Chavies v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
NICOLE L. CHAVIES,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Civil No.: 1:24-cv-01543-JRR
BALTIMORE CITY BOARD OF SCHOOL
COMMISSIONERS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is pending before the court on the following motions: Defendant Baltimore
Teachers Union’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 42), Defendants
Keith Zimmerman and Kahn, Smith & Collins, P.A., d/b/a KSC Law’s Motion to Dismiss, or in
the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46) (construed as a motion to dismiss),
Defendant Baltimore City Board of School Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss Count III and
Count IV of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 48) (collectively, the “Motions”), and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Return to Administrative Leave with Pay Status (ECF No. 56). The court
has reviewed all papers; no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons
set forth below, by accompanying order, the Motions will be granted and the Motion for Return to
Administrative Leave with Pay Status will be denied as moot.
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I. 	BACKGROUND1
A. Factual Background
Pro se Plaintiff Nicole L. Chavies, a resident of Gwynn Oak, Maryland, is employed as a
School Psychologist by Baltimore City Public Schools at Waverly Elementary/Middle School and
Calvin Rodwell Elementary/Middle School. 	(ECF No. 39 ¶ 1.) 	Plaintiff is a member of the
Baltimore Teacher’s Union (“BTU”), which has a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“BTU
Agreement”) 	with 	the 	Baltimore City 	Board 	of 	School 	Commissioners 	(the 	“Board” or
“BCBSC”).2 Id. ¶ 14. The BTU Agreement sets forth provisions governing employee discipline,
evaluations, and grievance procedures concerning BTU members. Id. ¶ 15.
1. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations Against BCBSC
On January 7, 2022, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave with pay by BCBSC.
(ECF No. 39 ¶ 16.) 	The letter notifying Plaintiff of the decision to place her on administrative
leave provides “that ‘serious allegations’ called into question Plaintiff’s ‘suitability to perform her
duties’ and ‘the nature and severity of [those] allegations necessitate[d] [Plaintiff’s] assignment be
modified pending a Loudermill Hearing.’”3 Id. A Loudermill Hearing was subsequently held on
January 26, 2022, at which Plaintiff was represented by John Casey, a BTU Field Representative.
Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff claims she “immediately raised concerns about the impartiality of Loudermill
Hearing officer Mr. Grant” due to his “bias toward school leadership” and her requests for a fair
hearing were ultimately ignored. Id. ¶ 18.
1 For purposes of resolving the Motions, the court accepts as true all well-pled facts set forth in the Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 39.) Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017).
2 In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff refers to Defendant Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners as the
“School Board”. (ECF No. 39 ¶ 2.) In its Motion and subsequent papers, Defendant refers to itself as “BCBSC.”
(ECF No. 48.)
3 A Loudermill Hearing refers to a hearing to provide public employees the opportunity to be heard in advance of
decisions bearing on termination of employment or severe workplace discipline. 	See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 523 (1985).
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Plaintiff asserts that after the Loudermill Hearing, on March 5, 2022, her pay was
“arbitrarily revoked” and she was placed on administrative leave without pay, and with no clear or
reasonable explanation from BCBSC. 	(ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 18, 19.) 	On the same date, Plaintiff
received a letter including “a Statement of Charges recommending Plaintiff’s termination for
alleged [wilful] neglect of duty, insubordination, and misconduct.” Id. ¶ 20. On March 11, 2022,
Plaintiff submitted a request for an evidentiary hearing before BCBSC pursuant to M D. C ODE
ANN ., EDUC . § 6-202 and Board Policy BLB.4 	Id. ¶ 21. 	Plaintiff has remained on unpaid
administrative leave for over three years without being formally terminated, and although she
initially requested a hearing before BCBSC, she sought a postponement of the hearing due to lack
of proper notice. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff claims that as a result of being denied her salary and benefits,
she has faced significant financial hardship (including having to file for bankruptcy relief) and she
has been unable to secure employment with any other school district. Id. ¶ 23.
2. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations Against BTU
Plaintiff contends that because she is a member of the teacher’s union, Defendant BTU was
her “exclusive bargaining representative” and owed her a duty of a fair representation. (ECF No.
39 ¶ 24.) 	Plaintiff alleges BTU failed to: (1) adequately represent her interests when BCBSC
placed her on administrative leave and subsequently suspended her without pay; (2) ensure
BCBSC followed proper procedures for employee discipline as outlined in the BTU Agreement;
4 M D. CODE A NN., E DUC . § 6-202(a)(2) provides:
(I) Before removing an individual, the county board shall send the individual a
copy of the charges against the individual and give the individual an opportunity
within 10 days to request:
1. A hearing before the county board; or
2. A hearing before an arbitrator in accordance with paragraph (5) of this
subsection.
(II) If an individual’s request does not specify that the hearing be before an
arbitrator, the request shall be considered a request for a hearing before the county
board.
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(3) pursue or adequately process grievances regarding BCBSC’s actions against her; and (4)
provide effective representation to challenge BCBSC’s actions and protect her employment rights.
Id. ¶¶ 25–28.
3. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations Against KSC Law and Keith Zimmerman
Defendant BTU assigned attorneys from Defendant The KSC Law Firm f/k/a Kahn, Smith
& Collins, P.A. (“KSC Law”) to represent Plaintiff in her employment dispute before BCBSC.
(ECF No. 39 ¶ 29.) 	Plaintiff was initially represented by attorney Heather Heilman until on or
about July 11, 2023, when Heilman left KSC Law. 	Id. ¶ 30. 	Thereafter, Defendant Keith
Zimmerman, another attorney at KSC Law, was assigned to represent Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff
alleges Mr. Zimmerman pressured her to resign from her position and represented he would
negotiate a “neutral” professional reference on her behalf should she resign. Id. ¶ 32. According
to Plaintiff, Mr. Zimmerman unilaterally terminated his representation of Plaintiff on or about
September 23, 2023, after Plaintiff requested that he advocate more zealously on her behalf instead
of pressuring her to resign. Id. ¶ 33.
Plaintiff further contends that no just cause was provided by KSC Law or Mr. Zimmerman
for terminating their representation, and neither KSC Law nor BTU provided Plaintiff with
replacement counsel, thereby leaving her without representation while on unpaid administrative
leave. (ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 33–34.) Plaintiff also alleges that Mr. Zimmerman failed to (1) obtain and
provide her with complete documentation from BCBSC regarding the basis for her administrative
leave and (2) challenge BCBSC’s procedural violations and pursue available remedies to restore
Plaintiff to paid status. Id. ¶¶ 35–36.
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B. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 28, 2024, against Defendants BCBSC, BTU, KSC
Law, and Keith Zimmerman. (ECF No. 1.) In response to Plaintiff’s Complaint, KSC Law and
Mr. Zimmerman filed a Motion for More Definite Statement (ECF No. 13), and BCBSC and BTU
each filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 14, 22.) On February 26, 2025, granted the Motion
for More Definite Statement and denied the Motions to Dismiss as moot. (ECF No. 38.) The order
required Plaintiff to file an amended complaint because her Complaint was unclear as to what
Plaintiff alleged as to each Defendant, what causes of action she was pursuing and on what basis,
and failed to abide Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Id.
On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 39), which asserts
the following claims:
Count I: Breach of Duty of Fair Representation (against BTU);
Count II: Legal Malpractice (against KSC Law Firm and Keith Zimmerman);
Count III: Procedural Due Process Violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against individual
BCBSC officials in their individual capacities);
Count IV: Breach of Contract (against BCBSC).
(ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 37–56.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief; back pay from March 5,
2022, to present, plus interest, from BCBSC; compensatory damages for financial losses,
emotional distress, and other alleged harm; punitive damages against KSC Law and Mr.
Zimmerman; reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees; and other relief “as the [c]ourt deems just and
proper.” Id. at p. 6.
On April 8, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Motions. (ECF Nos. 42, 46, 48.) On June
9, 2025, Plaintiff filed an omnibus response to the Motions and the Motion for Return to
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Administrative Leave with Pay Status. 	(ECF Nos. 55, 56.) 	Defendants thereafter filed their
respective replies. (ECF Nos. 57, 59, 61.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d)
Defendants KSC Law and Keith Zimmerman bring their Motion as a motion to dismiss or,
alternatively, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 46.) “A motion with this caption implicates the
court’s discretion under F ED. R. C IV. P. 12(d).” Snyder v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., No. CCB-21-930,
2022 WL 980395, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2022). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides,
“[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56.” FED. R. C IV. P. 12(d). “Pursuant to Rule 12(d), the Court has discretion to determine whether
to accept evidence outside the pleadings, and thus convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56
motion.” Coleman v. Calvert Cnty., No. GJH-15-920, 2016 WL 5335477, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 22,
2016) (citations omitted).
“There are two requirements for a proper Rule 12(d) conversion.” Greater Balt. Ctr. for
Pregnancy Concerns. Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013).
“First, all parties must ‘be given some indication by the court that it is treating the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion as a motion for summary judgment,’ which can be satisfied when a party is aware ‘material
outside the pleadings is before the court.’” Snyder, 2022 WL 980395, at *4 (quoting Gay v. Wall,
761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985)). 	Second, the parties must first “be afforded a reasonable
opportunity for discovery.” Gay, 761 F.2d at 177.
The present case is in its infancy and there has been no discovery. In light of the above,
and where, as here, the court need not consider matters outside the pleading, the court declines to
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convert Defendants KSC Law and Mr. Zimmerman’s Motion, and will therefore treat the Motion
as one to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)5
“Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Barnett v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 3d 515, 518 (D. Md. 2016).
“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Trump, 416 F. Supp. 3d 452, 479 (D. Md.
2019). 	Subject matter jurisdiction challenges may proceed in two ways: a facial challenge or a
factual challenge. Id. A facial challenge asserts “that the allegations pleaded in the complaint are
insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” 	Id. 	A factual challenge asserts “that the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.” Id. (quoting Kerns v. United States, 585
F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)). “In a facial challenge, ‘the facts alleged in the complaint are taken
as true, and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject
matter jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192 (instructing that in a facial challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction the plaintiff enjoys “the same procedural protection as . . . under a Rule
12(b)(6) consideration”)). “[I]n a factual challenge, ‘the district court is entitled to decide disputed
issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction.’”6 Id.
Defendant BCBSC raises a facial challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
asserting that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against it. (ECF No.
48-2 at p. 12.) 	The defense of sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar because “sovereign
5 In addition to Rules 12(d) and 12(b)(1), the Motions invoke review under Rule 12(b)(6); however, because the court
grants the Motion under Rule 12(b)(1) grounds only, the court does not set forth the standard applicable when
reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
6 Because the court addresses BCBSC’s jurisdictional arguments only as to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,
and Defendants do not offer exhibits in support of same, the court need not consider the attached exhibits in addressing
the jurisdictional argument.
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immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims, and a court finding that a party is
entitled to sovereign immunity must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 207 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Given the unique attributes
of sovereign immunity, we have held that the burden of proof falls to an entity seeking immunity
as an arm of the state, even though a plaintiff generally bears the burden to prove subject matter
jurisdiction.” Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC, 929 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Hutto
v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the court is ever mindful that pro se filings “must be construed
liberally, . . . so as to do substantial justice,” and are held to less stringent standards than filings
drafted by lawyers. 	Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Erickson v.
Paradus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); FED. R. C IV. P. 8(f); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
“In practice, this liberal construction allows courts to recognize claims despite various formal
deficiencies, such as incorrect labels or lack of cited legal authority.” Wall v. Rasnick, 42 F.4th
214, 218 (4th Cir. 2022). 	Such liberal construction, however, does not absolve Plaintiff from
pleading a plausible claim, and this court “may not act as an advocate for a self-represented
litigant” by “conjur[ing] up” issues not presented. 	Desgraviers v. PF-Frederick, LLC, 501 F.
Supp. 3d 348, 351 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Bey v. Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP, 997 F. Supp. 2d 310,
314 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d, 584 F. App’x 135 (4th Cir. 2014); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775
F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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A. 	Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim (Count III)
As each of the Motions addresses the different claims asserted by Plaintiff against each
Defendant, the court begins by addressing BCBSC’s argument regarding Plaintiff’s sole federal
claim, the § 1983 claim (Count III), which implicates the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
1. 	Official vs. Individual Capacity
In assessing the viability of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, the court first must address her
contention that this claim is asserted against individual officials of BCBSC in their individual
capacities. (ECF No. 39 at p. 5.)
“[W]hen a plaintiff does not allege capacity specifically, the court must examine the nature
of the plaintiff’s claims, the relief sought, and the course of proceedings to determine whether a
state official is being sued in a personal capacity.” Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir.
1995). 	“[T]he underlying inquiry remains whether the plaintiff’s intention to hold a defendant
personally liable can be ascertained fairly.” Id.
“Personal capacity suits . . . seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer
for actions taken under color of state law.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). “On the merits,
to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under
color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985) (emphasis in original). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has held that factors indicating
that a state official is being sued in an individual capacity include “plaintiff’s failure to allege that
the defendant acted in accordance with a governmental policy or custom . . . [and] plaintiff’s
request for compensatory or punitive damages, since such relief is unavailable in official capacity
suits.” Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Plaintiff alleges that “[i]ndividual officials of [BCBSC], acting under color of state law,
deprived Plaintiff of her property interest without adequate due process” in violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 	(ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 50–51.) 	As noted by BCBSC in its Motion,
Plaintiff fails to identify any individual officials of the Board either in her initial Complaint or
Amended Complaint, and no individual officials have been served with notice of her claims. (ECF
No. 48-2 at pp. 13–14.) 	Plaintiff fails to attribute the actions she complains of to specific
individuals of the Board; nor does she identify any individual Board member (whether by name or
Doe pseudonym) in the caption of her Amended Complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
676 (2009) (holding “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution.”). 	Although the court acknowledges Plaintiff generally seeks
“compensatory damages against all Defendants[,]” she names only Defendants BCBSC, BTU,
KSC Law, and Mr. Zimmerman as Defendants in this action. (ECF No. 39 at p. 6.)
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff adds: “To the extent [BCBSC] as an entity is immune
from suit under § 1983, Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this complaint to name individual
[BCBSC] officials who were personally involved in the deprivation of her constitutional rights.”
Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff has already been afforded the opportunity to amend her complaint and to name
the individual officials. Moreover, the language of the Amended Complaint suggests that Plaintiff
knows the identity of the individuals she claims violated her constitutional rights and chose not to
personally identify them.
Here, Plaintiff’s intention to hold liable individual officials of BCBSC cannot be
ascertained fairly. Accordingly, the court will address Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim as against BCBSC
as an entity only.
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2. 	Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
Defendant BCBSC asserts that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against it is barred by Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 6-1 at pp. 7-9.) Plaintiff fails to address this argument
in her omnibus response to the Motions and thus concedes the point. (ECF No. 55.)7
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “the Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
C ONST. AMEND. XI. 	Under the Eleventh Amendment, states generally enjoy immunity from suit
unless a state waives its immunity, or the immunity is abrogated by Congress. See Bd. of Tres. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2001) (explaining that “[t]he ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh
Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.
We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority.” (citations omitted)); Passaro v. Virginia, 935 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir.
2019) (providing that “state sovereign immunity bars all claims by private citizens against state
governments and their agencies, except where Congress has validly abrogated that immunity or
the state has waived it.”). 	As explained above, a finding that a defendant enjoys sovereign
immunity on a claim presents a jurisdictional bar to the court’s adjudicative power over such claim.
Cunningham v. General Dynamics Info. Tech., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018).
Sovereign immunity also operates to bar suit against state agencies. McCray v. Maryland
Dep’t of Transp., Maryland Transit Admin., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014); see Pennhurst State
7 The court notes that Plaintiff’s omnibus response to the Motions fails to address any of Defendants’ arguments and
instead evaluates each of the exhibits attached to the Motions because Plaintiff contends that “Defendants have made
assertions not validated within the documentation they have provided.” (ECF No. 55 at p. 2.)
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Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101–102 (1984) (“It is clear, of course, that in the
absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the
defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”). 	This court has repeatedly held that
BCBSC is an arm of the state. See N.T. v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, JKB–11–356, 2012 WL
3028371, at *2 (D. Md. July 24, 2012) (stating BCBSC is “a local board of education that, under
Maryland law, is considered a state agency”); Downing v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,
No. CIV.A. RDB-12-1047, 2012 WL 6615017, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2012) (holding that BCBSC
is “an arm of the state . . . entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity”); Shank v. Baltimore City
Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, No. CIV.A. WMN-11-1067, 2014 WL 198343, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 14, 2014)
(holding that BCBSC “is an arm of the state and, as an arm of the state, is entitled to immunity
from suit under § 1981 and § 1983”). BCBSC is thus a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity.
“The Fourth Circuit has identified three exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s
prohibition of suits against a state or an arm of the state.” Doe v. Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore Cnty.,
595 F. Supp. 3d 392, 409 (D. Md. 2022); Anderson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. 24-1339,
2024 WL 4814882, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 18, 2024) (identifying the three Eleventh Amendment
immunity exceptions). The three exceptions include:
First, Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts
pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Bd. of Trustees
of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 [121 S. Ct. 955, 148
L.Ed.2d 866] (2001) . . . . Second, the Eleventh Amendment permits
suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in
violation of federal law. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S.
431, 437 [124 S. Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855] (2004) . . . . Third, a
State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit in a federal court. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
535 U.S. 613, 618 [122 S. Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806] (2002).
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Doe., 595 F. Supp. 3d at 409 (quoting Lee-Thomas v. Prince George’s Cnty. Pub. Sch., 666 F.3d
244, 249 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Notably, “Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity for § 1983 suits[.]” Biggs v. N.
Carolina Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 953 F.3d 236, 241 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 345 (1979)). 	Moreover, Maryland “has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment to suit in federal court.” Pevia v. Hogan, 443 F. Supp. 3d 612, 632 (D. Md. 2020)
(citing M D. C ODE ANN ., S TATE GOV ’T § 12-202(a)); see also Morgan v. Copper State Univ., No.
SAG-20-0427, 2021 WL 5280893, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 12, 2021) (noting “Maryland has not waived
its sovereign immunity as it pertains to federal statutory claims.”).
As to the second exception, “suits for ‘prospective injunctive relief against state officials
acting in violation of federal law’ are permitted” pursuant to the Ex parte Young exception. Eller
v. Prince George’s Cnty. Pub. Sch., 580 F. Supp. 3d 154, 168 (D. Md. 2022) (citing Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). As explained supra, because Plaintiff fails to identify any individual
BCBSC officials acting in violation of federal law, the Ex parte Young exception is inapplicable
here.
Accordingly, the court will dismiss Count III, the § 1983 claim, as against BCBSC for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.8
8 The court need not address BCBSC’s argument concerning the failure to exhaust administrative remedies or merits
of any Title VII claim purportedly asserted by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 48-2 at pp. 15–18.) No such claim is asserted in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 39.) An amended complaint replaces the original complaint filed. “[A]n
amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier,
238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co. (In re Crysen/Montenay
Energy Co.), 226 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2000)) (holding that “if an amended complaint omits claims raised in the
original complaint, the plaintiff has waived those omitted claims.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is
the operative complaint, which does not set forth a Title VII claim.
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B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
Because Plaintiff’s sole federal claim will be dismissed, only Plaintiff’s state law claims
for breach of duty of fair representation, legal malpractice, and breach of contract (Counts I, II,
and IV) against Defendants remain for consideration. BCBSC argues if the court grants its Motion
to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims, the “[c]ourt may but is not required to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction [over] the state law claims.” (ECF No. 48-2 at p. 19.) Again, Plaintiff fails to address
this argument.
“When a district court has jurisdiction over a federal claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it also
has supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims.”9 Kovachevich v. Nat’l Mortg. Ins.
Corp., 140 F.4th 548, 556 (4th Cir. 2025). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that “in any civil action
of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution.” “Section 1367 contemplates that when an amended complaint is filed, the
jurisdictional basis for the suit is reviewed anew. If nothing in the amended complaint now falls
‘within [the federal court’s] original jurisdiction,’ then neither does anything fall within the court’s
‘supplemental jurisdiction.’” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 34 (2025)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
“Where a district court dismisses all federal claims under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . the district court is precluded from exercising supplemental
9 Here, Plaintiff only asserts that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action based on a federal question
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (ECF No. 39 ¶ 6.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts also have
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States[,]” also known as “diversity jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). There can be no diversity jurisdiction in this case. As the court explained supra, Defendant
BCBSC is an arm of the State and is not a citizen of Maryland for purposes of § 1332(a). “[A] State is not a ‘citizen’
for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction.” Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973).
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jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” 	Cangemi v. United States, 13 F.4th 115, 134
(2d Cir. 2021); see Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (explaining that “when a
federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
complaint in its entirety”); Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 680 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding
that “[w]hen a district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over federal claims, it cannot
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367”); Crosby v. City
of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 644 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[h]ad the federal claims in this
matter truly been susceptible to dismissal solely for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the
district court supposed, its discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims would have been problematic”).
Here, because Plaintiff’s sole federal claim is dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the court is precluded from exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the remaining state law claims—Counts I, II,
and IV—will be dismissed without prejudice.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Return to Administrative Leave with Pay Status
On June 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Return to Administrative Leave with Pay
Status. 	(ECF No. 56.) 	Plaintiff claims that the exhibits attached to Defendants’ Motions
improperly characterize her as being “terminated” as opposed to being on administrative leave
with pay. Id. at p. 2. As a result, Plaintiff requests that the court “correct” the classification to
reflect her status as being on administrative leave, a return to “pay status”, and a return of all
retroactive pay from March 2022 to the date of filing of the instant motion, June 9, 2025. 	Id.
Defendants did not file a response.
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Plaintiff’s motion merely seeks relief already requested in her Amended Complaint. (See
ECF No. 39 at p. 6.) 	As the court will dismiss all counts of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, it
lacks the authority to grant the relief requested in the motion. Therefore, the Motion for Return to
Administrative Leave with Pay Status will be denied as moot.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, by separate order, the Motions (ECF Nos. 42, 46, 48) shall
be granted and Plaintiff’s Motion for Return to Administrative Leave with Pay Status (ECF No.
56) shall be denied as moot.
/S/
March 3, 2026 	______________________
Julie R. Rubin
United States District Judge
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