Moore v. Patterson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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' JACQUELYN MOORE,
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Plaintiff,
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V.
* 	Civil No. 24-1600-BAH
,JESSE PATTERSON ET AL.,
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Defendants.
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
, MEMORANDUM OPINION
* 	*
Plaintiff Jacquelyn Moore ("Plaintiff' or "Moore") brought suit against Frederick County
Sheriff's Deputy Jesse Patterson ("Patterson") and two unknown deputies alleging violations of
,Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count I) and the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II), as well as
false arrest (Count III), false imprisonment (Count IV), and negligence (Count V) under Maryland
law. See ECF 27 (amended complaint). 1 Moore also brings suit against Jaroth Ramon Armando
Ralon Perez ("Perez"), alleging one count of negligence (Count VI). See id. All claims arise out
of the aftermath of a collision that occurred after 'Perez fled a car stop initiated by Patterson.
Moo're, an innocent bystander whose car was struck by Perez's, alleges that the accident caused
her serious 'injuries. Though she sues Perez for damages directly resulting from the accident, she
also takes issue with Patterson's actions immediately after the accident. Id. at 11-12. Specifically,
1 The original complaint is docketed at, ECF 1. 	Moore also brought a breach of contract claim
against USAA Casualty Insurance Company. 	See ECF 1, at 12; ECF 27, at 14. 	However, the
parties stipulated to ,the dismissal of that claim with prejudice on April 23, 2025. 	ECF 46.
Accordingly, USAA Casualty Insurance Company is no longer a defendant in this action.
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Moore also alleges that immediately following the accident, Patterson, and possibly other unnamed
deputies, effectuated her "unnecessary and unlawful arrest, assault, detention, and imprisonment."
Id. at 10.
Pending before the Court is Patterson's motion for summary judgment. ECF 48 .. Moore
• filed an opposition, ECF 53, and Patterson filed a reply, ECF 56. Moore has also moved to file a
. 	.
surreply, ECF 57, which Patterson opposes, ECF 58. 2 All filings inc,lude memoranda oflaw and-
exhibits. 3 The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See
Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). 	Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Patterson's motion is
GRANTED. Moore is also ORDERED to show cause within fourteen (14) days of the issuance.
of this opinion and implementing order why the unidentified officer defendants should not be
dismissed from the action, and Moore is ordered to file a motion for default judgment against Perez
or file a report as to why such a motion would be inappropriate within fourteen.(14) days of the
issuance of this opinion and implementing order.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background·
This case arises out of Patterson's pursuit ofa suspected stolen vehicle on September 22,
(
2021. 	See ECF 27, at 6; ECF 48-2, at 1-8 (incident report); ECF 48-6, at 13-14 (deposition of
Moore). The pursuit lasted approximately forty-four seconds and spanned about three-quarters of
a mile. ECF 48-10; at 1 (vehicle pursuit report); ECF 48-8, at 11 (deposjtion of Angleberger). 4
2 For the reasons explained below, Moore's ·motio~ to file a surreply is GRANTED.· See infra
note 12.
3 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECf-
generated page numbers at the top of the page.
4 Patterson's interrogatories state that he "was not wearing a body worn camera, and his vehicle ,
was not equipped with a dash camera at the time of the occurrence."· ECF 53-3, at 4. '
2
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It began at approximately 6:30 p.m. when Patterson, while on patrol for the Frederick
County Sheriffs Office, observed a black Infiniti sedan stopped at a· red light on Buckeystown
_Pike near the I-270 entrance ramp. ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 1 (statement of probable cause);
ECF 48-4 (deposition of Patterson), at 28-30. Patterson observed the driver and passenger of the
Infiniti, who Patterson identified as two Hispanic men, stare at him and then quickly look away.
ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 1; ECF 48-4, at 30, 33, 37. Based on that interaction, Patterson made
a U-turn and approached the Infiniti again, which was still stationary at a red light. ECF 48-2, at
5; ECF 48-3, at l; ECF 48-4, at 40-41, 43. 	Once behind the vehicle, Patterson noticed that its
registration plate was from North Carolina. 	ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-4, at 31, 37-38. 	Patterson
ran a registration check on his in-cruiser computer, which returned a National Crime Information
Center ("NCIC") "hit'; for a stolen registration plate. ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 1; ECF 48-4;
at 44.
Patterson next contacted the Frederick County Emergency Communications Center, and a
dispatcher confirmed the hit and advised that the registration plate was reported stolen through the
City of Frederick Police Department. 	ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 2. 	Patterson asked the
dispatcher whether the registration plate or the vehicle itself had been reported stolen. ECF 48-2,
at 5; ECF 48-3, at 2; see also ECF 48-4, at 51-61, 116. 	The dispatcher advised that the stolen
plate belonged to an Infiniti. 5 ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 2; ECF 48-4, at 61-62, 64-67, 116-.
5 The incident report reflects that this advisement turned out to be inaccurate--although the stolen
tag was registered to a black Infiniti, a later "check of the VIN on the suspect vehicle stated it used
.to be associated with another Maryland tag, but was not associated with this stolen tag." ECF 48-
2, at 7. According to the incident report, the driver later "admitted to stealing the North Carolina
registration plate from a similar looking black Infiniti in an unknown apartment complex parking
lot in Frederick." 1d; see also ECF 48-4, at 181.
3
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17. 	Patterson·continued to follow the Infiniti during this conversation with the dispatcher. 	See
ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 2; ECF 48-4, at 62-63, 122. 	While he did so, the Infiniti made a
series of turns that Patterson construed as an attempt to create distance from him. ECF 48-2, at 5;.
ECF 48-3, ~t 2; ECF 48-4, at 122-23. Eventually, the vehicle turned into the parking lot of a gas.
station and stopped at a gas pump. 	ECF 48~2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 2; ECF 48-4, at 62-63, 123.
Patterson positioned his cruiser behind the Infiniti and, at some point, activated his overhead lights.
ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 2; ECF 48-4, at 124, 131-32. He also requested that dispatch send a
backup unit. ECF 48-3, at 2.
Patterson exited his cruiser and told the Infiniti' s occupants to stay inside the vehicle. ECF
48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 2; ECF 48-4, at 127-29. The driver of the vehicle opened his door. ECF
48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 2; ECF 48-4, at 132. •Patterson drew his firearm and ordered the driver to
shut the door and the occupants to stick their hands out of the vehicle's windows. ECF 48-2, at 5;
ECF 48-3, at 3; ECF 48-4, at 130, 136. 	Both occupants complied at first, but then Patterson
observed the Infiniti's red brake lights illuminate and heard the engine revving. ECF 48-2, at 5;
ECF 48-3, at 3; E~F 48-4, at 136-37. The Infiniti then sped out of the parking lot and turned north
onto Buckeystown Pike. ECF 48-2, at 5; ECF 48-3, at 3; ECF 48-4, at 139. Patterson returned to
his cruiser, alerted the Frederick County Emergency Communications Center that the Infiniti had
fled, activated his overhead sir\:n, and gave chase down Buckeystown Pike. 	ECF 48-2, at 5-6;
ECF 48-3, at 3; ECF 48-4, at 139.
Buckeystown Pike, also known as Maryland Route 85, is a busy thoroughfare with several
lanes of traffic in each direction. See ECF 48-4, at 160-61, 212; ECF 48-5, at 1; ECF 48-8, at 11.
Patterson accelerated to around eighty-six miles per hour to chase the Infiniti, which was·' 	. 	.
approximately one intersection ahead. ECF 48-2, at 6; ECF 48-3, at 3; ECF 48-4, at 140. However,
4
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Patterson reduced his speed at times to maneuver through moderate .traffic. 	ECF -48-2, at 6.
Roughly one minute into the pursuit, the Infiniti hydroplaned on wet pavement, hit a median, and
crossed into oncoming traffic. ECF 48-2, at 6; ECF 48-3, at 3; ECF 48-6, at 17. The Infiniti briefly
traveled onto an adjacent sidewalk and then reentered the roadway and collided with the rear end
of Moore's stationary grey Lexus sedan, which was stopped at a red light. ECF 48-2, at 4, 6; ECF
48-3, at 3-4; ECF 48-6, at 18; see also ECF 48-7 at 1 (photograph of the accident). 	Patterson's
vehicle also hydroplaned and struck another vehicle. 	ECF 48-2, at 6; ECF 48-3, at 4; ECF 48-4,
at 152.
After checking on the person that his car struck and seeing they appeared uninjured,
'Patterson ran across the median of Buckeystown Pike towards the Infiniti. 	ECF 48-2, at 6; see
also ECF 48-3, at 4; ECF 48-4, at 164, 212. 	As he approached the accident, Patterson observed
the passenger of the Infiniti exit the vehicle and flee into a nearby wooded area. ECF 48-2, at 6;
-ECF 48-3, at 4; ECF 48-4, at 214. 	At this point, Patterson's and Moore's account of the facts
diverge.
Moore _stated at her deposition that after her vehicle was struck, she attempted to exit her
-car. ECF 48-6, at 19-20, 42. Moore recalled seeing several officers respond to the scene but stated
that only one officer approached her vehicle. Id at 20-22; ECF 48-12, at 3 (Moore's response to
interrogatories) ("She saw several officers running across the street towards the accident with guns
.drawn as they blocked the_ intersection."). According to Moore, an officer approached the door of
her vehicle with his firearm drawn and stated: "Let me see your hands." ECF 48-6, at 20, 41-42;
ECF 48-12, at 2-3. Moore states that she informed the officer that she was a victim and was in
_pain, and the unnamed officer then instructed her to get back in her car and called for paramedics.
ECF 48-6, at 20; see also ECF 53-4, at 4 (Moore's interview with insurer).
5
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At no point, according to Moore, did the responding officer ever make physical· contact
with her or "put [her] on·the ground." ECF 48-6, at 43. Moore was not able to approximate the
amount of time the interaction lasted for, although she noted that "it seemed like forever." Id. at'
43. 	Nor was she able to remember at her deposition what the officer looked like,. noting that ,
"everything happened so fast," id. at 22, but Moore did recall that he "was white," possibly wearing
a black shirt, and "pointing a gun" at her car door, id. at 22, 41--42. 	However, in an affidavit'
attached to her opposition to Patterson's motion, Moore stated that although at the time of her
deposition she could not clearly remember or identify Patterson, after seeing Patterson at his
deposition on Zoom, she "can definitively say that he was the Frederick County Sheriff Deputy·
who pointed his gun at [her] on 9/22/21, and ordered [her] in [her] vehicle." 	ECF 53-2, at 1
(affidavit of Moore).
Patterson denies Moore's allegations. Patterson stated at his deposition that the Infiniti's.
passenger side was facing him when he arrived on the scene, so he ran around the back of the car
to the driver's side of the vehicle. ECF 48-4, at 164, 213. Patterson asserted that he did not run
around the front of Moore's vehicle but rather was well behind it. Id. at 164-66, 171,204,213.
Patterson further stated that he "never approached" Moore's vehicle and "did not point a firearm
at her," and when asked who told her to "show me your hands," he responded, "I don't know. I
was focused on arresting somebody." Id. at 165-66, 171,213. Patterson noted that another officer,
Sergeant Taylor Angleberger, arrived on the scene after him, although Patterson could not say
when precisely Sergeant Angleberger arrived: Id. at 166-67, 206. Sergeant Angleberger stated at
his deposition that he had joined the pursuit and was "probably about a quarter mile" behind
Patterson. 	ECF 48-8, at 9, 11-12. 	However, Sergeant Angleberger reported that he did not see
the collision that ended the pursuit. Id.
6
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The driver of the Infiniti was _arrested at approximately 6:45 p.m. ECF 48-2, at 6; ECF 48-
3, at 4. 	Patterson stated that when he took the driver of the Infiniti into custody, he observed
Sergeant "Angleberger standing on the driver's side of Ms. Moore's vehicle, but he was kind of
·near the rear of the vehicle." ECF 48-4, at 167, 175. Patterson could not recall whether Sergeant
Angleberger was speaking to Moore at that tinie. Id. 	Patterson stated that he spoke with Moore
"[a]t some point eventually," but Patterson believed it was Sergeant Angleberger who spoke with
-her about her potential injuries and called the ambulance for her. 	Id. at 167-69. 	Sergeant
Angleberger similarly stated at his deposition that he had a verbal exchange with Moore, during
which she told him that "her lower back hurt" and that he "asked her to sit in the vehicle" while
.paramedics were c·alled. 	ECF 48-8, at 17. 6 	Patterson stated that he "was not near Ms. Moore
again" that evening because he "had a subject in custody." ECF 48-4, at 169.
Moore was ultimately transported to Frederick Health Hospital for her injuries; which sli.e
reports included lower back pain, shoulder pain, and a broken wrist. ECF 48-2, at 6; ECF 48-3, at
5; ECF 48-6, at 27, 29-31; 48-12, at 7-8.
B. 	Procedural History
On June 	3, 	2024, 	Moore 	filed 	a 	complaint against Patterson and 	others 	seeking
compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to attorney's fees. See ECF 1. On September 10, •
2024, Moore filed an amended complaint. See ECF 27. The parties completed discovery on April
7, 2025, see ECFs 42 & 44, and Patterson filed the pending motion for summary judgment on May
6, 2025. That motion is ripe for review .
.6 Sergeant Angleberger stated that he "did not use force that evening," draw his firearm, or order
Moore to take any action. ECF 48-8, at 13-17. Moore does not contend that Sergeant Angleberger
is the officer who approached her with a firearm drawn. Bee generally ECF 53.
7
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted
"if the movant shows that there. is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fee\. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is "whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether
it is so one0sided that one party must prevail as a matter oflaw." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
"Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party
has the burden of showing that a genuine factual dispute exists." Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Jireh
House, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d 369,373 (E.D. Va. 2022) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986)). 	"A dispute is genuine if 'a reasonable jury .could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party."' Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308,313'
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Par;kaging Corp. ofAm., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)).
"A fact is material ifit 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law."' Id. (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 	Accordingly, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute·
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment ...." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and.
draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per
. 	.
curiam); Scott v. •Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), and the Court "may not make cred!bility
determinations or weigh the evidence," Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing_
Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007)). 	For this reason, summary
judgment ordinarily is inappropriate when there is conflicting evidence because it is the function
of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including matters of witness credibility. See Black &
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Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431,442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis v. Columbia Colleton
Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644--45 (4th Cir. 2002).
At the same time, the Court must "prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from
_proceeding to trial." 	Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 2003)). "The existence of a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party as well as conclusory allegations or denials,
without more, are insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion.''.. Progressive Am. Ins.
Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir.
2020)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
In opposing summary judgment, Moore alleges that there are three material facts in dispute
that preclude summary judgment: 1) whether or not Deputy Patterson pointed a gun at her; 2)
whether or not Deputy Patterson ever spoke to Moore "at the scene of the accident and gave her
an unlawful order;" and 3) whether or not Deputy Patterson acted reasonably when he pointed his
gun at Moore. ECF 53-1, at 10-11. However, Moore's complaint, and her response to the motion
for summary judgment, styles her Fourth Amendment claim as one alleging "false arrest and false
'imprisonment," not excessive force or the excessive use ofweapons. 7 ECF 27, at 8-9139. Even
7 As Moore observes, see ECF 53-1, at 15, Patters~n's principal memorandum in support of his
motion.for summary judgment characterizes Moore's Fourth Amendment claim as an excessive
force claim, see ECF 48-1, at 17. 	Moore clarifies in her opposition that her claim is not one of
·excessive force, but of unlawful seizure. See ECF 53-1, at 16. In reply, Patterson responds that
Moore's clarification is "puzzling" in light of the fact that the amended complaint alleges that
Moore was "seized by a use of force." ECF 56, at 7. The Court is not as puzzled; an arrest typically
involves the use of some force, or at least a "surrender to the State's show of authority." Albright
v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,271 (1994). In any event, the phrase "excessive force" appears nowhere
in Moore's amended complaint, see ECF 27, and she raises no arguments relying on the excessive
·use of force. Indeed, she explicitly challenges Patterson's reliance on cases that address that issue.
ECF 53, at 3 ("The Defendant's focus on legal standards involving conduct 'that shocks the
conscience' and 'excessive force' has nothing to do with this case. The Defendant is being sued
9
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answering the first two question in Moore's favor, the Court finds that the brief seizure of Moore·
in the aftermath of a high-speed chase was reasonable and thus grants summary.judgment on that.
ground. Moreover, the Court finds that Patterson is entitled to qualified immunity and alternatively
grants summary judgment on that basis.
A. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim (Count 11)8
Moore's second count is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges that Patterson
violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 	ECF 27, at 8: 	Section 1983
pr~vides a plaintiff with an avenue to "vindicat[e] federal rights." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266,271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Section 1983 allows
suits against any "person" acting under color of state law who subjects the plaintiff to "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." 	42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
To state a claim under§ 1983,. a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was
committed by a "person acting under the color of state law." 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); see Davison v. Randall, 912 FJd 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2019); Loftus v. Bobzien, 848 FJd
278, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2017); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med Ctr., Inc., 562 FJd 599, 615 (4th Cir.
2009); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 FJd 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997). Section 1983 also requires a
for unlawfully seizing the Plaintiff, not for merely using excessive force to affect a· lawful
seizure."). Accordingly, the Court will construe Moore's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim _solely
as one alleging that her seizure was unreasonable and not one claiming that the means utilized to
.effectuate that seizure were unreasonable.
8 Patterson begins his arguments by addressing the § 1983 claim (Count II), then shifts to address
Moore's Maryland Declaration of Rights claim (Count I) and her remaining Maryland tort claims
(Counts III, IV, and V). See generally ECF 48. Moore responds in a similarly structured fashion
See generally ECF 53-1. The Court addresses the parties' arguments in the same order.
10
,i
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showing of personal fault based upon a defendant's personal conduct. S~e Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550
F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that for an individual defendant to be held liable under
§ 1983, the plaintiff must affirmatively show that·the official acted personally to deprive the
•plaintiff 	of 	his 	rights). 	In 	other 	words, 	there 	is 	no 	respondeat 	superior 	liability
under § 1983. 	Ashcroft v. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) ("Because vicarious liability is .
inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); see also Wilcox v.
Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017);Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766,782 (4th Cir._
2004); Trulockv. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391,402 (4th Cir, 2001).
1. 	Fourth Amendment
"The first step in any such claim is to pinpoint -the specific right that has been
infringed." 	Sqfar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2017). 	Moore alleges that·Patterson
arrested her "without probable cause or a valid arrest warrant" in violation of the Fourth
·Amendment. ECF 27, at 8-9 iJ 39. Again, despite employing language in her response that might
suggest otherwis_e, Moore is explicit that her Fourth Amendment claim alleges "false arrest and
false imprisonment," not excessive force or the excessive use of weapons. Id.; see also ECF 53-
.1, at 13 ("In this case the rights that were violated were DMoore's 4th Amendment Rights not to
be seized without'probable cause and her analogous rights under Article 26 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights .... She is not seeking redress for an excessive force claim because no
_amount of force is permitted to be used when an officer is unlawfully seizing someone.;'). "[T]he
Fourth Circuit has explained that § 1983 incorporates common law torts, such as false arrest and
false imprisonment, so a~ to create a 'special species of tort liability, founded on rights originating
_in the Constitution."' Osborne v. Giordades, Civ. No. RDB-140 182, 2015 WL 251956, at *5 (D.
Md. Jan. 20, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257,
11
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262 (4th Cir. 2000)); see also Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[F]alse
' 	' 	'
arrest and false imprisonment claims ... are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in'
violation of the Fourth Amendment[.]"). 	"Section 1983 	claims for false 	arrest or false
imprisonment 	are 	thus 	'properly 	analyzed 	as 	unreasonable 	seizures 	under 	the 	Fourth
Amendment."' Id. (quoting McPhearson v. Anderson, 873 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756 (E.D. Va. 2012)). 9•
i. 	Personal Involvement
"In order for an individual to be liable under§ 1983, it must be 'affirmatively shown that
the official charged acted persol).ally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs rights."' Wright v. Collins,.
766 F.2d 841,850 (4th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, claims like Moore's are typically brought against
. 	'
the seizing or assisting officer. 	See Fernandes v. Montgomery Cnty., Civ. No. AW-10-CV-752,
2012 WL 1664086, at *3 (D. Md. May 10, 2012). to Here, however, the question of Patterson's
involvement in Moore's alleged seizure is disputed. 	Patterson argues that Moore has "failed to
9 Moore appears to allege a Fourth Amendment claim premised on both false imprisonment and
false arrest. 	See ECF 27, at 8 ~ 39 ("The acts and omissions of Defendants detailed within this'
Complaint, including, but not limited to, the seizing of the Plaintiff without probable cause and the
false arrest and false imprisonment of P,laintiff, without probable cause or a valid arrest warrant,
deprived Plaintiff of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [.]"). Moore does not explain how the claims
differ, and the parties discuss them under one basic Fourth Amendment analysis. Thus, the Court
will do the. same and treat the claims as a single Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim. See
Nicholson v. Baltimore Police Dep't, Civ. No. DKC-20-3146, 2023 WL 4549741, at *4 (D. Md.-
July 14, 2023).
to Even in the _absence of personal involvement, "the Fourth Circuit recognizes that law
enforcement officers have 'an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of
citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers."' Machie, 2013 WL 3353740, at
*6 (quoting Randall v. Prince George's Cnty., 302 F.3d 188,-203 (4th Cir. 2002)). 	"An officer
may be liable under§ 1983 on a theory of bystander liability ifhe: '(l) knows that a fellow officer
is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the
harm; and (3) chooses not to act."' Id. (quoting Randall, 302 F.3d at 204). However, Moore _has
not brought a failure to intervene claim. See ECF 27. And even if she had, she has not pointed to
any evidence before the Court suggesting that Patterson had knowledge of any other unidentified
officer's alleged seizure or a reasonable opportunity to prevent it.
• 12
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adduce a scintilla of evidence suggesting that Deputy Patterson was the law enforcement officer
·that approached her with his firearm· drawn." ECF 48, at 18. Rather, Patterson argues that Moore
has only "generally asserted that these actions were taken by an unidentified officer" and stated at
her deposition that she was "not even sure that she had any interaction with Deputy Patterson on
'the day of the incident" Id. (citing ECF 48-6, at 25 (noting that in response to the question, "Sitting
here today, do you know whether you had any interaction with Deputy Patterson?" Moore
responded "No")).
Moore, however, argues that the question of "wJ;iether or not Deputy Patte_rson pointed his
gun at Plaintiff Moore and gave her illegal commands that she acquiesced to" represents a genuine
dispute of material fact. ECF 53-1, at 7. Moore primarily relies on a sworn affidavit attached to
.her opposition, in which she affirmatively identifies Patterson as the person who pointed his
firearm at her and ordered her into her vehicle. See ECF 53-2, at I. 	At Moore's deposition, she .
was not able to remember whether the officer that approached her was Patterson. See ECF 48-6,
_at 22, 21-42. 	However, Moore explains that "[a_]fter seeing Deputy Patterson, at his deposition,
which occurred after Moore's deposition,'she.can now place the name and face of the deputy who
pointed his gun at her." ECF 53-1, at 9; see also ECF 53-2, at 1. Patterson responds that the Court
should regard Moore's affidavit as a "sham." See ECF 56, at 2.
The Fourth Circuit has before held that where affidavit and deposition testimony conflicts,_
a "district court [is] left not with a genuine issue cif material fact, but with trying to determ_ine
which of several conflicting versions" of a plaintiffs testimony are true. 	Rohrbaugh v. Wyeth
Lab 'ys, Inc., 916 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990) (alteration added) (citing Barwickv. Celotex Corp.,
736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir .1984)). 	"If a party who has·been examined at length on deposition could
raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this
13
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would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham
issues of fact." Barwick, 736 F.2d at 960 (quoting Perma Rsch. & Dev. Co. v. Singer, 410 F.2d
572,578 (2d Cir. 1969)). Thus, "[a] genuine issue of material fact is not created where the only
issue of fact is to determine which of the two conflicting versions of the plaintiff's testimony is
correct." 	Id at 960; see also Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999)
("[A] party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply
by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly
contradicts 	that party's earlier sworn 	deposition) 	without explai_ning 	the 	contradiction or
attempting to resolve the disparity.").
"However, application of the sham affidavit rule at the summary judgment stage 'must be
carefully limited to situations involving flat contradictions of material fact"' in order ·to avoid
'infringing upon the province of the factfinder. Mendez v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 910
F. Supp. 2d 784, 789 (D. Md. 2012) (emphasis added) (quotingMandengue v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc.,
Civ. No. ELH-09-3103, 2012 WL 892621, at *18 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 2012)). 	Specifically, the·
"inconsistency between a party's deposition testimony and subsequent af~davit must be clear and
unambiguous to justify striking the affidavit.'' Mandengue, 2012 WL 892621, at *18 (quoting Van
Asdale v. Int'! Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2009)). A non-moving party is "not·
precluded from elaborating upon, explaining or clarifying prior testimony elicited by opposing
counsel on deposition," and "minor inconsistencies that result from an honest discrepancy, a
mistake, or newly discovered evidence afford no basis for excluding an opposition affidavit." Id. .. 	.
Where, as here, a plaintiff cannot remember a key detail at their deposition but later asserts
that they have a specific recollection of that fact in an affidavit, courts have sometimes refused to
allow the affidavit to defeat summary judgment. See, e.g., Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1080.
14
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(9th Cir. 2012) ("Several of our cases indicate that a district court may find a declaration to be a
.sham when it contains facts that the affiant previously testified he could not remember."); Higgins
v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 364, 368 n.4 (D. Md. 2002) ("In opposition to Defendant's
summary judgment motion, Plaintiff attached an affidavit, dated the same day as the opposition,
:in which he asserts that he now has a specific recollection of working off the clock on [those dates].
Based upon the facts of this case, the Court finds that such a recollection, alone, cannot be used to
defeat the summary judgment motion, especially where it so clearly contradicts the Plaintiffs
deposition testimony."). However, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that "newly-remembered facts,
or new facts, accompanied by a reasonable explanation, should not ordinarily lead to the striking
ofa declaration as a sham." Yeager, 693 F.3d at 1081. 	Courts must be wary of dismissing such
affidavits where "a deponent's memory could credibly have been refreshed by subsequent'events,
including discussions with others or his review of documents, record, or papers." Id.
Patterson argues that Moore's claim that her recollection was refreshed upon seeing
Patterson's face at his deposition is "plainly insufficient, as it is nonsensical that, nearly eight (8)
months after she filed suit against Deputy Patterson and after the parties had exchanged written
discovery, she would not be able to identify whether Deputy Patterson was the law enforcement
officer that pointed his firearm at her." 	ECF 56, at 3. 	Patterson further notes that his "picture
(while he is in uniform) is readily available online," and cites to a Facebook page and news article
each featuring Patterson's photo, see ECF 56, at 4, ~hough Patterson does not suggest that Moore
has seen either photo. Finally, Patterson points out that "[a]lthough Plaintiff was suppos_edly able
'to identify Deputy Patterson during his deposition on February 6, 2025, she did not amend her
prior testimony until nearly four ( 4) months later-_after the close of discovery and after Deputy
Patterson filed his Motion for Summary Judgment." Id.
15 	.
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Moore responds in her surreply 11 that Moore had "only seen Deputy Patterson twice in her.
life, once at the scene of incident and again" at his deposition. ECF 57-1, at 6; see also ECF 53-
2, at 1 ("I have seen Deputy Patterson twice rn my life, first on 9/22/21 when he poin,ted his gun
at me and told me to stay in my vehicle and again on 02/06/25 when Deputy Patterson gave his.
deposition in this case on Zoom."). 	Accordingly, she asserts that it is.reasonable that viewing
Patterson at his deposition, which took place after her deposition, refreshed her memory of his
appearance. See ECF 57-1, at 6. Moore also asserts that she either had not seen or was not able
to discern Patterson's appearance from the pictures available online. See id. at 2.
The Court agrees with Moore that her affidavit should not be disregarded. 	Moore has
sufficiently explained that this is a situation where "a deponent' s memory could credibly have
been refreshed by subsequent events, including discussions with others or [her] review of
documents, record, or papers." 	Yeager, 693 .F.3d at 1081 (alteration added); see also Sky Angel
U.S., LLC v. Discovery Commc'ns, LLC, 28 F. Supp. 3d 465,484 n.6 (D. Md. 2014) (rejecting the
argument that a post-deposition de_claration should be disregarded as a "sham affidavit" where a
party "could not remember the details of the emails at issue here, yet was able to do so in his
recently submitted declaration" because "the deposition occurred over six years after the
correspondence in question was written and [the party] was testifying without the aid of the
disputed emails" so "the discrepancy [was] adequately explained"), ajf'd, 885 F.3d 271 (4th Cir.
11 "Though surreplies are generally not permitted, see Local Rule 105.2(a), the Court in its'
discretion may allow a party to file a surreply." Bolandv. Amazon.com Sales, Inc., 628 F. Supp.
3d 595, 599 (D. Md. 2022). "This discretion is typically used in the interest of fairness to permit
parties to respond to new matters rajsed for the first time in the opposing parties' reply briefs." Id.
In this case, Patterson advances a new argument in his reply memorandum that Moore's affidavit
is a "sham affidavit." See ECF 56, at 2. In the interest of fairness, Moore should be permitted to
respond to that new argument. Accordingly, the Court grants Moore's motion for leave to file a·
surreply, ECF 57.. 	•
16
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2018). 	Moreover, the end of Patterson's deposition transcript is consistent with Moore's
representation that she logged on to the deposition, which was taken on Zoom, for the purposes of
viewing Patterson's face and refreshing her memory with respect to Patterson's appearance. See
ECF 48-4, at 189-90 ("[B]efore we get off, we're going to bring on Ms. Moore, just so she can
visually see Mr. Patterson."). Moore's affidavit reflects her ability to place a name to a face after
seeing Patterson for the first time since the accident. See ECF 53-2, at 1-2. Her statemerits at the
deposition, reflecting a failure of memory prior- to seeing Patterson's face again, are not
inconsistent with that explanation. 	Indeed, to the extent Moore attempted to recall physical
characteristics of the officer·at her deposition, a description she offered-that "[h]e was white"-
is vague but nonetheless consistent with a later identification of Patterson. 	ECF 48-6, at 41. 	In
light of Moore's explanation, the Court concludes that there is no inconsistency so "clear and
'unambiguous to justify striking the affidavit." See Mandengue, 2012 WL 892621, at *18.
Patterson '.s countervailing arguments are unpersuasive. 	Patterson does not suggest that
Moore had the opportunity to view his face at length prior to his deposition, but rather asserts that
•pictures of him were publicly available for review. See ECF 56, at 4. However, the Court observes
that the two pictures of Patterson he identifies as accessible online are not clear images of
Patterson's face. Patterson is masked in the Facebook photo, and thus a significant portion of his
-face is obscured. See Image posted by Federick County Sheriffs Office, MD, Facebook (Jan. 21,
2021), https://perma.cc/S83X-2U9P. 	Likewise, the image in The Frederick News-Post displays
Patterson relatively far from the camera, with his head down and wearing sunglasses. See Mary
.Grace Keller, People with disabilities practice trqffic stops with Frederick deputies, nonprofit,
Frederick News-Post (Apr. 22, 2022), https://perma.cc/5D5M-LF4C.
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In addition to her affidavit, Moore also asserts that the record contains "circumstantial·
evidence" that it was Patterson who seized her. See ECF 53-1, at 21-22. First, Moore points to
the statement she gave to her insurance company, made two days after the accident, in which
Moore stated that at least one deputy ran up to her, pointed his gun, and told her to show her hands·
before ordering her back into her car. 	Id. at 21 (citing ECF 53-4, at 4). 	Second, she notes that
Sergeant Angleberger represents that he and Patterson were the first two deputies on the scene of
the accident, and Sergeant Angleberger stated that he did not pull his gun and would have filed a.
use of force report ifhe had. Id. (citing ECF 48-4, at 13). But Patterson, Moore observes, did file
a use of force report. Id. (citing ECF 48-11, at 1-2). Moore thus conten_ds that when you combine
. her testimony, along with testimony that only two deputies were on the scene initially and Sergeant.
Angleberger did not use his weapon, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that P·atterson was the
officer who allegedly seized her. See id. at 21.
While the Court has an obli¥ation to view all facts and reasonable inferences taken
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "[t]he nonmoving party 'cannot
create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference
upon another."' 	Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526 F.3d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beale v.
Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)). 	"Rather, a nonmoving party mu~t produce some
evidence (more than a 'scintilla') 'upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for
the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed."' Id. (quoting Anderson v, 477
U.S. at 251 ).
The Court notes that Machie v. Manger, which Patterson invokes in support of his position,
admittedly bears some resemblance to the circumstances presented here. 	See Civ. No. A W-09-
2196, 2013 WL 3353740, (D. Md. July 2, 2013), aff'd sub nom. Machie v. Demme, 564 F. App'x
18
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17 (4th Cir. 2014). There, the plaintiff brought a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against
defendant police officers arising out of his arrest outside of his apartment. Id at * 1. The plaintiff
asserted that one of the officers was personally involved in his arrest and relied on the fact that the
officer was listed as an arresting officer on a report, filled out the statement of probable cause; and
consulted with another officer about the plaintiff prior to the arrest. See id. at *5. However, there
·was "no testimony or evidence in the record· suggesting that [the officer] made the ultimate
decision to arrest [the plaintiff!." Id 	Further, the officer provided uncontradicted testimony "that
he did not know that [the plaintiff! was going to be arrested until he saw [the plaintiff! in
·handcuffs." 	Id. 	The Machie Court thus concluded that there was no evidence to support the
conclusion that the officer "had any personal involvement in [the plaintiffJ's encounter with police
outside of his apartment" other than based on his "status as 'lead investigator,' ... not on the
.actions he took in that capacity." Id. at *6.
Here, unlike in Machie, Plaintiff asserts, under penalty of perjury, that upon seeing
Patterson's face. at his deposition, she is convinced that he was the officer that came towards her
.with his gun drawn and ordered her back into her vehicle. ECF 53-2, at 2. Moore'nmequivocal. 	r
assertion is enough to generate a genuine dispute of material fact as to Patterson's personal
involvement in Moore's alleged seizure. See Swinkv. S. Health Partners Inc., No. 21-2183, 2025
WL 3237254, at *24 n.14 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025) (Richardson, J., concurring in part) ("The
deposition testimony alone is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact."); Merch. v.
Fairfax Cnty., Va., 778 F .. Supp. 2d 636 (E.D. Va. 2011) ("[T]he Fifth Circuit has sensibly noted
that circumstantial evidence can provide a genuine basis for a factual dispute even where only one
witness offers direct testimony concerning the event .... "), aff'd sub nom. Merch. v. Bauer, 677
F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2012); Mack v. Detyens Shipyards, Inc., Civ. No. 2:16-1323-RMG, 2017 WL
19
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5952692, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2017) ("Rather, it is her sworn testimony regarding facts of which
. she has direct, personal knowledge .... If other witnesses dispute her account of the event, that is
an issue of credibility issue for a jury to decide."). 	Acc9rdingly, summary judgment is not
warranted in favor o( Patterson on this ground alone.
ii. 	Seizure
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.·. 	.
"Because arrests are 'seizures' of 'persons,' they must be reasonable under the circumstances."
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 585 (2018). Even assuming Patterson was the officer
involved, Patterson argues that Moore's Fourth Amendment claim must fail because "Patterson·
did not intend to seize her." 	See ECF 48-1, at 20-21. 	Moore responds that Patterson's intent-
focused argument is misplac~d, and that "[n]o reasonable citizen would think they were free to
leave the scene of that accident with a sheriffs deputy pointing a gun at them and telling them to·
get back in their car." ECF 53-1, at 18-19. Moore has the better argument.
"A 'seizure,' the Supreme Court recently affirmed, occurs when officers employ 'physical
force or a show of authority that in some way restrain[s] the liberty of the person."' United States.
v. Cloud, 994 F.3d 233, 241--42 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Torres
v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306,311 (2021) (alteration in Torres)). 	The key question, then, is whether
the officer "made a sufficient 'show of authority' to effectuate such a seizure." Id. at 242. ''.[A].
show of authority occurs if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that a reasonable person,. 	. 	.
measured objectively from an innocent citizen's perspective, 'would have believed that he was not
free to .leave."' 	Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality
opinion)). 	However, "[t]hat officers employed a show of authority does not alone implicate the
20
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Fourth Amendment"-"[f]or a seizure to occur, the defendant must actually submit to that show
of authority." Id. (citing United States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991,995 (4th Cir. 2015)).
The Fourth Circuit has "enumerated six broad, non-exclusive categories of facts that may
be relevant" in evaluating whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave: "(1) how
many officers were present; (2) whether officers were in uniform and/or displayed firearms; (3)
_whether any officer touched the defendant or made any attempt to block or restrain his movement;
(4) if the officer's questioning was 'conversational rather than intimidating'; (5) whether the
officer informed the defendant that he suspected him of illegal activity, or treated the encounter as
'routine'; and (6) if the officer asked for identification, how quickly the officer returned it to the
defendant.'' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320,
322-23 (4th Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302,310 (4th Cir. 2002) ("In.
, applying the totality of the circumstances test, courts look to numerous factors including ... the
potential display of a weapon by an officer[.]" ( emphasis added)).
As an initial matter, the Court addresses Patterson's argument that "Patterson did not intend
to seize her." ECF 48-1, at 20. 	It is true that "[v]iolation of the Fourth Amendment requires an
intentional acquisition of physical control." Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).
However, that does not mean that the officer must have specifically intended to seize Moore. See
id. ("A seizure occurs even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention or
taking."). Rather, "the detention or taking itself must be willful," rather than the product of "an
unknowing act." 	Id. 	"Thus, if a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake and pins a
passerby against a wall, it is likely that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth
'Amendment." Id. 	"It is clear, in other words, that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur
whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement
21
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(the 	innocent 	passerby), 	nor 	even· whenever 	there 	is 	a 	governmentally 	caused 	and
governmentally desired_termination of an individual's freedom of movement (the fleeing felon),
but only when there is a goverrimental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied." Id. at 596-97 (emphasis in original). 	The means through which Moore
asserts the seizure occurred-i.e., the pointing of the firearm and the alleged yelling of commands
directly at her, ECF 48-6, at_20-21-were certainly "intentionally applied" to the intended object
of application, who, Moore contends, was her . .See Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. Accordingly, viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to Moore, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Patterson
"made a sufficient 'show of authority' to effectuate" the seizure of Moore. See Cloud, 994 F.3d
at 242.
Moore asserted at her. deposition that more than five officers were present on the scene,
although she consistently asserts that only one approached her vehicle and ordered her into the car.
See ECF 48-6, at 22; see also ECF 53-4, at 4. 12 	Moreover, Moore's deposition reflects an
interaction that could be construed as "intim_idating," rather than a "conversational" and routine
encounter, Cloud, 994 F.3d at 242-specifically, Moore asserts that the officer, whom she has
12 To support the argument that Moore was seized, Moore produces expert testimony from David
Sweeney, a former lieut_enant of the Seattle Police Department. See ECF 53-5. Patterson argues,
however, that Sweeney:s unswom expert report is inadmissible at the summary judgment stage.
See ECF 56, at 5-7. 	"[I]t is well-established at both the circuit level and in this District that
unswom expert reports.are inadmissible on summary judgment." Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince·
George's Cnty., 982 F. Supp. 2d 641, 660 & n.5 (D. Md. 2013) (collecting cases), ajf'd, 605 F.
App'x 159 (4th Cir. 2915). 	Sweeney's report.is unswom, and Sweeney did not sign it under
penalty of perjury. 	See id. (observing that signing under penalty of perjury may substitute for a
sworn declaration pursuant to 28 t.J.S.C. § 1746). 	Accordingly, the Court does not consider
Sweeney's report, ECF 53-5; in considering whether a seizure was effectuated in this case, or for
any other purpose. 	However, Moore also attaches a deposition of Sweeney, which Sweeney·
participated in under oath. Patterson does not argue that the deposition should be excluded, and
the Court sees no reason to exclude it. 	Accordingly, the Court has considered the deposition in
addressing the motion for summary judgment.
,I
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since identified as Patterson, ECF 53-2, at 1, "yelled" at her to get back in the vehicle, and repeated
the phrase, "Let me see your hands," ECF 48-6, at"21. 	Moreover, Moore states that Patterson's
firearm was drawn, id. at 41, a factor weighing in favor of a seizure having occurred. See Weaver,
282 F.3d at 310. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances as presented in this factual record,
the Court thus holds that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Moore did not feel free to
leave during the interaction she alleges, and that she submitted to Patterson's alleged show of force
by remaining in her vehicle for a period oftime.
To be sure, had Moore alleged that she was somehow accidentally seized by Patterson as
he attempted to seize his intended target, the outcome may be different since a Fourth Amendment
•sei=e only occurs "when a governmental actor acts with the intention of seizing the particular
individual 	at issue [and] 	accidental 	or unintend_ed sei=es 	do 	not fall under the Fourth
Amendment." Lopezv. City ofSantaMaria, No. CV13-7287 AJW, 2016 WL 316004, at *3 (C.D.
•Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) (citations omitted). As the Fourth Circuit made clear in Rucker:
A [F]ourth [A]mendment seizure may occur notwithstanding that the person
restrained was mistakenly thought to be another, because he nevertheless is the
. intended object of the specific act ofphys_ical restraint. But it does not mean, as [the
plaintiff in Rucker] contend[ed], that a sei=e occurs just so long as the act of
restraint itself is intended ... though it restrains one not intended to be restrained.
946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991). 	Thus, an innocent bystander who was accidentally shot by
police was not "'seized' within contemplation of the Fourth Amendment" because it was
-"undisputed on the summary judgment record that [the bystander] was not the intended object of
the shooting by which he was injured." Id. at 281. Thus, if Moore contended that she was seized
because of her response to an unholstered firearm in the hands of an officer running by in pursuit
.of a fleeing suspect, the Court might agree that deputies could not be held liable under the
principles outlined in Rucker and Brower. However, Moore states in her affidavit that "Patterson
23
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pointed his gun at her and ordered her to get back in her vehicle." 	ECF 53-1, at 16 (emphasis
added) (citing ECF 53-2, at 1-2). 	Thus, the Court reiterates that summary judgment is not
warranted on the ground that "Deputy Patterson did not intend to s"ize her." ECF 48-1, at 14.
Stated plainly, there is ample evidence in the record for a factfinder to agree that Moore
was intentionally seized when an officer pointed a firearm at her and ordered her to remain in her
car, if even briefly. 	Moreover, there is evidence in the record that could lead a factfinder to•
conclude that the officer who did so was Patterson. Thus, the Court will assume Moore was seized
by Patterson and proceed to analysis of whether that seizure was reasonable.
' 	.
iii. 	Reasonableness
At the outset, the Court again notes that Moore cabins her argument solely to the question
of whether an officer she identifies as Patterson acted unlawfully in ordering her to briefly remain
in her car while he called for paramedics and pursued a fleeing suspect. See supra note 7. "The
Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from making unreasonable seizures, and
seizure of an individual effected without probable cause is unreasonable." Moretti v. Thorsdottir,
157 F.4th 352,360 (4th Cir. 2025) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,
85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684,689 (4th Cir.
2013) ("As a general rule, 'an official seizure of the person must be supported by probable cause,
even if no formal arrest is made."' (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981))).
"The governrnent bears the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless seizure is reasonable." Id
Patterson appears to concede that the alleged seizure of Moore was not supported by probable
cause, arguing instead that probable cause was not required to meet the Fourth Amendment's
general reasonableness standard. 13 See ECF 56, at 7-8.
13 Even if Patterson had not effectively conceded this point, the Court would nevertheless conclude
that the record does not establish that any officer had probable cause to seize Moore. 	"Probable
24
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"In analyzing the reasonableness of a seizure that is not supported by probable cause, courts
are required to evaluate 'the law enforcement interest and the nature of the articulable facts
supporting the detention."' 	Watson, 703 F.3d at 689-90 (internal quotation marks omitted)
"(quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702). 	Such an intrusion "must be 'strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation."' Id at 693 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
The "analysis entails a balancing test because, under the Fourth Amendment, 'reasonableness
·depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitrary interference by law officers."' Id. at 690; see also United States v. Stanfield,
109 F.3d 976,979 (4th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the Court must balance the intrusion on Moore's
-Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of the legitimate governmental interests
implicated here. See id. (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)).
Starting with the governmental interest, the Court observes that law enforcement had a
.significant interest in attempting to control the scene of an accident in the aftermath of a high-
speed pursuit of a suspected stolen vehicle. 	The Fourth Circuit has acknowledged "that 'traffic
stops alone are inherently dangerous for police officers."' Nazario v. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th 2i3,
cause is determined by a 'totality-of-the circumstances' approach." 	Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d
248,253 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,230 (1983)). "While probable
cause requires more than bare suspicion, it requires less than that evidence necessary to convict."
Id. (quoting United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998)). 	"The probable-cause
'inquiry turns on two factors: 'the suspect's conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of
the offense thought to be committed by that conduct."' Id. (quoting Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d
176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016)). 	Here, Patterson would have known nothing about Moore's.conduct
• before he allegedly approached her with his firearni drawn, other than the clear fact that her car
had just been hit by the fleeing suspects' vehicle. 	Moreover, Moore bore no resemblance to the
men that Patterson was chasing. See ECF 53-1, a,t 20; ECF 48-4,'at 177 (in response to the question
·of whether Patterson "identif[ied] a black African American woman as someone [he was] pursing,"
he answered "No"). Thus, there was not enough information for a reasonable or prudent officer
to believe there was probable cause that Moore committed the offense.s at hand (or any offense).
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233 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 2017) (en
bane)). Thus, "[i]t is well established that officers performing a lawful stop are authorized to take
such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety thereafter." Id (alteration
in Nazario) (quoting United States v. Sori_ano_-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007)). When
a "driver suddenly pulls away in the midst of a stop, the risks multiply." Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S.
73, 86 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 	Specifically, the risks multiply for civilians driving
and walking in the public thoroughfares through which the police chase ensues, in addition to the
offi~ers involved in the_ chase. And as the Supreme Court has stated in the context of a case with
a car chase at its center, the "governmental interest in ensuring public safety" is "paramount.''
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,383 (2007); see also Myers v. Town of Elkton, 745 F. Supp. 3d 219,
239 (D. Md. 2024) ("The governmental interests alleged to justify the seizure-protecting .
individuals, including law enforcement officers, from imminent danger of physical harm-is also·
strong." (citing Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222,227 (4th Cir. 2020)).
It is also important to reiterate that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, not individualized suspicion." 	Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4·
(2006). 	"Thus, 	while 	[the 	Supreme 	Court's] 	jurisprudence has 	often recognized that 	'to
accomniodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a
prerequisite to a constitutional search or sei=e,_' [the] Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible.
requirement of such suspicion.'" Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-
61 (1976)). 	For example, the "detention of occupants on the premises during the execution of a
search warrant, even absent individualized suspicion" is "reasonable and necessary in light of the
law enforcement interests in conducting a safe and efficient search." Bailey v. Unite<;/ States, 568
U.S. 186, 191 (2013) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 692). 	With a focus on officer safety, courts
26
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.have extended the rationale cited in Summers to cover a wide variety of scenarios, including
endorsing the seizure of an innocent bystander who was "truly in the wrong place at the wrong
time" while police sought to arrest a fugitive on a warrant lawful despite the fact that' the innocent
_bystander was ordered to "show his hands." 	United States v. Ens/in, 327 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir.
2003); see also Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1191 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding the "need to
ascertain [the plaintiffs'] identity, the need to protect them from stray gunfire, and the need to clear
._the area of approach for the police to be able to operate efficiently all made it reasonable" for
officers to order uninvolved bystanders entering an apartment that was about to be searched to
"'get down,' until the situation was under control';). 	The same rationale should control where
police momentarily detained a bystander to ensure her safety, and theirs.
Here, a seemingly lawful car stop 14 transformed into a chase that put bystanders at
significant risk, as evidenced by the harm suffered ·by Moore when the Infiniti crashed into her
I 	' 	' • 	•
vehicle. 	Although the suspected crime justifying the stop was nonviolent, and though Patterson
14 Moore does not argue that Patterson was not legally j'ustified in initially stopping the Infiniti
after he identified the license plate as stolen. 	See generally ECF 53. 	Moreover, to the extent
Moore seeks to r'aise a Fourth Amendment challenge to Patterson's earlier seizure of the Infiniti's
.occupants, she does not have standing to do so. "To have Fourth Amendment standing, a Plaintiff
must show that 'the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the [Plaintiff's] which
the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect."' Antunes v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
627 F. Supp. 3d 553, 565 (W.D. Va. 2022) (alterations in Antunes) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 140 (1978)), aff'd sub nom. Antunes v. Becerra, No. 22-2190, 2024 WL 511038 (4th
Cir. Feb. 9, 2024). 	"One who asserts a Fourth Amendment violation bears the burden of
demonstrating that his own Fourth Amendment rights, rather than those of someone else, were
·violated." Disner v. United States, 888 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd, No. 12-5328, 2013
WL 1164502 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 2013). "Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be
'vicariously asserted.'" 	Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34). 	Moore has not invoked any
precedent supporting the proposition that she has standing under the Fourth Amendment to
challenge the prior stop of the occupants of the Infiniti. 	See Davis v. Twp. of Hillside, 190 F.3d
167, 169 n.1 (3dCir. 1999) ("Even if the use ofa police car to stop Cook's flight could be found
·to be a Fourth Amendment seizure, the claim would be personal to Cook and could not be asserted
by a bystander such as plaintiff." (internal citations omitted)).
27
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never observed that the suspects in the Infiniti had weapons, the Infiniti' s flight in the midst of
moderate traffic posed a serious risk to the public apd demonstrated that the driver of the Infiniti_
was willing to take dangerous risks to avoid capture by law enforcement. 	Cf Scott, 550 U.S. at
384 ("Although the~e is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is clear from *e
videotape that respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who
might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.").
Moreover, at the time Moore alleges she was ·seized, a passenger had fled the crashed vehicle and
was not yet identified or apprehended by law enforcement. 	See ECF 48-4, at 166; ECF 48-6, at
20-21. Accmdingly, at the time of her seizure, it was critical that bystanders like Moore stayed
safely in their cars while police adclressed any. possible threat posed, at minimum, by the occupants
of the Infiniti.
Further, even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Moore, her alleged seizure
was short in duration. Moore's deposition testimony describes a short exchange of words between
her and Patterson, which ended with Patterson telling Moore to "get back into the car" and calling
the paramedics to assist her. See ECF 48-6, at 19-22. Although Moore was not able to recall the
exact length of time of the interaction, Moore makes no assertion ·that the officer she identifies as
Patterson continued to point a firearm at her after she clarified that she was an injured victim. Id.
at 120.
Of course, Moore's.assertion that a firearm was pointed at her for any length of time means
that she incurred some risk of serious injury or death, as is always the case when a loaded weapon
is p·ointed at one's person. This was no doubt a frightening,jarring event and one that constitutes·
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Nicholson, 2023 WL 4549741, at *5 ("Assuming the
sequence of events. happened_ as previously described-Defendant identified himself as police,
28
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pulled. out his weapon, 	and directed Plaintiff to 	leave-a reasonable person under those
circumstances would not have felt 'free to terminate the encounter' once the gun was pulled out.").
But the Court is mindful of the fact "that 'police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving'" and the Court must
"consider the facts from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and avoid judging the
officer's conduct with the '20/20 vision of hindsight."' Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543,550 (4th
Cir.2002) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,395 (1989)). Thus, at least in the context of
claims of excessive forc·e, "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of a judge's chambers," represents a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S.
at 396. The same is true here where deputies were responding to a fleeing vehicle where the driver
and passenger's "behavior indicated to the officers a good chance that [they] would not cooperate
in the arrest without application of some force and that it was difficult to predict how [they] would
react to their orders." 	Whitebey v. Sarrge, No. 7:11CV00105, 2011 WL 6323134, at *11 (W.D.
Va. Dec. 16, 2011). 	Thus, the. Court concludes that the momentary seizure of Moore as police
dealt with the chaotic aftermath of an accident and at least one fleeing suspect does not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
As this Court recently observed in the related context of the warrantless seizure of property,
"government interests will only overcome the presumptive unreasonableness of the seizure in the
context of summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute as to the existence and degree of [the]
-danger" officers faced. 	Myers, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 239. 	The evidence here paints an undistorted
picture of an objectively chaotic, and potentially dangerous, situation. Moore emphasizes that the
initial 	violation which 	led 	Patterson to 	stop 	the 	Infiniti-the 	stolen tag-was 	"a minor
.misdemeanor" and that the occupants had showed "no aggression to that point." See ECF 53-1, at
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14. While this is a technically true statement, it ignores what happened next; the vehicle fled at a •
high rate of speed, crashed, and an occupant fled the vehicle. Sweeney, Moore's proposed expert,·
also stated in his deposition that Moore was not d~ing anything "that should have caused [officers]
to fear for their safety." ECF 53-6, at 18, 69:4-1.6. 	This is also true, but ignores the fact that it
wasn't just Moore that Patterson (and other officers) had to contend with as the driver of the Infiniti ·
remained in a nearby car, other cars were involved in the accident, and a passenger was fleeing the
Infiniti. 	These exigent circumstances marked the moments following the crash while Patterson
and other deputies attempted to apprehend a fleeing. suspect.
Sweeney also offers that the "stolen tag and a vehicle that fled at high speed" do not create
enough of an exigency "to draw [a] weapon," and although there was a "passenger that _escaped,"
there was "no evidence that the passenger engaged in any criminal activity." 	ECF 53-6, at 23,
89:1-90:3 (deposition of Sweeney); see also id at 90:12-92:4. Putting aside the.fact that the focus
on the use of the weapon misconstrues Moore's claim as one alleging excessive force, not, as she
describes it, assessing whether her temporary seizure was lawful, the Court cannot find fault with
the decision to pursue the fleeing passenger who bailed out of the wrecked Infiniti. 	"Although
flight alone is not enough to justify a police stop, this is not'a case of flight upon noticing police."
United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 2004). 	It is beyond debate that "[d]uring a
traffic stop, police officers may exercise reasonable superintendence over the vehicle, its driver,
and passengers.''. 	Id 	Accordingly, "[f]light from a non-consensual, legitimate traffic stop (in
which the officers are authorized to exert superintendence and control over the occupants of the
car) gives rise to reasonable suspicion." 	Id. 	In fact, courts have found no error in the forceful
detention ofpassengernwho remain at the scene ofa traffic stop. See United States v. Persinger,
'
284 F. App'x 885, 889 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding it reasonable to place the passenger of a vehicle that
• 30
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fled a traffic stop_ face down on the p·avement "following a vehicle chase in which the offending
vehicle collided with several cars before crashing to a stop"); see also United States v. Rice, 483
F.3d I 079, I 084 (I 0th Cir. 2007) (noting that becal!Se "passengers present a risk to officer safety
equal to the risk presented by the driver, an officer may ask for identification from passengers and
'run background checks on them as well" (citing Maryland v. 	Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-14
(1997))). Given that it is uncontested that the passenger here emerged-' and ran-from a vehicle
that tried to elude police, at ahigh rate of speed, and caused a major accident, the Court finds no
·fault with the decision to pursue the passenger.
The Court is also mindful of the fact that though Moore understandably wanted to escape
the situation, leave her car, and "get home to [her] family," ECF 48-6, at 123, she arguably was
-not permitted to do so under Maryland Law. 	Under multiple provisions of the Maryland Code,
individuals involved in traffic accidents are not permitted to leave the scene of the accident. See,
e.g., Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 20-102(a)(l) ("The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident
.that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall stop the vehicle as close as possible
to the scene of the accident[.]"); id. § 20-103(a) ("The driver of each vehicle involved in an
accident that results only in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property immediately
shall stop the vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident, without obstructing traffic
more than necessary."). The Court cannot find it unreasonable to compel Moore to remain at the
scene when she w~ otherwise compelled to do so ooder applicable law.
Patterson also invokes two Fourth Amendment excessive force cases from the Fourth
Circuit that suggest his behavior comported with existing Fourth Alp.endment law. See ECF 48-
1, at 22- 24 (citing Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103 (4th Cir. 2009) and Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d
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415, 418 (4th Cir. 2011)). 15 	A review of the cases Patterson cites only bolsters the Court's
conclusion that the brief detention at issue here was reasonable. In Unus v. Kane,.agents executing
a search warrant seeking financial records entered a residence with firearms drawn, broke down
the door, pointed guns at occupants, and_ handcuffed seemingly uninvolved family members of the
target of the inyestigation. 	565 F.3d 	103, 	110 (4th Cir. 2009). 	Applying the Virginia
Constitution's reasonableness requirement, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "the pointing of
firearms at the plaintiffs, upon entry into the [] residence was reasonable under the circumstances."
Id. at r'18. Specifically, the court pointed out that the occupants had failed to "permit the officers
to enter in accordance with the. Warrant" and once the officers entered, they "immediately
' 	.
encountered two persons unknown to them, one of whom was on a telephone." 	Id. 	In such
circumstances, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that "the officers were reasonably entitled to believe·
that the drawing of weapons was necessary in order to gain control of a fluid situation and ensure
the safety of all involved." Id. at 118.
In Be/latte v. Edwards, officers secured· a warrant to search a suspect' s home after it was·
alleged that the suspect had visited a self-service photo kiosk at Wal-Mart and printed a photo
possibly depicting child pornography. 629 F.3d 415,418 (4th Cir. 2011). The appellate court was
ultimately tasked with addressing both the reasonableness of the decisions to execute a "no-knock,
15 Moore, however, notes that these cases involve excessive force allegations and argues that they
are ill-suited to address her unlawful seizure claim. See ECF 53, at 24-25 ("The excessive force
test has nothing to do with this case ... no amount of force is permitted to be used when the sei=e, .
is unlawful to start with so Bellotte is irrelevant."). Patterson replies that courts frequently assess
the reasonableness of a seizure by relying on principles espoused in excessive force cases. 	See
ECF 56, at 11 (citing Covington v. Plymouth Twp. Police Department, 779 F. Supp. 3d 509, 528
(E.D. Pa. 2025), where the trial court concluded that a jury could find a plaintiffs sei=e to be
unreasonable by relying in part on "cases where courts have assessed the reasonableness of officers
detaining bystanders during the execution of a warrant" even though those cases were "not directly
on point"). 	The Court agrees that the cases provided by Patterson are helpful to the general·
reasonableness inquiry that must be conducted here.
"32
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entry" into the home and, relevant to the case at bar, the decision to enter the "home and [a
.plaintiff's] bedroom in dramatic fashion with guns ... drawn." Id at 425. Though finding fault
with the decision to execute the warrant without knocking and announcing their presence, id. at
421, the Court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their decision to enter
_the home with their weapons drawn, id. at 425. 	Prior to the search, officers had learned that the
target of the search and his spouse had concealed carry permits. 	Id. 	at 423. 	Drawing on Unus,
the Fourth Circuit held that the officers acted in response to a real "risk to their safety" Id. at 425.
Indeed, when one of the occupants "reached for a gun with the intention to shoot," officers
"wrest[led] her to the ground" and "did not "touch[] her with a weapon or threat[ en] to use a
weapon against her." Id Since officers acted reasonably in drawing (and handling) their weapons,
the Fourth Circuit held that they were entitled to qualified immunity. 	The appellate court even
extended this immunity to cover officers' actions toward a "twelve-year-old" occupant of the
home, who awoke to the sight of several officers "standing at the foot of her bed with flashing
lights and guns pointed at her." 	Id at 426. 	"[O]fficers," the Fourth Circuit noted, "had good
reason to fear for their own safety upon entering [the child's] unsecured room" under the
circumstances. 	Id. at 426. 	Moreover, "[t]here [was] no evidence that the officers who entered
[herJ room kept their weapons drawn after they realized who she was." Id.
Unus and Bellotte obviously present facts that are only marginally analogous to what
Moore experienced here. However, each provides an example of binding authority finding no fault
with police officers who draw their firearms and momentarily seize innocent bystanders during
·hectic and quickly evolving situations. 	Given that the chaotic aftermath of the high-speed car
chase and accident here presented a reasonable threat to their safety, officers were justified in
drawing their firearms and ordering those involved, like Moore, to remain in their cars.
33 	.
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iv. 	Qualified Immunity
Even if the Court concluded that Patterson acted objectively unreasonably as a matter of
law under the Fourth Amendment, he would nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claiin. 	Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct doe~ not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable pers~n would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The doctrine protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) .. "[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under
§ 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness' 	. 	.
of their conduct was 'clearly established at the time."' Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62-63 (quoting Reichle
v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). Both prongs m(Jst be answered in the affirmative to defeat
a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Dobbs v. Townsend, 416 F. Supp.
3d 441,451 (D. Md. 2019) (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 (4th Cir. 2007)).
"In the Fourth Circuit, we have a split burden of proof for the qualified-immunity defense.
The plaintiff bears the burden on the first prong, and the officer bears the burden on the second
prong." Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227,233 (4th Cir. 2022). "Ordinarily, the question of qualified'
immunity should be decided at the summary judgment stage." 	Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d
553, 558-59 (4th Cir. 2005). Further, because qualified immunity is in part designed "to protect
public officials from the 'broad-ranging discovery' that can be 'peculiarly disruptive of effective·
government,"' the Supreme Court "has emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be
resolved at the earliest possible stage oflitigation." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6
(1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982)).
34
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Disputed factual issues may preclude such a determination. 	See, e.g., Burno-Whalen v.
Maryland, Civ. No. GJH015-564, 2016 WL 1259556, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2016) ("[D]isputes
of material fact may preclude a finding by the Court about whether qualified immunity applies,
and instead convert the inquiry into a question for·the trier of fact."); Gray v. Torres, Civ. No.
WDQ-08-1380, 2009 WL 2169044, at *2 (D. Md. July 17, 2009) (noting that, in the summary
judgment context, "the qualified immunity question can ... at times require factual determinations
respecting disputed aspects of [a defendant's] conduct" and therefore the summary judgment
doctrine should not be "skewed from its ordinary operation to give substantive favor to the
defense" (citations omitted)); Raub v. Bowen, 960 F. Supp. 2d 602,608 n.8 (E.D. Va. 2013) ("So
long as qualified immunity does not turn on dispu(ed facts, 'whether the officer's actions were
reasonable is a question of pure law."' (emphasis in original) (citing Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d
·524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en bane))). Plus, the Fourth Circuit has unambiguously noted that in the
context of§ 1983 claim premised on a Fourth Amendment challenge, "[w]hen there is no dispute
about the historical facts-the who, what, where and when of what happened-the objective
·reasonableness of officers' conduct is a matter of law to be decided by the court." Armstrong v.
Hutcheson, 80 F.4th 508, 513 (4th Cir. 2023). 	Here, the only apparent disputes of material fact
are settled for purposes of addressing the pending motion since the Court assumes that Patterson
·was the officer involved and that all events unfolded as Moore alleges. 	The issue of qualified
immunity is thus a pure question oflaw appropriate to assess at this stage of litigation.· See Raub,
960 F. Supp. 2d at 608 n.8.
Because the Court has determined that Moore's constitutional rights were not violated,
Patterson's claim of qualified immunity succeeds on the first prong. 	Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62-63.
However, qualified-immunity analysis can move froward in any sequence as the Supreme Court
35
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has held that "[t]hejudges of the district courts and the courts of appeals [may] exercise their sound·
_discretion in deciding which of the two prongs . . . should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand." 	Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).	. 	' 	'
The Court finds it appropriate under the circumstances present here to address both prongs and•
finds that Patterson prevails as to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis as well.
"To determine whether a right is clearly established, [the Court must] assess whether the
law has 'been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate United .States Court.
of Appeals, or the highest court of the state."' Wilson v. Prince George's Cnty., 893 F.3d 213,221
(4th Cir. 2018) (alteration added) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998)). "A
right need not be recognized by a court in a specific factual context before such right may be
considered 'clearly established' for purposes of qualified immunity." 	Id 	(citations omitted).
However, courts are "not to define clearly·established law at a high level of generality," as
"[s]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context." Kise/av. Hughes, 584
U.S. JOO, 104 (201.8) (internal citations omitted). "Defining the right at a high level of generality
'avoids the crucial question whether the offic[er] acted reasonably in the particular circumstances
that he or she faced."' Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 505 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Wesby, 583
U.S. at 63) (alteration in Atkinson). 	"In other words, existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, "although we must avoid ambushing government officials with liability
for good-faith mistakes _made at the unsettled peripheries of the law, we need not-and should
not-assume that government officials are in.capable of drawing logical inferences, reasoning by
analogy, or exercising common sense." Williams v. Strickland, 917 F.3d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 2019).
36
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Here, it is especially important to note that an officer ll)erely "'[p Jointing a gun'
encompasses far too great a variety of behaviors and situations." Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d
·340, 345 (7th Cir. 2009). Focusing on Patterson's actions on September 22, 2021, 16 the Coi:u-t has
not identified a case-in this Circuit or beyond-clearly establishing that Patterson violated the
Fourth Amendment by acting as Moore contends he did. 	_Accepting Moore's facts as true,
'Patterson attempted to control the scene of an accident involving suspects who fled a traffic stop
(and one who was fleeing the· subsequent crash) by ordering others involved in the accident to
remain in their vehicles and show their hands. 	Moore points to no case where actions like
·Patterson's, even assuming he briefly pointed a weapon at Moore, were found to run afoul of the
Fourth Amendment. Neither has the Court identified case law which would allow an officer to
conclude that such b_ehavior violated the law through ''drawing logical inferences, reasoning by
.analogy, or exercising common sense." See Williams, 917 F.3d at 770. To the contrary, a review
of relevant i:aselaw "reinforce[s a] critical point: while police are not entitled to point their guns at
citizens when there is no hint of danger, they are allowed to do so when there is reason to fear
_danger." Baird, 576 F.3d at 345.
Indeed, relevant precedent goes in the other direction as the Fourth Circuit recently held
that a police officer's conduct "did not violate a clearly established constitutional right" where the
16 Moore views the alleged Fourth Amendment violation in the most general of terms by alleging
that qualified immunity is inappropriate because "[t]o be free from unreasonable seizure is a right
as old as the constitution itself." ECF 53-1, at 23. Moore goes on to claim that "[t]here are many
cases in both the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts, dating back hundreds of years, that
·stand for the proposition that you cannot legally seize someone who you do not suspect of
committing a crime:" Id. 	This broad statement is, of course, true, but ignores that the reasonable
standard is a dynamic one and seemingly forgets that the Court is not permitted to define the
specific contours of Fourth Amendment reasonableness at "a high level of generality." Atkinson,
100 F.4th at 505.
37
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officer had drawn his service pistol at an otherwise routine traffic stop and pointed it at the driver
of the vehicle for over a minute. Nazario, 103 F.4th at 223, 232-33. 	If holding an individual at
prolonged gunpoint in circumstances which involved significantly less exigency than those here
does not violate clearly established law, 17 then the Court cannot find that Patterson did so. 	Had
Moore alleged that Patterson pointed the firearm at her for a longer duration, yelled threatening
commands implying that he intended to use the firearm, or had Moore been a child, the Court notes
that the qualified immunity inquiry may be resolved differently. See, e.g., Baird, 576 F.3d at 346
(noting that cases finding the pointing of a firearm at innocent bystanders to be unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment "often involve children because they are much less likely to present the
police with a credible threat"); Nazario, 103 F.4th at 232 (noting the "importance" of the fact thaf
"the pointing of firearms at [the motorist] by the Policemen was unreasonably exacerbated by the
verbal death threats made" by the defendant officer). 	Here, even viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Moore, Patterson was faced with a fluid situation and was permitted to take steps·
reasonably necessary to protect himself and others, including the drawing of a weapon that he
briefly pointed at Moore as she attempted to exit her car. 	Patterson is thus entitled to qualified
immunity and summary judgment on Moore's Fourth Amendment claim.
2. 	Fourteenth Amendment
It is unclear whether Moore's amended complaint alleges a§ 1983 claim pursu~t to the
Fourteenth Amendment for "deprivation ofliberty without due process of the law," or whether she.
17 The Nazario majority did, however, conclude that officers who pointed firearms and shouted
inconsistent commands at a motorist during a traffic stop were not "justified in either threatening
or using deadly force" under the circumstances present there. 	I 03 F.4th at 232. To the extent the
facts present in Nazario can even be analogized to Moore's experience, that decision was handed·
down years after the encounter at issue here and thus the alleged "unlawfulness of their conduct"
was not "'clearly established at the time"' of the encounter with Moore. 	Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62-
63 (quoting Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664) (emphasis added).
38
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invokes the Fourteenth Amendment only insofar as it makes applicable the Fourth Amendment
against the states. See ECF 27-1, at 8139; Marshall v. Town of Bladensburg, Civ. No. DKC 24-
.1549, 2025 WL 822936, at *4 n.3 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 2025) ("The Fourth Amendment is applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 654-56 (1961))). Patterson argues that this claim fails because (1) "Moore's allegations
.sound in the Fourth Amendment" and (2) because "Moore failed to adduce any evidence that the
unidentified law enforcement officer's actions 'shock the conscience."' 	ECF 48-1, at 25-26.
Moore's opposition fails to address these arguments at length and instead primarily focuses on
defending her Fourth Amendment claim. 	In fact, Plaintiff observes that "Defendant's focus ·on
legal standards involving conduct 'that shocks the conscience' ... has nothing to do with this
case." 	ECF 53, at 3 1 9. 	Moore states in her opposition that she will "defer to the court on the
disposition of her 14th Amendment ... claim[] and makes no argument either way about the
sufficiency ofth[at] claim[]." Id. at 112 (alterations added); see.also ECF 53-1, at 36.
"A plaintiffs failure to respond to a summary judgment motion may constitute a waiver or
abandonment of a claim." Bell v. Univ. ofMd. Coll. Park Campus Facilities Mgmt., Civ. No. PX-
17-1655, 2020 WL 978659, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2020) (quoting Estate of Edgerton v. UPI
Holdings, Inc., Civ. No. CCB-09-1825, 2011 WL 6837560, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 28, 2011))
'
(collecting cases). Because Moore has decided not to defend her suit insofar as it seeks to assert a
Fourteenth Amendment violation against Patterson, despite Patterson's arguments related to that
claim in_ his motion for summary judgment, the Court concludes that Moore has waived her
Fourteenth Amendment claims. 	Further, the Court agrees with Patterson that Moore's § 1983
claim primarily sounds ih the Fourth Amendment, as is further evidenced by the content of
Moore's opposition. See ECF 27, at 8-10; ECF 53-_1, at 13-25 ("Iri this case the rights that were
39
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violated were Mrs. Moore's 4th Amendment Rights not to be seized without probable cause and
her analogous rights under Article 26 of the Mary land Declaration of Rights.").
Additionally, even if Moore had brought a Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Supreme
Court has explained that "[w]here a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of
• constitutional protection' against a particular·sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not
the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these
claims."' Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). 	Relevant here, "[t]he Framers considered the
matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it." Id. at
274. 	Thus, Moore's unlawful seizure § 1983 claim is appropriately brought under the Fourth
Amendment.
Even if the Court were to consider a substantive due process claim here, it would fail.
Although "[s]ubstantive due process violations are actionable under§ 1983," Johnson v. Baltimore
Police Dep 't, 452 F. Supp. 3d 283, 300 (D. l\fd. 2020), "only the most egregious official conduct
can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense,' such that a substantive due process violation
lies." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cnfy. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846 (1998)); see also Rucker v. Harford Cnty., 946 F.2d 278,281 (4th Cir.-1991) (explaining that
"the substantive protections of the due process clause" may extend to "unintentionally injured
'bystanders'" where "the state actor's conduct ... amount[s] to a brutal and inhumane abuse of
official power literally shocking to the conscience'' (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). 	"Specifically, the Supreme Court [has] reaffirmed that only official conduct that
'shocks the conscience' will give rise to a substantive due process violation." Id. (quoting Lewis,'
523 U.S. at 846-47). "[C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government
40
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interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.;, Lewis,
523 U.S. at 848 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). Even assuming Patterson
briefly pointed his gun at Moore and ordered her into her vehicle for some brief period of time,
such conduct falls well short of"the conscience-shocking level." See id 18 Patterson is entitled to
summary judgment on Moore's Fourteenth Amendinent claim, to the extent she even maintains
one.
B. 	Maryland Declaration of Rights Claim (Count I)
Moore also brings claims under "Articles -24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights." ECF 27, at 7-8 ,r,r 33, 36. Articles 24 and 26 are the state constitutional counterparts to
the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments, respectively. See Harried v. Maryland, Civ. No. TDC-
24-1190, 2024 WL 4817107, at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 18, 2024) ("The Maryland Supreme Court has
recognized that Article 26 is construed in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment while Article ·
·24 is construed in pari materia with Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, titled "Due Process," "holds '[t]hat no.
man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
·outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property; but
by the judgment ofhis peers, or by the Law of the land."' Graham v. Maryland, 738 F. Supp. 3d
644, 653 (D. Md. 2024) (quoting Md. Const., Deel. of Rts., art. 24). 	"Although the Maryland
·Constitution does not contain an express guarantee of equal protection of the laws, it is well
18 To the extent Moore tries to conn~ct her Fourteenth Amendment claim to the car chase which
ultimately gave rise to her seizure, the Court observes that the pursuit itself also fails to rise to the.
shock-the-conscience 	standard 	of the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment's 	substantive 	due 	process
-component. See Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm 'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir.1991) (holding
that a car chase by a police officer that "continued for a significant period of time over a ten mile •
area" at a "very high rate of speed" and "initiated because of a minor violation" was ''disturbing
and lacking in judgment" but "did not rise to the level of a violation of substantive due process
cognizable under a section 1983 claim"). 	•
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established that Article 24 em~odies the same equal protection concepts found in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." Doe v. Dep 't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 971 A.2d 975,
982 (Md. App. 2009) (quoting Verzi v. 	Bait. 	Cnty., 635 A.2d 967, 969-70 (Md. 	1994)).·
"Therefore, the analysis under Article 24 is, for all intents and purposes, duplicative of the analysis
under the Fourteenth Amendment." Hawkins v. Leggett, 955 F. Supp. 2d 474, 496 (D. Md. 2013),
aff'd sub nom. In re Canarte, 558 F. App'x 327 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, titled "Warrants for search and sei=e,"
provides that "all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any
person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to. search suspected.
places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person
in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted." Harried, 2024 WL 4817107, at *7 (quoting
Md. Const., Deel. of Rts., art. 26). 	Although its wording departs from the Fourth Amendment,
"Article 26 protects the same rights as those protected under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution." Ro~s v. Early, 899 F. Supp. 2d 415,431 (D. Md. 2012), aff'd, 746 F.3d 546
(4th Cir. 2014) (citing Barnes v. Montgomery Cnty., 798 F. Supp. 2d 688, 700 (D. Md. 2011)).
"As such, the disposition of [Moore's] § 1983 claim based on an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation dictates the same result on [her] Article 26 claim." See id.
For the reasons articulated above with respect to Moore's Fourteenth Amendment claim,
Patterson is likewise entitled to summary judgment on Moore's Article 24 claim. Moore similarly
does not defend her Article 24 claim in the face of Patterson's arguments for summary judgment,
thus the Court considers Moore to have waived that claim. See Bell, 2020 WL 978659, at *3 ("A
plaintiffs failure to respond to a summary judgment· motion may constitute a waiver or
abandonment of a claim." (citation omitted)), However, the conclusion as to qualified immunity
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for Patterson on Moore's Fourth Amendment claim is not applicable to his state constitutional
claim.. See Brooks v. McKimmie, Civ. No. DLB-23-0208, 2025 WL 1018882, at *5 (D. Md. Apr.
4, 2025). 	Accordingly, the Court turns to Patterson's arguments regarding immunity under the
Maryland Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") for this constitutional tort and the other state law torts
alleged next.
C. 	Maryland Tort Claims
I. 	Notice Provision of the MTCA •
As a threshold matter, Patterson argues that Moore "failed to comply with the notice
requirement of the Maryland Tort Claims Act." ECF 48-1, at 31. "Under the MTCA, '[a] plaintiff
·may assert a common law or state constitutional tort claim against the State of Maryland or one of
its agencies only ifhe first complies with the notice requirements of the [statute], which provides
a limited waiver of state sovereign immunity."' Canter v; Mamboob, Civ. No. GJH-17-908, 2020
.WL 1331894, at *17 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2020) (quoting Taylor v. Somerset Cnty. Comm'rs, Civ.
No. RDB-16-0338, 2016 WL 3906641, at *5 (D. Md. July 19, 2016)). 	"Under Maryland law,
sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are considered employees of the state." McGrath-Malott v. Maryland,
.Civ. No. RDB-06-879, 2007 WL 609909, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2007); see also Brooks v. St.
Charles Hotel Operating, LLC., Civ. No. DLB-23-0208, 2023 WL 6244612, at *8 (D. Md. Sept.
26, 2023) ("But for law enforcement matters in general . . . sheriffs are considered state
.employees.").
With a few exceptions inapplicable here, a plaintiff may not institute such an action unless
,(1) the plaintiff "submits a written claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 1
year after the injury. to person or property that is the basis of the claim;" (2) "the Treasurer or
designee denies the claim finally; and" (3) "the action is filed within 3 years after the cause of
action arises." Md. Code Ann., State Gov't ("SG") ·§ 12-106(b); see also McDaniel v. Maryland,
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Civ. No. RDB-10-00189, 2010 WL 32600Q7, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. rs, 2010) {citing Gray v.
Maryland, 228 F. Supp. 2d ·628, 640-41 (D. Md. 2002)). This requirement "affords the State the
opportunity to .investigate th~ claims while the facts are fresh and memories vivid, and, where
appropriate, settle them at the earliest possible time." 	Haupt v. State, 667 A.2d 179, 183 (Md.
1995).
However, "this Court has recognized two corollary principles softening strict compliance
with the MTCA's notice provisions." Andrews v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs.,
No. \:23-CV-00172-JMC, 2024 WL 520038, at *9 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2024). "First, 'the Maryland
General Assembl~ amended the MICA in 2015 to permit substantial compliance . . . [which]"
entails a communication that providf,s the 	State requisite and timely notice of facts 	and
circumstances giving rise to the claim."' 	Id. (quoting McDaniel, 201,0 WL 3260007, at *3).
Specifically, the MICA provides that "[i]f a claimant fails to submit a written claim ... , on motion·
by a claimant and for good cause shown, the court may entertain an action under this subtitle unless
the State can affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced by the claimant's failure to
submit the claim." SG § 12-106(c)(l). And it further provides that the notice requirement "does.
not apply if, within 1 year after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim, the
State has 	actual 	or constructive notice 	of: 	(i) the 	claimant's injury; 	or 	(ii) the 	defect 	or
circumstances giving rise to the claimant's injury." SG § 12-106(c)(2). Second, "compliance with	. 	.
the MTCA's notice requirement is not necessary in a suit against individual State personnel in
which it is sufficiently alleged that the defendants acted with malice or gross negligence." Francis
v. Maryland, Civ. No. ELH-21-1365, 2023 WL 2456553, at *28 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2023) (citing
Barbre v. Pope, 935 A.2d 699, 714 (Md. 2007)); see also Andrews, 2024 WL 520038, at *9.
44
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Moore does not dispute Patt.erson's claim that she failed to submit a written claim to the .
State Treasurer or the Treasurer's designee within one year of the incident, which occurred on
September 22, 2021. See ECF 27, at4; ECF 48-i, at 33; ECF 53-J, at 28. However, Moore alleged
·in her first amended complaint that although she "maintains that there is no applicable immunity
for State of Maryland statutory or common law claims ... , [the] Complaint nonetheless complies"
with the MTCA because Moore "submitted notice of[her] claims via United States Postal Service
.certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid to the Frederick County Attorney on
December 14, 2021." ECF 27, at 4113 (alterations added). 	Consequently, Moore as~erted that
the County of Frederick has "good and sufficient actual and/or constructive prior notice of all
_claims." Id.
However, neither party discusses substantial compliance in their briefing on the motion for
summary judgment. 19 See generally ECFs 48 & 53. 	Instead, Moore contends that a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that Patterson's conduct during and prior to the high-spe~d chase·was
grossly negligent, such that she need not have ni.et the notice requirement of the MTCA. See ECF
53-1, at 26. Specifically, Moore asserts that Patterson's conduct prior to the chase involved him
"pulling his gun without cause to do so" and that Patterson's conduct during the police pursuit was
19 Moore's amended complaint niay have been referencing the notice provision of Maryland's
Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"), which provides that an action for unliquidated
damages may not be brought against a local government or its employees unless the notice of the .
-claim is given within one year of the injury. 	CJP § 5-304(a); see also Bibum v. Prince George's
Cnty., 85 F. Supp. 2d 557, 564 (D. Md. 2000). 	The LGTCA at one point required that notice .be
given to either the county solicitor 'or the county attorney, and still does in some cases. See Bibum,.
85 F. Supp. 2d at 564; CJP § 5-304(b). But as discussed, "for law enforcement matters in general.
... sheriffs are considered state employees." Brooks v. St. Charles Hotel Operating, LLC., Civ.
No. DLB-23-0208, 2023 WL 6244612, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2023). 	Regardless, because the
.Court concludes that Patterson is immune to Moore's state law claims irrespective of the notice
requirement of the MTCA, it does not decide whether Moore substantially complied· with the
MTCA pursuant to SG § 12-106(c)(l). See infra Section II.C.2.
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almost identical to the suspect of the Infiniti, who was charged with "reckless endangerment." Id.
Moreover, Moore points to the evidence of Patterson's conduct after the pursuit, which she
describes as "waiving his gun around and pointing it at innocent civilians, thereby putting them in
fear of death." Id.
"For MTCA purposes, malice is 'conduct characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent
to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud."' Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106,
127 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Barbre, 935 A.2d at 714). "To establish malice, a plaintiff must show
that the government official 'intentionally performed an act without legal justification or excuse,
. but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and
willfully injure the plaintiff."' 	Id. (quoting Bord v. Bait. Cnty., l 04: A.3d 948, 964 (Md. App.
2014)). No evidence before the Court suggests that Patterson acted out of"hate" or "to deliberately
and willfully injure" Moore, and Moore does not appear to contend that Patterson acted with
malice. See ECF 53, at 28. Instead, Moore as_serts that "[t]here are more than enough facts present
here, most of which are supplied by the Defendant's own written statements, for a reasonable jury
• to conclude he was grossly negligent." Id.
. "Gross negligence is 'an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard
of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another,'-' something more than simple
negligence, and likely more akin to reckless conduct."' 	Nero, 890 F.3d at 127-28 (internal'
citations omitted) (first quoting Cooper v. Rodriguez, 118 A.3d 829, .845 (Md. 2015); and then
quoting Barbre, 935 A.2d at 717) (emphasis in Barbre). "A government official commits gross
negligence 'only when he or she inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to the rights·
of others that he or she acts as if such rights did not exist."' Id. at 128 (quoting Cooper, 118 A.3d
at 846); see also Henry, 652 F.3d at 536 ("An officer's actions are grossly negligent when they are
46
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,'so heedless and incautious as necessarily to be deemed unlawful and wanton, manifesting such a
gross departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under
the same circumstances so as to furnish evidence of indifference to consequences.'" (quoting State
_v. Albrecht, 649 A.2d 336, 348 (Md. 1994))). 	Thus, Moore must point to specific evidence'that
raises a reasonable inference that Patterson's actions were improperly motivated. 	See id. 	"The
question of gross negligence is typically a question for the jury but can be determined as a matter
of law when the facts clearly show that no reasonable jury could ·find thatthe defendant's actions
amounted to gross negligence." E. W by & through T. W v. Dolgas, 884 F.3d 172, 187 (4th Cir.
2018); see also Henry, 652 F.3d at 536.
The evidence adduced here is inadequate to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
Patterson acted with gross negligence. As an initial matter, the Court declines Moore's invitation
to consider Patterson's conduct prior to and during the pursuit, as both occurred before the
allegations of her seizure. 	Moore does not assert a gross negligence claim against Patterson for
the events leading up to the crash, but rather a simple negligence claim, to which Patterson is
necessarily immune under the MTCA. See Hicks, 2020 WL 7624773, at *9 (holding that an officer
had statutory immunity from an ordinary negligence claim, as opposed to a gross negligence claim,
·under the MTCA). Accordingly, the relevant conduct to assess for purposes of gross negligence
is not Patterson's conduct prior to and during the pursuit, but rather his alleged conduct upon
encountering Moore at the scene of the accident as that is the conduct upon which she ultimately
'bases her remaining Article 26 and false arrest and imprisonment state tort violations· against
Patterson. See ECF 27, at 9-8, 10-11.
A reasonable factfinder could not conclude on this record that Patterson was "so utterly
·indifferent to the rights of [Moore] that he ... act[ed]. as if such rights did not exist.'" See Nero,
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890 F.3d at 128. Moore attempts to characterize Patterson's conduct as "waiving his gun around
and pointing it at innocent civilians, thereby putting them in fear of death." ECF 53al, at 26. In-
light of the exigent circumstances created by the high-speed chase and subsequent crash, see supra
Section III.A. l .iii, Patterson'.s· conduct with respect to Moore was not "so heedless and incautious
as necessarily to be deemed unlawful and wanton." See Henry, 652 F.3d at 536 (citation omitted) ..
At worst, Patterson's display of his firearm in the direction of an injured Moore was careless, but
does not, under preva\ling. law, amount to· gross negligence. 	See Do/gos, 884 F.3d at 188
(concluding that there was insufficient evidence_ in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude_
that an officer acted maliciously or with gross negligence when she handcuffed a ten-year old not
because she was "reasonably in fear for her or anyone else's safety" but instead was bothered by
the child's "lack of remorse or concern for hitting" another child, and "removed the handcuffs
about two minute_s later" in response to the child crying and apologizing); Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d
121,580 (Md. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs' allegations that an officer "drove at high speeds on a
road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not
indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others" even where it was
alleged he "did .not 	'immediately' 	activate his emergency equipment. and violated police
procedures"). Cf Henry,.652 FJd at 536 (holding that a reasonable jury could find that an officer
was grossly negligent in failing to make even a minimal effort to verify that he had drawn his taser
instead of his firearm where ma)dng that check was implied in training, the officer kept both
holstered on the same side of his body, and "there was no particular exigency").
2. 	MTCA Immunity
Even if Moore, has met the MTCA'.s notice requirement, Patterson argues that he is
nonetheless immune to her state constitutional and common law tort claims under the MTCA
. 	48
Ii
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because Moore has not provided evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
he acted with actual malice or gross negligence. ECF 48-1, at 33; see also Lee v. Cline, 863 A.2d
297, 309-10 (Md. 2004) (holding that MTCA immunity encompasses constitutional torts and
intentional torts). 	The MTCA provides that "[s]tate personnel shall have the immunity from
liability described under§ 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article." SG § 12-105.
Section 5-522(b) provides, in relevant part, that state personnel "are immune from suit in courts of
the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public
duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence." Cts. & Jud. Proc.
("CJP") § 5-522(b ). 	The Court addresses the applicability of MTCA immunity to Moore's
negligence claim first, and then to her remaining state law claims.
i. 	Negligence (Count v?
Patterson argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Moore's negligence claim
because under the MTCA, only an action for gross negligence may lie against state personnel.
-ECF 48-1, at 34 (citing SG § •12-105). Furthermore, Patterson asserts that the record demonstrates
as a matter of law that Patterson's actions do not come "close to the high gross negligence
standard." 	ECF 56, at 14. 	Moore responds that the record supports "the claim that Deputy
.Patterson was grossly negligent and as such he does not have governmental immunity to the state
negligence claim." ECF 53, at 3 ,r 11. However, the substance of Moore's opposition on the issue
of her state law tort claims only analyzes the issue of gross negligence in the context of whether
she was required to comply with the notice requirements under the MTCA. See ECF 53-1, at 26-
28. 20 Moore does not further address her claim for "negligence" against Patterson in her
opposition. See generally ECF 53-1.
•
20 In reply, Patterson asserts that Moore "now argues that she is asserting a claim for gross
negligence." 	ECF 56, at 14 (citing ECF.53-1, at 26-28). 	However, Patterson incorrectly reads
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•As discussed, the MTCA provides that "a party can bring a viable tort action against the
State when the tort was conunitted by a State employee acting within the scope of his or her·
employment and without malice of gross negligence." Ford v. Bait. City Sheriff's Off, 814 A.2d
127, 134 (Md. App. 2002). 	"If, however, the State employee has acted with malice or gross
negligence ... , the State is inunune from suit and the injured party may only bring a viable tort·
claim against the State employee." Id. at 120-21 (citations omitted). Thus, under Maryland law,
'
"the tort 'liability of the State and [the tort] liability of individual State personnel are mutually
exclusive. If the State is liable, the individual is inunune; if the individual is liable, the State is·
immune.'" Francis v. Maryland, Civ. No. ELH-21-1365, 2023 WL 2456553, at *23 (D. Md. Mar.
IO, 2023) (quoting Marks v. Dann, DKC-13-0347, 2013 WL 8292331, at *7 (D. Md. July 24,
2013) (alteration in Marks)).
Negligence and gross negligence are two distinct torts under Maryland law that are
"mutually exclusive of one another." Krell v. Braightmeyer, 828 F. App'x 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2020)
(citing Barbre, 935 A.2d at 717). 	Gross negligence "occurs when the defendant[] act[s] 'in.
reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another ... without the
exertion of any effort to avoid them ... or [is] so utterly indifferent to the rights of others that
[they] act[] as if such rights did not exist."' McDaniel v. Arnold, 898 F. Supp. 2d 809, 849 (D.
Md. 2012) (quoting Barbre, 935 A.2d at 717). "Put another way, gross negligence is 'something
more than simple negligence, and likely more akin to reckless con.duct.'" Albero v. Worcester
Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, Civ. No. JKB-24-1100, 2025 WL 462588, at *18 (D. Md. Feb. 11,
2025) (quoting Cooper v. Rodriguez, 118 A.3d 829, 854 (Md. 2015)). "Federal and state courts
Moore's discussion of gross negligence pursuant to the notice requirement of the MTCA as.
advancing the distinct argument that her claim is one of gross negligence.
• 50
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alike have applied the gross-negligence standard" as equivalent to that of a recklessness standard.
'Id. 	As such, gross negligence "implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the
exertion of any effort to avoid them." Est. a/Green v. City ofAnnapolis, 696 F. Supp: 3d 130, 173
(D. Md. 2023) (quoting Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F. Supp. 3d 366, 383 (D. Md. 2018)) (internal
·quotation marks omitted).
Count V of Moore's complaint sounds in simple negligence, rather than gross negligence.
See ECF 27, at 11 ("Count V. Negligence"), 12 ("Patterson acted in a negligent, careless, and
.wanton manner .... "). 	Moreover, although Moore argues in her opposition that Patterson was
grossly negligent, she does· not argue that the Court should construe Count V of her amended
complaint as alleging gross negligence, rather than simple negligence. See generally ECFs 53 &
. 	.
_53-1. 	Where the conduct alleged falls short of malice or gross negligence, a state employee_wiH
be immune from liability where the alleged tortious act or omission was "within the scope of t_he
public duties of the State personnel." Hicks, 2020 WL 7624773, at *9 (quoting CJP § 5-522(b~r
"Maryland 	courts 	treat 	the 	MTCA's 	'within-the-scope-9f-employment 	requirement 	[as]
. 	' 	. 	-
coextensive with the common law concept of 'scope of employment' under the doctrine of
respondeat superior."' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in Hicks) (quoting Nero
v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 126 (4th Cir. 2018)). 	"[C]onduct falls within the scope of employment
when it is 'authorized by the employer' and 'in furtherance of the employer's business."' Nero,
890 F.3d at126 (quoting Larsen v. Chinwuba, 832 A.2d 193,200 (Md. 2003)). "The conduct need
not be 'intended or consciously authorized,' so long as it is 'of the same general nature as that
authorized' or 'incidental to the conduct authorized."'. Id. (quoting Larsen, 832 A.2d at 201).
There can be no doubt that Patterson was "undertaking conduct 'of the same general nature. 	.
as that authorized' by" the Frederick County Sheriffs Office in responding to the accident and
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securing the scene after the pursuit. See Hicks, 2020 WL 7624773, at *9 (quoting Nero, 890 F.3d
at 126). 	Accordingly, as a state employee acting within the scope of his employment, Patterson
has statutory immunity from Moore's simple-negligence claim. See Hicks, 2020 WL 7624773, at
*9 (holding that an officer had statutory immunity from an ordinary negligence claim, as opposed
to a gross negligence claim, under the MTCA); Krell, 828 F. App'x at 160 (upholding a grant of
statutory immunity under the MTCA to poli_ce officers on mere negligence claims). 	Since suit
cannot lie against Patterson for mere negligence, he is entitled to summary judgment on Count V. 21
ii. 	False Arres( and False Imprisonment (Counts III and IV) and
•Article 26 (Count I)
Patterson argues that the MTCA entitles him to immunity from Moore's remaining state
tort claims, including her false arrest and imprisonment claims, because the underlying conduct
for those claims was "conduct committed within the scope of their duties 'without malice or gross
negligence."' 	See ECF 48-1, at 33; Brooks v. McKimmie, Civ. No. DLB-23-0208, 2025 WL
1018882, at *14 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2025). For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that a
reasonable factfinder could not conclude Moore was grossly negligent with respect to the conduct
21 Although iatterson does not raise this issue, the Court also observes that there may be significant
causation issues with Moore's negligence claim. 	Fo~ the claim to survive summary judgment, a·
reasonable factfinder must be able to conclude that any negligence on the part of Patterson was
"both a cause in fact of the injury and a legally cognizable cause." 	Pasternak & Fidis, P. C. v.
Recall Total Info. Mgmt., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 886 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Casey v. Geek Squad
Subsidiary Best Buy Stores, L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 334, 351 (D.Md.2011)). 	"The 'cause in fact'
inquiry 'concerns whether defendant's negligent conduct actually produced an injury.""' 	Casey,
823 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (quoting Young v. United States, 667 F. Supp. 2d 554, 561 (D. Md. 2009)) ..
"Maryland courts consider two tests in determining whether causation'.in-fact exists: the 'but for'
test and the substantial factor test." 	Id. 	"The substantial factor test applies in situations where
more than one independent negligent act may be_ responsible for a plaintiff's injury." Id. (citing
Young, 667 F. Supp. 2d.at 562). "Under the substantial factor test, an action is viewed as the cause
ofan injury only if the action was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about plaintiff's injury.'" Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Young, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 562). 	However, because_
the parties have not addressed the issue of causation, the Court does not consider it further.
52
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underlying Moore's Article 26 unlawful sei=e claim. See supra Section III.C.1. 	Accordingly,
.Patterson is entitled to immunity under the MTCA on that claim, and summary judgment is
warranted in his favor:
Turning to Moore's false arrest and imprisonment claims, Patterson argues that there is a
_more fundamental problem with those claims beyond whether the alleged conduct was grossly
negligent: he asserts that "there is no evidence that Ms. Moore was ever arrest,ed or imprisoned."
ECF 48-1, at 34 (emphasis omitted). Under Maryland law, "the elements offalse·arrest and false
imprisonment are identical: I) the deprivation of the liberty of another; 2) without consent; and 3)
without legal justification." Gray v. Maryland, 228 F. Supp. 2d 628,641 (D. Md. 2002) (citing
Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 58 (Md. 2000)); Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 133 (2000)
•("Although the intentional torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are separate causes of action,
they share the same elements."). 	"False arrest and false imprisonment are evaluated under 'the
principles applicable to the law of arrest."' Id. (quoting Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 664 A.2d •
916, 926(Md. 1995)).
Patterson argues that Moore is entitled to summary judgment as to the claim of"false arrest
and false imprisonment" because "there is no evidence that Ms. Moore was ever arrested or
imprisoned."· ECF 48-f, at 34 (emphasis omitted). 	Patterson's argument raises the question of
whether the Maryland tort of false arrest or imprisonment's first element-"the deprivation of
liberty"-is satisfied where a sei=e of the person occurs, rather than a full-blown arrest or
subsequent incarceration. 	In "the vast majority of false arrest cases, [the] focus is ·on the last
·element," legal justification. 	Rovin v. State, 321 A.3d 201, 222 (Md. 2024).' Consequently,
discussion of the first element is sparse. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Maryland has stated
that"[a]ny deprivation of the liberty of another without his consent, whether by violence, threats,
53 	.
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or otherwise constitutes an impriso1111;1ent." Fleisher v. Ensminger, 118 A. 153, 159 (Md. 1922).
(emphasis added). Although "there must be some direct restraint of the person[,] . . . confinement
injail or prison is not essential." Mason v. Wrightson, 109 A.2d 128, 131 (Md. 1954) (alterations
added). "Any exercise of force, or threat of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived of.
his liberty, compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not wish
to go, is an imprisonment." Id.; see also Roshchin v. State, 100 AJd 499,504 (Md. App. 2014)
("A defendant may be liable for false arrest or false imprisonment if the arrest, or the continued
detention, is made without legal authority."), rev 'don other grounds, 130 AJd 453 (Md. 2016)).
"Generally, the tort of false arrest or imprisonment 'requires some sort of volitional
conduct that continually prevents the plaintiff from moving from· his or her current space."'
Nicholson v. Bait. Police Dep't, Civ. No. DKC 20-3146, 2023 WL 4549741, at *9 (D. Md. July
14, 2023) (first quoting Gray v. Kern, 124 F. Supp. 3d 600, 615 (D. Md. 2015), aff'd in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Gray by Gray v. Kern,.702 F. App'x 132 (4th Cir. 2017); and then citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). 	"Often, in cases challenging police
officer conduct, _this requirement is. easily satisfied by the occurrence of a custodial arrest." 	Id.
(citing Gray, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 615). "In cases, however, not involving an arrest or a d~tentfon,
a hallmark of false imprisonment is a continuing action on the part of the tortfeasor that restrain~
the movement of the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Gray, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 615). Accordingly, in cases
where a seizute of the person occurs but no further action is taken to confine the person, or where
steps are taken to help enable the person's removal from the area, courts have granted summary
judgment in favor of an officer on a state law false imprisonment Claim. See, e.g., Gray, 124 F.
Supp. 3d at 615 (granting summary judgment on false imprisonment claim in favor of an officer
who shot the plaintiff because the officer "took no further action to confine him" to a building and'
54
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instead "took steps to enable his removal from the building" by notifying another officer and
calling 911); see also Nicholson, 2023 WL 4549741, at *9 (collecting cases).
Undisputed evidence reflects that after the initial alleged seizure, neither Patterson nor any
other officer engaged in any further action to confine Moore to her vehicle or to the scene of the
accident generally. 	See ECF 48-6, at 18-25 (describing the interaction with the officer who
approached her vehicle and then noting that a paramedic "assisted [Moore] out of the car"). 	To
the contrary, Moore stated at her deposition that after ordering her back into her vehicle, the. officer
"called for paramedics." ECF 48-6, at 20; see also ECF 48-4, at 179; ECF 48-8, at 17. Regardless,
Moore "makes no argument either way about the sufficiency of' her false arrest and imprisonment
claims. ECF 53, at 3; ECF 53-1, at 26. As discussed above, "[a] plaintiffs failure to respond to a
summary judgment motion may constitute a waiver or abandonment of a claim." Bell, 2020 WL
·978659, at *3 (quoting Estate ofEdgerton, 2011 WL 6837560, at *4) (collecting cases). Because
Moore has decided not to defend the viability of her suit insofar as it seeks to assert a false arrest
and false imprisonment tort against Patterson, the Court concludes that Moore has waived her false
·arrest and false imprisonment claims. 	For all those reasons, summary judgment is awarded to
Patterson on Moore's remaining Article 26 and false arrest and imprisonment claims.
IV. 	TWO UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS
Moore's amended complaint also brings suit against two unnamed defendants, "Unknown
Sheriff Deputy One" and "Unknown Sheriff Deputy Two." See ECF 27, at 1-2. Specifically, the
amended complaint asserts Counts I, II, III, and IV against the unidentified officers. See id at 7-
.11. 	Federal courts have observed that "[t]he idea of an unnam~d defendant is contrary to. the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Myers v. City of Charleston, No. 2:19-CV-00757, 2021 WL
925326, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 10, 2021) (alteration added) (quoting Price v. Marsh, Civ. No.
_2:12--cv-05442, 2013 WL 5409811, at *3 .(S.D. W. Va. Sep. 25, 2013)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
55
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lO(a) ("The title of the complaint shall name all the parties .... "). Accordingly, ''John Doe suits
are permissible only against 'real, but unidentified, defendants."' Chidi Njoku v. Unknown Special
Unit Staff, 217 F.3d 840,at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (table) (per curiam) (quoting Sch!ffv. Kennedy, 691
F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1982)). 	The designation of an unnamed defendant "is appropriate only'
when the identity of the alleged defendant is not known at the time the complaint is filed and the
plaintiff is likely to be able to identify the defendant after further discovery." Id. (first citing Roper
v. Grayson, 81 F.3d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1996); and then citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637;
'
642 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (4th Cir. 1978) (reversing
denial ofleave to amend complaint and noting that pro se plaintiff."should have been granted the
opportunity to disclose the identity of' unnamed defendants).
The Fourth Circuit has thus held that "there is no basis to permit a judgment against an
unidentified John Doe defendant to be su~tained." Id.; see also Myers, 2021 WL 925326, at *10
("[A] John Doe defendant must be identified by the time the issues are adjudicated on their merits,.
as the Fourth Circuit has determined that judgments may not be entered against unnamed
defendants."); Loftus v. Kanawha Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 2:18-CV-01345, 2021 WL 2419449,
C
at *4 (S.D.W: Va. May 19, 2021) (same), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-CV-_
01345, 2021 WL 2418575 (S.D.W. Va. June 14, 2021). "Where a plaintiff 'has had ample time to
identify' a John D.oe defendant but gives 'no indication that he has made any effort to discover the
[defendant's] name,' however, the plaintiff'simply cannot continue to maintain a suit'against' the
John Doe defendant." 	Coward v. Town & Vil!. 	of HarrisolJ, 665 F. Supp. 2d 281, 300-01
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Kearse v. Lincoln Hosp., No. 07-CV-4730, 2009 WL 1706554, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2009)) (collecting cases); see also Cruz v. City of New York, 232 F. Supp. 3d
438, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (collecting cases).
56
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Moore filed her initial complaint in June of 2024, iee ECF 1, and amended it once in
September of that same year, see ECF 27. The parties reported that discovery was completed in
April of 2025. ECF 44, at I. Using due diligence, Moore has had ample time to identify the
unnamed officers during the discovery process and to timely move to fil!lend her complaint to
specifically name those individuals as defendants but has not done so. Cf Blake v. R<:fce, 487 F.
Supp.2d 187, 192 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Though discovery is complete in this case, plairitiffhas
failed to identify any of the unnamed defendants, or to present any evidence demonstrating their
involvement , . . nor does plaintiff indicate that he will be able to identify these unnamed
defendants in the future .... Thus, the 'John Doe' defendants are hereby dismissed without
prejudice."). Accordingly, the Court orders Moore to show cause within fourteen (14) days of the
·issuance of this opinion and implementing order why the suit should not be dismissed as to the
unidentified officers. If Moore chooses not to respoi:id, the claims against the unidentified officers
will be dismissed.
·v. CLAIM AGAINST PEREZ
A return of service was filed on October 29, 2024 reflecting that service of process has
been effected upon Perez. ECF 34. Perez's response to the amended complaint was due on or
-before November 8, 2024, but no response was filed. On December 4, 2024, Moore moved for
the Clerk's entry of default against Perez. ECF 36. On December 5, 2024, the Clerk entered
default as to Perez, ECF 37, and issued the accompanying notice of default, ECF 38. However,
.Moore has not yet filed a motion for default judgment. Accordingly, the Court orders Moore to
file a motion for default judgment as to Perez, or provide a report as to why such a motion would
be inappropriate, within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of this opinion and implementing order.
If Moore does not file the motion or otherwise provide the Court with an update as to the litigation
'against Perez, the claim against Perez will be dismissed.
. 57
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VI. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Moore's m9tion to file a surreply is granted, Patterson's motion
for summary judgment is granted, Moore is ordered to show cause within fourteen (14) days of
the issuance of this _opinion and implementing order why the unidentified officer defendants should
not be dismissed from the action, and Moore is ordered to file a motion for default judgment against
Perez or file a report as to why such a motion would be inappropriate within fourteen (14) days of
the issuance of this opinion and implementing order,
A separate implementing order will issue.
Dated: January 13, 2026 	/s/
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
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