimbursement for. ECF 20, a! 4 (noting that the work performed by another attorney on Plaintiffs
3 The amount calculated by the Court is $305 less than the amount sought.· The discrepancy
originates in the December 2024 and May 2025 invoices. 	First, the invoice dated December 2,
2024 reflects 16. 7 attorney hours and 2. 7 paralegal hours worked, which, based on the hourly rates,
should total $8,687.50, but the total service amount listed on the bill is $8,937.50. See ECF 20-1,
at 7-8; ECF 22-1, at 24--25. The Court also observes that the December 2024 invoice in ECF 22-
.1 appears to be missing numbers, so the Court relies on the December 2024 invoice in ECF 20-1,
which Counsel represents is the same invoice. ECF 22, at 1 ("This discrepancy was the result of
counsel's inadvertent omission of invoices prior to September 2024."). Second, the invoice dated
May 1, 2025 shows 0.4 attorney hours and 0.2 paralegal hours worked, which should total $225,
• but the total service amount listed on the bill is $280. See ECF 20-1, at 12; ECF 22-1, at 29.
g
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case "has been written off and is not included" in the request for fees); see ECF 22-1, at 19-20,
24-25. The Court first analyzes the reasonableness of the hourly rates and then turns to the hours
worked.
1. 	Reasonable Billing Rate
Counsel asserts in his affidavit that the attorney billing rate of $500 per hour and paralegal
billing rate of $125 per hour are both reasonable because those rates are consistent with the.
prevailing rates in his community, which he identifies as the "D.C., Maryland, and Virginia"
areas. 4 ECF 17-2, at 1-2 ,i,r 6-7.
Counsel does not present additional documentation in support of the reasonableness of the.
billing rates, such as affidavits of other local lawyers, so the Court may rely on its own knowledge
of the market to provide this information. 	CoStar Grp., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 788. 	"In the
District of Maryland, this market knowledge is embedded in the Guidelines" set forth in the Local_
Rules. Gonzalez, 2011 WL 3886979, at *2. This Court recently updated its Guidelines Regarding
Hourly Rates in the Local Rules, which now provide:
Reasonable hourly rates should be determined by the Court using declarations,
affidavits, stipulations by the parties, or other evidence. A useful guideline for
hourly rates may be provided by the Fitzpatrick Matrix* as adjusted annually, with
a reduction of 5% to 20% (to reflect differences between the legal markets in
Washington, D.C. and Maryland).
Loe. R. App. B, Guideline 3 (D. Md. Dec. 2025). 	While fee matrices can be a "useful starting
point to determine fees[,]" the court must consider all relevant evidence when assessing the
4 Plaintiff also argues that Counsel's rates are reasonable even though they are "above those in.
Appendix B of the Local Rules," ECF 20, at 3, referencing the prior iteration of this Court's Local
Rules which included a fee matrix. See Loe. R. App. B, Guideline.3 (D. Md. July 2025). However,
as of December 1, ·2025, the Local Rules no longer contain a fee matrix and instead provide the
revised guidance noted herein. 	See Section ·1n.B. l; Loe. R. App. B, Guideline .3 (D. Md. Dec.
2025). 	•
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reasonableness of an attorney's fees and "may not elevate a matrix above all other types of
evidence or treat a matrix as establishing a presumptive answer or range of answers." De Paredes
.v. Zen Nails Studio LLC,. 134 F.4th 750, 753-54 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Holiday, 591 F.3d 219,229 (4th Cir. 2009)). "Instead, the court
must consider all relevant evidence to determine 'the prevailing market rates in the relevant
.community,' including lawyer affidavits, fee awards in similar cases, general surveys, fee m·atrices,
and even its 'own personal knowledge[.]"' Id at 754 (first quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
895 (1984), then quoting Rum Creek Coal Sales, jnc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 179 (4th Cir.
1994)) (additional citations omitted).
The Court is satisfied that the hourly rates here are reasonable based on Counsel's affidavit
as well as a cross-check with the Fitzpatrick Matrix. 	As to Counsel's rate, Johnson factor nine
(experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney) is particularly relevant. 	Barber, 577 F.2d at
226 n.28. 	According to Counsel's affidavit, his hourly rate is commensurate with those "of
attorneys with reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." 	ECF 17-2, at 2 1 7.
Counsel was first admitted to the New York bar in 2017 and has since been admitted to the
Washington, D.C., Virginia, and. Maryland bars. Id at 1 1 3. 	Counsel "began [his] employment
with Thatcher Law Firm, LLC," in September of 2019, and has "handled all types of employment
law matters, including discrimination, harassment, retaliation, whistleblower protection, and wage
and hour claims." Id. 14. In March of 2024, he "became a Partner at Thatcher, Zavaro & Mani,"
and "represent[s] both employees and employers, large and small, across the o:c., Maryland and
Virginia" regions. 	Id. 1 5. 	As part of his many years pf experience, he has "litigated multiple
·wage and hour cases in federal court." 	Id. 	As to the paralegal rate, co·unsel asserts that he is
"familiar with the hourly rates prevailing in the community in which [he] lives and practices," and
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that "an hourly paralegal rate of $125/hour is consistent with the prevailing rates of paralegals in
[his] community." Id. at 1-2 ,i,i 6-7.
A cross-check with the Fitzpatrick Matrix also supports Counsel's assertion that the hourly·
rates are reasonable. At the time legal services began, Counsel had six years of experience. See
ECF 17-2, at 1 ,i 3 (stating Counsel was admitted to the New York bar in 2017); see also ECF 22-
1 (invoices reflecting legal services were provided from 2023 to 2025). Counsel contends that his·
rates are "significantly below the[] customary rates" within the Laffey 5 and Fitzpatrick matrices. 6
ECF 20, at 3-4. 	As noted, the Fitzpatric~ Matrix is endorsed by the Local Rules to assist in
determining the reasonableness of fees and thus the Court uses it as guidance here. 	See Loe. R..
App. B, Guideline 3 (D. Md. Dec. 2025). The Fitzpatrick Matrix billing rates corresponding with
Counsel's years of experience from 2023 to 2025 are between $568 and $691 per hour. See U.S.
Atty's 	Off. 	for 	the 	Dist. 	of 	Columbia, 	Civ. 	Div., 	The 	Fitzpatrick 	Matrix,
https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/sites/mdd/files/fitzpatrick-matdx.pdf 	[https://perma.cc/3H6E-
5 The Legal Services Index (LSI) "Laffey Matrix ... also pertains to hourly rates of litigation·
attorneys in Washington, D.C." Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. United States Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., Civ. No. RDB-23-1561, 2024 WL 3964761, at *7 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2024).
6 More specifically, Counsel asserts that "as [o ]f 2023, the Fitzpatrick Matrix lists a rate of
$612/hour." ECF 20, at 4. It appears that Counsel is referencing the 2023 rate for an attorney with
nine years of experience, however, Counsel had six years of experience in 2023 and therefore the·
corresponding rate would be $568. See Fitzpatrick Matrix. Courts have taken varying approaches
to calculating years of experience for purposes of awarding fees. 	Compare Jaramillo v. Latino
Regal Corp., No. 19 CV 3104 (HG) (CLP), 2024 WL 4648135 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2024) ("Courts
award hourly rates based on the years of experience that the attorney had when they billed the
time."), with Nitkin v. Main Line Health, No. CV 20-4825-KSM, 2022 WL 2651968, at *3 n.2
(E.D. Pa. July 8, 2022) ("The Court calculates the number of years of experience as of 2021, when.
the fee petition was filed."). 	The invoices provided by Plaintiff span from 2023 to 2025, and.the
fee petition was filed in 2024. 	The Court observes that regardless of the approach taken here,
Counsel's houri/rate is less than the rates witl).in the Fitzpatrick Matrix, and so the Court's analysis
remains the same. See Fitzpatrick Matrix (setting the rate for an attorney with six to eight years
of experience in 2023 to 2025 as $568 to $691 per hour).
10
,I
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DN9L] (hereinafter "Fitzpatrick Matrix"). 	Counsel's rate of $500 per hour is a reduction of
approximately 12% to 18% from the Fitzpatrick Matrix rates noted above and therefore accords
_with the recommendations of the Guidelines. See Loe. R. App. B, Guideline 3 (D. Md. Dec. 2025)
(suggesting "a reduction of 5% to 20%" of the Fitzpatrick Matrix rates "to reflect differences
between the legal markets in Washington, D.C. and.Maryland"). Additionally, the paralegal rate
. billed here, $125 per hour, is well below the hourly rate set forth in the Fitzpatrick Matrix of
between $220 and $255 for 2023 and 2025, respectively. And while the Court does not "treat [the
. Fitzpatrick Matrix] as establishing apresumptive answer or range of answers," De Paredes, 134
F.4th at 753-54, this cross0 check with the Fitzpatrick Matrix supports the conclusion that both the
• attorney and paralegal hourly rates are reasonable.
2. 	Reasonable Hours
The next inquiry is whether the number of hours worked are reasonable. The Court finds
Johnson factors 	one (time and labor), eight (results 	obtained), and eleven (length of the
profession.al relationship) most relevant here. Barber, 577 F.2d at 226 n.28.
Plaintiff contends that the number of hours billed is reasonable because "much of the work
involved was done in response to the Defendants' actions," including "obstructionist and dilatory
tactics" such as "sending incomplete or manipulated reports, withholding reports entirely, ignoring
demands for clarification, knowingly labeling partial payments as 'final,' [and] entering into
settlement discussions which delayed the filing of the instant suit - only to abandon them without
explanation[.]" 	ECF 20, at 4. 	Further, Plaintiff asserts "[t]he reasonableness of [her] request is
further supported by the fact that she is seeking fees for one attorney, although more than one
·contributed to her case." Id. 	Counsel's affidavit asserts that the billed work included tasks such
as "reviewing Mrs. Schrider's documentation and corresponding with Defendants and Defendants'
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attorney in Massachusetts over the course of_ more than one year," "request[ing] and analyz[ing]
Zoho reports pertaining to projects for which Mrs. Schiider ha[ d] not received her commissions,"
"communicat[ing] with Defendants' attorneys regarding defects in the Zoho reports," "engag[ing]
in extensive negotiations with opposing counsel," and "drafting and filing the Complaint, Motion
for Entry of Default, and Motion for Default Judgment." 	ECF 17-2, at 2 ~ 9. 	The invoices are
consistent with Counsel's representation as they reflect numerous attempts to communicate with·.
opposing counsel, see ECF 22-1, at 2, 4~5, 7-11, 13, 15-16, 18, 20, 26-27, analysis of Zoho
reports, see id. at 2, 4, and tasks related to drafting the complaint and motions, see id. at 12-13,
20, 24-25.
The Court is satisfied that the 67.5 hours of work billed by Counsel in this action, which·
has included the default judgment process and ultimately a successful judgment in Plaintiffs favor,
is reasonable. 	Wei v. Xu, Civ. No. 21-601-ELH, 2022 WL 1422926, at *14--15 (D. Md. May 4,.
2022) (determining that for an uncontested default judgment, 72 hours of work was reasonable);
. cf Dominion Fin. Servs. v. Pavlovsky, 673 F. Supp. 3d 727, 755 (D. Md. 2023) (finding that a total
of 166.8 hours of work on litigation involving a contested default judgment was reasonable) ..
Counsel and Plaintiff worked together to pursue Plaintiffs claims for two years, and the legal
invoices evince the length of time and amount of effort required of Counsel in this suit. 	In
particular, the invoices show extensive efforts to negotiate with opposing counsel to resolve_
Plaintiffs claims for over a year. 	See ECF 22-1, at 2, 4--5, 7-11, 13, 15-16, 18, 20, 26-27.
Moreover, the record clearly reflects specificity in the more routine legal work done by Counsel,
including reviewing documents, correspondence with Plaintiff; negotiation with opposing counsel,
researching and drafting motions, and preparation of affidavits. 	See, e.g., id. at 1 ("review of
documents sent by client"), 22 (reflecting five attem_pts to contact opposing counsel), 24 ("drafted
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motion for default judgment; prepared exhibits; drafted proposed order"). This time, even if some
of it was expended "pre-suit," appears compensable. as "it was 'reasonably expended on th~
litigation."' Harwood v, Am. Airlines, Inc., 37 F.4th 954, 961 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Webb v.
Cnty: Bd. ofEduc. ofDyer Cnty., 471 U.S. 234,242 (1985)); see als_o Ibn-Queen v. T.IME. Org.,
Inc., C1v. No. DLB-20-3501, 2021 WL 1890622, at *3 (D. Md. May 11, 2021) (permitting an
award of attorneys' fees for tasks including "time spent investigating plaintiff's claims, attempting
pre-suit settlement negotiations, conferring with the plaintiff regarding the facts underlying his
claims and sett\ement negotiations, analyzing plaintiffs potential damages, and negotiating the
settlement"). 	Furthermore, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that writing off 4.7 hours of attorney
work is reasonable because that work appears redundant to work already completed by Counsel.
E.g., id. at 18 ("Reviewed case file and service requirements and next steps."); see Bobb v.
FinePoints Priv. Duty Healthcare, LLC,, 794 F. Supp. 3d 343, 361 (D. Md. 2025) (noting that
foregoing "billing for certain compensable activities" supported the reasonableness of hours
billed).
However, the Court observes that only one paralegal billing entry is compensable. 	See
'ECF 22:1, at 27 ("Reviewed and edited Settlement Agreement" for 0.3 hours). The remainder of
the time billed for paralegal services is for non-compensable clerical work. 	See, e.g., id. at 20
("Drafted summonses for all 5 Defendants" and "downloaded, saved, and emailed all I 0/16/25
·court filings"), 21 ("Filed proof of service" and "saved all stamped copies of filings to g drive"), •
24 ("Organized Client's Pleadings folder on shared drive" and "Prepared exhibits/attachments for
Motion for Default Judgment"), 25 ("Mailed 5 Motion for Default Judgment to Defendants"), 29
{"called Judge's chambers re status check"), 30 ("Called judge's chambers to speak with law clerk
re pending, unopposed motion"). 	As such, the clerical hours billed will be stmck from the fee •
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award, and Plaintiff will only be awarded 0.3.hours of the paralegal time billed. Cf Molina v. KP
Stoneymill, Inc., Civ. No. GLS-19-3123, 2021 WL 2805838, at *6 (D. Md. July 6, 2021) (striking
non-compensable clerical work from a fee award).
Accordingly, based on the calculation of the reasonable hourly rates multiplied by the
reasonable hours billed, the Court awards fees for 67.5 hours of attorney work at $500 per hour
(totaling $33,750) and 0.3 hours of paralegal work at $125 per hour (totaling $37.50), for a sumo{
';-." 	' 	•
$33,787.50 .
.C. 	Costs •
Plaintiff also requests reimbursement of $1,526.66 in costs. See ECF 22, at 1. "The Court·
has the discretion to determine costs that will be assessed against a losing defendant." 	Kubas,
2024 WL 3487890, at *6 (citing Roy v. Cnty. of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 549 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Costs may include "those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are·
normally charged to a "fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services." 	Spell v.
McDaniel, 852 F.2d 762, 771 (4th Cir. 1988). 	Service of process, filing fees, and attorney
admission costs, among other things, are reimbursa_ble. Butler v. PP&G, Inc., Civ. No. JRR-20-.
3084, 2023 WL 6517593, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 2023). 	The Court is satisfied that the costs
requested here are reasonable and recoverable, as they are associated with reimbursable expenses.
See ECF 22-1, at 1($19.51 for legal research), 2 ($127.31 for legal research and FedEx shipment.
of demand letter), 13 ($5.26 for legal research), 15 ($2.19 for legal.research), 21 ($1,265.28 for
legal research, court.fees, and service of process), 25 ($107.11 for legal research, mailing·motion
for default judgment to defendant, and photocopies).
14
Case 1:24-cv-02978-BAH Document 23 Filed 01/14/26 Page 14 of 15

'IV. 	CONCLUSION
. For the foregoing reasons, the Court AMENDS the default judgment order, ECF 19, and
• dismisses Plaintiffs claims against Brian Devlin and Cindy Ingemi, enters final judgment against
'Matthew Devlin, Devlin Contracting, and Devlin Solar, and awards damages ($532,840), plus
attorney's fees ($33,787.50) and costs ($1,526.66), totaling $568,154.16, for which Matthew
Devlin, Devlin Contracting, and Devlin Solar are jointly and severally liable.
A separate implementil)g Order will issue.
Dated: January 14, 2026 	Isl
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
15 •
Case 1:24-cv-02978-BAH Document 23 Filed 01/14/26 Page 15 of 15